
Class. 
Book. 



(COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



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FRANCE IN THE 
A3IERICAN REVOLUTION 



' FEANCE IN THE 



AMERICAN EEVOLUTION 

BY 

JAMES BRECK PERKINS 




BOSTON AND NEW TOEK 
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

1911 






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COPYRIGHT, I91I, BY MARY E. PERKINS 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 

Published April iqii 



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PREFACE 

This book, the latest fruit of Mr. Perkins's long- 
contiuued devotion to studies in the history of France, 
was practically complete at the time of its author's 
death in March, 1910. In preparing the manuscript 
for the press Mrs. Perkins has been greatly assisted 
by Dr. John Franklin Jameson of the Carnegie Insti- 
tution in Washington, who read the manuscript and 
made valuable suggestions ; by Professor Charles Hal- 
stead Van Tyne of the University of Michigan, who 
has verified all the references and made other impor- 
tant suggestions ; by Mr. George B. Ives of the River- 
side Press, who has made the index ; and by other 
gentlemen connected with that press, who have been 
most helpful in all stages of the publication of the 
work. To all these Mrs. Perkins desires to express 
thankful appreciation. 

She finds great satisfaction in being able to give 
the book to the public substantially as Mr. Perkins 
left it. The work of final revision, which fell to her, 
has been done with that appreciation of the author's 
intention and with that unf^ ' .standing of his habits of 
thought and expression which no other editor could 
have brought to the task. To the wide circle of the 
author's personal and literary acquaintance, the editor 
has done great service with rare success. 

Rush Rhees. 

The University of Rochester. 



CONTENTS 

Introduction ix 

I. France and the New World .... 3 

II. The Treaty of Paris and its Consequences 21 

III. The Diplomacy of Vergennes .... 34 

IV. Silas Deane's Mission 61 

V. Beaumarchais 70 

VI. Events of 1776 119 

VII. Franklin 129 

VIII. The Privateers 152 

IX. La Fayette 164 

X. The Ambition of the Comte de Broglie . 193 

XI. America and the French People . . . 204 

XII. Progress of the Negotiations .... 219 

XIII. France sends a Plenipotentiary . . . 247 

XIV. The French Fleet 256 

XV. La Fayette to the Rescue 280 

XVI. The Arrival of Rochambeau .... 300 

XVn. "The Sinews of War" 325 

XVIII. The French Troops in America . . . 340 

XIX. The Expedition of de Grasse .... 355 



viii CONTENTS 

XX. The Yorktown Expedition 363 

XXI. YORKTOWN AKD DE GrASSE 390 

XXII. Closing Years of the War 402 

XXIII. French Impressions of America .... 418 

XXIV. American Envoys in France .... 439 
XXV. Negotiations for Peace 461 

XXVI. Conclusion 496 

Index 525 



INTRODUCTION 

On Friday the 6th of February, 1778, plenipoten- 
tiaries met in Paris to sign a treaty for which there 
had been no precedent in history, and of which there 
has been no imitation since. Three of them repre- 
sented a government that was independent only in 
its own estimation ; they were called Benjamin Frank- 
lin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, and we're delegates 
of the new-born " United States of North America"; 
the fourth represented the oldest monarchy in Europe, 
and was Conrad Gerard de Rayneval, destined to be 
later the first diplomat ever accredited to America. 

Article II of the treaty provided that " the essen- 
tial and direct end of the present defensive alliance is 
to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty and in- 
dependence absolute and unlimited of the said United 
States." By other articles France pledged herself not 
to lay down her arms until this independence had been 
achieved, and, whatever be the delay, cost, or losses, 
to neither claim nor accept anything for the help thus 
provided. She even specifically consented that the 
harshest of the conditions of the 1763 treaty of peace 
with England be maintained : if conquests were made 
" in the northern part of America," the conquered land 
would be annexed to the United States, and not to 
the country which had settled Canada and possessed 
it until that peace. 

A treaty of commerce had been signed on the same 
day, and in the same spirit, France reserving for 
herself no advantage but subscribing an agreement 



X INTRODUCTION 

to which any nation, England included, would be 
welcome to be a party when it chose. Fiance, wrote 
Franklin, has " taken no advantage of our present dif- 
ficulties to exact terms which we would not willingly 
grant when established in prosperity and power." 
France, grumbled Mr. de Floridablanca, prime minis- 
ter of Spain, when the treaties were read to him, " is 
acting like Don Quixote." 

The treaties signed on the 6th of February, 1778, 
were certainly unprecedented. So much so that, in 
some minds, and for a long time (in that of John 
Adams, for example, to the last), doubts remained. 
Was that really possible ? Were there no secret 
articles? No, there were none. Would France keep 
her word, and, if success was attained, reserve for 
herself nothing on a continent two thirds of which 
had been hers ? She would, and did, keep her word. 
Even Washington had had his doubts and had won- 
dered when, time and again, plans were submitted to 
him for an action in Canada, whether there was not in 
them " more than the disinterested zeal of allies " 
(Nov. 11, 1778). The event proved that such fears 
were groundless. 

Extraordinary events have extraordinary causes. 
This was a unique one ; how did it come about ? 

The answer will be found in the volume to which 
the finishing touches were being put by Mr. James 
Breck Perkins when death removed him from the place 
he so worthily filled among lovers of historical studies, 
and from Congress, where his sense, experience, and 
wisdom as chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs will long be remembered. There are in his 
book no better chapters than those in which he makes 
clear what took place and why. 



INTRODUCTION XI 

Two principal motives explain what happened : a 
chief one which has usually been more or less neglected, 
and a secondary one to which historians usually give 
the foremost place. 

The latter is the obvious one of France's animosity / 
against her old enemy, Great Britain, the winner at 
the Plains of Abraham, the deviser of the harsh con- 
ditions of 1763. But because it is obvious and needs 
neither research nor even thought to be put forth, 
that has often been alleged as the chief, if not the 
unique, motive for what took place. Two distinct in- 
fluences, in fact, acted together to bring about the 
alliance of France with the New Republic : that of 
statesmen and that of the nation. Among certain 
statesmen, as among many officers, the desire for re- 
prisals was a potent factor, and the rebellion of the 
colonies was welcomed, chiefly because they rebelled 
against England. Among the French people at large it 
was quite otherwise : the rebellious colonies were pop- 
ular, not especially because they wanted to throw off 
an English yoke, but because they wanted to throw off 
a yoke. 

It must not be forgotten that the period of the War 
of Independence was not coincident with one of Anglo- 
phobia in France, but on the contrary with one of 
Anglomania. Everything English was admired, and, 
when possible, imitated : manners, literature, philoso- 
phy, sport, parliamentary institutions, and above all, 
writes one of the earliest French supporters of the 
colonists, Segur, " the liberty, at once calm and lofty, 
enjoyed by the entire body of the citizens of Great 
Britain " ; Frenchmen " were crazy about the English 
institutions." It was the period when people would go 
to London in order to " learn how to become thinkers," 



xii INTRODUCTION 

and to learn also how the stiff rules of old should be 
discarded, whether the matter was of the laying out 
of a garden, of the government of empires, or the writ- 
ing of a tragedy. The year of the Proclamation of 
Independence was also the one during which the com- 
plete works of Shakespeare, translated by LeTourneur, 
took Paris by storm, and were published by subscrip- 
*tion, the King and Queen heading the list. " All the 
youth of Paris is for Le Tourneur," wrote indignant 
Voltaire. 

The anti-English sentiment existed indeed only 
within somewhat narrow limits. Even among military 
men that sentiment was not a universal one : examin- 
ing the causes why so many young officers, and he 
himself among them, longed to play a part in the great 
struggle, Segur enumerates the usual motives, such 
as a " desire of glory and of rank," the service due 
to the King and country, and concludes that, above 
all, they were impelled "by a yet more exalted prin- 
J ciple, a sincere enthusiasm for the cause of American 
liberty." Of a desire to humble the old enemy not a 
word: people were rushing "to the field of battle," 
says he further, " in the name of philanthropy." 

Liberty, philanthropy, natural rights, those were 
the magic words that were then stirring not only 
writers and thinkers, but the very masses in France. 
The day of unbending dogmatism and heavy yokes 
had passed ; privileges subsisted, but had scarcely 
any defenders left ; the aspirations were immense for 
a greater equality, more breathing space, simpler lives, 
more accessible knowledge, free discussion of common 
interests. Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire, the ency- 
clopedists, had said their say ; it had sunk deep into 
the nation's mind. Those who could read had read 



INTRODUCTION xiii 

the books, the others had been talked to about them. 
The power of public opinion and of illiterate masses 
had wonderfully increased, more even perhaps than 
. is shown in the present work. Peace had not yet 
been signed at Versailles when Necker published his 
epoch-making " Compte Rendu," enabling the whole 
nation to be judge of its own interests ; peace had 
just been signed when he printed his " Administi'ation 
des Finances de la France," of which, in spite of the 
opposition of his successors in oiBfice, eighty thousand 
copies were sold. The days indeed were not far off 
when the nation would show that it had ideas of its 
own, and would draw the famous Cahiers of 1789, some 
being compiled by mere peasants who offered excuses 
for their rough mountaineers' orthography. 

Add to this that, while old ideas, old rules, the old 
Regime in its entirety, were losing ground, youthful 
enthusiasm and ardor pervaded the nation. Two years 
before American Independence was proclaimed, the 
correspondence of Grimm and Diderot tells us of the 
effect on the French public of " those general and ex- / 
aggerated maxims that fire the enthusiasm of youths 
and would make them run to the world's end, and 
abandon father, mother, brother, to come to the as- 
sistance of an Esquimau or a Hottentot." 

Now the time had come to run to the world's end 
and, like La Fayette, leave wife, child, and the pleas- 
ures of an easy life, for something greater indeed than 
the fate of any Hottentot. What was at stake was in 
fact what the French of the new generation held dear- 
est. All the reports that came concerning Americans 
showed them lovers of liberty, practisers of equality, 
accepting no privileges, tolerant of all creeds, leading 
honorable and simple lives, in their poetic solitudes. 



xiv INTRODUCTION 

Deane, Lee, and Franklin appear in Paris, and seem 
" sages, contemporaries with Plato, or republicans of 
the age of Cato and of Fabius " (S^gur). In the eyes 
of Voltaire the insurgents are animated by the truest 
philosophical principles, they fight for " reason and 
liberty." The constitutions of the principal states are 
translated into French a little later under the super- 
vision of Franklin, and the admiration is unanimous 
for those " charters of liberty." French officers leave 
Versailles, the soldiers leave their villages and their 
garrison towns : what they find on reaching America 
fulfills, in most cases, their anticipation. They prove 
friendly judges ; what they observed is thus described 
by one of them : " Indigence and brutality were no- 
where to be seen ; fertility, comfort and kindness were 
everywhere to be found ; and every individual dis- 
played the modest and tranquil pride of an independ- 
ent man who feels that he has nothing above him 
but the laws." 

No wonder, when all this is considered, that French 
public opinion was wrought up to the highest pitch 
and that it played, as it did, a decisive part in the 
grand drama. The animosity against England still 
harbored by some statesmen and soldiers in this 
period of Anglomania, would never have achieved the 
momentous results that were at stake. The King hesi- 
tated, his ministers (Vergennes excepted) fell into 
periodical doubts ; Necker, who held the purse-strings, 
was a confirmed Anglophile ; official reports on Amer- 
ica were not all as rose-colored as the private letters 
of a La Fayette, a Segur, or a Chastellux. But public 
opinion never wavered. " During the five years that 
the war continued," says Mr. Perkins, " the French 
people remained constant in the cause." " On all sides," 



INTRODUCTION XV 

-wrote that same good jiulge, Segur, " public opinion 
urged a regal government to declare itself in favor of 
republican liberty, and even murmured at the irreso- 
lution and delay. The ministers gradually yielding to 
the torrent were, at the same time, alarmed at the 
prospect of a ruinous war." 

Ruinous it was indeed, costing the French treasury 
seven hundred and seventy-two millions of dollars; ^ 
but public opinion remained faithful to the struggling 
states. The people groaned under the weight of taxa- 
tion, but never grumbled at the expense for such a 
cause. Peace came, France kept her word ; she did 
not try to recover any of her possessions on the Amer- 
ican continent ; she made a pro-American peace, 
not an anti-English one. Public opinion again was 
fully satisfied : what it wanted had been secured ; 
there were no protests against the moderation shown 
towards the adversary ; the joy was universal. Years 
after the war the same pro- American feelings which had 
apparently taken deep root still prevailed, as shown 
by the French National Assembly's adjourning at the 
news of the death of Franklin ; the French army go- 
ing into mourning at the death of Washington, and 
the glowing eulogies of the new republic still sent 
home by its French visitors. Talleyrand came to 
America in 1794, so as to become acquainted, he says, 
with " that great country whose history now begins." 
His impressions are most favorable to a people " that 
shall one day be a great people, the wisest and happiest 
on earth." He observes, it is true, in 1797, that the 
bulk of the trade goes to England, so that " Independ- 
ence, far from having been hurtful, has proved, in 
many respects, helpful to that country." But he ob- 
1 See page 498. 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

serves this with perfect equanimity. "Americans," 
writes General Moreau, in 1806, from Philadelphia, 
" are good people. . . . Their progress in trade and 
navigation is truly wonderful. . . . One enjoys in their 
country the most boundless liberty, and there is no 
abuse. . . . Men who have lived under such a govern- 
ment will never allow themselves to be shackled 
again." 

On all this, the author of the present work has 
much to say that should be remembered, and never, 
perhaps, has the question of how and why what hap- 
pened could take place, been so clearly put before the 
American reader. The existence of an anti-English 
feeling in certain French milieus is not denied and it 
receives no less than its due in the first chapters. But 
the other side of the question is then placed in such 
•full light that few readers will fail to agree with Mr. 
Perkins's conclusion that " public opinion became, at 
Y ( the last, the most potent factor in controlling the de- 
cision of the French government. ... It was the 
popular enthusiasm for American liberty which pene- 
trated the council chamber and influenced the minis- 
ters in their decision, even if they failed to recognize 
such a motive." * 

Those views are the worthier of notice since Mr. 
Perkins never allows himself to be led astray by en- 
thusiasm or sentimentality. No excessive indulgence 
marks his judgments on men or deeds, be they French 
or American. This probity in his views is on a par 
with the austerity of his style, an austerity which, 
far from deadening, enhances, on the contrary, the 
dramatic interest, and the romantic charm, not to say 
the poetry of the events. 

1 Pages 205, 237. 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

Once more, under this trusty guide, the reader fol- 
lows, scene by scene, the progress of the momentous 
drama, with its alternatives of success and defeat, 
fights by land and by sea, lucky or fruitless negotia- 
tions, fleets crossing and recrossing the ocean, cities 
taken and lost, great New York impregnable with 
its fortincations and its eleven thousand English and 
Hessian regulars, the key, as it seemed, of a situation 
that was in reality to be decided under the bastions 
of a small borough along the Chesapeake. Before us 
appear soldiers and sailors of fame : Wayne, Greene, 
Rochambeau, d'Estaing, de Grasse, Paul Jones, La 
Fayette, the grand image of Washington towering 
above all the rest ; but room is found for many others 
great and small, evoked before the reader in the clear 
light of the author's lucid style : circumspect and 
steady Vergennes, who favored the insurgents from 
the first, and remained to the last " consistent and up- 
right," Gerard and La Luzerne, my cool-headed pre- 
decessors, impetuous Beaumarchais, who has his statue 
in Paris for that product of his brain, " Figaro," and 
deserves a memorial in America too for that other pro- 
duct of his brain, " Hortalez and Co." The hard pil- 
grimage is told us of American negotiators sent by an 
optimistic congress " to various European courts, but 
few of them were received," * and they secured, at best, 
promise of friendship for the time when the danger 
should be over. " The affairs of the colonies," wrote 
Frederick II to one of his ministers, " are yet in too 
great a crisis ; so long as their independence is not 
more firmly established, all immediate commerce under 
my flag seems to me too perilous and fraught with 
too great inconveniences for me to run such risks." 

1 See pag-e 221. 



xviii INTRODUCTION 

He thought however that the French would do well 
to run any risks, and, at the time when they had not 
yet taken sides, expressed himself as shocked at their 
"pusillanimity." 

France and the States went their way, which led 
them to Yorktown and to one of the most honorable 
treaties of peace ever concluded : so honorable because 
it was so just and moderate. 

In a sort of postscript Mr. Perkins carries the story 
down almost to our own days, recalling the difference 
of feeling toward America which, for well-known 
causes, existed in France, between the Imperial Gov- 
ernment and the nation, at the time of the War of 
Secession. Once more on the eve of a transformation 
accompanied by terrible woes, the nation manifested 
how eagerly her wishes went to the maintenance of 
the then only great republic ; a popular subscription 
was opened (of two cents per head, so that the poorest 
might take part) for a medal to be struck in commem- 
oration of the life and death of Lincoln, " honest man," 
as the inscription reads, " who abolished slavery, re- 
established the Union, saved the Republic, without 
veiling the statue of Liberty." 

In the midst of the conflicting judgments passed on 
the part played by France in the War of Independ- 
ence, from that of Mr. de Floridablanca, who consid- 
ered us quixotic, to those of Jay or Adams, who could 
never believe that we had no concealed plans, poster- 
ity will probably ratify the conclusions of Mr. Per- 
kins's whole study, well condensed by him in the fol- 
lowing admirable words : " The arguments on which 
statesmen based their action were not justified in 
the future. But the instincts of the French nation 
were right : they assisted a people to gain their free- 



INTRODUCTION xix 

dom, they took part in one of the great crises of mod- 
ern progress, they helped the world on its onward 
march, . . . The reward is not to be found in more 
vessels sailing laden with wares . . . but in the con- 
sciousness of the unselfish performance of good work, 
of assistance rendered to the cause of freedom, and to 
the improvement of man's lot on earth." 

J. J. JUSSERAND. 
Washington, March, 1911. 



FRANCE IN THE 
MIERICAN REVOLUTION 



FRANCE IN THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 

CHAPTER I 

FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 

Whether the American colonies would have suc- 
ceeded in their struggle for independence if they had 
not received aid in men and money from France, is 
an interesting and not a simple question. A study of 
the period impresses one with the difficulties under 
which the colonists suffered, — difficulties which might 
well have proved insurmountable, had the colonists 
been left entirely to their own resources. Naturally we 
assume that what did occur must have occurred, that 
because the English did not succeed in reducing their 
rebellious colonists to subjection, there was no possi- 
bility of their doing so. We can, indeed, be certain 
that with the growth of population in this country, its 
people, sooner or later, would have become independ- 
ent of foreign rule ; but it was entirely possible that 
the struggle begun in 1775 should have ended in dis- 
aster, and the history and development of the United 
States have been different. 

The most important factor working for the colo- 
nists was the extraordinary incapacity manifested by 
their opponents. Less than twenty years earlier, Eng- 
land had conducted a war against France, in which 
ber armies and navies had displayed skill, vigor, and 
heroism to a degree exceeded in few great contests. 



4 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

But the English government had sadly changed from 
the days in which Pitt was minister to those in which 
it was guided by North and controlled by George III. 
The Seven Years' War was one of the most glorious 
epochs in English history, the American Revolution 
was one of the most inglorious. A contest that had 
been precipitated by folly was conducted with stu- 
pidity; in seven years of fighting with their own 
colonists, not one English officer gained a first-class 
reputation ; the movements of the English armies 
were sluggish, their generals were inefficient, golden 
opportunities were lost, great advantages were frit- 
tered away. Gerard, the French minister at Philadel- 
phia, said with much truth : " If the English had 
shown themselves in America as we have seen them 
elsewhere, only too active, confident, and courageous, 
they would have met with little resistance." ^ 

But if George III did not know how to select good 
generals or inspire vigorous action, he was resolute in 
his purpose. If he was not wise he was stubborn, and 
if the colonists did not encounter skillful opponents, 
they had to endure many years of fighting. A long 
contest our ancestors were in many respects unfitted 
to meet, and the reason for this unfitness was in their 
form of government. If the resources of three million 
people, fairly prosperous, intelligent, and courageous, 
could have been properly utilized, it would have been 
impossible for England to reduce them to subjection, 
though Chatham had commanded her councils, Marl- 
borough her armies, and Nelson her fleets. But while 
a body with the limited powers of the Continental Con- 

^ Gerard to Vergennes ; Doniol,iii, 319. Most of the citations from 
the French official correspondence are taken from the collection in 
Doniol's in-valuable work, La Participation de la France hV ijtablisse- 
ment des Etats Unis d^Amirique, cited as " Doniol." 



FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 5 

gress might suffice during a brief season of patriotic 
enthusiasm, enthusiasm will not take the phice of 
an effective government. The chai-acter of the Con- 
gress deteriorated, and the helplessness into which that 
body was plunged rendered a seat in it unattractive 
to able men. Having no power to raise supplies or 
compel the formation of an army, it was at the mercy 
of the several states, and to expect vigoi'ous action 
from thirteen different governments, was to show small 
knowledge of human nature. If the French King had 
not interfered, wrote his minister, "there is every rea- 
son to believe that the employment of the means of 
resistance would not have corresponded to the desire 
to maintain independence." This judgment may have 
been wrong, but as the war pi'ogressed the difficulties 
in raising, fitting, and equipping soldiers grew steadily 
greater, and a strong desire to be independent would 
not have secured independence if there had been no 
armies to fight for it. 

The inherent weakness of the government hardly 
threatened greater danger to the patriot cause than 
the evils resulting from economic mistakes. If the 
blood circulating in the veins is corrupted, there can 
be no health in the body ; when the financial system of 
the country was hopelessly diseased, the existence of 
the Republic was threatened. The issue of an irredeem- 
able currency proved more dangerous to our country's 
liberties than the invasion of Burgoyne or the treason 
of Arnold. The land possessed resources, and there 
were plenty of men patriotic enough to be willing to 
use them; but in the financial confusion that prevailed 
when a continental bill for ten dollars was worth only 
ten cents, when a pair of boots cost one hundred dol- 
lars, and butter and sujrar sold for three dollars a 



6 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

pound, when four months' pay of a private would not 
purchase a bushel of wheat and the pay of a colonel 
would not buy oats enough for his horse, when a wagon- 
load of money, as Washington wrote, would hardly 
purchase a wagon-load of provisions, it is not strange 
that the soldiers of Valley Forge walked barefooted in 
the snow, and the regiments of New Jersey and Penn- 
sylvania deserted the colors under which they were 
starving.* 

A currency that had no value and a government 
that had no head were the gravest perils to the suc- 
cess of the American Revolution. How serious they 
were may be judged from the writings of the most 
sagacious of American patriots, and the one who, from 
his position as commander-in-chief, had the fullest 
knowledge of the dangers of the situation. "Our 
affairs," Washington wrote in 1778, " are in a more 
distressed, ruinous, and deplorable condition than they 
have been since the commencement of the war . . . 
the common interests of America are mouldering and 
sinking into irretrievable ruin if a remedy is not soon 
applied." ^ 

And a few months later, he wrote again : " The 
rapid decay of our currency, the extinction of public 
spirit, the increasing rapacity of the times, the want 
of harmony in our council, the declining zeal of the 
people, the discontents and distresses of the officers 
of the army, and, I may add, the prevailing security 
and insensibility to danger are symptoms, in my eye, 
of a most alarming nature. If the enemy have it in 
their power to press us hard this campaign, I know 
not what may be the consequence. Our army as it 

* Hatch, Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, chap. 7. 
^ Writings of Washington, Sparks's edition, vi, 151. 



FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 7 

now stands is but little more than the skeleton of an 
army." ' 

" I have never yet seen the time," he writes again 
in 1779, " in which our affaii-s, in my opinion, were at 
so low aji ebb as at the present." ^ 

Repeatedly in the long years of weakness and dis- 
tress, Washington declared that unless aid came from 
France, the army would dissolve and resistance cease. 
"Unless a capital change takes place soon," he writes 
in 1781, " it will be impossible for me to maintain 
our posts and keep the army from dispersing." ^ With 
melancholy iteration came the statements of the diffi- 
culties in which the great patriot was involved, with 
a scanty army, that was often on the verge of dissolu- 
tion, usually unpaid and sometimes unfed, with re- 
quests for recruits meeting a feeble response, and 
with a disordered currency, rendering the pay pro- 
mised the men almost worthless, even if the promise 
had been kept. 

Nor can we disregard the fact that a considerable 
portion of the people, a minority probably, but a mi- 
nority prosperous and influential, had little sympathy 
with separation from the mother country, and that 
even among the " patriots " there could be no strong 
feeling for the newly created Republic. Their affec- 
tions were for the states to which they belonged ; there 
was no united country for whose benefits they were 
grateful, to whose memories they clung, and of whose 
glories they were proud. A strong desire to be rid 
of the tyranny of George III was not an impulse so 
powerful as patriotic zeal for a beloved fatherland. 

^ Writings of Washington, Ford's edition, vii, 451, 452. 
2 Writings of Washington, Sparks' s edition, vi, 252 (note). 
8 Ibid., viii, 38, 39. 



8 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

In our admiration for the great men of the Revolu- 
tion, we are apt to overestimate the vigor of resistance 
shown by the people of the thirteen colonies as a 
whole. The history of the period is by no means one 
of united zeal, or of strenuous self-sacrifice for the 
common cause. It was natural that the French should 
complain of allies whom they found less zealous than 
they hoped, but their criticisms cannot be wholly dis- 
regarded. " I am beginning to have a poor opinion of 
their firmness," Vergennes wrote 'of his new allies to 
the French minister at Madrid, ". . . their Republic, 
unless they correct its faults, . . . will never be more 
than a feeble body capable of little activity. ... I must 
own that I have little confidence in the energy of the 
United States." ^ 

The people of the United States have displayed 
energy, both in peace and war, to a degree never ex- 
celled, but they have been formed and developed under 
a more benign government than that the weakness 
of which Washington as well as Vergennes deplored. 
Prosperity not only brings happiness, but it develops 
virtues. The unequalled readiness with which our 
people in a later day responded to calls for the public 
need, while largely due to the influence of a wisely 
framed government, was in part the result of long 
years of increasing wealth and well-being. 

The French minister at Philadelphia was an intel- 
ligent, and not an unfriendly, observer of the people 
among whom he was thrown ; and he owed to his su- 
periors the duty of describing the condition of Ameri- 
can affairs with accuracy. " Personal disinterestedness 
/ and pecuniary probity," he writes, " do not illustrate 
the birth of the American Republic. All the agents 

^ Vergennes to Montmorin, Nov. 27, 1778 ; Doniol, iii, 581. 



FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 9 

have obtained exorbitant gains for their manufactures. 
. . . The spirit of mercantile cupidity forms, perhaps, 
one of the distinctive characteristics of the Americans, 
especially those in the north, and doubtless this will 
influence the future destinies of the Republic." ^ 

Such criticisms might be disregarded as coming from 
foreigners prone to judge harshly the conduct of an- 
other nation. To the unfavorable judgment of Gerard 
we might oppose the fervent praise of La Fayette. If 
the one reflected tl\e ardent confidence of amiable 
youth, the other savored of the suspicious apprehension 
of cynical maturity. But Washington's opinions of the 
situation were little more favorable than those of for- 
eign observers. " Speculation," he wrote, " Peculation, 
Engrossing, forestalling, with all their concomitants, 
afford too many melancholy proofs of the decay of 
public virtue." ^ Similar charges could be made in our 
civil war, and perhaps in all wars of all nations, but 
there is nothing to show that disinterestedness was 
stronger in 1776 than in 1861, and much to show that 
it was rarer. 

There was less danger from gross cases of dis- 
honesty than from the feeble response made to de- 
mands for money and troops. With much trouble 
some troops were obtained ; and if these had been 
properly fed and cared for, the supply of men might 
have been sufficient; but without French aid it is hard 
to see how they could have been furnished with guns 
or clothing, with meat or bread. The length of the 
contest increased the perils of the patriot cause. When 
France made her treaty of alliance, the war had al- 
ready lasted three years and the end was not in sight. 

1 Gerard to Vergennes, Aug-. 12, 17T8 : Doniol, iii, 319. 
- Writings of Washington, Ford's ed., vii, 388. 



10 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Hostilities were continued for four years more ; weari- 
ness of the conflict was widespread when the alliance 
with France was made ; it grew stronger each year that 
the conflict endured. Four years of warfare was a ter- 
rible tax upon a nation as rich and strong as our own 
in 1861; the burden of a much longer struggle upon a 
much poorer people might well have exhausted both 
their means and their zeal for resistance. 

The hardships of Valley Forge might be endured 
by patriotic men for a winter, but soldiers cannot be 
kept together for years without food, or clothes, or 
money. Even with French aid Washington with dif- 
ficulty maintained a small army of poorly equipped 
men ; without that aid it is hard to see how he could 
have kept an army in the field at all. Such were the 
elements of weakness among the colonists, which might 
have proved fatal to success if they had received no 
assistance from abroad. 

It is true that few of the victories won by the 
Americans were due to the direct assistance of the 
French army, or the French fleet. The capture of 
Yorktown was the only action of importance in which 
French and American soldiers fought side by side 
with success. The fleet which d'Estaing brought over 
in 1778 undertook no joint enterprise, save a futile 
movement against Newport, and from a military stand- 
point it was wholly unproductive. In the following 
year d'Estaing engaged in the siege of Savannah, 
but that resulted in a disastrous repulse. Not until 
1781, the last year of actual warfare, did French and 
American armies again act together, but by their joint 
action the war was then brought to an end. The out- 
come of the American Revolution without French aid 
may be problematical, but it is certain that without that 



FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 11 

aid, the army under Cornwallis could not have been 
captured. The siege of Yorktown could not have been 
attempted without the cooperation of a fleet, and the 
Americans had no fleet ; while of the forces which 
took part in the operations on land, one half were 
French. 

It is hard, therefore, to see how the colonists, un- 
aided, could have brought the struggle to a successful 
end, unless troops, money, and supplies had been fur- 
nished by the thirteen colonies on a far more liberal 
scale than was done during the last five years of the 
war. The colonies might indeed have united in a great 
and sufficient effort, but they might also have decided 
to accept some sort of decent terms from the mother 
country at the end of long years of exhausting war- 
fare. At all events, at a time when our early history 
is studied from many standpoints, the part taken by 
France in the American Revolution, the aid she gave 
us, and its influence on the result of the contest, fur- 
nish profitable themes for investigation. 

It is interesting to consider the effects of French 
assistance on the fortunes of the American Eevolu- 
tion. It is equally interesting to consider the effects 
of the action of the French government upon the 
French people themselves. How far did the increas- 
ing embarrassment of the French treasury, resulting 
from the cost of that war, hasten a financial crisis? 
Would the French Revolution have begun in 1789 had 
it not been for the impression produced on French 
thought by the successful revolution in America? 
Certainly the old regime could not have lasted much 
longer, but might not its overthrow have been delayed 
and the catastrophe have assumed a different shape ? 

The situation of our own country at the beginning 



12 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

of our Revolution, ind the causes which led to that 
event, are familiar to us all, but the social and politi- 
cal conditions in France which resulted in her inter- 
vention naturally are much less known. At first 
glance it might have seemed unlikely that France 
should lend her assistance to colonists across the 
Atlantic, who were seeking to shake off the home 
authority and establish a republic to be governed by 
its own citizens. Why should a Bourbon monarchy 
throw in its lot with a people in revolt against their 
King, who proclaimed the equal rights of men and 
denounced the evils of monarchical rule ? France had 
still many foreign possessions that were kept in close 
subjection by the home government. In France the 
right of self-rule was strictly denied. French states- 
men had for centuries declared that on the absolute 
and untrammelled authority of the monarch rested the 
welfare and happiness of the nation. It seemed un- 
likely that the successor of Louis XIV, the grandson 
of Louis XV, would take up arms in behalf of the 
principles of the Declaration of Independence. 

There were other reasons that might well have kept 
France from involving herself in a new war, of which 
the cost would be certain, and the results uncertain. 
The Seven Years' War had come to an end only 
twelve years before. It had been one of the most dis- 
astrous contests in French history, an almost un- 
broken chapter of defeat and disgrace. With disor- 
dered finances, with discontent among the people, with 
an increasing readiness to criticize the government 
and to question institutions that had once been re- 
garded as sacred as Holy Writ, a judicious statesman 
might well have felt that a long period of peace, of 
financial recuperation, of internal improvement, would 



FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 13 

be best for the true interests of France. Such was the 
policy advocated by Turgot, the most sagacious French 
statesman of his generation, but it was advocated in 
vain. 

In fact, the disasters of the Seven Years' War had 
created a desire in the French mind for a new war, in 
which old defeats might be avenged and old disgraces 
wiped out. The Treaty of Paris, in 1763, not only 
stripped France of a large part of her foreign pos- 
sessions, but contained provisions that were specially 
ignominious. It ceded to England Canada and all the 
French possessions in North America except those 
transferred to Spain, various islands in the "West In- 
dies, and practically all of the great empire in India 
that Dupleix had sought to secure for France, while 
the conditions in reference to Dunkirk, which had 
been extorted from Louis XIV at the nadir of his for- 
tunes, were reimposed. By the Treaty of Utrecht in 
1713, the King had been obliged to agree that the for- 
tifications of the French city of Dunkirk, which had 
been erected at great cost to protect that important 
harbor, should be demolished. It is rare that any 
nation will submit to the dictation of another power 
as to the use of its own territory ; such terms might 
be imposed by Kussia on Poland, but not, it would be 
thought, by England upon France. 

Yet Louis XIV promised to destroy the fortifica- 
tions of the city, to fill up the port, to ruin the locks 
and never to reestablish them. When a new war 
broke out, naturally these agreements were no longer 
regarded. But in the Treaty of Paris, the French 
King again agreed that the fortifications of Dunkirk 
should be destroyed ; and, as an aggravation of igno- 
miny, the French consented that an English commis- 



14 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

sioner might reside in the city to see that they were 
not rebuilt. 

It is hard to understand the wisdom of this provi- 
sion ; it was a constant irritation to the Fi-ench, it was 
of no great advantage to the English. The French 
were a proud people, and for many centuries their 
military record had been marked by much glory and 
little shame. The defeat of the Seven Years' War left 
a consciousness of disgrace in every patriotic French- 
man, and a strong desire for revenge. And the feeling 
was more bitter towards England than towards Prus- 
sia. Frederick had been fighting for his own existence, 
defending himself against enemies who proposed to 
dismember his kingdom. He had succeeded in keeping 
it intact, but he added nothing to it. No French ter- 
ritory had been wrested away by Prussia, no indem- 
nity had been extorted as a punishment for defeat. 
But England had interfered in the contest, not to save 
herself, but to check the power of France. She had 
profited enormously from her success ; she had wrested 
from the French possessions far greater than France 
herself, and from them she might anticipate a vast 
increase in wealth and power. While there was not 
the yearning to recover these foreign possessions that 
the French afterward felt for the recovery of Alsace 
and Lorraine, the desire for revenge upon perfidious 
and triumphant Albion was quite as strong as the de- 
sire for revenge upon Prussia after the War of 1870. 

At the same time the animosity felt against Eng- 
land was not accompanied by any love for England's 
colonists. The position of France, as the owner of vast 
territories in North America, had brought her into 
frequent conflict with the English-speaking settlers in 
that country. When war broke out between England 



FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 15 

and France, the English colonies had taken an active 
part with the mother country. And even when there 
was peace between the home governments, there had 
been frequent collisions between the representatives of 
the two nations in North America. The jealousy and 
the active opposition of the English-speaking colo- 
nies had done much to check French development 
in the New World, and it was natural that French 
statesmen should look upon our ancestors as an aggres- 
sive, domineering, and disagreeable population. Cer- 
tainly it was largely due to their action that the in- 
fluence of France in North America, at the beginning 
of the American Revolution, was far removed from 
that position of ascendancy for which sagacious and 
intrepid Frenchmen had hoped. 

It once seemed possible that civilization in North 
America might be as much French as English : the 
territories which, nominally at least, were under the 
control of France far exceeded those held by the Eng- 
lish colonists in extent, and were not inferior to them 
in fertility. At the beginning of the seventeenth cen- 
tury one might well anticipate that France would take 
a leading part in the development of the New World. 
French mariners had been among the early explorers 
of North America. Only a few years after the landing 
of Columbus in the West Indies, French fishing-boats 
were found in large numbers off the coast of New- 
foundland. The hardy mariners of Normandy and 
Brittany sailed each year across the Atlantic in search 
of fish, as their descendants do to this day. 

In 1635 the settlement of Canada was begun by 
Jacques Cartier, and that country became a French 
province. French immigration was small, and the home 
government did little to encourage the growth of a 



16 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

prosperous colony ; but French missionaries and ex- 
plorers secured for their country claims of ownership 
over vast territories. The explorations of Joliet and 
La Salle carried the French lilies over the western 
prairies and the Valley of the Mississippi. La Salle 
established a station by the banks of the Illinois, and 
started an ill-fated settlement in Texas. It must be 
said that, save in Canada, there were no French col- 
onies which could be compared with the English set- 
tlements along the Atlantic, and Canada itself, with 
its natural progress checked by the unwholesome re- 
straint of the home government, ill-ruled, priest-rid- 
den, sparsely populated, bore little resemblance to the 
prosperous communities of Massachusetts and Penn- 
sylvania. 

Yet French exploration spread over great territories. 
In the north and along the Mississippi Valley, scat- 
tered settlements, generally unprosperous, sometimes 
destroyed by plague, by famine, or by Indians, pre- 
served the claim of French sovereignty over regions 
which now contain twenty great and populous states. 

By the Treaty of Utrecht the Hudson Bay Territory, 
Newfoundland, and Acadia were ceded to England. 
But while these vast though barren territories were 
lost, France strengthened her claim over a great part 
of the fertile lands of North America. In the early 
part of the eighteenth century, the speculations of Law 
and the enterprises of the Mississippi Company gave 
a fresh impetus to French colonization. New Orleans 
was foxmded. The Company asserted its authority, 
not only over the Valley of the Mississippi, but over 
all North America west of the Alleghanies, except in 
the extreme north, and in the ill-defined territory over 
which the Spanish claimed a nominal sovereignty. 



FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 17 

The efforts at colonization that were made under 
the auspices of liaw's Company were often theatrical; 
some of them, it may be feared, were intended to in- 
fluence the stock market rather than furnish Pilgrim 
Fathers to distant provinces. On one day one hundred 
and eighty girls and as many youths were married at 
Saint-Martin des Champs and embarked for Louisi- 
ana. Boats laden with women were sent out, to supply 
spouses for the unmarried settlers already there. They 
were eagerly sought for; but unfortunately the past 
lives of most had not fitted them to be wives of hardy 
pioneers, and the results of governmental matrimony, 
like those of many other governmental enterprises, 
were unsatisfactory. One body of adventurers pene- 
trated into Arkansas in search of some fabled rocks of 
emerald. They did not find the emeralds and their 
settlement came to naught ; but a colony of Germans 
sent over by Law, who were content to seek their 
fortunes in market-gardening near New Orleans, re- 
mained and prospered. 

Some progress was thus made in strengthening the 
claims of France upon the Valley of the Mississippi, 
but a great and fertile territory could not be perma- 
nently held by a few forts over which floated the fleur- 
de-lis, or a few settlements in which French was 
spoken. The rich fields of the Valley of the Mississippi 
were in many respects more attractive for colonization 
than the fringe along the Atlantic in which the Eng- 
lish-speaking colonists were found. The soil was more 
fertile, and the climate more agreeable ; they were 
farther removed from the seashore, but this disadvan- 
tage was to some extent compensated by the proxim- 
ity of the Great Lakes and by the great river flowing 
through to the Gulf. These possessions would surely 



18 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

attract the rising tide of English colonization, and 
this could be checked only by French settlement of 
sufficient dimensions to turn a nominal sovereignty 
into an actual occupation. 

The failure of French colonization is often charged 
to defects in French character; it might more properly 
be attributed to mistaken theories in French govern- 
ment. English colonists were sometimes driven from 
the home country by persecution ; but if they suffei-ed 
injustice from the government at home, in their exile 
they received from it the greatest blessing it could be- 
stow. To a large extent they were let alone and left 
to make their fortunes as best they could. 

But a paternal government would not leave the 
French settler alone, though he had abandoned the 
banks of the Seine and the Loire for the shores of 
the St. Lawrence and the Saguenay. France sought 
to develop her foreign empire by granting monopolies 
and bounties, by every means except allowing the 
colonists to work out their own salvation. A little 
before the beginning of our Revolution it was figured 
that fifty-five great commercial companies, patronized 
by the French government and organized to trade in 
her foreign possessions, had come to ruin. They not 
only ruined themselves, but they deprived the settler 
of a fair chance to improve his lot ; he was harassed 
by privileges and restrictions and monopolies in Can- 
ada and Louisiana as much as he would have been in 
Paris or Normandy. As a result few emigrated. 

The French remained at home, not because they 
were necessarily averse to emigration, but because in 
the foreign possessions of their own country they saw 
small opportunity to better their condition. If the 
French government had furnished facilities for emi- 



FRANCE AND THE NEW WORLD 19 

gration, if it had encouraged its citizens in seeking 
new homes under the French flag, if it had even been 
content to let alone those who made the effort, the 
record of French colonization of North America would 
have been more creditable and more important. But 
as it was, the peasant of the province and the artisan 
of the city saw little reason for exposing themselves 
to the hardships of a new country, where they prob- 
ably would fare no better than they did at home. As 
a consequence little attention was given to the ques- 
tion of American colonization by the French people, 
and still less by the French government. 

There was one great opportunity for the develop- 
ment of French colonization, which was lost not so much 
by the inertness as by the bigotry of the home gov- 
ernment. When the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
compelled large bodies of industrious Frenchmen to 
leave their own country, a considerable proportion of 
them, in all probability, would have preferred life in 
a French possession to life in a foreign land. Even 
though driven from the fatherland, they might still 
have lived under their own flag and listened to the 
speech of their own people. The French Huguenots 
would have made as hardy pioneers, they were as well 
fitted to be the foundei's of a new state, as the Eng- 
lish Puritans, but this possibility was checked by the 
bigotry of Louis XIV and his successors. Neither the 
snows of Canada nor the prairies of the west could be 
profaned by the presence of heretics. The French gov- 
ernment preferred that its American possessions should 
be occupied by Indians and wild beasts rather than 
by Huguenots. 

Such were the conditions at the beginning of the 
Seven Years' War. That contest settled the question 



20 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

whether England or France should become the great 
colonial power of the world. Both in the east and in 
the west, France was forced to abandon her dreams 
of colonial empire. In India nothing remained to her 
but a few unimportant trading stations. Canada was 
ceded to England, the province of Louisiana, with its 
vague claims of empire in the west and southwest, was 
transferred to Spain as a consolation for her losses. 
The upper Mississippi was now regarded as a field for 
colonization by English colonists. 

Yet the conquest of Canada by England prepared 
the way for the loss of her other American colonies. 
The colonists had needed her assistance against the 
dreaded power of France, and the constant peril of 
interference or invasion from the French in Canada. 
When this danger was removed, the usefulness of the 
mother country was much diminished, and the annoy- 
ance caused by injudicious restraints was no longer 
lessened by the feeling that a suzerainty which was 
often a burden was sometimes a blessing. Choiseul, 
with the sagacity that in him was strangely mingled 
with frivolity and poor judgment, early discerned this 
danger to England, and watched eagerly the growth 
of discontent among the colonists towards the home 
government, of whose aid they no longer had need. 



CHAPTER II 

THE TREATY OP PARIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 

The terms of the Treaty of Paris were galling to 
French pride, and it was certain that French states- 
men would seek revenge whenever there was reason 
to suppose that France had her old enemy at a disad- 
vantage. There was no strong desire to win back the 
lost possessions in North America, especially in Can- 
ada. The Canadian colony had often been a thorn in 
the flesh, and the possible value of the great possessions 
held by France in America was not generally realized. 
Most persons regarded the West India Islands as 
worth more than the vallej'^s of the St. Lawrence 
and the Mississippi. Voltaire had written of the acres 
of snow, in contending for which the government 
wasted more money than all Canada was worth ; and 
he expressed the views of many Frenchmen. 

But if there was no desire to recover Canada, there 
was a strong wish to humiliate England, and it was 
thought that the loss of her American colonies would 
be a ruinous blow to her prosperity. The gift of politi- 
cal prophecy is possessed by few. All then believed 
that the advantage of colonies to the home country 
consisted in holding a monopoly of colonial trade, and 
when this was lost, the commercial interests of the me- 
tropolis would necessarily suffer. No one foresaw that 
free trade with the new Republic would be better for 
England than forced trade with the colonists, or that 
the United States would add vastly more to English 



22 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

wealth than her American colonies had ever done. 
French statesmen, whose economic views were quite as 
antique as those of British merchants, felt a confident 
hope that American independence would insure Eng- 
land's decline, and they were eager for an opportunity 
to do England harm. 

The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1763, and it is 
not surprising to find that in the following year the 
secret advisers of Louis XV were preparing plans for 
an invasion of England. These schemes were indeed 
of little importance. Designed by men of small judg- 
ment, approved by a king who regarded such intrigues 
as a relief from the ennui under which he suffered, 
they had no result except to furnish an unscrupulous 
adventurer with a pretext for extorting money from 
the French treasury, and to afford Beaumarchais em- 
ployment which put him in the way of future dealings 
with America. 

In 1758 the Due de Choiseul became chief minis- 
ter of France, and for twelve years he held that posi- 
tion with an influence such as had been exercised by 
no minister since Fleury. The obscure plots of the 
confidants of Louis XV in due time came to Choi- 
seul's knowledge. These transactions throw a curious 
light on the French monarchy, when the power of the 
royal office was exercised by an infirm incumbent. 
Nominally, the king was supreme ; he could decide his 
own policy, select his own agents, and control his own 
councils. The theory had not been far from the real- 
ity when Louis XIV was king, except as the monarch 
was unconsciously guided by those skillful enough to 
make him believe that when he adopted their views he 
was announcing his own. But Louis XV left to his 
ministers the actual decision of questions of impor- 



THE TREATY OF PARIS 23 

tance, and contented himself with obscure intrigues, 
carried on without the knowledge of his responsible 
advisers. 

Such had been these schemes for a new war with 
England, and the King was now in terror lest his part 
in them should be known by his own chief minister. 
He was as unwilliug to face Choiseul with a state- 
ment of what he had been doing as a school-boy is to 
acknowledge to his teacher the occupation of a truant 
afternoon. Choiseul soon discovered as much as he 
could wisely learn ; he was too judicious a courtier to 
subject his master to 02)en shame, and he knew that 
Louis was so alarmed by the prospect of exposure that 
he would willingly abandon his plans and sacrifice his 
confederates. But if Choiseul was unwilling that such 
schemes should be carried on by political opponents, 
he was eager for the day to arrive when plans of re- 
venge against England could be put into execution, 
and in the mean time he occupied himself in prejiaring 
France for the contest. 

The poor organization, the bad discipline, the scan- 
dalous abuses of the French army had much to do 
with the long list of defeats during the Seven Years' 
War. When Louvois was war minister, the armies 
of Louis XIV were the best in Europe, and French 
soldiers went forth to almost uninterrupted victory. 
Under Louis XV the soldiers were still brave ; but 
inefficient generals, bad rations, and insufficient equip- 
ment involved the army in almost uniform defeat. 
The navy was no better, and when the English met the 
French on the sea, they were victorious as a matter of 
course. 

Choiseul undertook a thorough reorganization of 
the army and of the navy. To improving the condition 



24 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

of the navy he gave special attention ; in ten years 
its nominal strength was doubled and its efficiency 
was probably increased four-fold. At the close of the 
Seven Years' War the French navy consisted of forty- 
four ships of the line and ten frigates, mostly in poor 
condition.* In 1771 there were sixty-four men-of-war 
and forty-five frigates, all in good condition. ^ France 
was ready to meet England on the seas with some 
chance of success. 

It was important to strengthen the army and navy, 
but it was still more important to foster the nation's 
commerce, and increase the nation's wealth. Many 
things assisted in bringing about this result, and the 
minister was entitled to some of the credit. Methods 
of taxation still remained bad, but there was some re- 
laxation in laws which had done much to check the 
nation's growth. New ports were opened to commerce, 
the monopoly possessed by the East India Company 
was abolished, trade with the West India colonies 
greatly increased, restrictions on the movement of 
grain from province to province and on its exporta- 
tion from the country were relaxed, and agriculture 
profited greatly. The doctrines of the physiocrats bore 
fruit. The ancient laws, by which manufactures were 
regulated and restricted, were in part repealed : a 
woman could wear a cotton dress without being sent 
to the pillory ; a merchant could make goods to suit 
his customers without being put in jail. The business 
of the country increased rapidly. Though the govern- 
ment was nearly bankrupt and the treasury was always 
in distress, commerce flourished and the growth of 
wealth in the community was apparent. In 1775, 
France was much richer than when the Seven Years' 

^ Lavisse, Sistoire de France, Tiii[2], 375. ^ j^^^ 



THE TREATY OF PARIS 25 

War ended : she had a better army, a stronger navy, a 
less prodigal king, and more sagacious ministers. 

AYhile Choiseul was endeavoring to prepare his 
country for a new war, he observed with watchful eye 
the possibilities of trouble in store for England. He 
was one of the first to suggest that the overthrow of 
French dominion in America would pave the way for 
a revolt of the English colonies. Naturally he viewed 
such a possibility with satisfaction, and it furnished 
him some consolation for the losses which France suf- 
fered as a result of the Seven Years' War. Any signs 
of discontent with English rule were closely watched, 
and the French minister did not have long to wait for 
their manifestation. Few statesmen on the continent 
paid any attention to the rautteriugs of war in scantily 
populated colonies three thousand miles away, but 
Choiseul observed them with close interest from their 
first beginning. He wished to be informed as to the 
sentiments and the resources of the colonists, and he 
was ready to incite them to resistance if the ojjpor- 
tunity offered. 

The American leaders did not need any stimulus 
from France to stir them into activity, but the reports 
made by Choiseul's representatives as to conditions in 
our country are not without interest. In 1764 M. de 
Pontleroy was despatched to America on a tour of ob- 
servation, and full reports of his two years' wander- 
ings were sent to the French minister. ^ He described 
the land as rich and prosperous, containing many 
hardy seamen and skillful ship-builders, who, in time 
of war, were well fitted to serve either on ships of war 
or on privateers. He declared that the colonists were 
beginning to feel their strength, and were too opulent 
1 Bancroft, History of the United States (ed. 1854), vi, 25. 



26 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

to remain long dependent on any foreign power ; he 
anticipated that they would not only shake off the rule 
of the mother country, but would invade the sugar 
islands of the West Indies and add them to their 
domain, A little later one of Choiseul's agents in 
London reported that only arms, a leader, and a feel- 
ing of self-reliance were required in order to secure 
the independence of the American colonies, and that 
it was the business of France and Spain to bring 
about that result. 

In 1768 Choiseul wrote cheerfully that the quarrel 
would have no end, the colonists would soon do with- 
out the assistance of the mother country, England 
would be ruined, and her vast possessions in, America 
prove a millstone around her neck. 

So far as Choiseul was concerned it made little dif- 
ference to him on which side of the ocean England 
became involved in trouble. Speaking of a report that 
there had been a riot in London and lives lost, he 
says, " I hardly dare hope that it is so. The English 
will never cut each other's throats to the extent that 
we desire." 

In the mean time a new agent was selected to gather 
information, and one who was destined to play an im- 
portant part in American affairs. Baron Kalb appar- 
ently took his title, not by hereditary right or ances- 
tral claim, but because he thought that it would be 
an advantage in his career to be called a baron. Sim- 
ilar instances were common in that time, and are not 
unknown in our own. When there is no sovereign 
ready to bestow a title upon a man, his only remedy 
is to bestow one upon himself ; and if it is resolutely 
asserted, the owner's right is not often questioned. 

At all events, Kalb, born near Bayreuth, of respect- 



THE TREATY OF PARIS 27 

able but not of noble .parentage, became while still a 
young man a lieutenant in the French service. He 
served with credit in the War of the Austrian Succes- 
sion and in the Seven Years' War, After that he re- 
tired on a pension and married a rich wife, but he was 
soon anxious to return to active service and sought 
employment wherever there was opportunity. He first 
desired a position in the Portuguese army, but after 
two years of intriguing he failed to obtain it. 

This disappointment resulted in his being assigned 
to much more important work. Choiseul decided to 
send a new agent to America. Kalb was strongly 
recommended by Brogiie and Soubise, under whom 
he had served ; he received a reappointment to the 
French army and was ordered by Choiseul to go first 
to Amsterdam and find out what he could about the 
American colonies, and then sail for America.^ There 
he was to investigate the sentiments of the people, and 
their ability to furnish munitions of war and competent 
officers ; to ascertain how many troops they could raise, 
the probability of a revolt against England, and of its 
success if it were attempted. Kalb hesitated to under- 
take the mission, but Choiseul told him that, after 
much deliberation, he had been selected for a difficult 
task, and he must not decline it. 

In October, 1767, Kalb sailed for America, and after 
a voyage which lasted more than three months, in Jan- 
uary, 1768, he reached Philadelphia. The reports he 
sent back were not altogether calculated to encourage 
the hopes of his superior. The discontents produced 
by the Stamp Act and the duties on tea were still 
active, so Kalb wrote ; even the women discarded tea 
and sugar, and sought to do without silks and English 
^ Friedrich Kapp, Life of Johann Kalb, 1-46. 



28 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

linen. "But," he added, "the question is how long 
they will adhere to this resolution." At present he did 
not think the colonies would be able to repel force by 
force, and said, what was undoubtedly true at that 
time, that at the bottom they were little inclined to 
shake off English supremacy, and especially with the 
aid of foreign powers. Yet he recognized the growing 
irritation produced by the policy of the British minis- 
try, and he gave at much length the complaints which 
the Americans brought against the home government. 
All classes of people, he wrote later, were imbued with 
a spirit of independence, and if the provinces could 
be united, an independent state would soon be formed. 
" At all events," he adds, "it will certainly come forth 
in time." The country was becoming too powerful to 
be governed from London ; the population was esti- 
mated at three millions, and was expected to double 
every thirty years. " It is not to be denied that chil- 
dren swarm everywhere like ants," he wrote. The size 
of the families of our ancestors impressed all foreign 
observers.^ 

In March Kalb writes from Boston ; " I meet with 
the same opinions as in the provinces I had already 
visited, only expressed with greater violence and acri- 
mony." But he added that in spite of this spirit, all, 
from the leaders down to the humblest citizens, cher- 
ished a strong affection for the mother country, and it 
would be difficult to induce them to accept assistance 
from other nations. 

Kalb continued his journey to Canada, and his re- 
ports from there could not have been gratifying to 
the home government. Only a few years had elapsed 
since the Canadians had ceased to be French, but they 
1 Letter of Feb. 25, 1768; Kapp, Life of Kalb, 63. 



THE TREATY OF PARIS 29 

had already discovered how much their lot was im- 
proved by becoming British subjects. They paid slight 
taxes, "wrote Kalb, they enjoyed freedom of conscience, 
they took part in public affairs, and as a natural re- 
sult of all this, their lands had increased in value. ^ 
The people of Canada, though they entertained a sen- 
timental fondness for the land of their origin, had 
no desire to be again subjected to the evils of French 
colonial administration. 

Kalb did not remain long in America. He gave as 
a reason for returning to France that he got no an- 
swers to his despatches, and feared they had not 
reached their destination ; but travel in this country 
was not then an alluring occupation. In January Kalb 
went from Philadelphia to New York. The weather 
was wintry, and when he endeavored to cross the 
Hudson, the boat was wrecked, the horses and lug- 
gage were lost, the passengers spent the night in a 
marsh without shelter of any sort, and two of them 
died from exposure. Kalb saved his life and his limbs, 
but he lost his baggage, the badge of his order, and 
several hundred louis d'or. 

In June, 1768, he arrived again in Paris. In the 
mean time Choiseul's interest in American affairs had 
diminished. He was occupied with the annexation of 
Corsica, and there seemed no immediate prospect 
of any disturbance in America. When subscriptions 
were raised in England to assist the Corsicans, Choi- 
seul said the French would retaliate by raising money 
to assist the Americans ; but he did not carry out his 
threat.2 

Kalb waited long for an Interview, and when at 

^ All the above reports are from Kapp, Life of Kalb, 53-70. 
2 Letter of Choiseul, Jan. 18, 1769 ; Ibid., 72. 



30 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

last one was granted, Cholseul brought it to a speedy 
end. " You have returned too soon from America," he 
said ; " you need not send me any more reports about 
the country." 

But if Choiseul, with characteristic fickleness, de- 
clined to bother himself further with American affairs, 
the reports of his agents, the volumes of newspaper 
articles and fugitive papers indicating discontent with 
the mother country, which were carefully preserved 
in the French archives, show how closely French 
statesmen watched the possibility of trouble between 
England and her American colonies. Even the ser- 
mons of discontented New England divines, who were 
not afraid to preach politics to their flocks, found 
their way to Versailles.^ 

If Choiseul's policy had been followed in another 
matter, France might again have been involved in a 
war with England, under circumstances much less 
favorable than at the time of the American Revolu- 
tion. Choiseul was bold and sometimes reckless in his 
foreign policies; "unquiet, aspiring, and superficial," 
he was declared to be by Frederick II, the most aspir- 
ing, but also the most sagacious of European sover- 
eigns. When the Comte de Broglie prepared plans for 
an English invasion, and the half-crazy Eon was sent 
as an agent to further them, Choiseul condemned such 
follies. Yet he was quite ready to take the chances of 
a new contest, if only he were the man to direct it, 
and the compact with Spain, which had been renewed 
by Choiseul, very nearly involved France in war with 
England. In 1766 a small English settlement was 
established on one of the Falkland Islands. These 
islands were of little importance, and Spain's claim 
1 Kapp, Life of Ealb, 73. 



THE TREATY OF PARIS 31 

upon them rested only on vague assertions of su- 
premacy over the South Seas. The Spanish had taken 
no steps to settle them, or make any practical use of 
their asserted supremacy, but they were offended at 
the action taken by England. In 1770 a Spanish 
armament, sent out by the governor of Buenos Ayres, 
landed on the islands, captured the English garrison, 
and carried them away prisoners. 

Though the territory in dispute was unimportant, 
the English were justly outraged at the insolence of 
this proceeding and they demanded that Charles III 
should disavow the act" of his governor and restore the 
island. The Spanish were loath to do this, and yet 
they recognized the madness of attempting to meet 
England single-handed. But by the terms of the 
Family Compact, France was bound to come to the 
aid of Spain if she became involved in war, and ac- 
cordingly the Spanish King declared that he would do 
nothing that could infringe upon his honor, and inti- 
mated that he was ready for the contest. 

There is no doubt that in this he was encouraged 
by Choiseul, and that rash minister was ready to in- 
volve his country in a new war on a question of Span- 
ish etiquette. He believed that France was prejjared 
for the contest, and he was ready to take the risk. If 
he could avenge the defeats of the last war, he would 
win great praise from his countrymen ; and at any 
rate, he believed that war would insure his continu- 
ance in office.^ 

The situation of affairs was changed by the inter- 
ference of the King. It was not often that Louis XV 
exercised any control over French policy ; he was 
quite right in saying that he had little influence with 
^ Mercy-Argentean to Maria TheresaJ Sept., 1770. 



32 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

his own ministers. But he had had enough of fight- 
ing ; drawing plans for the invasion of England he 
regarded as an amusement, but when there was a pos- 
sibility of actual hostilities, he was stirred from his 
ordinary apathy. He now intimated very decidedly 
that France would not go to war on any question 
of Spanish punctilio, and Choiseul's intrigues were 
brought to an abrupt close. In 1770 Louis XV dis- 
missed him from the ministry, the Spanish at once 
abandoned their position, and the island was restored 
to England. There can be little doubt that if France 
had become involved in hostilities with England, in- 
stead of obtaining revenge for the calamities of the 
late war, she would have added to them. The French 
were not as well prepared as when they interfered in 
behalf of the Americans eight years later, and the 
English were in far better condition. Louis XV, who 
had plenty of intelligence when he wanted to use it, 
was quite right in saying, " War in our present con- 
dition would be a frightful evil for me and for my 
people." * 

For a while, after the disgrace of Choiseul, Ameri- 
can affairs received little attention in France. The 
whole of Louis XV's reign was ignominious, but its 
closing years were the worst. The old King was sunk 
in sensuality and vice ; Madame du Barry was at the 
height of her favor ; the ministers were men of small 
capacity ; sordid schemes and petty ambitions com- 
prised the politics of the court. But on May 10, 1774, 
a loathsome disease ended Louis XV's unedifying 
life, and the face of French politics changed in a day. 
From his grandson, Louis XVI, who inherited the 
throne, a well-meaning youth of inferior intelligence 
» Louis XV to Charlea III, Dec. 21, 1770. 



THE TREATY OF PARIS 33 

and narrow sympathies, nothing great could be ex- 
pected ; but he began his reign with a sincere resolve 
to do his duty, he desired to improv'^e public condi- 
tions, he believed in morality and decency, and he 
sought the assistance of ministers who would aid him. 
iu his endeavors. 



CHAPTER III 

THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 

The young King received the popular favor which 
is readily bestowed on royalty combined with youth. 
Nothing could be worse than the old King, and the 
people looked with hope upon a new sovereign, who, 
though he had done little to arouse ardent anticipa- 
tion, had done nothing to excite popular disapproval. 
It was natural that a new ruler should choose new 
ministers, and there was special reason for change. 
Those in office shared the discredit which attached to 
the closing years of Louis XV's reign, and in addi- 
tion to this, they were regarded as the creatures of 
Madame du Barry. 

Public opinion in France was not severe and was 
habituated to royal gallantries, but it had been out- 
raged by the favor bestowed upon a woman like du 
Barry, and the ministers who had shared her power 
also shared her unpopularity. She was at once exiled 
from court, to the delight of all decent people, and the 
ministers of Louis XV were speedily removed. 

It was believed by many that Choiseul would now 
return to power. He was the most prominent of French 
statesmen ; if not the ablest, he was the most bril- 
liant ; he had been disliked by Madame du Barry, and 
his return to favor might naturally follow her over- 
throw. Such expectations were disappointed. Choi- 
seul's brilliancy did not appeal to a slow-witted youth 
like Louis XVI, while many of the duke's qualities 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 35 

were distasteful to the King. Choiseul was a spend- 
thrift, his life was immoral, his tongue was bitter, and 
his criticisms had spared neither king nor courtier. 
Louis selected for the head of his Council the Comte 
de Maurepas, a man of seventy -three, who had been 
out of office for quarter of a century. He was well 
known as a wit, as a satirist, as a great nobleman who 
patronized literature and condescended to scholarship. 
He had held office almost from boyhood until middle 
age, and had then been driven from power by the hos- 
tility of Madame de Pompadour. That might perhaps 
have been to his credit; but as he had aroused her 
hostility by some very indecent verses he wrote con- 
cerning her, his overthrow excites less sympathy than 
if it had been due to the fearless performance of pub- 
lic duty. At all events, he was now recalled, and he 
remained in office until his death on November 21, 
1781. 

A man whom years of alternate favor and disgrace 
had left weary of the struggle was not likely, at 
seventy-three, to adopt new or vigorous measures, 
either in domestic or foreign policy ; but the position 
of secretary of foreign affairs was filled by one who 
played a great part in the history of France and of 
our own country. For this office the King made choice 
of Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, then sta- 
tioned at the court of Sweden. 

The selection of Vergennes was of much importance 
to the American colonists. It is indeed probable that 
France would ultimately have become our ally, no 
matter who was at the head of her foreign depart- 
ment. Yet Louis XVI was at no time eager to inter- 
fere in our affairs. His temperament was sluggish, 
and was not stirred by any love for adventure or for 



36 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the hazard of war ; his instincts were monarchical, 
and the pictures of republican virtue and democratic 
simplicity which charmed French society did not 
allure him. If he had been governed by the counsels 
of an adviser like Turgot, the colonies might have 
been left to fight out their own salvation. 

Not only had Vergennes much to do with the mo- 
mentous decision, but during five years of war he did 
his best for his allies. He did not respond to all their 
demands for money, but he gave liberally and stead- 
ily the pecuniary assistance without which the Amer- 
ican armies might have dissolved from lack of clothes 
and food. He considered first the interests of his own 
country, as was his duty ; but never, during long years 
of indifferent success, did he waver in his resolution 
that peace should not be made until the independence 
of the United States was assured. For that object 
France had taken up arms, and until it was accom- 
plished Vergennes would listen to no suggestion that 
she should lay them down. He was a cold man, but he 
was constant; his memory is not green in America 
like that of La Fayette; he had few of the endearing 
qualities and none of the ardent enthusiasm of the 
marquis; he felt for the American patriots little of 
the fervid admiration of some who fought for us and 
many who talked of us; but he did more than any 
other Frenchman to secure political independence for 
the American colonies. 

Vergennes was fifty-seven years of age when Louis 
XVI selected him for secretary of state, and he had 
followed the profession of diplomacy during most of 
his active life. Almost quarter of a century earlier he 
had been minister at Treves ; a few years later he re- 
presented France at a diplomatic congress at Hanover, 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 37 

and he was then sent as ambassador to the Porte, in 
which difficult position he conducted himself with 
judgment and sagacity. In 1771 he was intrusted 
with an important mission to Sweden, and it was there 
that a summons reached him to return to Paris and 
assume the office of secretary of state for foreign 
affairs. 

He did not belong to the great nobility, he had lit- 
tle court influence, and he owed his appointment to 
the personal choice of the young sovereign. Ver- 
gennes was not a great man, but he was a sagacious and 
prudent statesman, and he devoted himself laboriously 
and intelligently to the service of his country. If he 
was not as brilliant as Choiseul, he was a much safer 
public servant. His industry was unwearied ; he was 
often at his office at eight in the morning, he was not 
unfrequently there at ten at night, and to industry 
and intelligence he added, not perhaps unselfishness, 
but integrity. Making money out of official position, 
unless actual dishonesty was added to greed, was in 
that day regarded with no disapproval ; the man who 
neglected such opportunities was thought to be a 
strange and not altogether an admirable creature. 
When Lord Stanhope declined the bribe of six hun- 
dred thousand livres which Dubois offered him, the 
abbd declared such conduct heroic. If not heroic it 
was unusual. 

To the self-seeking politicians of England, the first 
Pitt seemed a marvel because he declined profits that 
he might have pocketed. Pecuniary standards were no 
higher in France. Vergennes was not a dishonest man, 
nor was he regarded as a greedy man. He did not 
accumulate great wealth out of his office as Richelieu 
and Mazarin had done, but it would have been thought 



38 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

absurd if he had not availed himself of what were 
deemed to be the legitimate gains of royal favor and 
important position. He left a fortune of about two 
million francs, an amount of which the purchasing 
power would be little short of two million dollars to- 
day. Such wealth did not indicate dishonesty, though 
probably the larger part of it represented the direct 
or indirect gains of holding office. Pecuniary disin- 
terestedness in a public man was very nearly a thing 
unknown. We are disturbed when men in public life 
use their positions, not for actual corruption, but for 
greedy accumulation at the expense of those they re- 
present. In the eighteenth century sentiment in Eu- 
rope would not have been disturbed by such disclosures, 
and the number of offenders would have been very 
nearly measured by the number of those who had the 
opportunity. Few men got poor in politics a hundred 
and fifty years ago, except in a poor nation like ours, 
where there was little opportunity to make money. 
When Vergennes died, in 1787, Franklin, who knew 
him well, said that the taking away of so wise and 
good a man was a loss to mankind. He was surely a 
wise man and he was not a bad man, though both his 
political and his pecuniary standards were lower than 
those which public opinion now requires. 

The King called to office a greater man than Ver- 
gennes. Those who recognized the necessity for a 
radical change in French administration might have 
felt ground for hope when Louis, in the summer of 
1774, selected Turgot as his minister of finance. Tur- 
got had neither a great family nor influential friends 
to help him into office, but he had shown his fitness 
for this position during his administration as intend- 
ant at Limoges. He was known as one of the few offi- 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 39 

cials in France who improved the lot of those under 
them, as a disciple of legislative reform, identified 
with the economists and philanthropists. Turgot did 
away with the corvee, he reestablished free com- 
merce in grain within the kingdom, he abolished 
many iniquitous taxes, he checked many useless ex- 
penditures ; his policy would have relieved the poor 
from much of the undue taxation which fell upon 
them and would have averted the bankruptcy to which 
the government was rapidly progressing. " It is only 
Turgot and I," said Louis of him, " who love the peo- 
ple." But if the King could recognize the wisdom of 
Turgot's plans and sympathize with his efforts to im- 
prove the condition of the people, he had not the firm- 
ness to support his minister against a host of enemies, 
exasperated by his reforms. Turgot's tenure of office 
was brief. The innumerable enemies excited by his 
efforts at reform were soon powerful enough to bring 
about his overthrow ; if he had remained in office and 
been given a free hand, it is possible that the changes 
he would have carried into effect might have saved 
France from a revolution. 

That he was opposed to an alliance with the colo- 
nists may forfeit his claim for gratitude upon Ameri- 
cans, but should increase their respect for his judg- 
ment as a French statesman. Turgot viewed the 
question from a financial aspect, and he was right in 
saying that such a war would com"plete the ruin of a 
financial situation already in desperate plight. Natu- 
rally, we admire the action of France in assisting our 
forefathers to achieve their national independence. 
If the policy of a nation is to be judged by its influ- 
ence upon the world, the assistance France gave us 
was an act of high import to the interests of civiliza- 



40 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

tion ; but after all, it was the business of French states- 
men, under the French monarchy, to preserve the sys- 
tem of which they were servants; to improve it 
doubtless, to fit it for the future, but to save it from 
destruction. The man who is willing to involve his 
own country in ruin that he may assist other lands, 
manifests a high degree of national altruism; but it 
remains a question whether he is a useful citizen of 
the country to which he owes his allegiance. If Louis 
XVI had been governed by Turgot's counsel, the 
monarchy would not only have escaped the dangers 
threatened by a continuance of unbearable abuses, 
but would have been saved from the perilous effect 
on French thought produced by interference in be- 
half of a people who demanded political freedom. But 
Turgot was a prophet without honor, and heads less 
level and more visionary directed" the destinies of 
France. 

Towards the last of July, 1774, Vergennes returned 
from his mission in Stockholm to enter upon his du- 
ties as secretary of foreign affairs. The French were 
already watching with attention the growing prospect 
of revolt in the American colonies. Gerard de Kay- 
neval, who was to take so active a part in the affairs 
of America, was filling Vergennes's place in the 
interim, and he wrote early in July to the charge 
d' affaires in London : " We are awaiting the moment 
when the fate of the Bostonians will be decided. Gen- 
eral Gage will need much talent and much sagacity 
and patience to calm the spirit of insubordination 
which has possessed almost all the English colonists." * 
In September, after Vergennes had assumed the du- 

1 Gerard to Gamier, July 3, 1774 ; cited by Doniol, i, 12. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 41 

ties of his office, he wrote : "The quarrel between the 
colonies and the British government seems to become 
more serious every day. ... It may px-ove the most 
fatal blow to the authority of the metropolis." ^ 

The minister was right in saying that the quai*rel 
constantly became more serious, and it was more 
closely watched in France than in any other part of the 
continent. Russia, Austria, and Prussia had no Ameri- 
can colonies; they derived a mild pleasure from the 
complications in which England was involved, but they 
were little concerned by the progress of American dis- 
content. Though Spain had great American posses- 
sions, her apathetic government exhibited no interest 
in anything, except the possibility of some immediate 
gain for Spain herself. But France coukl not be in- 
di£ferent to the future of a continent in which for 
almost two centuries she had been largely interested, 
and her feeling of rivalry towards Great Britain was 
Stronger than that of any other European state. 

In time popular sympathy with the colonists became 
an important factor, but the probable results of 
American insurrection were considered by French 
statesmen long before they excited any interest in the 
French public. Vergennes and his associates believed 
that the loss of the colonies would prove fatal to Eng- 
land's commercial power. " If the resistance of the 
Americans is successful," wrote the French minister 
at London, "this memorable epoch will reduce Eng- 
land to a point where she "will no longer cause dis- 
quietude to France, whose consideration on the Con- 
tinent will increase in proportion to the enfeeblement 
of the British Empire." ^ 

1 Vergennes to Gamier, Sept. 11, 1774 ; Doniol, i, 13. 

2 Gamier to Vergennes, Aug. 16, 1776 ; Doniol, i, 585. 



42 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

A similar belief was held in America, on the Con- 
tinent, and in England herself. The feeling was wide- 
spread that if the American colonies achieved their 
independence, this would be a fatal blow to the power, 
the wealth, and the trade of England. The future was 
to show the fallacy of this belief, but it had a large 
influence in exciting the ardor of French statesmen 
for the American cause. Not only did they hope for 
harm to England, but for a great increase in French 
trade with the new republic, in return for assistance 
in her struggle. This hope, also, was disappointed. 
Trade between the United States and France increased 
as a result of the growth of the American people in 
numbers and wealth, but trade is governed by busi- 
ness conditions ; the French who assisted the colonists 
gained no more than the Germans who furnished 
troops to King George ; French merchants would have 
sold as many pieces of silk and bottles of champagne 
to Americans if the United States had secured their 
independence without French aid. If gains in trade 
only were considered, France was poorly paid for the 
money she spent in assisting the American colo- 
nists. 

In 1775 the first blood was shed, and the long dis- 
pute between the colonists and the motherland had at 
last resulted in actual war. The reports of these early 
events reached France for the most part through Eng- 
lish channels. The letters* of the French ambassador 
at London were filled with discussions as to the rela- 
tions of the colonies with the mother country, and 
with surmises as to their future action and the plans 
of the British ministers. The French representative 
was active in procuring information, and he did not 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 43 

hesitate over the necessary means. No daily press 
then revealed to the world the debates of Parliament, 
but Gamier wrote that he had secured a member of 
Parliament who was to furnish full reports of the 
discussions for the guidance of the French minister. 
"We may be sure that this member was liberally paid 
for his work. Parliamentary corruption was common, 
and selling reports of other men's speeches was not 
so bad as selling one's own vote. 

Notwithstanding his efforts to get accurate infor- 
mation, the ambassador sent to Paris many statements 
which had small foundation in fact. He was very ap- 
prehensive that Russia might interfere in the conflictj 
and he transmitted various sinister rumors that Cath- 
erine had promised to furnish England with twenty 
thousand men with which to subdue her rebellious sub- 
jects.^ Vergennes was not disturbed by this report. 
Catherine had many vices, but he knew that she was 
not a ruler of the type of the Elector of Hesse, and 
that she would not sell the blood of her subjects for 
the money of George III.^ 

Another rumor was more persistent and excited 
more alarm. The French ministers were haunted by 
the idea that England would seek relief from present 
troubles, or consolation for future losses, by declaring 
war on France and despoiling her of the scanty pos- 
sessions she still held in the west ; the recollection of 
the late war was fresh and excited apprehension for the 
future. When considering the complications of the 
American situation, nothing disturbed the French 
ministers so much as the possible return of Chatham 
to power. With him at the helm they thought that war 

1 Guines to Vergennes, Sept. 29, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 210. 

2 Doniol, i, 213. 



44 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

with France was certain to come, and would probably 
be disastrous. 

In February, 1775, Garnier, charge d'affaires, wrote 
that only immediate success could prevent the fall of 
the ministry, that the King would be forced to turn 
to Chatham, who would make peace with the colonies 
and find armies and navies ready at his hand. " It is 
a naked sword in the hands of a madman," he added ; 
and he then proceeded to show that Chatham's ambi- 
tion would seek fresh fields of glory at the expense of 
France.^ " Lord Chatham will necessarily become the 
conciliator and there is the man to dread," wrote 
Guines in June ; and he added : " What can be the 
conditions of the conciliation? Conditions little hon- 
orable to England, and then an audacious minister, 
accustomed to glory, will look upon our colonies as a 
necessary compensation." 

In reply Vergennes bade the ambassador to watch 
the progress of the crisis with care, and especially to 
ascertain what influence Chatham might obtain over 
the King.^ But there was no ground for fear. George 
III was not the sovereign to be influenced by a man 
like Lord Chatham, and no defeats in America could 
induce him to turn to the great war minister for 
aid. 

Vergennes was uncertain as to his future policy ; 
but he desired to be informed accurately as to the pro- 
gress of events, and the prospects of the contest. In 
July the ambassador at London wrote complaining of 
the inaccuracy of the news from America, and he added, 
" I think it might be advantageous to us, it would at 
least satisfy the King's curiosity, to have among them 

1 Gamier to Vergennes, Feb. 20, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 69. 
a Guines to Vergennes, June 16, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 81-83. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 45 

a capable man who could judge the situation from the 
political and the military standpoint, could foresee 
the course of events, and send on his reports by each 
merchant ship." ^ 

This suggestion was received favorably, and a gen- 
tleman named Bonvouloir was sent as a secret agent 
to America ; but Vergennes desired that the messen- 
ger should go without any trace of official character, 
so that his acts and words could in no way involve the 
French government. He could not even receive any 
written instructions, and lest his reports might fall 
into hostile hands, his letters nominally were to treat 
of commercial questions and be addressed to a corre- 
spondent at Antwerp, while the information he was 
sent to impart was to be written in some preparation 
of milk, which could be developed only when heated 
by a red-hot shovel. ^ AVith all these useless attempts 
at secrecy, Bonvouloir was assigned duties of some 
delicacy and importance. Not only was he to send 
home faithful accounts of all he saw and heard, but 
he was to insinuate into American ears suggestions 
of the desirability of France as an ally ; he was to 
tell the colonists how the French people admired the 
grandeur and nobility of their efforts ; and especially 
was he to impress upon their minds that under no 
circumstances would France seek to recover Canada.^ 
Vergennes fully realized that nothing could be more 
distasteful to the English colonists, after half a cen- 
tury of conflict, than to see the French flag again 
floating at Quebec and Montreal. It would be idle to 
expect the permanent friendship of the new nation if 

1 Report, July 1, 17T5 ; Doniol, i, 128. 

2 DonJol, i, 266. 

8 Vergennes to Guines, Aug. 7, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 155. 



46 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Canada were again French. Moreover, the French 
did not look with covetous eyes upon their lost Cana- 
dian possessions. Canada had been a source of anx- 
iety and vexation of spirit to the home government. 
The colony had not increased in population as had its 
southern neighbors ; it had not become an important 
factor in the trade of the home country ; even at Ver- 
sailles there was a dim consciousness that tlie colonial 
policy adopted for Canada had been a failure, and 
there was no desire to undertake the experiment 
again. No lust for the St. Lawrence or the Great 
Lakes interfered with the conviction that an attempt 
to regain Canada would surely excite the ill-will of 
the American colonists. 

In addition to these instructions, Bonvouloir re- 
ceived the modest allowance of two hundred louis. 
" If nothing is accomplished," Guines wrote with 
praiseworthy frugality, "it is only a loss of two hun- 
dred louis." ^ Bonvouloir received his louis, and in 
September, 1775, he sailed for America. Though he 
had no official position, his expedition must be re- 
garded as the first formal step towards action in 
behalf of America taken by France. Bonvouloir was 
not the man to take an important part in a crisis, but 
his reports may have tended to encourage the French 
minister in a policy of interference. 

He reached America in December, after a stormy 
and dangerous passage. " I had a frightful passage," 
he writes. " I was one hundred days at sea, twenty 
times I thought I should perish ; I was reduced to 
two biscuits a day, ... a little salt beef and stale 
water." Having at last landed, he at once repaired to 
Philadelphia, and talked with the members of Con- 
^ Guinea to Vergennes, Sept. 8, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 138. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 47 

gress gathered there ; but the fear of exceeding his 
authority rendered him a timid negotiator, " I made 
them no offer," he writes, "absolutely none. . . . 
When asked if France would aid them, and at what 
price, I replied, ... It is possible that she might, 
but I knew nothing about the terms, . . . and, in 
short, ... all they could do was to submit their 
propositions to that country." ^ 

But the secret committee insisted on regarding 
Bonvouloir as the representative of his country, and 
addressed him a set of written questions: Was the 
disposition of France favorable to their cause ? Could 
they obtain from her two experienced engineers? 
Could they buy arms and munitions of war in ex- 
change for American products? To this Bonvouloir 
replied that he was but a private citizen, he could 
only give his conjecture, but he believed that France 
wished them well, that she would furnish them two 
good engineers; and witliout making himself respon- 
sible for anything, he believed they might attempt an 
exchange of products at their own risk.^ 

Even these mild expressions disturbed him. He 
wrote for further instructions and said : " These af- 
fairs are so delicate that with all the good-will pos- 
sible, I tremble as I advance." But still he drew a 
satisfaction from his exploits, whicb was not entirely 
justified. "No one will ever make suck progress in 
their confidence as I," he writes, " nor manage them 
as I do. ... I toil night and day, happy if I succeed. 
... I am learning to talk English very prettily." 

Of more importance than these effusions of timidity 
and vanity, was the information he gave as to condi- 

1 Doniol, i, 267, 287-292. 

2 BonTonloir to Guines, Sept. 28, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 368. 



48 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

tions in America ; it was not accurate, but it was of a 
character to encourage the plans of interference which 
the French ministry already entertained. "Every man 
here is a soldier," he writes, "the troops are well 
clothed, well paid and well commanded. They have 
about fifty thousand men under pay, and a still greater 
number of volunteers who wish no pay. Judge how 
this sort of men would fight." ^ This enthusiastic ac- 
count was not correct, but it led Bonvouloir's supe- 
riors to overestimate the military strength of the 
colonists, and thus his lying was in a good cause. In- 
deed he seems to have believed his own statements, 
far as they were from the truth. 

Bonvouloir remained for another year in America, 
but the results of his mission were not important. He 
had spent his money, and the Comte de Guines, who 
had selected him for the expedition, asked the min- 
ister to come to Bonvouloir's assistance.^ Vergennes 
estimated the agent at about his real value : he said 
that Bonvouloir had failed to satisfy the curiosity 
which led them to authorize his journey, and the best 
thing he could do was to return as soon as possible. 
But Bonvouloir was at Philadelphia with his money 
all gone, and he could not return. At last Vergennes 
authorized Guines to send the unlucky envoy two 
hundred louis, and to send him at the same time in- 
structions to return to France forthwith. Thus Bon- 
vouloir faded out of the field of American politics and 
out of the attention of history. 

It is difficult to decide how far, at this early stage, 
the French ministers had any definite thought of in- 
terfering in the American contest. The struggle had 
just begun, the resources of the colonists were un- 
1 Doniol, i, 289. 2 Doniol, i, 510-513. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 49 

known, it was uncertain how stubborn a resistance 
they could make to the English armies. The situation 
was watched with no very strong sympathy for the 
insurgents, but with the lively desire that they should 
do England as much harm as possible. 

In 1775 Vergennes was profuse in his assertions 
that France wouhl take no part in the quarrel. And 
even if his asseverations were not entirely sincere, it 
seemed probable that he would keep his word. " You 
are right in explaining," he wrote the ambassador at 
London, " that . . . even if the interest of the King 
led him to stir up the flames of rebellion in America, 
justice would forbid it. And this is the most powerful 
consideration to his mind." ^ Far from seeking to 
profit by the embarrassment in which England finds 
herself on account of American affairs, wrote Ver- 
gennes in June, 1775, " we desire rather to aid her to 
escape from them. The spirit of revolt, wherever it 
appears, is always a dangerous example. With moral 
as with physical maladies, either can prove con- 
tagious." But it was in the American possessions of 
France that Vergennes foresaw the possibility of 
harm from the dangerous example of the American 
colonies ; he did not foresee how potent was to be the 
influence of that example on France herself. In 
August he said that if the Americans asked help 
from France, it would be politely refused. 

Lord Stormont was the English representative at 
Paris, a shrewd, hard-headed man, who afterwards 
proved a thorn in the flesh to Vergennes, when the lat- 
ter was secretly assisting the Americans, and openly 
denying that he was doing so. At this time Stormont 
believed there was no reason to fear unfriendly action 

1 Doniol, i, 149. 



/ 



50 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

by France. He wrote on October 31, 1775, narrating 
a long interview with Vergennes in which the French 
minister had said that he regretted the troubles in 
America and declared that these were of advantage to 
no one ; that if the Americans became an independent 
nation, sooner or later they would build up a great 
navy, seize the West Indies, extend their conquests 
over South America, and in time leave not a foot of 
earth on that hemisphere in the possession of any 
European power. '"You and I will not live to see these 
changes accomplished,' he added, ' but if these re- 
sults are remote they are certain.' All this he said," 
wrote the experienced diplomat, " with the air of one 
who was expressing his own opinion." * 

To this Vergennes added assurances which the 
future did not confirm. Instead of seeking to increase 
England's embarrassment, the French government, he 
said, viewed it with regret, and would prevent any 
assistance being given to the Americans. While they 
might not always be able to check private speculators, 
they would do their best to prevent any illegal com- 
merce between France and the colonies. Maurepas, the 
chief minister, talked in the same way, and assured 
Stormont that France would never give any assist- 
ance to the insurgents, directly or indirectly. 

These expressions were not wholly insincere. The 
French were very uncertain what action they would 
take in this crisis, and Vergennes was truthful in dis- 
claiming any strong interest in the principles for 
which the colonists were contending ; but if his state- 
ments were not altogether false at the moment, they 
were far from indicating a settled purpose to take no 
part in the contest between England and her colonies. 

1 Douiol, i, 200. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 51 

Whether these expressions were more or less sin- 
cere, the importance of the American contest was well 
understood. " This," wrote an officer in the West 
Indies, " marks a memorable epoch in the world's his- 
tory. . . . The result will surely affect every com- 
mercial nation on either continent." ^ Vergennes fre- 
quently expressed the same idea. In July he wrote 
saying that England must either lose her colonies or 
destroy them in the effort to hold them, and in either 
event there would be the same loss of trade, the same 
decay in manufactures, and the same destruction of 
national credit.^ 

While Vergennes was giving fair words to the Eng- 
lish ambassador, he wrote in a different strain to the 
Spanish minister, telling of England's crimes and 
suggesting that an opportunity now offered to obtain 
revenge for them. " That nation," he wrote, " is as 
depraved in its politics as in its morals. . . . Eng- 
land is the monster against which we should be always 
prepared." ^ They must not be deceived by any pro- 
fessions of friendliness on the part of England's min- 
isters, he added; they could count on her only so long 
as her domestic embarrassments continued, while the 
great possessions of Spain in America would surely be 
a bait to English greed. 

At so critical a period, the English ministers might 
well have avoided giving unnecessary offence to a pow- 
erful neighbor that bore England no love ; but dip- 
lomatic adroitness has never been an English quality. 
They now pressed irritating inquiries as to Dunkirk, 
where a vigilant watch was constantly kept to see that 
the French King took no steps to fortify his own city. 

1 Doniol, i, 242. 2 July 29, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 96. 

8 July 28, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 115, 



52 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

" This question . . . has been threshed over a hundred 
times," wrote Vergennes in the summer of 1775; "... 
if we have no right to restore what was destroyed by 
virtue of the treaties, we have the right to maintain 
and preserve what was allowed to remain." But still, 
he added, the French officials would be strictly charged 
not to exceed the limits, because the King wished to 
preserve a good feeling between the nations, and not 
to profit by England's embarrassments.^ 

No important event marked the campaign in the 
autumn of 1775. It became evident to Vergennes that 
the uprising of the colonists was no brief or ill-con- 
sidered movement, and yet he believed that unless 
they received foreign aid, the English would succeed 
at last in wearing out their means of resistance. Such 
a result would have been highly unsatisfactory to the 
French, and in December, 1775, Vergennes submitted 
to the King an elaborate statement of his views on the 
question. 

There was little profession of interest in the future 
of the colonies, and this was natural. The relations 
between the French and the English colonists had been 
those of almost perpetual hostility ; they had quar- 
relled and fought for generations. The principles 
which they advocated were soon to excite universal 
sympathy among the French people, but it would have 
been strange if ministers of Louis XVI had kindled 
into enthusiasm over declarations of popular rights 
and denunciations of the tyranny of kings. 

The questions were discussed in cold blood ; there 
was no altruism, no sympathy for a community strflg- 
gling to be free. The minister sought to discover 
wherein lay the interest of France, and this perhaps 

1 Vergennes to Guines, July 22, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 93. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 53 

was the only concern of a French statesman. The 
struggle between the colonies and England deserved 
the attention of all the powers, he said, but France 
and Spain had special reason to watch its progress. 
Left alone, he believed that England would reduce 
her rebellious subjects to submission ; even if the en- 
deavor cost her dear, she would still preserve the mer- 
cantile advantages which commerce with America had 
secured to her. " England," he added, " is the natural 
enemy of France, an enemy greedy, ambitious, unjust, 
and false. The invariable and cherished object of her 
policy is, if not the destruction of France, at least her 
abasement, her humiliation, her ruin." ^ 

Nor did he fear that the independence of the Eng- 
lish colonies would foster other revolutions in the new 
world. They would be fatigued by a long war, they 
would adopt a republican form of government, and it 
was admitted, he said, that republics rarely had the 
spirit of conquest. The history of Greece, of Rome, 
of Venice, might have thrown some doubt on this / 
aphorism, but Vergennes thought there was no reason 
to suppose that the United States would become a 
dangerous neighbor. Accordingly the minister advised 
helping the colonists, so far as it could be done pru- 
dently, and encouraging their efforts by the sugges- 
tion of still more active assistance ; if at the end of 
the next campaign the English had made no further 
progress in reducing the colonies, France might then 
decide to interfere openly and secure their triumph.^ 

Such was the policy which Vergennes advocated at 
the close of 1775, and it was followed. France assisted 
the colonists so far as she could without becoming 

1 Doniol, i, 244. 

2 Doniol, i, 243-249. 



64 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

embroiled with England, but the course of events de- 
layed actual interference until a later date than the 
minister contemplated. 

On February 27, 1776, the report of Bonvouloir 
reached Paris. The rosy accounts which he gave of 
the strength of the American army seemed to confirm 
the reports which had already reached Vergennes by 
way of London. In March the minister submitted to 
the King another carefully prepared paper on the 
American situation, and asked for the opinion of his 
colleagues upon it. The minister now saw danger both 
in the success and in the failure of England, and con- 
templated the possibility of a war against France 
undertaken by Great Britain, either exultant over her 
victory or seeking compensation for what she had lost 
by defeat. " As to the possibility of an invasion," he 
added, " which nothing had provoked, and which 
would be contrary to good faith and the obligation of 
treaties, he would be sadly mistaken who thought the 
English would be restrained by such considerations. 
They regard as just whatever they believe to be 
advantageous.' As a result of his arguments the min- 
ister decided that the continuance of the American 
war would be advantageous to France, and that it 
might offer an opportunity for action which would 
reduce England to a second-class power, strip her of 
the empire which she exercised with equal pride and 
injustice, and deliver the universe from a greedy 
tyrant which sought to absorb all power and all 
wealth. 

But neither France nor Spain was ready for open 
hostilities, so the minister abandoned the alluring 
dream of interference and recommended instead to 
give the insurgents all the secret aid that was possi- 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 55 

ble, without involving the country in actual war ; if, 
on the one hand, the English ministers could be per- 
suaded that France and Spain desired peace, and, on 
the other hand, the courage of the colonists could be 
maintained and their resistance strengthened, this 
would be the best policy for the present, and future 
problems could be considered when they arose. ^ 

Such a programme was in strict accord with the 
classic diplomacy, which indulged in no philanthropy 
and was much addicted to lying. At all events, it was 
favorably received by most of Vergeunes's colleagues 
to whom it was submitted. The Comte de Saint-Ger- 
main was minister of war ; his opinion was brief 
and did little more than echo the views which Ver- 
gennes had advanced. M. de Sartine, the secretary 
of the navy, was equally complacent. But Maurepas, 
whose influence was large with the young King, went 
somewhat further in his reply. While carefully 
guarded in expression, the programme advocated by 
Vergennes would ultimately result in war. Maurepas 
expressed the same purpose ^vith less concealment ; 
he said that while forming these projects for the 
present, it must be remembered that there had never 
been a more favorable opportunity for reducing the 
dangerous power of England than when she was em- 
barrassed and harassed, and when no continental 
power would interfere in her behalf. " From such con- 
siderations," he added, "it might be decided that a 
policy which would be actively offensive might be the 
true way to strengthen France, to weaken England, 
and to secure peace on the Continent, which was con- 
stantly disturbed by English intrigues and English 
money." - 

1 "Considerations " ; Doniol, i, 273-278. 2 Doniol, i, 285. 



56 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

But the policy advocated by Vergennes met with 
no favorable response from the most sagacious of the 
advisers of Louis XVI. The young King displayed 
not only the desire to do right, which he always had, 
but an intelligence and independence which he rarely 
exhibited, when he selected Turgot as his minister of 
finance. Turgot returned this confidence by courage 
in action, and by wisdom in advice, which might have 
averted the dangers awaiting the King, but which re- 
sulted only in bringing about the speedy overthrow of 
the minister. On the American question, as on many 
others, Turgot made no effort to agree with the views 
of his colleagues, and he considered only the financial 
and internal condition of France. 

For a month he meditated on Vergennes's proposi- 
tion, and at last submitted a reply that was sagacious, 
lengthy, but more fitted to excite the ill-will of his 
colleagues than to control the conduct of the King. It 
would have been a better state paper if it had savored 
more of the politician and less of the professor of 
political economy. Turgot detailed with disagreeable 
accuracy the condition of the French treasury, the 
amount of the deficit, the impossibility of making 
ends meet except by a reduction of expenses. The 
King, he said, knew the state of his finances ; that in 
spite of the economies already attempted there was a 
deficit of twenty millions, and this could be overcome 
only by the imposition of new taxes, by open bank- 
ruptcy, or by a further reduction of expenses. War, 
therefore, was the thing most to be avoided, because 
it would render impossible for a long period, and per- 
haps forever, the reforms necessary for the welfare of 
the state and the relief of the people. 

Nor did he view the external situation with the 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGE NNES 67 

eyes of the majority. Colonies, he said, were of small 
commercial value ; it was the part of wisdom to 
change them from subject dependencies to allied 
provinces. "In view of this," he added, "what dif- 
ference does it make to us whether England over- 
comes her rebellious colonies or whether she does 
not?" The loss of her colonies, he truly said, would 
not injure England, and would be a great benefit to 
the commerce of the world. He was less accurate in 
forecasting the commercial policy of the new republic. 
It must become, he declared, a nation of free traders, 
which would throw open its ports to the world, and 
prove to European nations that the colonial system of 
restriction and monopoly was founded on delusion.^ 

Some of Turgot's theories have become common- 
places of political economy, some of them are not yet 
recognized, but in so far as his doctrines were correct 
they were far in advance of the political thought of the 
day, and the addition of unpleasant facts, disagreeably 
told, rendered it still less likely that such revolutionary 
views should make converts. Certain it is that they had 
little effect upon the cabinet of Louis XVI, and Ver- 
gennes went on with his plan for aiding the colonies, 
as if Turgot had never spoken. 

In conformity with the principles of alliance be- 
tween France and Spain, which still controlled the 
French government, Vergennes submitted his argu- 
ments to Charles III as fully as to Louis XVI. They 
met, however, with a cool reception. The Spanish 
government was indifferent, if not inimical, to the 
American colonists ; if war was to be made upon 
England, they desired that the conquest of Portugal 

^ " M^moire sur la Mani^re dont la France," etc. ; CEuvres de Tur- 
got, ii, 551. 



58 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

for Spain should be its object, and they advised an 
attempt to free Ireland rather than the American 
colonies from English rule. The dissensions between 
the English and the Irish were notorious, the Spanish 
ambassador wrote in February, 1776 ; with the help 
of the Irish, who would be ready, Ireland could be 
freed from tyranny and England would be no longer 
a power to fear.^ 

This project was not favorably received at Ver- 
sailles, and the Spanish returned to the American 
proposition. It was not befitting the dignity of the 
two nations, Charles III declared, to make common 
cause with a people in revolt against their sovereign ; 
but it was for their interest to maintain the rebels in 
their insurrection and furnish them secretly all they 
needed in order to keep up the struggle.^ His minis- 
ter Grimaldi viewed the question from a standpoint 
no more altruistic. " Certainly it is for our advan- 
tage," he wrote, " that the revolt of these people 
should continue ; we must wish that they and the 
English should exhaust each other." ^ 

As a result of these deliberations the two nations at 
last decided upon the policy which, for the time being, 
they would adopt in reference to the American colo- 
nies. The French government was not disturbed by 
the idea of making common cause with a people in 
insurrection, as were the ministers of Charles III ; but 
they contented themselves with giving aid which, 
though secret, was none the less valuable. On May 2, 
1776, Vergennes asked Louis XVI to authorize an 
advance of a million livres, which was to be intrusted 
to Beaumarchais for the use of the rebellious coloni&ts, 

1 M. le Comte d'Aranda, Feb., 1776 ; Doniol, i, 352-358. 
3 April 1, 1776 ; Doniol, i, 342. 8 Doniol, i, 370. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF VERGENNES 59 

and this request was gi-anteJ. It was the first direct 
aid given by France to our forefathers, and was the 
beginning of the interference of that country in the 
American Revolution, which at last led to an open 
alliance and war with England. Though such a result 
was contemplated as possible by Vergennes and his 
associates, no decision had yet been reached, and the 
French ministers were desirous to avoid doing anything 
which would necessarily involve their country in war. 
For this reason the action now taken was enveloped in 
mystery. Vergennes did not even venture to write the 
letter concerning the use of the money, nor intrust it 
to his secretary ; it was written by his son, a youth of 
only fifteen, in whose discretion, the father declared, 
absolute confidence could be placed. 

The Spanish were asked to take similar action, and 
to this they agreed. Grimaldi sent to Paris a letter of 
credit for a million livres, to be used for the insur- 
gents in the same manner as the million advanced by 
France.' This moderate sum represented almost the 
entire direct assistance which the Americans received 
from Spain, and it was not given in order to secure 
their success, but in the hope that the contest would 
be prolonged until both sides were exhausted. Hov^- 
ever, the guns and supplies bought with the money 
advanced by Spain were just as useful as if the motive 
of the giver had been more exalted. 

France and Spain resolved on rendering this amount 
of assistance to the cause of the insurgents without 
any direct application from the thirteen colonies. It 
was decided to advance the money, in the hope that it 
would enable the rebellious colonists to prolong their 
resistance and make the situation more disagreeable 
1 Doniol, i, 485. 



60 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

and more embarrassing for England. Indeed, the col- 
onists had not thus far assumed the form of an in- 
dependent government or formally renounced their 
allegiance to the mother country. The progress of 
events soon changed the situation, and the govern- 
ments of France and the United States entered upon 
formal relations with each other. 



CHAPTEK IV 

SILAS DEANE's mission 

Thus far the colonists Lad no official representa- 
tion at the court of France ; their national existence 
had hardly assumed definite form ; but in the summer 
of 1776 an envoy of the new republic arrived at Paris, 
commissioned to ask for the assistance of France. 

When sporadic disturbances developed into actual 
war, the colonists at once considered the question of 
seeking aid from foreign powers. They believed, with 
good reason, that France would be the most likely 
of European nations to render assistance ; she was 
powerful, she was rich, and she hated England. Yet 
it was not without some opposition that the colonists 
decided to ask succor from the French King. It was 
a break with all the traditions of the past ; many who 
had been outspoken against England hesitated to seek 
the aid of a foreign nation against the mother coun- 
try. Then, too, France and the French had been im- 
memorial objects of dislike, sometimes ripening into 
hatred. The French had been the allies of blood- 
thirsty Indians, they had plotted against the peace of 
the English colonists, they had been bad neighbors, 
they were denounced as false in character and Papist 
in faith. 

In September, 1775, a motion was made in Con- 
gress that envoys should be sent to France, and this 
received the active support of John Adams. But he 
was unable to persuade his associates; in his own 



62 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

phrase, " the resolution was murdered." The proposi- 
tion, so Adams wrote, was too much for the nerves of 
Congress, " the grimaces, the agitations, the convul- 
sions were very great." ^ Even Franklin thought that 
a virgin state should not go a-suitoring for alliances, 
an opinion which he found reason to change. 

The progress of events soon did away with any 
such reluctance. A committee of foreign correspond- 
ence was appointed, of which Franklin was made a 
member, and the visit of Bonvouloir, notwithstand- 
ing the guarded expressions of that timid envoy, 
encouraged its members to believe that France was 
ready to come to our aid. Accoi-dingly in March, 1776, 
it was decided to send Silas Deane to Paris to ask 
for clothes, arms, provisions, money, and any other 
assistance that a rich monarchy might extend to a 
needy republic. His qualifications for the position 
were of the slightest. He knew no French, he had 
no diplomatic experience, and in both respects he 
resembled almost all Americans. But he had some 
money and lived with a degree of style which, to his 
simple-minded countrymen, savored of the splendor 
of foreign courts. Unfortunately the social display in 
which Deane had indulged in Connecticut did not 
dazzle the courtiers of Versailles, and, with the best 
intentions, he succeeded in embarrassing his country 
and ruining himself. 

His instructions regulated his conduct with much 
minuteness. He was to assume the character of a 
merchant, and might even pretend to be satisfying the 
curiosity which led so many to visit the renowned city 
of Paris.2 But our forefathers did not intend that 
their agent should waste his time in such occupation. 
1 Works of John Adams, i, 199-201. ' Deane Papers, i, 123. 



SILAS DE AXE'S MISSION 63 

He was directed to see Vergennes as soon as possible, 
and the words he should use were almost put in his 
mouth. He was to suggest the advantages France 
might derive from furnishing assistance to the col- 
onies, and he was to ask for aid on no modest scale ; 
the envoy was to intimate that clothing and arms for 
twenty-five thousand men, one hundred cannon, and 
supplies of any sort would be welcome. To pay for 
these, the colonists would promise to send shiploads 
of American products, though the prospect of pay- 
ment might have seemed doubtful even to the most 
sanguine speculator. 

The inducements for French action were depicted 
in alluring terms : " If France will join us, in time," 
wrote the Secret Committee a little later, " there is 
no danger but America will soon be established as an 
Independent Empire, and France, drawing from her 
the principal part of those sources of wealth and power 
which formerly flowed into Great Britain, will im- 
mediately become the greatest power in Europe." ^ 

If Vergennes should receive these demands coldly, 
Deane was bidden not to be discouraged : he must 
ask the minister to reflect further, inform him that 
the envoy could wait at Paris for a while to receive 
his orders, and endeavor to ascertain if France would 
make a formal alliance when the colonies were or- 
ganized as an independent state. On the whole, in 
their first essay in diplomacy, our ancestors did not 
err in asking for too little, or in understating the 
advantages to the state that should come to their aid. 

Thus instructed, Deane set out on his journey. In 
March, 1776, he sailed from America and, passing by 

^ Deane Papers, i, 298 ; letter from Secret Committee of Oct. 1, 
1776. 



64 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the Bermudas on his voyage, landed in Spain. By this 
circuitous route he escaped the English cruisers ; he 
then made his way over the Pyrenees, visited many 
French cities, and in July, 1776, arrived at Paris. 

On July 17 he was presented to the French Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, and though the conversation 
had to be conducted by interpreters, as has been the 
case with so many American diplomatic representatives 
since Silas Deane, the interview was satisfactory to 
both sides. Deane asked the minister to pardon man- 
ners that perhaps were ill adapted to the usages of 
courts, and assured him the colonies would soon de- 
clare their independence and become a nation. Ver- 
gennes informed him, in words which certainly savored 
of superciliousness, "that the people and their cause 
were very respectable in the eyes of all disinterested 
persons." Our forefathers, at the beginning of the 
struggle, were glad if they and their cause could even 
be considered respectable. 

In a conference of two hours, Deane presented the 
requests of the colonists, and these were received with 
as much favor as he could have hoped. Forgetting the 
assurance he had given Lord Stormont a few months 
earlier, Vergennes now said that while he could not 
openly permit the shipment of military supplies to the 
colonists, no obstacle should be put in the way. In con- 
clusion he bade Deane confer in the future with his 
secretary, Gerard, who understood English and could 
converse with him with facility.* Vergennes did not 
understand English and Deane's French was very im- 
perfect, even at a later period. "M. Deane," Beau- 
marchais wrote some time after this first interview, 
for fear of spies, " does not open his mouth before the 

1 Doniol, i, 494. 



SILAS DEANE'S iMISSION 65 

English-speaking people he meets. He must be the 
most silent man in France, for I defy him to say six 
consecutive words in French." ^ 

Deane profited by his friendly reception, and de- 
voted to the interests of his country an amount of zeal 
for which he received but scanty gratitude, either 
from his contemporaries or from posterity. His in- 
structions were vague, but in a general way he was 
to incline the mind of the French ministers towards 
furnishing aid to the colonists. This task he per- 
formed with much earnestness, and his arguments 
may not have been wholly without influence. No one 
imagined at that time that, ere many generations had 
passed away, the American colonists would become a 
great commercial and manufacturing nation, and that 
Europe would find in them not only profitable cus- 
tomers but dangerous competitors. Every one over- 
estimated, also, the degree in which their trade would 
be governed by sentimental considerations, or by any 
considerations except those of advantage. 

Great Britain, by means of the restrictive laws 
through which every nation then strove to monopolize 
trade with its own colonies, had controlled a large 
portion of the commerce with America. The future 
was to show that she would still control it, because 
her former colonists would find it to their advantage 
to trade with her. But both American representatives 
and French statesmen believed that, as a result of a 
political alliance between the two countries, a vast 
amount of trade which formerly belonged to England 
would in the future be carried on with France. The 
advantages of this Deane described in terms which were 
perhaps more glowing than accurate. He pictured an 
1 Beaumarchais to A^ergennes, Aug, 13, 1776 ; Doniol, i, 501. 



66 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

infinite number of customers who would, in the dim 
future, be crying out for French goods. 

The families of Americans were larger then than 
they are now, and Deane prophesied an increase of 
population that would be in keeping with the increase 
in wealth. " American planters," he wrote, " who, 
from the early age at which their children marry, 
have generally the pleasure of seeing in their lifetime 
their descendants doubling their numbers in the third 
and fourth generations, have also the solid satisfaction 
of finding the produce of the world they were peopling 
increase in equal degree." ^ 

This population, so vastly increased in the third and 
fourth generations, would still, Deane thought, be 
faithful in its love for the soil, a prophecy which has 
not been verified. "The production of necessary raw 
materials for the use of the manufactories and com- 
merce of Europe, as well as the essential ones of bread 
and provisions for the support of mankind, will in all 
probability increase for a century to come, in nearly 
the same ratio as hitherto ; and the aversion of the 
inhabitants of the United Colonies to the sedentary 
employments, joined with the charms found in the 
innocence and simplicity of agriculture in a new coun- 
try, will cooperate with other motives to induce them 
to receive from abroad the manufactures of others 
for the produce of their country. It is impossible for 
any power to become eminent in commerce, without 
excelling in manufactures and navigation. America 
is capable of supporting and increasing both, by her 
supplies and consumption ; attended with this peculiar 
circumstance, the United Colonies will never, let their 
increase of population be ever so great, interfere with 

^ Deane Papers, i, 186 ; Memoir of Aug. 15, 1776. 



SILAS DEANE'S MISSION 67 

the powers of Europe, either in their manufactures or 
commerce, nor, from their situation and climate, can 
they ever become rivals with the colonies of those 
powers in America in their staple produce, but, on the 
contrary, they will (indulged with a free trade to the 
West India Islands) enable them to extend and enlarge 
the cultivation of sugar, cotton, coffee, and their other 
articles, the demand for which yearly increases in 



Europe, to the greatest possible degree." ^ 

The development of the country soon proved Deane's 
arguments to be unfounded. But if Americans have 
not all been satisfied with the charms found in the 
innocence and simplicity of agriculture, if the United 
States have become rivals of the powers of Europe 
both in manufactures and conunerce, Deane was no 
further wrong in his prophecies than men of greater 
sagacity who have tried to forecast the future. 

In his early negotiations, Deane was more embar- 
rassed by an excess of would-be friends of America 
than by any coldness of reception. When Franklin 
visited Paris some years before, he met a Dr. Du- 
bourgand contracted a considerable intimacy with him. 
Dubourg translated some of Franklin's writings into 
French. He early manifested an active interest, not 
only in Franklin, but in the welfare of the revolted 
colonists, and sent long letters to Congress, in which, 
with much exuberance and a good deal of inaccuracy, 
he stated the readiness of France to assist them. Nat- 
urally enough, Deane was advised, when he should 
reach Paris as a stranger, to avail himself of the doc- 
tor's counsel in the intricacies of French diplomacy. 

Dubourg was only too willing to give aid ; he had 
already interested himself in obtaining supplies for 

1 Deane Papers, i, 192. 



68 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the colonists, he wished now to be the intermediary 
between Deane and the French ministry, and to be 
intrusted with the important operations that were 
to grow out of their relations. But, in truth, the doc- 
tor was a fussy and injudicious man, little trusted by 
Vergennes, and filled with an overweening desire to 
make himself prominent in the negotiations between 
France and the colonists. He was a most excellent 
person, but his bustling activity and exuberant vanity 
did not fit him for negotiations which require the 
faculty of working fast and lying freely. 

When Deane arrived, he at once resorted to Du- 
bourg for aid, and the doctor assumed to take charge 
of the American envoy and act as his representative 
with the French ministers ; but, in his desire to appear 
as the best friend of the colonists, Dubourg courted 
a publicity which was distasteful to his superiors. 
He had already asked for aid from the French gov- 
ernment for his American friends, for arms from the 
arsenals, and engineers from the army. Vergennes 
was willing enough to furnish both, but Dubourg 
proved a most indiscreet agent, so pleased with his 
activity that he wished all the world to know what he 
was doing. " One can wink at certain things," the 
minister wrote him, " but one cannot authorize 
them " ; and he bade the doctor pursue his course with 
greater discretion. 

Vergennes decided, therefore, that Beaumarchais 
was better fitted for such enterprises, and he recom- 
mended Deane to confer with the house of Hortalez 
and Company, under which name Beaumarchais did 
business. It was in vain that Dubourg remonstrated 
against this decision. He accompanied Deane to the 
minister's, only to be treated with so little attention 



SILAS DEANE'S MISSION 69 

that the American envoy saw that he would be better 
off unaccompanied by his self-constituted adviser. 
Vergennes wished the part taken by the government 
to be carefully concealed, but the doctor kept talking 
of the plans for assisting America, and left his hearers 
in little doubt as to where the aid would come from. 
Beaumarchais was ready to point out the mistakes of 
his rival. "If, while we close the door on one side," 
he wrote Vergennes, ''the window is opened on the 
other, surely the secret will escape." Silence must be 
imposed on these babblers, he added, who can do 
nothing themselves and who hinder those who can do 
something.^ 

Deane soon discovered that it was not through the 
doctor's agency that he could best reach the ear of 
the French minister. Dubourg, bitterly protesting, 
was no further heeded, and the task of obtaining and 
forwarding supplies to the colonists fell into the hands 
of Beaumarchais. The French minister was ready to 
furnish assistance to the colonists, but he desired to 
conceal such enterprises from the vigilant eye of the 
English ambassador. Deane was accordingly turned 
over to an intermediary who might jDose as a specu- 
lator on his own account, but whose action would, in 
truth, be seconded by the government. We might 
expect that the man chosen for' such an undertaking 
would be some great merchant or some bold specula- 
tor, but Beaumarchais was chiefly known as a famous 
writer of comedies. The part which he took in our war 
for independence was so important and so curious 
that it deserves a careful examination. 

1 Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Sept. 21, 1776 ; Doniol, i, 520. 



CHAPTER V 

BEAUMARCHAIS 

The part taken by Beaiimarchais In furnishing as- 
sistance to American patriots is a picturesque chapter 
in our early history, while the treatment he received 
from the people he befriended is not a thing of which 
we can be proud. There was little in Beaumarchais's 
career that was not picturesque ; he was dramatic in 
life as in literature ; whether he produced comedies 
or transacted affairs of state, he was always amusing, 
and not always high-minded. The morality of Figaro 
was very nearly the morality of the creator of Figaro. 

It was by a devious route that Beaumarchais 
reached the position of a great contractor, the repre- 
sentative of the French government in giving aid to 
a struggling republic. His father was a respectable 
jeweller, by the name of Caron, who made watches 
and practised his trade with much credit and moderate 
pecuniary success. He seems to have been an intel- 
ligent man ; in his letters he expresses himself with 
justness and sometimes with felicity. To his intel- 
lectual qualities the father joined an unusual virility ; 
he married a second time at the ripe age of seventy- 
seven, and espoused his third wife when eighty-six. 

The famous author was born in 1732 in his father's 
shop in the rue Saint-Denis. He learned the trade of 
a watchmaker, and learned it well. When only twenty 
years of age, he invented an improvement in escape- 
ments which brought him some prominence in his 



BE A UMA R CHA IS 71 

craft. Others sought to reap the benefit of the inven- 
tion, but the young Caron early showed skill in liti- 
gation ; he prosecuted the offenders with success, and 
the Academy of Sciences declared that the invention 
belonged to him.* 

Soon he made still more important progress, and 
succeeded in selling some of his watches to Louis XV 
and others of the court. Accordingly he styled him- 
self " Watchmaker to the King," and in the strangely 
compounded assemblage at Versailles, where those of 
every rank and occupation often jostled one another, 
Caron had the entree; he not only sold watches to 
courtiers, but he became in a certain way a member 
of the court, where his good looks and, still more, his 
agreeable conversation made him welcome. The ladies, 
we are told, were pleased, not only by his "lofty 
stature and his slender and elegant figure," but still 
more by the " ardor which he exhibited on their ap- 
pearance." Versailles was in some of its features 
curiously democratic, and the young watchmaker, 
though he did not meet great officials and nobles of 
long descent as an equal, at least had an opportunity 
to meet them. Presently he found a way to render his 
position somewhat more assured, by buying one of 
the innumerable offices which, if they were of little 
worth otherwise, obtained for the holder the right to 
figure as a regular member of the court. Beaumar- 
chais bought the office of controller of the pantry of 
the king's household ; in that capacity he marched 
with the procession that carried the meat to the royal 
table, had the honor of placing some of the dishes 
before the King with his own hands, and then stood 
watching the repast with sword at his side. If his 
^ Louis de Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, i, 19. 



72 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

duties were not weighty, at least they were as im- 
portant as those of the Cravattier in ordinary, or the 
Captain of the Greyhounds of the Chamber. 

The controller of the pantry made another step 
forward when he married a rich widow older than 
himself ; and he took the name of Beaumarchais 
from a small fief belonging to his wife. M. Caron 
borrowed his name from one of his wives, wrote an 
enemy some years later. In 1761 M. de Beaumarchais, 
as he was now called, bought for eighty-five thousand 
francs the office of secretary to the king, which im- 
posed no duties but conferred the rank of nobility.* 
When later he was taunted with being a plebeian, he 
replied that he could easily prove his nobility, he held 
the parchment which conferred it and a receipt for 
the money he had paid for it. No aristocratic preju- 
dices kept the author of " Le Mariage de Figaro" from 
sympathizing with republicans across the Atlantic. 

In his new surroundings Beaumarchais abandoned 
the humble trade of watchmaker, and his active mind 
led him into varied employments. He gave lessons on 
the harp to the daughters of Louis XV, four ex- 
emplary and somewhat insipid princesses, and organ- 
ized concerts which were sometimes honored by the 
presence of the King himself. Such relations flattered 
his vanity, but did not fill his pocket, for he received 
no pay from these august pupils. But he had a taste 
for speculation, and Paris Duverney, the famous con- 
tractor, initiated him, said Beaumarchais, " into the 
secrets of finance." ^ Opportunities to get into enter- 
prises "on the ground floor" could be found in the 
reign of Louis XV, as well as on "Wall Street to-day. 

^ Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, i, 91. 
2 Ibid., 115. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 73 

Beaumarchais profited by such and made money; 
some of it he spent and some of it, like many a 
modern speculator, he lost in other ventures. 

He continued his varied career, and burst into fame 
by a lawsuit with one of the judges of the new courts 
created by Chancellor Maupeou. It is not often that 
one gains literary distinction by legal pleadings, but 
Beaumarchais's pleas, which he prepared himself, were 
read all over Europe ; they excited the admiration of 
Goethe and Voltaire, and by the time the lawsuit 
terminated in a judgment that deprived him of all 
political rights and declared him infamous, he had 
acquired an international reputation, and was one of 
the most popular men in France. " It is not enough 
to be declared infamous," said a friend, who feared 
Beaumarchais's head would be turned by flattery, 
"one must also be modest." 

Beaumarchais's fame as a writer did not diminish 
his taste for speculation, nor his eagerness for work 
in connection with the court, and all these passions 
were gratified by the part he was allowed to take in 
the dealings with the United States. It was during 
a stay in England that he first became interested in 
American matters. His errand illustrated the careless- 
ness and recklessness of the closing years of Louis 
XV's reign. The Treaty of Paris stripped France of 
a large part of her colonial empire, and it was not 
strange that patriotic Frenchmen should devise plans 
of revenge. Yet it was strange that such schemes 
should receive the written approval of the French 
King, and be placed in the hands of diplomatic agents 
as a guide for their conduct. Such, however, was the 
case. Louis XV was too indolent to attend to the 
active duties of his position, but he sought amuse- 



74 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ment in playing at politics. He had a little body of 
secret advisers, and carried on, by their means, a 
personal diplomacy, which had no practical effect ex- 
cept occasionally to embarrass the official representa- 
tives of the state. 

One of these advisers v^^as the Comte de Broglie, 
and he prepared an elaborate plan for the invasion of 
England. Officers were sent to England who investi- 
gated places of landing, means of subsistence, positions 
for camps, and all the detail of an invasion, with as 
much precision as if an army were ready to embark. 
This might have been a harmless diversion, but the 
plan was submitted to the King, who endorsed upon it 
his written approval, with as little consideration as he 
would have given to granting a pension to one of his 
sultanas, and then intrusted it to the Chevalier d'Eon, 
one of his agents in England.^ Eon subsequently 
gained extensive notoriety by the controversy excited 
over the question whether he was a man or a woman. 
This became a favorite subject of wagers with the fre- 
quenters of White's, and enormous sums were staked 
upon it. Eon himself declined to solve the problem, 
and after wearing the garb and leading the life of a 
man and an officer of dragoons for almost fifty years, 
he donned petticoats and for twenty years passed as 
a woman. 

If it was uncertain whether the chevalier was a man, 
there was no doubt that he was a rogue ; he quarrelled 
with the French minister and was presently dis- 
charged from employment, very much out of pocket, 
and the possessor of a document containing a plan 
for the invasion of England and bearing the written 
endorsement of the French King, which members of 

» Due de Broglie, The King's Secret, ii, 80-87. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 75 

the English opposition would gladly buy at any price. 
They had criticized the terms of peace made with 
France ; they declared that the ministry had failed 
to profit by victories won on sea and land, had neg- 
lected to complete the work Pitt had begun and 
thus cripple for all time the dangerous power of 
France. What force would be added to such charges, 
if they could produce a plan for the invasion of Eng- 
land, formally approved by Louis XV, when the ink 
was hardly dry on the Treaty of Paris I Not perfidi- 
ous Albion, but perfidious Gaul would be exposed to 
the contempt of mankind. 

Having rashly intrusted so compromising a paper 
to a most untrustworthy agent, Louis was now iu 
great distress lest the existence of this scheme should 
be disclosed, not only to the English, but to his own 
ministers. The King was somewhat afraid of the wrath 
of Chatham, and much more afraid of the rebuking 
look of Choiseul ; and Eon knew the value of the 
document he held; he would not surrender it; he 
would not expose himself to the dangers of a return 
to France; he intimated that his needs were great 
and the project of an English invasion would not be 
surrendered at the French King's command, but only 
in exchange for the French King's money. 

It was a delicate problem to deal with a rogue who 
was also half crazy, and the King's advisers in these 
foolish schemes now added to his alarm. " Is it not to 
be feared," wrote the Comte de Broglie,* speaking of 
the possibility of Eon revealing his secrets, " that the 
sacred person of your Majesty would be compromised, 
and that a declaration of war on the part of England 
would be the inevitable consequence?" After great 

^ Due de Broglie, The King's Secret, ii, 137. 



76 FRANCE IN THE .REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

disquiet the King made his peace with his dangerous 
subordinate by promising him twelve thousand livres 
per year, and this payment was made with greater 
regularity than Louis observed in dealing with many 
more meritorious creditors. 

Eon kept his peace during the remainder of Louis 
XVs life, but he did not surrender the compromising 
papers. While Louis XVI and his ministers were not 
responsible for these, they knew enough about them 
to be sure that their publication would cause disagree- 
able complications. It was decided to secure them if 
Eon would agree to any reasonable terms, and Beau- 
marehais was selected as the best man for this nego- 
tiation. He had already proved his fitness for such a 
task. In the days of Louis XV, he had been sent to 
London to negotiate for the purchase of all the copies 
of a book purporting to give a history of the early 
career of Madame du Barry. A large sum of money 
had to be paid in order to prevent the publication of 
anything that might cast a shadow on the fair fame 
of that lady, but Beaumarchais performed his errand 
in a manner that secured the good-will of his em- 
ployer. He had again been employed iri securing the 
suppression of a libel on Marie Antoinette, and he 
was now deemed well qualified to deal with a black- 
mailer of another sort. Beaumarchais was superior to 
Eon in adroitness and his equal in freedom from scru- 
ple, and he was sent to England to obtain the incrimi- 
nating documents at the lowest possible figure. 

Accordingly in 1775 he visited London and at last 
made terms with the culprit. Though the chevalier 
was as erratic as he was dishonest, his business quali- 
ties were well developed. Before turning over the 
documents which it was his duty to return, he de- 



BEAUMARCHAIS 77 

raanded twelve thousand livres a year in rentes, and to 
this Beaumarchais agreed.^ In addition, Eon received 
a liberal sum for the payment of his debts, but to 
the contract were annexed some singular stipidations. 
The chevalier agreed that as a condition of his return 
to France he would assume the dress of a woman, and 
continue to wear this for the remainder of his life. 

Beaumarchais, with less acuteness than he usually 
displayed, was convinced that Eon was a woman. " I 
assured this lady," he writes Vergennes, " that if she 
were wise, modest, talked little, and bore herself pro- 
perly, I could probably obtain some further advan- 
tages for her." Eon was wise enough to demand at 
once two thousand crowns to buy a lady's wardrobe, 
and this was granted. On the whole the chevalier got 
the best of the bargain, but still the incriminating 
papers were obtained, and the French government 
was glad to get them back at any price. 

This curious errand, in its indirect results, exer- 
cised a large influence upon Beaumarchais's future 
career, and was not without importance to the thir- 
teen colonies that were about to renounce their alle- 
giance to the English King. Beaumarchais's visits to 
England led to his action in behalf of England's re- 
bellious colonies. He met intimately some of the men 
prominent in the opposition to Lord North, and he 
heard their opinions on American questions ; natu- 
rally enough he formed views as to English sentiment 
that were not always accurate. He was also brought 
into relations with some of the colonists, who were 
intimate with his English friends. "Wilkes, then Lord 
Mayor of London, was an ardent advocate of the 
American cause. Americans were w.elcome and fre- 

1 Lomdnie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, i, 419. 



78 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

quent visitors at the lord mayor's, and among them 
was a young man whose acquaintance Beaumarchais 
was unlucky enough to make.^ 

Arthur Lee was a member of the famous Lee fam- 
ily of Virginia, and was then studying law in Eng- 
land. He possessed a restless desire for prominence, 
and either from natural exuberance of imagination, or 
from a willingness to pervert the facts to suit his 
taste, he was reckless in his statements to an extraor- 
dinary degree. It is hard to say whether he lied in- 
tentionally or from mere inability to tell the truth, 
but his looseness of statement made him a dangerous 
associate. Beaumarchais was not the most cautious of 
men in his talk ; when he and Lee discussed the affairs 
of their respective governments, probably each de- 
ceived the other, and from this intercourse sprang in 
the future many serious complications. Beaumarchais 
believed all of Lee's rosy statements as to the strength 
of the insurgents, and Lee was persuaded that France 
stood ready to assist their cause to the utmost of her 
power. 

Lee sent home a report that, as a result of his la- 
bors, he had an assurance that France would furnish 
/ five million livres' worth of arms and ammunition as 
X a free gift to the United States.^ Beaumarchais was a 
fervent talker, but he could not have made such a 
statement as this. Lee reported this fable, partly from 
his eagerness to make himself prominent as one who 
had extracted great promises of aid, and partly, doubt- 
less, deceived by his own heated imagination. 

At all events, Beaumarchais suggested to the French 
government the advisability of lending aid to the col- 

* Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, ii, 113. 
1/ s Jiid.^ ii^ 115. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 79 

onies, and when Beaumarchais had undertaken a cause, 
he gave his whole soul to it. Even if he overestimated 
the strength of the insurgents and the weakness of 
England, he saw more clearly than many statesmen 
the opportunity which France had to injure her an- 
cient rival, and he manifested an interest in the cause 
of America that was then felt by few Frenchmen. 
The creator of Figaro must be counted among the 
eai-liest friends of the American Republic, and the 
services he rendered were by no means inconsiderable. 

The American cause excited in Beaumarchais a 
genuine enthusiasm, though doubtless his zeal for lib- 
erty was increased by his desire to take an active part 
in the relations between the French court and the 
patriots. His dealings with the Americans exhibited 
that mixture of motives which is found in the actions 
of most men. He was eager to take a part in politics, 
and he found pleasure in the intrigues and secrecy in 
which plans for assistance to the colonists were in- 
volved ; he did not disdain the possibility of pecuniary 
gain from his labors, but in addition to this he was 
sincerely eager for the success of the colonists, and 
one of the first to feel a strong sympathy with the 
young nation struggling for independence. 

In September, 1775, having returned to Paris, he 
submitted to the King a formal memoir in which he 
predicted the triumph of the colonies. The Comte de 
Vergennes was inclined to favor the insurgents, but 
he hesitated before taking any overt action. Beau- 
marchais, therefore, devoted himself to arousing Louis 
XVI and his minister to activity; the task was not an 
easy one, but nothing discouraged his patriotic zeal. 
England, he wrote, was in such a state of disorder 
within and without, that her ruin was near at hand, 



80 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

if her rivals would seize their opportunity. The re- 
sources and the virtues of the insurgents were then 
depicted in a manner that the facts did not wholly 
warrant. The Americans, wrote Beaumarchais, would 
suffer all things rather than yield ; they were not only 
full of enthusiasm for liberty, but thirty-eight thou- 
sand men, resolute and well armed, were ready to de- 
fend the cause, without taking one workman from the 
factory or one tiller from the soil. " Every fisherman," 
he continued, "reduced to poverty by the English, 
has become a soldier and vows he will avenge the ruin 
of his family and his country's liberty." 

From this glowing picture, which was partly due to 
Arthur Lee's heated imagination, Beaumarchais de- 
clared the Americans to be invincible, while so griev- 
ous was England's strait that the King was not sure 
of his crown and the ministers were not sure of their 
heads. " This poor English people," he writes, " with its 
frantic liberty, inspires compassion in every reflecting 
mind. Never has it known the pleasure of living tran- 
quilly under a wise and virtuous king." ^ Beaumar- 
chais's eloquence was rarely without some personal end. 
He drew as a moral from the situation that the French 
ministry was ill informed, that it was delaying impor- 
tant action, and that the services of an active, intel- 
ligent man were absolutely required in London. 

Though Louis XVI was a wise and virtuous king, 
his mind worked slowly, and all this eloquence did 
not make him a convert to the American cause. Beau- 
marchais was not a man to brook delay. This letter 
was written on September 21, and on the next day he 
wrote again, complaining to Vergennes that the Coun- 

^ Memoir, Sept. 21, 1775; Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, ii, 
92-96. 



BE A UMA R CHA IS 81 

cil had taken no action. " All the wisdom of the 
world," he wrote, " will not enable a man to decide 
on the policy he should pursue, if he receives no an- 
swers to his letters. . . . Am I an agent who may- 
prove useful to his country, or am I a deaf and dumb 
traveller?"^ 

Beaumarchais's usefulness might be questioned, but 
it was certain that he would not remain a mute. 
Though he complained of delay and bewailed the loss 
of time, his suggestions were followed with consider- 
able promptness, and on the following day, September 
23, he was again on his way to London. His activity 
had already excited the suspicions of the English min- 
isters, and he was now given the nominal errand of 
buying old Portuguese piastres, which were to be sent 
to some of the French islands and there used as cur- 
rency. In fact, he was commissioned as an agent to in- 
vestigate the condition of English feeling, to ascertain 
the sti'ength of the American colonists, and to make 
suggestions that might be valuable to his government, 
but he was strictly warned that he must do and say 
nothing that could be embarrassing to the French 
King. "Let your Excellency be at ease," he wrote 
Vergennes ; " it would be an unpardonable folly in 
such a matter to compromise the dignity of my master 
or his minister. ... To do one's best is nothing in 
politics ; it is by doing the best possible that one dis- 
tinguishes one's self from the ordinary run of public 
servants." 

In December, 1775, he addressed another long com- 
munication to the sovereign, who thus far had received 
his suggestions with silent disapproval. " There are 
plans of such importance," he now wrote, " that a zeal- 
1 Lom^nie, Beaumarckais et son Temps, ii, 98. 



82 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ous servant must present tliem more than once." His 
suggestions, so Vergennes informed him, had been 
rejected, " not because they possessed no utility, but 
from the delicate conscientiousness of the King." 

Delicate scruples did not appeal to the creator of 
Figaro, nor, for that matter, to the diplomats of that 
age. Beaumarchais insisted that Louis must rise to 
the heights of political expediency, where the first law 
was to do the best for one's self, though this should, 
indeed, be accomplished with the least possible wrong 
to other governments. National policy, he declared, 
differed wholly from the civil morality which gov- 
erned individuals. Starting with this moral principle, 
he reached the conclusion that Louis owed it to the 
French people, whose father he was, to weaken Eng- 
land, their eternal foe. " Such," he said, after ex- 
pounding England's wickedness in the past, " is the 
audacious, unbridled, shameless people you will always 
have to deal with. . . . Have the usurpations and 
outrages of that people, recognized any limit but their 
own strength ? . . . The most solemn treaty of peace 
is to this usurping nation merely a truce demanded 
by an exhausted people ; and yet your Majesty is so 
delicate and conscientious as to hesitate." Were men 
angels, he added, the devices of politics could be dis- 
dained, and earth would be a celestial abode ; but 
while men were men, and the English were wicked, 
one must profit by their troubles. The English had 
chased the French from three quarters of the globe, 
they had seized the ships of the French King in time 
of peace and forced him to destroy his finest harbor, 
a humiliation which made the heart of every true 
Frenchman bleed ; the King must not be deceived by 
the sophisms of a false sensibility, but must find in 



BE A UMA R CHA IS 83 

England's necessity France's opportunity. " May the 
guardian angel of the state incline the heart and mind 
of your Majesty," was the pious sentiment with which 
Beaumarchais ended his long appeal, which was zeal- 
ous almost to impertinence.^ 

Two months later the untiring agent sent another 
long communication, in which he again urged that 
aid be given to the Americans. The quarrel between 
America and England, he said, with just foresight, 
was to divide the world and change the system of 
Europe, and every person should consider how the im- 
pending separation would work to his own gain or 
loss. And then he proceeded to show that it was for 
the interest of France to aid the insurgents ; that the 
Americans must be helped, was the proposition he 
sought to demonstrate.^ 

His letter discloses how far his mind was influenced 
by the exuberant promises of Arthur Lee, the man 
who was destined to be the cause of Beaumarchais's 
financial ruin in his dealings with the United States. 
"A secret representative of the colonies, in London," 
so he wrote, "discouraged by the failure of his efforts 
through me to obtain from the French minister sup- 
plies of powder and munitions of war, said to-day, ' Has 
France absolutely decided to refuse us all succor, and 
thus become the victim of England and the laughing- 
stock of Europe ? . . . We offer France in return for 
secret assistance a treaty of commerce which will 
secure to her for a certain number of years after the 
peace all the benefits with which for a century we 
have enriched England.' " 

If the ministers desired to avoid a war with Eng- 

^ Beaumarchais to Louis, Dec. 7, 1775 ; Doniol, i, 251. 
=» Same to Same, Feb. 29, 1776; Doniol, i, 403-407. 



84 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

land, this could only be done, so Beaumarchais de- 
clared, by furnishing secret aid to the Americans 
which would enable them to maintain the contest ; 
otherwise England, after subduing her colonists, 
would send her victorious fleets to despoil France 
of her remaining possessions in the West Indies. 

To secure the advantages which the situation of- 
fered, Beaumarchais proposed a scheme which was 
agreeable to himself. It was possible, he wrote, to 
aid the colonists without involving France in war; 
they might receive succor which could not be shown 
to come from the French government ; and he added: 
" If your Majesty has not a fitter man to employ, I 
will undertake the enterprise and no one shall be 
compromised. My zeal will better supply my lack of 
capacity, than the ability of another could replace my 
zeal." 

In May, 1776, Beaumarchais returned to Paris, 
and on the day of his arrival he sent post-haste to 
Vergennes to demand an audience. " At three o'clock 
in the morning," he wrote, "my servant will be at 
Versailles for your levee. He will return in time for 
mine. I hope he will bring the tidings which I await 
with the utmost impatience, and that is, permission 
to go and assure you of my devotion." ^ 

So eager an emissary could not long be delayed. 
The plan of operations was acceptable to Vergennes, 
and in May the minister wrote the French ambassador 
at Madrid that, although the government was not 
ready to make any combination with the Americans, 
and that even to furnish them with arms and muni- 
tions of war might be proceeding too openly, yet the 
King had decided to lejid them a million livres with 

1 Doniol, i, 483. 



BE A UMA R CHA IS 85 

which they could buy what they needed. All, he 
added, would be done in the name of a commercial 
firm which would color its zeal by the appearance of 
desiring to take a great part in American trade, when 
this should become possible.^ The uncertainty of any 
repayment seems to have been recognized, for Yer- 
gennes adds that the company would furnish securi- 
ties, "to tell the truth, not very binding." In this 
plan the Spanish King had agreed to join, and he was 
therefore to send a million livres to be used in the 
same way. 

Beaumarchais had convinced Vergennes, if not the 
King, and he now formed the imaginary house of 
Roderigue Hortalez and Company, to carry into effect 
his scheme. The taste for Spanish literature which 
he showed in his plays appeared in the title which 
he selected for the mythical firm ; it was Spanish, 
high-sounding, and fictitious. In the name of this 
house supplies were to be sent to the insurgents, 
the government furnishing as much money as it was 
willing to advance, and supplying munitions of war 
from the royal storehouses. How far the advances of 
the French King were to be repaid was left in ob- 
scurity. If Beaumarchais could obtain payment from 
the Americans, he was to do so ; if he failed in this, 
it seems doubtful whether the French government 
intended to press its claim. It was evident that the 
enterprise would require considerable sums of money 
above any supplies furnished by the state, and to this 
extent, at least, Beaumarchais contemplated a specu- 
lation on his own account which might prove profit- 
able, but was certain to be attended with risk ; his 
ships might be captured by the English, or their 
1 Doniol, i, 375. 



86 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

contents might never be paid for by the Americans ; 
but he feared the danger of loss as little as he feared 
the judgment of a court. 

On June 10, 1776, the French government made 
an advance of one million livres,^ and Beaumarchais 
executed a receipt for the money, adding, " Of which 
I am to render an account to the said Sieur Comte 
de Vergennes." On August 11, 1776, the million 
livres arrived from Spain, and this also was given 
to Beaumarchais through the medium of the French 
government, and for this he executed a similar re- 
ceipt, saying, " The use of which I am to account for 
to his Excellency M. le Comte de Vergennes." The 
second receipt did not figure in subsequent trans- 
actions, but a reference to the first advance of a 
million livres was subsequently made by the French 
government in stating the moneys it had furnished to 
the colonies, and caused Beaumarchais untold woe. 
Whether any of this money was ever repaid does not 
appear, but we can safely assume that it was not. 
Doubtless Beaumarchais used the two millions in the 
purchase of supplies for the Americans, and in the 
course of his transactions with them. For that pur- 
pose the money was given him, and Vergennes never 
found any fault with his administration of the fund. 

In the mean time a new actor appeared on the scene. 
In July, 1776, Silas Deane arrived in Paris with a 
commission from Congress to purchase supplies, which 
were to be paid for by the proceeds of cargoes of pro- 
duce shipped from this country. Vergennes was ready 
to assist the colonists if he could do so without being 
found out, and he suggested to Deane that he had best 
apply to Beaumarchais, who was prepared to deal with 

^ Lomdnie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, i, 439. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 87 

such matters on a large scale. Beaumarchais met these 
overtures with alacrity, and at once offered to ship 
merchandise on the credit of Congress, to the amount 
of three million livres.^ The American representative 
felt, however, a certain distrust of Beaumarchais's 
ability to perform this agreement, he being known, 
so says the report, "as a man of more genius than 
property"; but Vergennes replied there need be no 
fear. " That a man," Deane writes to the Secret Com- 
mittee, "should, but a few months since, confine him- 
self from his creditors, and now on this occasion be 
able to advance half a million, is so extraordinary 
that it ceases to be a mystery " ; and the explanation 
was, as Deane adds, that " everything he says, writes 
or does, is in reality the action of the ministry." ^ 

Beaumarchais admitted that his resources for aid- 
ing the colonists were by no means as great as he de- 
sired, and, therefore, he must have iDrompt returns in 
order to continue his advances; but, he adds, " I desire 
to serve your country as if it were my own, and I hope ,/ 
to find in the friendship of a generous people the true 
reward of a labor that I consecrate to them." ^ 

A contract was promptly entered into, which was 
plainly within the authority Deane had received from 
Congress, and Vergennes gave his assurance that 
Beaumarchais would be pi"operly supported, and be 
able to fill his engagements on the most advantageous 
terms. By this contract Beaumarchais was authorized 
to procure the supplies desired and ship them to 
America, and these were to be paid for by the pro- 
ceeds of tobacco and other articles, which would be 
shipped by Congress as fast as vessels could be pro- 

^ B. F. Stevens, Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives re- I 
lating to America, no. 890. 

2 Beane Papers, i, 183, 217. » July 22, 1776 ; Ihid., 158. 



88 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

vided. Twelve months, it was said, would be the long- 
est credit required, and it was hoped that consider- 
able remittances would be made within six months.^ 

The fact that these supplies were to be paid for was 
specified with frequency and clearness in the contract 
with Deane, and Congress hardly seems justified in 
assuming later that they were not to be paid for, 
merely because Arthur Lee said so. In the instruc- 
tions given to Silas Deane, requesting him to obtain 
clothing and arms for twenty-five thousand men, the 
Committee said : " We mean to pay for the same by 
remittances to France " ; while as to linens, woollens, 
etc., they were to be settled for at once and no credit 
asked. ^ In conformity with these instructions Deane 
promised prompt payment to Beaumarchais's house, 
and reported to Congress the purchase of the goods, 
and also that he had certified to the merchants " that 
the Congress would pay for whatever stores they would 
credit them with." He adds further on that he is 
negotiating for purchases from Beaumarchais on a 
credit of eight months from the time of delivery. " If 
I effect this, as I undoubtedly shall, I must rely on the 
remittances being made this fall and winter without 
fail, or the credit of the Colonies must suffer." ^ 

Beaumarchais himself was equally explicit, when 
he reported this transaction to the Secret Committee. 
He speaks of the cargoes that were to be sent in re- 
turn and says, " I request you, gentlemen, to send me 
next spring, if it is possible for you, ten or twelve 
thousand hogsheads, or more if you can, of tobacco 
from Virginia, of the best quality." ^ It should be 

^ Beam Papers, i, 153. 

^ Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 
Francis Wharton, editor, ii, 79. Cited hereafter as " Wharton." 

3 Wharton, ii, 113-120. ^ Wharton, ii, 129. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 89 

said that the Secret Committee never sent a reply to 
any letters of Roderigne Hortalez.and Company; hut 
that unlucky firm could hardly regard this as signi- 
fying that their offer of supplies was accepted, while 
their request for payment was declined. 

It was agreed that two hundred brass cannon and 
arms and clothing for twenty-five thousand men should 
be provided, and more if they could be procured. If 
Beaumarchais's anticipations had been verified, very 
much larger quantities would have been supplied. In 
February he had submitted a further letter to the 
King, by which he showed that if money to the amount 
of a million livres could be furnished Hortalez and 
Company, and tobacco be promptly received in pay- 
ment and sold at the satisfactory figures that Beau- 
marchais anticipated, by the time the King had invested 
for the second time the profits of the operation, the 
Americans would receive two millions in gold and 
seven millions in powder, and this would continue to 
increase in geometrical progression, using three as a 
multiple : " If the first million produced three, these 
three employed in further operations, on the same 
theory, ought to produce nine, and these nine, twenty- 
seven, etc., as I think I have sufficiently demon- 
strated." ^ Unfortunately, the demonstration of Beau- 
marchais was not realized, any more than that of 
Deane showing the immense return the French would 
enjoy from America's commercial favor. 

All shipments were to be made in the name of the 
mythical house of Roderigue Hortalez and Company. 
The French King could do nothing himself towards 
providing the insurgents with contraband of war, but 
it was correctly assumed that his officials would wink 
1 Deane Papers, i, 110-115. 



90 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

very hard when Beaumarchais was smuggling such 
articles out of the country to be sent to America. 

The task of furnishing these supplies was beset 
by difficulties of every kind, and had it not been 
for Beaumarchais's indefatigable zeal, it is doubtful 
whether the much-needed powder, guns, and clothing 
would ever have reached the American army. The 
first embarrassment arose from the jealousy of those 
who wished to take part in the work and found them- 
selves superseded. Dr. Dubourg regarded himself as 
the unofficial representative of the colonies, and was 
greatly displeased when he found that Beaumarchais 
had been selected as the person to furnish them 
aid. His vanity was injured, and probably he hon- 
estly believed that a man of Beaumarchais's erratic 
character was ill adapted to the business of obtaining 
coats, powder, and second-hand guns, and shipping 
them over to America. Accordingly he wrote Ver- 
gennes, protesting against this selection. " He likes 
splendor," said the doctor ; " it is asserted that he 
maintains young ladies at his expense ; in short he 
passes for a prodigal ; in France there is no mer- 
chant . . . who would not hesitate very much to 
transact business with him." * 

This accusation, it is feared, amused Vergennes, 
instead of alarming him, and he forthwith transmitted 
it to the culprit. Beaumarchais at once sent a chai-ac- 
teristic reply. " How does it affect our business, if 
I like pomp and splendor, and maintain young ladies 
in my house ? The ladies . . . are your very humble 
servants. There were five, four sisters and a niece. . . . 
Two of the girls have died, to my great sorrow. I now 
keep there only two sisters and a niece. . . . But what 
^ Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, ii, 120. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 91 

would you think of it, if . . . you had been aware 
that I carry the scandal so far as to support . . . two 
young and pretty nephews, and even the miserable 
father who brought such a scandalous person into the 
world ? As to my splendor, it is still worse. . . . The 
best black cloth is not too good for me, sometimes 
I even push my recklessness so far as to wear silk 
when it is very warm, but I supplicate you not to re- 
port these things to the Comte de Vergennes. You 
would entirely destroy me in his opinion." ^ " Deliver 
us," he writes again, " from this blundering and fatal 
agent, this cruel babbler, this doting doctor." 

Having made his contract, Beaumarchais under- 
took its execution with characteristic ardor. He rented 
in the Faubourg du Temple an enormous house known 
as the Hotel de Hollande, in which the Dutch am- 
bassadors had formerly dwelt ; there a great force of 
clerks and employees were installed, and there the 
famous author was himself to be found early and 
late, overseeing the operations of the house of Hor- 
talez and Company with an energy that, to some ex- 
tent, compensated for deficiencies in business methods 
and ignorance of commercial affairs. Undeterred by 
opposition, Beaumarchais proceeded to fulfil his part 
of the agreement with zeal, though not always with 
discretion. He announced his purpose to the Secret 
Committee of Congress in the extraordinary language 
which the imaginary Hortalez generally used in his 
business correspondence. " The respectful esteem 
which I have toward that brave people who so well 
defend liberty under your guidance, has induced me 
to form a plan of concurring in the great work by 
establishing an extensive commercial house solely for 
1 Lomdnie, Beaumarchais et son Tem^s, ii, 120-125. 



92 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the purpose of serving you in Europe and supplying 
you with necessaries of every kind. . . . Your depu- 
ties, gentlemen, can find in me a sure friend, an 
asylum in my house, money in my coffers, and every 
means of facilitating their operations." The King of 
France, he said, and his ministers, must manifest op- 
position to anything that carried the appearance of 
violating treaties with foreign powers. " But," he 
added, " I promise you, gentlemen, that my inde- 
fatigable zeal shall never be wanting to clear up diffi- 
culties, soften prohibitions, and facilitate the opera- 
tions of a commerce which your advantage, more than 
my own, has made me undertake." ^ 

It must be said that his performance very nearly 
equalled his promise. He ransacked the government 
storehouses in order to obtain arms ; he purchased 
clothes and chartered vessels. A fevered activity per- 
vaded the Hotel de Hollande, where tranquil Dutch 
ambassadors had formerly smoked and dozed. Com- 
plications constantly arose from the desire of the 
French government to avoid any responsibility for 
what Beauraarchais was doing. There was an abun- 
dance of brass cannon in the armories, but the arms 
of France were stamped on them ; if any of these 
were captured by the English it would be apparent 
that they had been furnished by the French King. In 
view of this, Vergennes said the arms must be erased, 
if it could be done without weakening the cannon too 
much, and if this was not possible, then new guns 
must be cast.^ But Beaumarchais obtained, mostly 
from the French arsenals, over two hundred cannon, 
twenty-five thousand guns, two hundred thousand 

1 Wharton, ii, 129. 

2 Narrative of Bancroft ; Deane Papers, i, 182. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 93 

pounds of powder, twenty or thirty brass mortars, 
and clothing and tents for twenty-five thousand 
men, and these he loaded on boats which he himself 
provided. 

The work was necessarily attended with much pub- 
licitj% and the report of it soon came to the ears of 
the English ambassador. At this period Lord Stor- 
mont haunted Vergennes's chamber with complaints, 
almost always well founded, of the assistance France 
was giving the rebels, in violation of all principles of 
neutrality, and he now protested with special vigor 
against allowing these ships to sail, laden with con- 
traband of war for the use of the American insur- 
gents. 

Vergennes maintained the farce of neutrality, and 
directed them to be stopped. He was perhaps the 
more ready to do this because the affairs of the colo- 
nists were at this time in very unpromising condition 
and it seemed probable that their struggle for inde- 
pendence would result in entire failure. 

Beaumarchais was indefatigable in his efforts to get 
the boats off, but was not always equally judicious. 
He went to Havre on this errand, and Kalb, with 
good reason, complained of his conduct. It was impor- 
tant that his presence should not be known, and he 
accordingly assumed the name of Darant. But, wrote 
Kalb, there was little gain in that, when he occupied 
any leisure hours in superintending the representa- 
tion of one of his comedies, and drilling the actors at 
the rehearsal.^ There were inconveniences in purchas- 
ing powder and clothing from a man of genius. 

At last, however, in December, 1776, the Amphi- 
trite, one of Beaumarchais's boats, actually set sail. 
1 Deane Papers, i, 433. 



94 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

But the exultation over its departure was soon turned 
to sorrow. There sailed on it an officer named du 
Coudray, one of the numerous French volunteers 
whom Deane employed in the service of the United 
States, and whose misdeeds had much to do with the 
ill-favor into which he later fell in his own country. 
Du Coudray insisted that his services would be inval- 
uable to the colonies, and Deane took him at his own 
estimate. By the contract made with him, he was to 
be a major-general and command the engineer corps, 
with power to fill all vacancies. He was to have 
horses and carriages, at the expense of the colonists, 
in going from one place to another, and at the end of 
his service he was to be retired on an " honorable 
annual stipend." 

The employment of this man was an instance of 
the lamentable lack of judgment which finally in- 
volved Deane, a well-meaning and, at the beginning, 
an honest man, in utter ruin. He wrote of du Coudray 
that he was " a plain, modest, active, sensible man." * 
Of all the undesirable foreign recruits who sought 
their own advantage under the guise of coming to our 
assistance, du Coudray was perhaps the least entitled 
to be designated by any of those adjectives. He sopn 
showed the manner of man he was. The accommo- 
dations on the Amphitrite were not to his taste, and 
he accordingly ordered her to return, and in January 
the boat sailed back into port. 

Both Deane and Beaumarchais were in despair.^ 
'•'The devil is in our affairs," wrote Beaumarchais, 
and with good reason he poured reproaches on du 
Coudray, and directed him to turn over the command 
to another officer. Two other boats were ready to sail, 
1 Wharton, ii, 124 ; Beane Papers, i, 229. ^ Wharton, ii, 252. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 95 

and Beaumarcliais gave Vergennes no rest until the 
prohibition upon their departure was revoked. If this 
was not done openly, it was done secretly ; and, at last, 
thanks to the connivance of the Trench government, 
the three boats set sail for America, carrying much- 
desired provisions and a considerable number of 
officers. Some of these proved less valuable than the 
powder and cannon, but among them was Steuben, 
and his virtues atoned for the deficiencies of many 
others. 

Beaumarchais was indefatigable as a correspond- 
ent, and embellished the details of warfare with the 
flowers of rhetoric. He sent over a recommendation 
of Steuben in which he wrote : " The art of making 
war with success being the fruit of courage combined 
with prudence, intelligence and experience, a com- 
panion in arms of the gi-eat Frederick, who was with 
him during twenty-two years, seemed to us all a man 
most fit to assist Monsieur Washington." 

Beaumarchais's ships escaped the perils of the sea 
and the vigilance of British cruisers. They reached 
Portsmouth and landed greatly needed supplies in 
time to be used against Burgoyne. Many a soldier who 
marched in that campaign wore shoes on his feet, a 
coat on his back, and carried a gun on his shoulder, 
which came from the magazines of Louis XVI, and 
had been procured and furnished by the author of the 
"Barbier de Seville." Several more ships, loaded by 
Beaumarchais, were allowed to sail from France and 
in due time reached their destination. By September, 
1777, he had shipped munitions of war to the value 
of five million livres. 

But the shiploads of tobacco and American pro- 
duce, the proceeds of which were to pay for all this, 



96 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

did not make their appearance ; he did not even get 
a letter acknowledging the arrival of the boats and the 
receipt of the- supplies. In October, he wrote in char- 
acteristic tone : " There is no news from A merica, 
and no tobacco either. This is depressing, but depres- 
sion is a long way from discouragement." ^ 

His troubles grew largely out of the indefatigable 
and pernicious activity of Arthur Lee. Lee was one 
of the most suspicious, the most atrabilious, and the 
most cantankerous persons whom the Revolution pro- 
duced, and he excited in those with whom he had to 
deal a degree of irritation difficult to describ^. He 
was eager to take a prominent part, and jealous of 
those who were preferred to him ; believing all men 
to be liars except himself and possibly John Adams, 
with an extraordinary power of hating, an endless 
fund of acrimony, and an exhaustless capacity for 
lying, he did an amount of evil out of all proportion 
to his very moderate ability. When he found that 
Beaumarchais was dealing with Deane instead of with 
him, he took steps which proved very disastrous to 
the creator of Figaro. 

Lee wrote Congress that these munitions of war 
were not to be paid for, but were the free gift of the 
French King. " M. de Vergennes," he said, " has re- 
peatedly assured us that no return was expected for 
the cargoes sent by Beaumarchais. This gentleman is 
not a merchant, he is known to be a political agent 
employed by the Court of France." If the latter as- 
sertion was true, the former was the reverse of the 
truth. Vergennes had said nothing of the sort, and 
Lee's statement was an unblushing lie. The French 
court had furnished Beaumarchais with one million 
1 Deane Papers, i, 318. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 97 

livres, and Spain as much more, and while he was 
instructed to get pay for all the supplies, it is not 
probable that the advance of the two millions was 
regarded as a business transaction. But the material 
furnished by Beaumarchais absorbed much more than 
the two millions, and for all over that amount he had 
advanced his own money and that of his associates, or 
pledged their credit. He now asked for payment as 
agreed. Lee said nothing was to be paid, and inti- 
mated that the demand was in fraud of the French 
government, and intended to fill the pockets of Beau- 
marchais and Deane with illegal gains. Congress 
knew not what to do, and in its perplexity was in- 
clined to do nothing. When it was difficult to pay 
debts of unquestioned legality, it was easy to delay 
payment of claims which perhaps were not debts at all. 

So no tobacco was sent, and the enterprising firm of 
Hortalez and Company soon found itself in financial 
distress, Beaumarchais applied to Yergennes for relief, 
and succeeded in extracting another million to help 
him out, but there still remained a large balance. Pie 
repeatedly asked for payment. Lee as repeatedly as- 
sured Congress that these demands were either part of 
a commercial comedy and not intended to be answered, 
or rascally attempts to cheat Congress and defeat the 
liberal purposes of the French King.^ It was in vain 
that Beaumarchais wrote that he had exhausted his 
money and his credit. Congress insisted upon regard- 
ing him as a generous benefactor, who, representing 
the French King, was sending goods from love and 
asking pay for amusement. 

At last one small cargo of rice and indigo reached 
France, and even this the American envoys said be- 
i Wharton, i, 402, 494. 



98 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

longed to them. Beaumarcliais got possession of the 
cargo, but it was worth only one hundred and fifty- 
thousand livres. "You will see,", he wrote his agent 
in America, " that there is a great difference between 
this drop of water and the ocean of my debts. . . . 
I am contending with obstacles of every nature, but I 
struggle with all my might, and I hope to conquer 
with patience, credit and money. The enormous losses 
to which all this puts me appear to affect no one ; the 
minister is inflexible, even the deputies at Passy claim 
the honor of annoying me, — me, the best friend of 
their country." ^ 

All this seems to be strictly correct, and it is sad 
to know that the ships laden with tobacco, in visions 
of which Beaumarchais indulged in this letter, never 
appeared on the horizon. Yet it is not remarkable that 
Congress thought him a merchant of so strange a type 
that it could hardly be believed he was selling them 
goods in the expectation of payment ; for, after lament- 
ing his woes, he continued in his letter : " Through all 
these annoyances, the news from America overwhelms 
me with joy. Brave, brave people, their warlike con- 
duct justifies my esteem and the noble enthusiasm felt 
for them in France. Finally, my friend, I only wish 
some return from them in order to meet my engage- 
ments, and be able to serve them anew." 

His relations with the colonies still rested upon the 
agreement signed by Deane. He had delivered large 
quantities of supplies and received small remittances 
in return, and he therefore sent one Francy to the 
United States, to see if he could not obtain some set- 
tlement of past accounts, and make satisfactory ar- 

1 Beaumarchais to Francy, Dec. 20, 1777 ; Lom^nie, Beaumarchais 
et son Temps, ii, 147. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 99 

rangements for the future. "Be like me," be writes 
his agent, in a tone that certainly is not often assumed 
by merchants, "despise small considerations, . . .and 
small resentments. I have enlisted you in a magnifi- 
cent cause. You are the agent of a man who is gener- 
ous and just. Remember that success is due to fortune, 
that the money owing me is at the hazard of a great 
combination of events, but that my reputation is my 
own, and that you to-day are the artisan of your own 
good name. Let it be always good and all will not be 
lost, whatever may happen to the rest."^ " After what 
I have done," he added, "I hope that Congress will 
not doubt that the most zealous partisan of the Re- 
public in France is your friend Roderigue Hortalez 
and Company." 

It seems immaterial whether or not Deane had au- 
thority to contract with Hortalez and Company: the 
guns and powder, the coats and shoes had been 
shipped, they had been received and used by American 
soldiers. But any further transactions were put upon 
a still surer basis, as a result of Francy's negotiations. 
In April, 1778, a contract was executed between the 
commissioners of Congress and the adventurous house 
of Hortalez and Company. It recited that the house 
had already shipped considerable quantities of arms, 
ammunition, and clothing, which had been received by 
the agents of the United States, and that they were 
willing to continue furnishing supplies if satisfactory 
assurance were given for payment at a just price. It 
was therefore agreed that the cost of the shipments 
already made should be fairly stated at current prices ; 
that orders thereafter given should be filled at not 

1 Beaumarchaia to Francy, Dec. 20, 1777 ; Lom^nie, Beaumarchais 
et son Temps, ii, 147. 



100 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

higher figures, adding ,only the usual mercantile 
charges at the places whence they were exported ; 
that the agents of Congress should be allowed to in- 
spect all goods, and reject those which they should 
judge too dear or unfit for use. It was further agreed 
that bills might be drawn on the house of Hortalez 
and Company for the accommodation of Congress, to 
the amount of twenty-four millions of livres, payable 
during the ensuing year. In consideration of this the 
committee promised that cargoes of merchandise 
should be shipped to Hortalez and Companj^ who 
would credit our government with the proceeds of the 
sales ; that they should be allowed 6 per cent interest 
on advance, together with a commission of 2^ per cent 
on the amount of invoices, freight, and moneys paid 
and disbursed by them for the account of the United 
States ; and that remittances should be made to them 
from time to time in jiroduce or money until the en- 
tire indebtedness should be discharged. This agree- 
ment was signed by Ellery, Forbes, Drayton, and 
Duer as the committee of the American Congress.^ 

Notwithstanding this formal contract, the accounts 
of the firm remained unliquidated, and Arthur Lee still 
insisted that most, if not all, of the supplies furnished 
were the free gift of the French government, for which 
there could be no liability. Congress decided that the 
only way to solve this dispute was to ascertain the 
facts from the French government itself. Accordingly 
the American commissioners at Paris were instructed 
to seek information from Vergennes, and to inquire 
how far these su})plies were the free gift of the French 
King, and how far they were property furnished by 

^ April, 1778. John Dnrand, New Materials for the History of the 
I American Revolution, from Documents in the French Archives, 119-126* 



BE A UMA R CIIA IS 101 

Hortalez and Compsyiy for which payment should be 
made. " You will observe," so ran the instructions, 
"that their accounts are to be fairly settled, and what 
is justly due paid for, as, on the one hand, Congress 
would be unwilling to evidence a disregard for, and 
contemptuous refusal of, the spontaneous friendship of 
his Most Christian Majesty, so, on the other, they 
are unwilling to put into the private pockets of indi- 
viduals what was graciously designed for the public 
benefit. You will be pleased to have their accounts 
liquidated, and direct, in the liquidation thereof, that 
particular care be taken to distinguish the property 
of the crown of France from the private property 
of Hortalez and Company, and transmit to us the 
accounts so stated and distinguished. This will also 
be accompanied by an invoice of articles to be im- 
ported from France, and resolves of Congress relative 
thereto. You will appoint, if you should judge proper, 
an agent or agents to inspect the quality of such goods 
as you may apply for to the house of Roderigue 
Hortalez and Company, before they are shipped, to 
prevent any impositions."^ 

The commissioners submitted these instructions to 
Vergennes, and then proceeded with their inquiries. 
" We are under the necessity of applying to your 
Excellency upon this occasion," so they wrote, "and 
of requesting your advice. With regard to what is 
passed, we know not who the persons are who consti- 
tute the house of Roderigue Hortalez and Company ; 
but we have understood, and Congress has ever under- 
stood, and so have the people in America in general, 
that they were under obligations to his Majesty's 
good will for the greatest part of the merchandise and 
1 Letter of Sept. 10, YllS; Durand, New Materiajs, etc., 127-131. 



102 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

warlike stores heretofore furnished under the firm 
name of RoderigueHortalez and Company. We cannot 
discover that any written contract was ever made be- 
tween Congress or any agent of theirs and the house 
of lioderigue Hortalez and Company ; nor do we know 
of any living witness, or any other evidence, whose tes- 
timony can ascertain for us who the persons are that 
constitute the house of Roderigue Hortalez and Com- 
pany, or what were the terms upon which the merchan- 
dise and munitions of war were supplied, neither as to 
the price, nor the time or condition of payment. As 
we said before, we apprehend that the United States 
hold themselves under obligations to his Majesty for 
all those supplies,rfind we are sure it is their wish and 
their determination to discharge the obligations to 
his Majesty as soon as Providence shall put it in 
their power. In the mean time we are ready to settle 
and liquidate the accounts according to our instruc- 
tions, at any time, and in any manner which his 
Majesty and your Excellency shall point out to us." ^ 

Nothing could seem fairer than this letter, but its 
promises were not fulfilled in the subsequent conduct 
of the American Congress. Vergennes did not answer 
directly, nor could he. He could not acknowledge any 
responsibility for the doings of Hortalez and Company, 
whose action in furnishing supplies to the Americans 
when France and England were at peace was, nomi- 
nally at least, without the knowledge or sanction of the 
French government. He wrote the newly appointed 
French minister to the United States, and said: — 

"M. Franklin and his colleagues would like to 
know what articles have been supplied by the King, 
and those that have been supplied by M. de Beau- 

1 Durand, New Materials, etc;, 129-131. 



BE A U MARCH A IS 103 

marchais on his own account, and they insinuate that 
Congress is persuaded that all, or at least a large 
portion, of what has been sent, is on account of his 
Majesty. I am about to reply that the King has not 
furnished anything ; that he has simply allowed M. 
de Beaumarchais to provide himself with what he 
wanted in the arsenals, on condition of replacing what 
he took ; and that, for the rest, I will gladly inter- 
pose in order that they may not be pressed for the 
payment of the military supplies." 

Apparently this statement was regarded as satis- 
factory, and in January of 1779 Congress extended 
its formal thanks to Beaumarchais for his efforts in 
behalf of the colonies. Nothing could have been 
handsomer than their expression of regard. 

Sir: The Congress of the United States, sensible 
of your exertions in their favor, present you with 
their thanks and assure you of their regard. 

They lament the inconvenience you have suffered 
by the great advances made in support of these 
States. Circumstances have prevented a compliance 
with their wishes ; but they will take the most effect- 
ual measures in their power to discharge the debt due 
you. 

The liberal sentiments and extensive views which 
could alone dictate a conduct like yours are conspic- 
uous in your actions and adorn your character. While 
with great talents you served your Prince, you have 
gained the esteem of this infant Republic and will 
receive the united applause of the New World. 

John Jay, 

President.* 
1 Durand, New Materials, etc.,' 134. 



104 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Doubtless this gave great pleasure to its recipient, 
who cared more for public applause, not to say public 
notoriety, than ever he did for money. But this ex- 
pression of gratitude was neither accompanied nor 
followed by any remittances on account. Arthur Lee 
had been recalled from Paris, and his activity with 
. members of Congress was quite sufficient to prevent 
any settlement of the claim. It may be said that Con- 
gress was in such pecuniary straits that it was prone 
to seize any excuse for postponing the claim of a 
creditor, but it must also be said that it showed no 
eagerness to pay for supplies which were certainly of 
great value. The fact is that our country at that time 
was in the condition of a needy personage constantly 
asking and frequently receiving the bounty of those 
better off in the world. The receipt of pecuniary 
assistance is apt to be demoralizing. When much is 
given, the recipient naturally thinks that all should be 
given ; the desire to pay to every one his legal dues 
is apt to be blunted in those who are in a condition 
of chronic impecuniosity. The members of Congress 
were evidently little distressed by the possibility that 
their country owed Beaumarchais not only thanks but 
cash. 

Probably Beaumarchais hoped for gain as well as 
glory from his dealings with the Americans. It is quite 
possible that in his accounts he neglected to credit 
the sums which had been advanced him from the 
ji French and Spanish treasuries, and of which, appar- 
1 ently, no repayment was expected by those govern- 
ments ; but certainly he was interested in the cause, 
and continued to furnish supplies when a prudent 
merchant would have delayed further shipme"nts until 
he had been settled with to date. Not only had he 



BEAUMARCHAIS 105 

received practically nothing on his great advances in 
excess of the money furnished by the French King, 
but war vi-as now declared between France and Eng- 
land, and fresh perils awaited any ships which haz- 
arded the long journey across the Atlantic. 

Beaumarchais was undeterred by the danger that 
his merchandise would never reach the other side, or 
by the still more serious danger that even if it were 
received, it would never be paid for. In December, 
1778, he despatched a new fleet laden with arms and 
supplies. The vessels sailed at his own risk, and this 
was certainly serious in time of war, when the ocean 
was patrolled by English cruisers. He writes : " Con- 
gress will not be obliged to pay for cargoes it does 
not receive, which may have been lost on the passage 
from Europe." His zeal for the cause was unabated 
by past troubles, though the remissness of Congress 
might well have discouraged a less enthusiastic friend. 
He treated the United States as he" did others whom 
he assisted. 

In the same letter he writes: "Remember me often 
and kindly to Baron Steuben. According to what I 
hear from him I congratulate myself on having sent 
so fine an officer to my friends the free men, and for 
having compelled him, in a certain way, to enter upon 
such a noble career. I am not at all uneasy about the 
money I lent him for an outfit. Never have I made a 
more satisfactory use of money, for I have placed a 
man of honor where he ought to be. I learn that he 
is inspector-general of all the American forces ! Tell 
him that his fame pays the interest of his debt, and 
that I have no doubt of its payment in this way at 
usurious rates." ^ 

^ Durand, New Materials, etc., 140. 



106 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

This was apparently the only payment ever made, for 
at the inventory taken of Beaumarchais's assets after 
his death in 1799 there appears an advance made to 
Steuben and his nephews in order that they might go 
to America. The claim is entered with the accuracy 
with which Beaumarchais kept his accounts, and which 
contrasted with the liberality with which he advanced 
his money and the carelessness with which he allowed 
it to remain unpaid. 5995 frs. 2 sols 7 deniers was 
the amount of the advances to Steuben, as they appear 
in Beaumarchais's books, and if the interest on the 
debt was paid by Steuben's fame, the jirincipal re- 
mained wholly unliquidated. 

Beaumarchais not only equipped ten merchant ships, 
but he fitted out at his own expense a man-of-war 
named the Fier Roderigue, and sent it forth to guard 
the merchantmen. The result of this enterprise was 
gratifying to his pride and costly to his purse. The 
little fleet came '^ailing along, when d'Estaing was 
about to engage Admiral Byron. Discovering that 
the man-of-war belonged to Beaumarchais, d'Estaing 
compelled the Fier Roderigue to join his fleet and 
take part in the battle. She acquitted herself with 
great credit, but the captain was killed, and the ship 
suffered more severely than any other of d'Estaing's 
command.^ She had to be refitted at great expense, 
and the convoy came to grief. Beaumarchais suffered 
ruinous losses, though he finally obtained two million 
livres as indemnity. Even this payment was so delayed 
that he received the last installment seven years later, 
on leaving the prison in which he had been thrown 
for using impertinent language. 

The United States at last made some payment on 

* Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, ii, 164. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 107 

account, but with hardly less deliberation. They did 
not send cargoes of tobacco, which could at once have 
been turned into money, but remitted two million and 
a half livres, in bills payable three years in the future. 
Such obligations of a government whose existence was 
still at stake could not be discounted on favorable 
terms, and even when the time for payment came ^ 
round, Robert Morris suggested to Franklin that they 
might as well be left unpaid. But Franklin said they 
were in the hands of the bankers and must be met for 
the country's credit, and paid they accordingly were. 

Beaumarchais not only furnished supplies to the 
United States, but he undertook similar operations 
with Virginia and South Carolina. These were no 
more successful than his dealings with the general 
government. He sent to these states two cargoes of 
supplies, and received his pay in paper money which 
was worth little or nothing by the time it reached 
him. 

It illustrates the character of the man, that, undis- 
turbed by all these embarrassments and undeterred by 
all these losses, he entered on various other commer- 
cial speculations in the West India Islands. Lom^nie, 
who went over Beaumarchais's accounts from 1776 
to 1783, the period of his commercial career, says 
that they disclosed expenditures of twenty-one million 
livres, and receipts exceeding this great amount by 
only the beggarly sura of forty-eight thousand livres.^ 
It is safe to say that when all the accounts were in, 
the balance was on the other side. What Beaumar- 
chais wrote his confidential agent Francy about his 
private expenses, was true as to his great commercial 
operations. " When I try to arrange my expenses in 
1 Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, ii, 204-205. 



108 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

part, I am mortified to hear that every one about me 
is wasting my money. . . . Live simply and do with- 
out the things that are unnecessary. . . . I am robbed 
on every side on account of the lack of order by 
which they all profit. ... I have three coachmen 
who are leagued together to pillage me. . . . Where 
is confusion, there is robbery. I wish in the future to 
live in the greatest simplicity." 

There was equal confusion and probably much 
more robbery in the affairs of the great house of 
Hortalez and Company, and when we add the fact 
that its chief debtor declined to settle, the financial 
distresses of the great dramatist are easily understood. 

At last, even Beaumarchais's zeal failed, or, what is 
more probable, his finances were exhausted. He had 
obtained assistance from various persons; the names 
of some great nobles are found in the list of those 
who took a share in his ventures ; but if his statement 
can be credited, they were less indulgent towards their 
creditor than he was with his American friends. At 
all events, he decided to send no more supplies until 
he could obtain a settlement for what he had already 
furnished. It is unpleasant to reflect that the diffi- 
culties he had met with and overcome in obtaining 
and shipping supplies to the United States, were much 
less than the difficulties which he was unable to over- 
come in getting his pay. The adjustment of Beau- 
marchais's claims extended over a period of almost 
half a century. 

In 1781 Silas Deane undertook the settlement of 
Beaumarchais's accounts. He had made the original 
contract, and he was more familiar with this intricate 
affair than any other representative of the United 
States. Notwithstanding all the slanders poured upon 



BEAUMAnCHAJS 109 

him by his enemies, there is nothing to show that in 
his relations with Beauniarchais he acted corrupth', or 
even negligently. Deane had always insisted that 
Beanmarchais was to be paid for the supplies he fur- 
nished. Such had been the express wording of the con- 
tract which Deane executed, and he constantly bore 
witness to Beaumarchais's activity and good faith. 
In November, 1776, he wrote Congress : " I should 
have never completed w^hat I have, but for the gen- 
erous, the indefatigable and spirited exertions of 
Monsieur Beanmarchais, to whom the United States 
are on every account greatly indebted ; more so than 
to any other person on this side of the water ; he is 
greatly in advance of stores, clothing, and the like, 
and therefore I am confident you will make him the 
earliest and most ample remittances." ^ 

Deane now went over the accounts and found there 
was a balance due Beaumai'chais of three million six 
hundred thousand livres. But in the mean time Deane's 
own affairs were involved in hopeless complications. 
Not only Lee, but Paine and many other rancorous 
opponents, pronounced him a monster of corruption. 
Adams and his associates looked upon Deane with 
distrust and dislike. His conduct had been indiscreet, 
Congress was mistrustful of him, and his adjustment 
of Beaumarchais's accounts was formally declared to 
be without authority. 

In 1783 Mr. Barclay, then consul-general at Paris, 
undertook a new examination of the records. Bean- 
marchais declared his accounts had already been 
settled. Barclay said that Congress would not pay 
him a cent unless they were again examined. The un- 
lucky creditor was forced to submit; but before any 
1 Deane Papers, i, 378. 



110 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

decision could be reached a new incident added new 
confusion, and resulted in the postponement of any 
settlement until many years after Beaumarchais had 
been in his grave. 

In 1783 a memorandum had been signed between 
Franklin and Vergennes as to the advances made by 
the French government to the United States. In this 
it was stated that three million livres had been given 
to our government prior to the treaty of alliance in 
1778. At the time no question was raised as to this 
figure. But three years later Franklin, for the first 
time, seems to have awakened to the fact that he had 
only received two million livres in money from the 
French government prior to the treaty. In addition to 
this he had received a million as an advance from the 
French farmers-general, which was to be repaid in 
produce, though our government, dealing with the 
farmers-general much as it did with Beaumarchais, 
had sent them tobacco to the value of only one hundred 
and fifty-three thousand livres. With a business-like 
spirit that, though doubtless commendable, was cer- 
tainly unusual when proceeding from a nation that 
had been the recipient of boundless charity, it was now 
suggested to the French government that perhaps the 
three millions included the money supposed to be ad- 
vanced by the farmers-general, and if so, the farmers- 
general must at once pay for the tobacco they had 
received. It might have been suggested that if the 
French government had not furnished the million 
which the farmers-general advanced eight years be- 
fore, it might be well for the United States to think 
about paying the eight hundred and fifty thousand 
livres which they still owed. No such suggestion, how- 
ever, was ever made. 



BEAUMARCHAIS 111 

The question put to Yergennes was very embarrass- 
ing. It was doubtless by inadvertence that the amount 
given the United States was stated at three million 
instead of two million livres, f or the other million had 
been turned over to Beaumarchais, and for it he was 
to account. Vergennes was reluctant to admit publicly 
that he had given Beaumarchais money to buy mili- 
tary supplies while France was still at peace with 
England, for he had often assured the English that 
he was doing nothing of the sort. He was unwilling 
also further to embarrass Beaumarchais, who had al- 
ready been for years trying to get a settlement of 
his accounts with the United States. At all events, 
the Americans were informed that the French King 
had nothing to do with the advances made by the 
farmers-general, and that this million was paid from 
the treasury in June, 1776. Grand, acting for the 
United States, asked for a copy of the receipt, but the 
French government declined to furnish it. 

From all this the American Congress decided that 
Beaumarchais had received the million, in which they 
were entirely right ; that he ought to turn this mil- 
lion over, in which they were wrong ; and that they 
would pay him nothing until the matter was cleared 
up. Vergennes had repeatedly declared that the French 
King had nothing to do with the supplies furnished 
by Beaumarchais, and if his word were to be credited, " 
Beaumarchais was entitled to be paid. If Beaumar- 
chais had had dealings with the French government, 
manifestly, in view of the position taken by that gov- 
ernment, it was for us to settle with our creditor, and 
for him to settle with his creditor. If a portion of his 
claim represented supplies furnished by France, there 
was no reason that the United States should insist this 



^i 



112 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

was Intended as a gift, in the face of tlie declaration 
of the French minister that it was not a gift. Presum- 
ably, if Beaumarchais had received supplies from 
France and was paid for them by the United States, 
he would pay to the French government whatever was 
its due ; and even assuming that he had omitted to 
credit the money advanced, and that it was a just 
credit, there still remained a large balance due to 
Hortalez and Company. But Congress would do no- 
thing and would pay nothing until the mystery of the 
million was cleared up. 

In 1787, when the account was now ten years old, 
even Beaumarchais's good-nature failed him, and he 
wrote the President of Congress : " What do you sup- 
pose is the general opinion here of the vicious circle 
in which you have involved me ? We will not reim- 
burse M. de Beaumarchais until his accounts are ad- 
justed by us, and we will not adjust his accounts, so 
as not to pay them ! With a nation that has become a 
powerful sovereign, gratitude may be a simple virtue 
unworthy of its policy ; but no government can be 
relieved from doing justice and from discharging its 
debts. I venture to hope, sir, that, impressed by the 
importance of this matter and the soundness of my 
reasoning, you will oblige me with an official reply 
stating what decision the honorable Congress will 
come to, either promptly to adjust my accounts and 
settle them, like any equitable sovereign, or to submit 
the points in dispute to arbiters in Europe with re- 
gard to insurances and commissions, as M. Barclay 
had the honor of proposing to you in 1785, or, finally, 
to let me know without further shift that American 
sovereigns, unmindful of past services, deny me jus- 
tice. I shall then adopt such measures as seem best 



BE A UMARCHAIS 113 

for ray despised interests and my wounded honor, 
without lacking in the profound respect with which I 
am, sir, the very humble servant of the general Con- 
gress and yourself." ^ 

A creditor who during ten years had been in vain 
asking for a settlement of his accounts could hardly 
be charged with any impropriety in thus presenting 
his claim, but Congress regarded this language as 
impertinent and unseemly and resolved to discipline 
the offender. Accordingly it voted to adjust Beaumar- 
chais's account and referred it to Arthur Lee to settle 
the amount due. This was equivalent to saying that 
it would pay nothing. Lee was Beaumarchais's bitter 
enemy. He insisted that all articles furnished by Hor- 
talez and Company were gifts from the French gov- 
ernment, and that the entire claim was a fraud. He 
now promptly reported, not only that the United States 
owed nothing to Beaumarchais, but that Beaumarchais 
owed the United States almost two million francs. How 
this result was reached does not appear. Probably 
Lee's process was a simple one. All the supplies fur- 
nished by Hortalez and Company were gifts from the 
French government; any shipments of produce from 
this country, which by any possibility came into the 
hands of that firm, were charged against them. In 
other words, Beaumarchais's account contained no 
credits, and consisted solely of debit items. 

Thus the matter remained for five years longer, 
until, in 1793, Congress ordered a new examination to 
be made by Alexander Hamilton. The financial ability 
of the investigator, his integrity and his standing, 
made it certain that his report would be just to all par- 
ties. It seemed also that a statement by Hamilton of 

1 Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, ii, 192. 



f 



114 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the amount due should carry conviction to Congress, 
and that if Beaumarchais could obtain an award at his 
hands, his troubles would be over. This was far from 
being the case. Hamilton examined the claim, decided 
that Lee's decision was wrong, and fixed the sum 
justly due from the United States to Beaumarchais at 
two million two hundred and eighty thousand francs. 
The question of the million he left open, saying that 
further inquiry should be made by the French gov- 
ernment, and if it appeared that the United States 
was entitled to the credit, that sum should be de- 
ducted. It is probable that this decision came as 
near the truth as it was possible to reach in this in- 
tricate matter. It was, however, of no benefit to Beau- 
marchais. Congress declined to pay the award of its 
own arbitrator. It still insisted that the million fur- 
nished by the French government should be applied 
on the debt, and decided that, as it was uncertain how 
much ought to be paid, the safest way was to pay 
nothing. 

In the mean time the French Revolution involved 
Beaumarchais in financial ruin. He fled from France 
and sought refuge in Hamburg, where he lived in 
great poverty in a garret. Not long before his death 
in 1795, he prepared a memorial in behalf of his 
daughter. The style is flowery and effusive, but it is 
not a paper that any American can read with pleas- 
ure. Whatever were Beaumarchais's faults, he had 
given useful aid to a country struggling for existence. 
Even if the exact amount due him was uncertain, it 
was certain that the sum was large. The struggling 
republic had now become, not perhaps a rich and 
powerful nation, but prosperous, fully able to pay its 
debts, and with infinite possibilities before it. The 



BEAUMARCHAIS 115 

creditor who had waited for twenty years was old, 
poor, sick, broken in health and fortune. Thus he 
writes : — 

"Americans, I served you with untiring zeal. I 
have thus far received no return for this but vexation 
and disappointment, and I die your creditor. On leav- 
ing this world, I must ask you to give what you owe 
me to my daughter as a dowry. When I am gone she 
will, perhaps, have nothing, on account of other wrongs 
against which I can no longer contend. Through your 
delay in discharging my claims Providence may have 
intended to provide her with a resource against utter 
destitution. Adopt her after my death as a worthy 
child of the country I Her mother and my widow, 
equally unfortunate, will conduct her to you. Regard 
her as a daughter of a citizen . , . Americans, ... be 
charitable to your friend, to one whose accumulated 
services have been recompensed in no other way! 
Date oholum Belisarioy ^ To this appeal no answer 
was given. 

Beaumarchais died unpaid, and thirty-six years 
passed before his heirs obtained a settlement. Various 
French ministers interested themselves in behalf of 
Beaumarchais's family, but their efforts were in vain. 
Talleyrand did not put the case unfairly in his letter 
to the French minister at Washington. " Opposition 
is made to M. de Beaumarchais's heirs on account of 
a receipt he gave June 10, 1776, for one million francs, 
paid to him by order of M. de Vergennes, and it is 
pretended that this sum should be credited on the sup- 
plies which he furnished to the United States. As the 
payment and purpose of this million related to a meas- 

^ Durand, New Materials, etc., 154 ; Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son 
Temps, ii, 196. 



116 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ure of secret political service ordered by the King, 
and immediately executed, it does not seem either just 
or proper to confound this with mercantile operations, 
later in date, carried on between Congress and a pri- 
vate individual. ... A French citizen who hazarded 
his entire foi'tune to help the Americans, and whose 
zeal and activity were so essentially useful during the 
war which gave them their liberty and their rank 
among nations, might unquestionably pretend to some 
favor ; in any event he should be listened to when he 
asks nothing but good faith and justice." ' 

Many years later the American government again 
asked the question which it had been putting from 
time to time for over thirty years : Would the French 
government say that the million given Beaumarchais 
had nothing to do with the supplies which Beaumar- 
chais had furnished the United States ? The Due de 
Richelieu was then minister of foreign affairs, and 
he promptly made the required statement.^ In one 
sense it was untrue, for the money had been used by 
Beaumarchais to buy supplies. In another sense it was 
true, for Beaumarchais was accountable for this sum 
to the French government alone, and it was none of 
our business. But at all events, having asked the ques- 
tion of the French government, it would have been 
courteous to accept its answer as true. Nothing of the 
sort was done. Beaumarchais had now been dead for 
almost twenty years, and his heirs still continued their 
efforts to obtain a settlement of the claim. Opinions 
sustaining its justice were obtained from American 
lawyers, but they availed nothing. 

In 1822 Beaumarchais's daughter, then his only sur- 
viving heir, once more submitted her case to Congress, 
^ Lom^nie, Beaumarchais et son Temps, ii, 198. 2 md., 200. 



BE A UMA R CHA IS 117 

and truly said that all she asked was justice. Among 
other authorities to support the claim were the opinions 
of the two attorneys-general, Rodney and Pinkney, 
and the daughter adds : " After having paid some 
attention to the aforesaid documents, you will wonder, 
no doubt, that justice has been asked for without suc- 
cess so many years. Will it be refused to me again ? 
As a reward for the devotion of Beaumarchais to your 
cause, shall his daughter be deprived of her fortune, 
and finish her life in vain and cruel expectation, as her 
father did, whose existence was shortened by troubles 
and sorrow ? Till the last moment of his life he begged 
you to decide upon his claim. He said to you : ' My 
proceedings towards you were zealous and pure ; my 
letters, my commercial conventions attest it ; they are 
in your hands; they have been thoroughly examined: 
examine them again.' The proofs which those frequent 
examinations have established are warranted by illus- 
trations and unexceptionable testimonies, among which 
I find, with pride, those of some of your countrymen : 
their veracity could not be questioned. Decide, in your 
own cause, with equity and impartiality ! Or, at least, 
be pleased to appoint special commissioners to settle 
that discussion, to end the unequal struggle, and I 
will accept them from you with confidence as my 
judges : but I beg that a speedy decision may take 
place." ^ 

In 1824 she came to Washington and solicited pay- 
ment of the claim in person. Eleven years more passed 
before the matter was closed. In 1835 the heirs were 
at last informed that they could have eight hundred 
thousand francs, if they would execute a receipt in 
full. Fifty-seven years had passed since the claim ac- 
^ Durand, New Materials, etc., 267. 



118 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

crued. With interest at three per cent the settlement 
represented an original indebtedness of three hundred 
thousand francs. This was not one seventh of the 
amount which Alexander Hamilton had decided was 
due, not one fourth of the amount which he reported 
should be paid, even after deducting the million francs 
advanced by France, for which it was insisted Beau- 
mai'chais was not entitled to payment. It was a set- 
tlement at twenty-five cents on the dollar, after a 
delay of half a century, made by a rich and prosper- 
ous nation, with the heirs of a man who had furnished 
our ancestors with assistance when our national exist- 
ence was in doubt, who had lost much by the perils of 
war and had risked losing all if we had failed to 
achieve our independence. It cannot be regarded as a 
liberal settlement, but after fifty years of hope de- 
ferred, the claimants were not inclined to wait longer ; 
they took what was offered, but they had no reasons 
to feel any gratitude.^ 

^ The history of Beaumarchais's relations with the United States is 
very fully and very fairly related in Lom^nie's valuable and agreeable 
work, Beaumarchais et son Temps. 



CHAPTER VI 

EVENTS OF 1776 

In relating the part taken by Beaumarchais in be- 
half of the United States, and the disasters in which 
his zeal involved him, we have been carried beyond 
the time when Deane appeared as the representative 
of the colonists at the French court. It was through 
the medium of Beaumarchais, either acting for him- 
self or as agent for the government, that military 
supplies were first sent to America in any large 
quantities. But he was not the only French merchant 
who engaged in these enterprises, though no one else 
conducted them on so large a scale. The others em- 
ployed in this contraband trade seem to have obtained 
the connivance of the government, but not its active 
assistance. Among those who took part in such ven- 
tures was Dubourg, who thus sought to console him- 
self for his disappointment that Beaumarchais was 
preferred to him as agent of the government. He was 
unfortunate in this undertaking also; he loaded a 
ship at his own expense, which was captured by the 
English, and the doctor, like his successful rival, was 
a pecuniary loser by his efforts to aid the cause of 
American liberty. 

Having started to furnish military supplies to the 
United States, the French government was soon on 
the point of actual interference. Had it not been for 
the ill-success of the American army, France would 
have acknowledged our independence not long after 



120 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

we ourselves proclaimed it. A little over a month 
after Deane's arrival at Paris came the news that the 
United States had renounced allegiance to the British 
crown, and this intelligence was received with great 
satisfaction in France. There had been a constant 
fear that the colonists would agree on terms and make 
peace with the mother country; this seemed less 
probable when by solemn resolution they had abjured 
their allegiance to the British King. The English had 
declared that vigorous measures would soon bring 
to their senses unruly demagogues and their deluded 
followers. But the armies that had been sent over to 
repress insurrection by force had not yet succeeded, 
and at the end of a year the rebels, neither disheart- 
ened nor alarmed, had declared themselves an inde- 
pendent people. 

Moreover, the sounding phrases of the Declaration 
aroused enthusiasm, not among politicians like Ver- 
gennes, but in social and philosophic circles. It is 
curious to contrast the responses which the sentiments 
of the document met in France and in England. It 
was natural that English political leaders should 
declare this matter of small importance; but while the 
Declaration asserted principles dear to most English- 
men, it aroused little interest even among those who 
were friendly to the colonists. It seems to have been 
regarded as a highly impudent and not very impor- 
tant act. 

The French attributed to it far greater weight, 
and in this, history has shown they were right, even if 
they were not correct in some of their anticipations. 
When the charg^ d'affaires at London reported this 
momentous act, he added, "If the resistance of the 
Americans is victorious, this ever memorable epoch 



EVENTS OF 1776 121 

will reduce England to a point where she will no 
longer be a subject of disquiet to France, whose in- 
fluence on the Continent must increase in proportion 
to the diminution of the British empire." ^ The senti- 
ments of the Declaration of Independence were wel- 
comed, not only among the disciples of Kousseau, but 
in the large class which admired the principles of 
liberty and democracy, when applied anywhere ex- 
cept to the government of France. The Declaration 
excited a degree of enthusiasm among the French 
people which had been aroused by no other public 
document, and feeling grew constantly stronger in 
favor of extending the aid of France to the American 
patriots. 

This decisive step also strengthened Vergennes's in- 
clination to interfere actively in behalf of the colo- 
nists. Popular sympathy with their cause had become 
outspoken, the English had made small progress in 
their military efforts, and the time seemed ripe to 
take part in a controversy in which the French gov- 
ernment would receive the approval of its own people 
and might hope for sjDeedy and decisive success. It 
was about the middle of August, 1776, that the news 
of the Declaration of Independence reached Paris, 
and on the thirty-first the Council met to consider 
the questions which now arose. The King was present 
and with him were Maurepas, the prime minister, 
St. Germain and Sartine, the ministers of war and 
of the marine, and the secretary of foreign affairs, 
Vergennes, who presented a report which apparently 
received the approval of all his auditors. 

It began with a discussion of general principles, 
a manner of arguing which so often distinguishes 
* Gamier to Vergennes, Aug. 16, 1776 ; Doniol, i, 585. 



122 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

French from English political documents. An Eng- 
lish cabinet considering practical questions would 
not indulge in any debate on the principles of gov- 
ernment, but Vergennes sought to place his argument 
upon a philosophical basis. The purpose of all social 
institutions, he said, was their own advantage and 
preservation ; on that basis societies had been estab- 
lished, and only when governed by that consideration 
could they maintain themselves and prosper. Thus 
the object of every administration should be to secure 
whatever advantages it could for the country com- 
mitted to its charge. 

After some further discussion of the evils of war 
and the wickedness of England, Vergennes at last 
reached the practical question, Should France interfere 
actively in behalf of the American colonists ? His re- 
port was an elaborate and powerful argument in favor 
of interference, and immediate interference. Now, he 
said, there was a unique opportunity for France to 
avenge herself for all the perfidies and outrages com- 
naitted by England in the past, and to render it im- 
possible for her to repeat them for a long time to 
come. England was the hereditary enemy of France, 
jealous of her greatness, envious of her rich soil and 
her advantages of situation, using all her power to at- 
tack France, or to band Europe against her. Now there 
was an opportunity, which might not recur for ages, 
to abate England's pride and lessen her uifluence. If 
one should balance the advantages and disadvantages 
of a war against England in the present juncture, the 
advantages would be incomparably greater ; not only 
was it possible to visit that country with just punish- 
ment and weaken her dangerous power, but much 
could be hoped from the friendship of the new re- 



EVENTS OF 1776 123 

public. A union between France and the United 
States was not one of those casual combinations that 
would cease when the need of the moment was over. 
" No interest," he said, " can divide two peoples con- 
nected only over vast tracts of sea ; the relations of 
commerce will form a chain which, if not eternal, will 
be of long duration." ^ 

Vergennes called attention also to the European 
situation, which was singularly favorable for any such 
action. The affairs of this world are closely linked 
together, and the condition in which Europe was left 
after the Seven Years' War rendered possible the 
interference of France, and the establishment of 
American independence. If France became involved 
in war, this often excited the activity of rivals who 
dreaded her preeminence on the Continent and were 
eager for any opportunity to check her power. But 
the Seven Years' War had changed the position of 
that country in Europe ; her prestige had been less- 
ened, and, as some compensation for this, her neigh- 
bors watched her with less apprehensive eyes. Austria 
was not an ally, and the relations between the coun- 
tries were fairly cordial. Frederick II was always a 
man to be closely watched, but he had no desire for 
more warfare, and he took a malicious interest in any 
misfortunes that might befall England ; he had never 
forgiven her desertion in his own hour of peril, and 
his representative at Paris repeatedly assured the 
French minister that if France were to interfere in 
the American contest, she need fear nothing from 
Prussia. " I protest to you," he wrote his minister in 
London, " that it is more possible that a good Chris- 

1 Doniol, i, 567-577. Read to tlie King and a Committee of the 
CouncU, Aug-. 31, 1776. 



124 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

tian should form an alliance with the devil than I 
with England." Russia was far distant, and Catherine 
had no desire for war. 

To all these favorable conditions Vergennes called 
attention, and he concluded by saying: "It is certain 
that if his Majesty seizes this unique opportunity, 
which perhaps the ages will never again present, we 
can deal England a blow that would abate her pride 
and place her power within just bounds, . . . and he 
would have the glory, so dear to his heart, of being 
the benefactor not only of his own people but of all 
nations." * 

As a result of these lengthy reasonings, Vergennes 
was in favor of enlisting in the cause of the American 
colonists without further delay. Apparently his views 
met the approval of his associates, and were not dis- 
approved by the King. Louis had little sympathy with 
the colonists, and no taste for war, but he was a dull, 
inert youth, and if his ministers were resolved on 
their policy, he was not likely long to resist them. An 
American who could have known the secrets of the 
royal councils would have thought that the hour of 
deliverance for his country was near at hand. 

The only delay in deciding on immediate action 
seems to have come from a desire to communicate this 
resolution to Spain and ask her to join. Vergennes 
held closely to the traditions of the Family Compact, 
and on September 7 a report of his argument, which 
had received the approval of his colleagues, was sent 
to Madrid, and the cooperation of the Spanish King 
was asked. ^ 

The Spanish were not averse to war with England, 
but they had no thought of undertaking it except upon 
1 Doniol, i, 567-576. « Doniol, i, 578. 



EVENTS OF 1776 125 

the promise of large reward. " One does not make 
war," said the Spanish minister, " except to preserve 
one's own possessions or to acquire those of others." 
Having thus disavowed any altruistic motive, he de- 
clared that the recovery of Portugal would be espe- 
cially advantageous to Spain and would also redound 
to the advantage of the entire Bourbon family. It was 
more than one hundred and thirty years since Portugal 
had freed itself fi'om a foreign yoke, but the Spanish 
people clung with Spanish tenacity to the hope of re- 
covering this lost possession. The French were willing 
that Spain should reconquer Portugal if she could, 
but they had no thought of undertaking a war against 
England for that purpose. Such a result would not 
benefit France, nor would it seriously injure England. 

Before the letter which stated the price Spain would 
charge for her aid could reach Paris, the aspect of 
affairs had changed, and the purposes of the French 
minister had changed with it. Vague rumors of the 
progress of arms in America had reached France, full 
of the inaccuracies that might be expected in reports 
that had crossed three thousand miles of water. Howe, 
it was said, had met with disaster in his expedition 
against New York, and had been forced to reembark 
his troops. It was reported, so Vergennes wrote his 
representative in London, that there had been a bloody 
engagement on August 12 or 13, on Long Island. Ten 
or twelve thousand men had been killed on the two 
sides, and the English troops had been forced to re- 
embark.^ 

These illusions were soon dispelled. On October 
16 an authentic report reached Paris, which announced 
that the American army had been defeated on Long 
1 Letter of Sept. 28, 1T76 ; Doniol, i, 613. 



126 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Island, and that New York would soon be in the hands 
of the English. The Americans had been defeated, so 
Garnier wrote from London, with a loss of tliirty-three 
hundred men, while the English loss did not exceed 
four hundred ; the intrenchments of the Americans 
had been ill made and worse defended, and the sup- 
porters of the government in London declared that 
the rebels could now make no effective resistance an,d 
must speedily submit.^ 

These unfavorable predictions were not accepted 
by the French ministers, but their zeal for immediate 
interference was checked. The disaster of Long Island 
delayed for almost two years the French alliance, and 
the war which, with the active aid of France, might 
perhaps have been brought to a speedy close, now be- 
came a long and weary struggle. 

The demand of Spain that Portugal should be re- 
conquered as the price of her assistance furnished an 
excuse for a different tone in the negotiations with that 
country. This suggestion was not favorably regarded 
by French statesmen ; they were unwilling to involve 
France in a war which must continue until Portugal 
should become the prize of Spain, and if they had 
been ready for immediate action, they would have 
sought some modification of these demands. As it was, 
they treated the entire question as one that might be 
considered at leisure. "There is no pressing haste," 
Vergennes said to the King. " All that circumstances 
now require from your Majesty and the Catholic 
King," wrote the minister, " is to see that the Ameri- 
cans do not succumb for lack of means of resistance."^ 

A long despatch was sent to Spain, filled with the 

1 Letter of Oct. 11, 1776; Doniol, i, G15. 

2 Oct. 26, 1776 ; Doniol, i, 620. 



EVENTS OF 1776 127 

terms of affection which should be expected between 
near kinsmen, but indicating with clearness that 
France was no longer eager for speedy action, and 
that the price demanded for Spanish assistance was 
not acceptable. '■'■ The French King will always view 
without jealousy," said Vergennes, "the aggrandize- 
ment of the Spanish monarchy, but he cannot conceal 
from the King his uncle that the conquest of Portugal 
would be alarming to all rulers interested in preserv- 
ing a just balance, and they would not view with tran- 
quillity the power of the House of Bourbon increased 
by the reunion of the rest of the Spanish peninsula. 
... If M. Grimaldi was right, that one makes war 
only to make gains, . . . they should regard it as a 
great gain to lower the power of England. Let us se- 
cure the separation of her colonies in-North America, 
and her diminished commerce, her burdened finances, 
will render that power less unquiet and less haughty."^ 
To this sentiment Vergennes remained constant. 
When the war came he sought for France no acqui- 
sition of territoiy, no gain except the injury to Eng- 
land that would result from the loss of her American 
colonies. Whatever degree of disinterestedness this 
represented, France and her minister are entitled to 
be credited with. And so these negotiations terminated 
by the resolution on the part of France that the fire 
already kindled should not be extinguished ; that 
means should be provided by which the colonists could 
obtain the succor necessary to enable them to continue 
the contest, but that neither France nor Spain would 
at present enlist openly in the war. If the English 
had failed in the endeavor to capture New York, pos- 
sibly the colonists might have been successful with- 
1 Despatch of Not. 5, 1776 ; Doniol, i, 686. 



128 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

out an alliance with any foreign power ; but it is 
quite certain that France would speedily have made 
a treaty with the United States and taken an active 
part in the war had it not been for the disasters which 
befell our army. She was anxious to prevent the col- 
lapse of the American cause, but did not wish to em- 
broil herself with England if the failure of the colonies 
was assured. No matter how desperate the condition of 
the colonists might seem, the French ministers were 
ready to render all the assistance they could give 
without becoming involved in war with England. 
They were quite willing to take part in the contest 
if they could insure the independence of the thirteen 
colonies, and thus deal, as they hoped and believed, 
a fatal blow to the power of their great adversary ; but 
they did not wish to expose France to an expensive 
war with a powerful state if the probable result was 
that the American colonists, even with French aid, 
would be unable to secure their independence. For a 
long period little favorable news came from across 
the Atlantic, and the French ministers doubted if 
there were any possibility of success for the Ameri- 
can insurgents. As they doubted so they delayed, 
giving to the colonists, indeed, much valuable aid, but 
hesitating to acknowledge the new nation and declare 
themselves its ally. In the mean time the Continental 
Congress decided to take more active measures to ob- 
tain the assistance of France. 



CHAPTER VII 



FRANKLIN 



Deane had gone to Paris in search of assistance, 
with no official position. But immediately after the 
Declaration of Indei)endence it was decided to send 
accredited representatives of the new government to 
France, and in September, 1776, Franklin, Jefferson, 
and Deane were chosen by Congress as commissioners. 
Jefferson declined the mission, and in an evil day 
Arthur Lee was selected in his place. Franklin was 
unanimously elected on the first ballot. lie was by far 
the most prominent of the commissioners, and was in 
France the best-known American ; his experience and 
character peculiarly fitted him for the position, and 
Congress would have acted wisely if he had been sent 
over as its sole representative. When the vote was 
announced, he turned to one near and said : " I am 
old and good for nothing, but, as the storekeepers say 
of their remnants of cloth, ' I am but a fag end, you 
may have me for what you please.' " So far as the wel- 
fare of the United States was concerned, the most 
valuable part of Franklin's life was still before him. 
The results of his mission in France could have been 
accomplished by no one else, and without them it is 
by no means certain that American independence 
would have been achieved until many years later. 

A proposed treaty was drafted by Congress, which 
the commissioners were authorized to sign, with such 
changes as might be required. It was nothing more 



130 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

than a commercial agreement, but it was hoped that 
the French government would go further and form an 
alliance with the new republic. Not only were the 
commissioners to negotiate for a treaty, but they were 
to obtain supplies of arms and ammunition, for which 
Congress would make payment. It was especially 
important to secure munitions of war, for the colonists 
were almost entirely unprovided, and there were 
practically no facilities for manufacturing guns or 
powder in this country. The guns with which the 
American soldiers had thus far been furnished were 
of every variety, and few of them were fit for service. 
Agents had gone from house to house to obtain mus- 
kets, and these were largely old weapons which had 
been rejected by the inspectors of the English army 
and had drifted into the hands of the colonists. There 
was no manufactory where guns could be made in any 
quantity, and the authorities met with almost insur- 
mountable difficulties in obtaining powder. When the 
battle of Lexington was fought, it was said there was 
not enough powder in the thirteen colonies to last for 
a week's fighting, and that English troops could have 
marched from Boston to Savannah almost without 
resistance, because the colonists could not have ob- 
tained enough powder for serious opposition. 

In July, 1775, the Committee of Safety in New 
York wrote : " We have no arms, we have no powder, 
we have no blankets." * This was still the condition in 
every part of the United States, and it was for this 
reason that the necessity was so great of obtaining 
supplies abroad. The quality of the stores sent from 
France was occasionally criticized; doubtless some of 

1 W. G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American 
Revolution, i, 107. 



FRANKLIN 131 

the powder was poor and some of the guns were de- 
fective, but they were vastly superior to anything that 
couki be had on this side of the water. 

On October 26, 1776, Franklin sailed for France 
on the sloop of war Reprisal. The boat was several 
times chased by English cruisers ; she not only es- 
caped capture, but as she neared the other side made 
two prizes, with which in tow she sailed into Quiberon 
Bay after a voyage of thirty days. The weather was 
rough, Franklin had a small and uncomfortable cabin, 
the fowls were too tough for his teeth, and he lived 
chiefly on salt beef ; between stormy weather and poor 
nourishment, he was in a very reduced condition when 
he finally reached land.^ 

On December 3, he landed at Auray, and from 
there he pi-oceeded to Nantes, Travel in those days 
was not luxurious. The carriage, the doctor writes, 
was uncomfortable and the horses tired ; they met 
few persons, and their spirits were not raised when the 
driver told them that two weeks before a gang of 
robbers had plundered and murdered some travellers 
on the road. But the doctor's party made the journey 
safely, and at Nantes he was hospitably received. The 
citizens thronged to see him, he was given a great 
dinner, and after waiting a few days to recruit, he 
went to Paris. 

The news that Franklin had arrived in France ex- 
cited widespread interest. He had become an object 
of special dislike in England, except among those who 
sympathized with the colonists, and his journey across 
the Atlantic loosened the tongues of his adversaries. 
It was currently reported that, foreseeing the ruin of 
the insurgent cause, he had abandoned his country, 

1 E. E. Hale, Franklin in France, 49. 



132 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

like a rat leaving a sinking ship ; that he had fled like 
a poltroon from the ruin he had helped to create. The 
accusation was so often repeated that it moved Burke 
to say he could not believe that Franklin would close 
a life " which has brightened every hour it continued 
with so foul and dishonorable a flight." "I have just 
seen," writes Franklin, " seven paragraphs in the Eng- 
lish papers about me, of which six were lies." 

Franklin's arrival was especially distasteful to the 
British ambassador, and Stormont poured out the 
vials of his wrath. " It is generally believed here," he 
writes, " that he comes in the double capacity of a 
negotiator and a fugitive ; this suspicion, joined to the 
knowledge of his former character, and to that repu- 
tation of duplicity which he has so justly acquired, 
will, I hope, throw many difficulties in his way." * 
" He will lie, he will promise, and he will flatter, with 
all the insinuation and subtlety that are natural to 
him," Stormont writes again. 

But it was not alone to the English minister that 
Franklin's arrival furnished a theme for thought. 
" His arrival," writes Deane, " is the common topic 
for conversation, and has given birth to a thousand 
conjectures." When the doctor had reached his desti- 
nation, the interest increased instead of diminishing. 
" The celebrated Franklin arrived in Paris the 21st 
of December," writes one, " and has fixed the eyes of 
everyone upon his slightest proceeding." Probably in 
the whole world there was not another man so fitted 
for the work he had to do as Franklin. His scientific 
discoveries, his reputation as a philosopher and a sage, 
the simplicity of his dress, the shrewdness of his talk, 

1 Charlemagne Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette in the American 
Revolution, \, 164. 



FRANKLTX 133 

the dignity of his expression, all helped to give him 
in France a position such as had been held by few- 
Frenchmen and by no foreigner. 

The Comte de S^gur has told us of the reception 
which the representatives of the thirteen colonies met 
with in France. "It would be difficult to describe the 
eagerness and delight with which . . . these agents 
of a people in a state of insurrection against their 
monarch were received in France, in the bosom of an 
ancient monarchy. Nothing could be more striking 
than the contrast between the luxury of our capital, 
the elegance of our fashions, the magnificence of Ver- 
sailles, the still brilliant remains of the monarchical 
pride of Louis XIV, and the polished and superb 
dignity of our nobility, . . . and the almost rustic 
apparel, the unpowdered hair, the plain but firm de- 
meanor, the free and direct language of the envoys, 
whose antique simplicity of dress and appearance 
seemed to have introduced within our walls, in the 
midst of the effeminate and servile refinement of the 
eighteenth century, sages contemporary with Plato, or 
republicans of the age of Cato and of Fabius. This 
unexpected spectacle produced upon us a greater ef- 
fect in consequence of its novelty, and because it 
occurred precisely at the period when literature and 
philosophy had spread amongst us all an unusual 
desire for reforms, a disposition to encourage innova- 
tions, and the seeds of an ardent attachment to 
liberty." * 

"Men imagined," writes another, "they saw in 
Franklin a sage of antiquity, come back to give aus- 
tere lessons and generous examjiles to the moderns. 
They personified in him the republic, of which he was 
^ James Parton, Life of Franklin, ii, 211 ; S^gur, Mimoires, i, 109. 



134 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the representative and the legislator. They regarded 
his virtues as those of his countrymen, and even judged 
of their physiognomy by the imposing and serene 
traits of his own." * 

The French police authorities gave full reports of 
the distinguished visitor : " Dr. Franklin ... is very 
much run after, and feted, not only by the savants, 
his confreres, but by all peojjle who can get hold of 
him. . . . This Quaker wears the full costume of his 
sect. He has an agreeable physiognomy. Spectacles 
always on his eyes ; but little hair, — a fur cap is al- 
ways on his head. He wears no powder, but a neat 
air, linen very white, a brown coat." ^ When he was 
presented to Louis XV, his cnestnut-colored coat was 
replaced by black velvet ; but while he was not in all 
respects dressed like the ambassador from Austria, 
no one would have suspected that he was a peasant 
come to court. 

When Franklin arrived at Paris, he first took lodg- 
ings at the Hotel de Hamburg on the rue de 1' Uni- 
versity ; but a residence in the centre of the city he 
found inconvenient and disagreeable. Le Ray de 
Chaumont, a wealthy Frenchman and an ardent friend 
of the colonists, offered him a more retired abode in 
the spacious Hotel de Valentinois in Passy. With the 
enthusiasm displayed by so many Frenchmen for the 
American cause, Chaumont gave the use of the house 
free of charge, saying only that when American in- 
dependence had been established. Congress, if it saw 
fit, could compensate him with a grant of American 
land. 

This offer was in every way acceptable. Passy was 

1 Parton, Life of Franklin, ii, 211. 
^ Hale, Franklin in France, 90. 



FRANKLIN 135 

then a pretty village on the outskirts of Paris, about 
half a mile from the limits and two miles from the 
centre of the city, convenieutly removed from the con- 
fusion and bustle of the capital. It was an advantage 
to Franklin to have a residence so far removed as to 
lessen somewhat the crowd of visitors that sought 
him, and this choice was also agreeable to the French 
ministers. They did not care to have the representa- 
tive of the rebellious colonies too conspicuously in 
view. Lord Stormont might find less opportunity to 
complain if Franklin was somewhat obscurely lodged 
in a quiet suburb than if he were within a stone's 
throw of the Louvre. What perhaps was of no less 
importance, in such a s^Ajt it was more easy for the 
French ministers to have communication with the 
American representative, and yet escape the vigilant 
observation of the English ambassador. 

The Hotel de Valentinois had recently been pur- 
chased by Chaumont. It had had many distinguished 
owners. In the early part of the century the Duchesse 
d'Aumont had occupied it as a country residence. It 
was afterwards owned by the Due de Valentinois, and 
in 1776 it was purchased by Chaumont, who was a 
gentleman of large wealth. The property consisted of 
two dwellings, and it was the smaller of the two, 
known as the petit hotel, which Franklin occupied. 

A portion of the house still stands in what is now a 
thickly populated part of the city, and an inscription 
on the facade informs passers-by that this was the 
home of Franklin. Chaumont offered the use of the 
property rent-free, though the arrangement was so 
convenient for the French ministers, and Chaumont's 
relations with them were so intimate, that it has been 
suspected that the French government, rather than 



136 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

this liberal gentleman, was really the benevolent 
landlord. 

However this may be, it was occupied by Franklin 
for nine years. Any house in which Franklin dwelt 
was sure to bear his mark, and upon this he placed a 
lightning rod, which was said to be the first ever put 
up in France. There the negotiations between the 
colonies and France, and subsequently between the 
colonies and England, were carried on ; there he ex- 
ercised an extensive hospitality^, and was visited by 
great numbers of people. Franklin liked society and 
he had full opportunity to gratify his taste. Six days 
in the week he dined out, meeting almost every one who 
was prominent in political, literary, or social life. This 
was not the least arduous nor the least useful part of 
his career as an ambassador. He spoke French, not 
with entire correctness, but with fluency and wit. 
Never did he weary his auditors by talking too much 
of America, and never did he lose the opportunity, 
by fit and felicitous reference, to interest them in the 
American cause. Every entertainment which he ac- 
cepted, said one of his listeners, gained him admirers, 
who became partisans of the American Revolution. 
Every dinner-party at which the wise doctor was pre- 
sent was a diplomatic success, and aided the cause 
which he represented. Sundays he stayed at home, and 
his Sunday dinners were attended by a large num- 
ber of Americans, as well as by some of his French 
friends. His doors were open to all Americans, even 
those who bore him little love. Lee and his followers 
were often there. Franklin tried, so he said, to bring 
them all together and compel them, if possible, to for- 
get their animosities. In this endeavor he was not 
successful, and at last the virulent abuse which Izard 



FRANKLIX 137 

poured out upon him disturbed even the doctor's tran- 
quillity, and he refused to receive him further at his 
house. 

"While Adams was a joint commissioner, he occupied 
the same hotel, but Arthur Lee was of too irritable a 
temperament to be willing to sleep under the same 
roof with Franklin. The doctor's social life was little 
to Adams's taste, and the terms on which the Amer- 
ican representatives were occupying the house were 
also distasteful to this practical Yankee. In 1778 he 
wrote Chaumont, begging as a favor that he would 
state what rent should be paid for the house and fur- 
niture, both for the past and future. " It is not rea- 
sonable," he said, " that the United States should be 
under so great obligation to a private gentleman, as 
that two of their representatives should occupy for so 
long a time so elegant a seat with so much furniture 
and such fine accommodations, without any compensa- 
tion." 

The enthusiastic Chaumont would not accede to 
Adams's views. " When I consecrated my house to 
Dr. Franklin," he wrote, " and his associates who 
might live with him, I made it fully understood that I 
should expect no compensation. ... It is so much 
the worse for those who would not do the same, if they 
had the opportunity, and so much the better for me 
to have immortalized my house by receiving into it 
Dr. Franklin and his associates." ^ 

As Adams's letter by inference suggested that Dr. 
Franklin was remiss in living in this house for two 
years, undisturbed by the fact that his occupation 
was rent-free, so Chaumont, in his reply, delicately 
intimated that it was the name of Franklin and not 

1 John Bigelow, editor ; The Life of Benjamin Franklin, written by 
himself, ii, 429-430. 



138 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

that of Adams which would immortalize the Hotel de 

Valentlnois. 

Chaumont's dealings with the United States were 
by no means confined to furnishing a residence for 
their commissioners. He took an active part in send- 
ing supplies to the colonies, and his experience was 
hardly more fortunate than that of Beaumarchais. It 
is sad to reflect that almost every one who attempted 
business relations with our country, at the time of 
the Revolution, ended in bankruptcy. Chaumont often 
acted for the French ministers in obtaining supplies 
and equipping ships for the colonists, and he also 
furnished them on his own account. Soon after the 
beginning of the war he sent a shipload of powder to 
Boston, with instructions to his agent not to insist on 
repayment unless the Americans were successful in 
their struggle for independence. The colonies suc- 
ceeded in their struggle, but they do not seem to have 
paid Chaumont for the powder and supplies which he 
furnished them. 

Partly as a result of this, though chiefly from a 
loose administration of his business matters, of which 
his dealings with the United States were a fair sample, 
Chaumont became embarrassed before the outbreak 
of the French Revolution, and he was forced to make 
an assignment soon after that. In 1785 his son visited 
this country and endeavored to obtain a settlement of 
the father's claim. His father was, so Franklin wrote 
Washington, " the first in France who gave us credit, 
and before the Court showed us any countenance, 
trusted us with two thousand barrels of gunpowder, 
and from time to time afterwards exerted himself to 
furnish the Congress with supplies of various kinds, 
which, for want of due returns, they being of great 



FRANKLIN 139 

amount, has finally much distressed him in his circum- 
stances."' Notwithstanding this, the son stayed here 
many years without obtaining either money or settle- 
ment, and finally, like many other creditors of the 
Confederacy, abandoned the claim as hopeless. He 
remained in this country and entered into a great land 
speculation in the interior of New York State. Among 
the shareholders of his company were many illustrious 
names, — Caulaincourt, Grouchy, Necker, and Joseph 
Bonaparte. But he fared no better than his father in 
American speculations ; he finally became bankrupt 
and returned to France to die. 

In the Hotel de Valentinois Franklin lived in com- 
fort, and even with a certain amount of luxury, which 
disturbed the prudent soul of John Adams, but was 
appropriate and useful in the position which the 
doctor held. Though he led an existence that could 
fairly be called strenuous, yet he preserved in his coun- 
try home a certain official semi-obscurity which was 
agreeable to the French government. Vergennes de- 
clared that the laws of hospitality forbade refusing a 
home in Paris to Americans who wished to stay there, 
but he did not wish to have the fact that the rebel- 
lious colonists were officially represented obtrusively 
paraded before the English minister. The police re- 
ported that Franklin was difficult of approach and 
lived with a reserve that was supposed to be directed 
by his government. He had no such orders and 
needed none : his own tact enabled him to adopt the 
most judicious procedure for the accomplishment of 
his ends. 

If he avoided any unnecessary prominence as a re- 
presentative of the American government, he attracted 

1 Bigelow, Franklin, iii, 437. 



140 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

personally an amount of attention that would have 
satisfied the most insatiate lover of publicity. There 
were no great newspapers that could daily report his 
sayings and doings; but Franklin, his appearance, his 
opinions, his modes of life, were known to all Paris. 
Franklin's reputation, says John Adams, " was more 
universal than that of Leibnitz or Newton, Frederick 
or Voltaire ; and his character more beloved and 
esteemed than any or all of them. . . . His name 
was familiar to government and people, to kings, 
courtiers, nobility, clergy, and philosophers, as well as 
plebeians, to such a degree that there was scarcely a 
peasant or a citizen, a valet-de-cliambre, coachman or 
footman, a lady's chambermaid or a scullion in a 
kitchen, who was not familiar with it, and who did not 
consider him as a friend to human kind. ... If a col- 
lection could be made of all the Gazettes of Europe, 
for the latter half of the eighteenth century, a greater 
number of panegyrical paragraphs upon 'Ze grand 
Franklin ' would appear, it is believed, than upon any 
other man that ever lived." * 

It was as a man of science and by his discoveries in 
electricity that Franklin was best known in France. 
Scientific studies then excited widespread interest, and 
this republican sage had made valuable researches. 
The zeal for such studies was not confined to scholars, 
but extended through the community. Franklin had 
been elected a member of the Academy of Sciences, 
and he attended its meetings with great regularity. 
The sage who had already snatched lightning from 
the sky, aroused an admiring sympathy when he was 
engaged in wresting the sceptre from tyrants. 

The writings of Franklin were widely known in 
1 Works of John Adams, etc., i, 660. 



FRANKLIN- 141 

France and exceedingly popular. The neatness of his 
expression, the ikdicate humor of his style, was pecu- 
liarly fitted for French taste, and so also was the phil- 
osophy which he taught. It w^as not abstruse, it was 
not metaphysical, it was not, perhaps, very elevated, 
but it inculcated virtues that were dear to the French 
heart. The apothegms of Poor Richard were almost 
as familiar to the French as to Americans. They had 
been often translated; bishops and priests advised 
their flocks to profit by their study. Poor Richard 
.taught no exalted philosophy, but he preached practi- 
cal wisdom, and he constantly praised the quality of 
thrift. No virtue is dearer to the average Frenchman ; 
no one appreciates better than he the wisdom and the 
delights of a careful economy. When Poor Richard 
told them that industry pays debts, and if you kept 
your shop, your shop would keep you ; when he bade 
his readers think of saving as well as of getting, to 
beware of little expenses, and remember that silks and 
satins put out the kitchen fire, his words were dear 
to the industrious, thrifty, penny-saving bourgeois of 
France. 

It is not strange that representations of the wise 
doctor were multiplied indefinitely, — medallions, 
busts, medals of every kind and size. He writes his 
daughter, in reference to medallions, with the smiling, 
half-contemptuous vanity that was characteristic of 
him: "A variety of impressions have been made of 
different sizes ; some large enough to be set in the 
lids of snuff-boxes ; some so small as to be worn in 
rings; and the numbers sold are incredible. These, 
with the pictures, busts, and printings (of which 
copies upon copies are spread everywhere), have made 
your father's face as well known as that of the moon." 



142 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

It was the fashion for every one to have an engraving 
of M. Franklin on the mantelpiece, writes a contem- 
porary. 

Franklin was fond of women ; the homage paid to 
him by a great circle of ladies was agreeable to the 
philosopher, and was by no means without value in 
the work he was sent to do. Petticoats and alcoves 
still held their place in French political life. There 
were many Frenchwomen who possessed and liked to 
exercise an influence in politics, and there were few 
of these who were not ready to say a good word for, 
the cause which their dear Dr. Franklin advocated. 
Madame Helvetius was one of those with whom the doc- 
tor was most intimate, and if her appearance shocked 
the New England mind of Mrs. Adams, she was not a 
useless friend to the American minister. Mrs. Adams 
has recorded her impressions, which certainly were 
less favorable than those of the doctor : — 

"Her hair was frizzled; over it she had* a small 
straw hat, with a dirty gauze half-handkerchief round 
it, and a bit of dirtier gauze than ever my maids 
wore was bowed on behind. She had a black gauze 
scarf thrown over her shoulders. She ran out of the 
room ; when she returned, the Doctor entered at one 
door, she at the other ; upon which she ran forward 
to him, caught him by the hand, — 'Helas! Frank- 
lin ' ; then gave him a double kiss, one upon each 
cheek, and another upon his forehead. ... I should 
have been greatly astonished at this conduct, if the 
good Doctor had not told me that in this lady I should 
see a genuine Frenchwoman, wholly free from affec- 
tation or stiffness of behavior, and one of the best 
women in the world. For this I must take the Doc- 
tor's word ; but I should have set her down for a 



FRANKLIN 143 

very bad one, although sixty years o£ age, and a 
widow." 

The well-known Comtesse d'Houdetot was one of 
Franklin's ardent admirers, and long accounts are 
given of the great fete which she gave in his honor 
at her chateau. "When it was known the doctor 
was approaching, the whole company set off on foot 
and met him half a mile from the chateau. Then they 
walked by his carriage as an escort, and the countess 
handed him from the carriage, when they had arrived. 
"The venerable sage," says the French chronicler of 
the fete, " with his gray hairg flowing down upon his 
shoulders, his staff in his hand, the spectacles of wis- 
dom on his nose, was the perfect picture of true philo- 
sophy and virtue." 

In the year following Franklin's arrival at Paris, 
Voltaire reached that city after twenty-eight years of 
absence. The orders which forbade his return had 
never been rescinded, but no one thought of enforcing 
them. When the officers at the city gates asked if the 
carriage contained anything dutiable or forbidden, 
the poet replied that there was nothing contraband 
except himself, and the exclusion of that prohibited 
article was not insisted upon. The enthusiastic Pa- 
risians could not be content until the great American 
had met the great Frenchman. In April, 1778, they 
were both at the Academy of Sciences, and the audi- 
ence cried out that they should be presented to each 
other. They rose and bowed, they grasped each other's 
hands, but it was not enough ; the clamor continued 
until the two philosophers threw their arms about each 
other and kissed each other's ancient cheeks. Then 
the French heart was content: Solon and Sophocles 
^ Letters of Mrs. Adams (2d ed.), ii, 55, 56. 



144 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

had embraced, and the requirements of the situation 
were satisfied.^ 



Immediately after the arrival of Franklin the com- 
missioners entered upon the important duties with 
which they had been intrusted. Deane was already 
at Paris, Lee came over from England and joined 
his associates, whose existence he was to do so much 
to render miserable. He was already unfriendly to 
Deane because the latter had supplanted him in the 
confidence of Beaumarchais. It was with Deane that 
Hortalez and Company were arranging for the sup- 
plies they were to send to America, while Lee had 
expected that he would be the intermediary to take 
charge of this important business. Therefore he looked 
upon Deane with disfavor, and the person whom Lee 
disliked he was sure to regard as a rogue, and to im- 
press upon others his opinion. He soon came to dis- 
like Franklin even more than Deane, and if he did 
not accuse the doctor of dishonesty, he found in him 
other faults which he declared were quite as grievous. 

For a time, however, while the three commissioners 
did not regard each other with great cordiality, they 
at least observed the forms of united action. They 
were sent over to obtain the aid, and, if possible, the 
alliance of France, and they at once sought an oppor- 
tunity to present their case to Vergennes ; but the 
reception of envoys from a government which was 
not recognized and whose existence was not yet estab- 
lished, presented many difficulties. On December 23, 
1776, the American representatives sent a formal 
letter to Vergennes asking for an audience. Congress, 
so they wrote, was ready to negotiate a treaty of amity 
\ Works of John Adams, etc., iii, 147. 



FRANKLIN 145 

and commerce and turned first to France. " We 
flatter ourselves," they added, " that the propositions 
we are instructed to malce are such as will not be 
found unacceptable." On December 28 they were re- 
ceived at Versailles, but the French minister sought 
to escape further complaints from Stormont, of which 
he had already heard so many, and the interview was 
accordingly secret ; it was, however, none the less cor- 
dial. 

The business was veiled in such mystery that Lord 
Stormont was kept in torment in his endeavors to dis- 
cover the facts. On December 18 he wrote Lord 
Weymouth that half Paris believed Franklin had 
been twice at Versailles, but really he had not yet 
arrived. On the 23d he was certain that Franklin 
had arrived and had had an interview with Vergennes, 
but he was consoled by trustworthy information that 
Franklin pi-essed for an interview with the King and 
was refused, so he went away in a bad humor. Two 
days later Stormont sent reports of another interview 
which was also imaginary. Finally on January 1 he 
reported that Franklin had had a conference with 
Vergennes, which was true ; but he consoled himself 
by the rumor that the doctor came away from Ver- 
sailles dissatisfied, which was untrue. " I continue to 
watch Franklin's motions as narrowly as I can," he 
writes later, and this he certainly did, though not al- 
ways with good success.^ 

At the interview, the details of which the English 
were so anxious to know, the American commissioners 
obtained no formal promise of aid, but they were re- 
ceived with courtesy, and they could expect no more 
at the beginning of their negotiations. Their demands 

1 Letters to Weymouth ; Hale, Franklin in France, ii, 419-426. 



146 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

were simple. A treaty of commerce was submitted to 
Vergennes ; but the commissioners did not even sug- 
gest an alliance, nor did they present any request for 
aid. Begging, unfortunately, was to be an important 
part of the duties of our representatives in Europe, 
still at their first interview the commissioners did not 
ask for money. The moderation of their requests sur- 
prised Vergennes. " Whether it is modesty," he wrote, 
" or fear, . . . such sentiments are very praise- 
worthy." ^ 

The Americans were content to be received un- 
officially at first, but Franklin intended that they 
should soon be placed on the same footing as the 
representatives of other nations. A formal audience 
was requested for January 5. The request was not 
promptly acceded to, and thereupon Franklin pre- 
pared a letter and submitted it without more ado. 
Such a procedure was not conventional, but the doctor 
was ready to disregard the rules of diplomatic pro- 
cedure, if he saw any advantage in so doing. Even in 
the detail of dress he adopted a style not so removed 
from ordinary usage as to seem uncouth, but which 
showed that when he found a fashion distasteful he 
did not fear to disregard it. He was sufficiently con- 
ventional to be decorous, and sufficiently unconven- 
tional to be unique. He did not attend the royal levee 
in the Quaker garb appropriate for Philadelphia, and 
when he was received by Louis XV he was dressed in 
black velvet, with white silk stockings and silver 
buckles, but he thought a wig uncomfortable and did 
not wear one. All the court knew that the man with 
the scanty unpowdered locks was the American phi- 
losopher and sage. 

1 Doniol, ii, 120. 



FRANKLIN 147 

In his diplomatic conduct, while always courteous, 
he was rigorous in preserving the dignity of his posi- 
tion and yielded to no conventional requirements 
which he thought might lessen it. If the representa- 
tives of ancient monarchies greeted with informality 
the envoy of a new and small republic, Franklin, with 
perfect amiability, treated them quite as unceremoni- 
ously in return. When Vergennes hesitated to grant 
a public reception, the doctor sent him a letter, as he 
might have done to a merchant from whom he wished 
to purchase a ship. In this communication the com- 
missioners asked for thirty thousand guns, for which 
Congress would make payment. If the English de- 
clared war, the colonies agreed to cooperate with 
France and Spain in an effort to secure for them the 
West India Islands belonging to England. North 
America, they wrote, now offered to those countries 
her friendship and her commerce. 

The arguments presented by the commissioners 
were made in good faith and in a good cause, but they 
have not all been realized. Trade with the colonists, 
80 said their memoir, must be very advantageous, as 
it would consist in an exchange of the products of the 
soil and raw material for manufactured goods. The 
colonies, in offering their commerce to France, offered 
what had been the principal source of England's 
wealth. Of this France would now reap all the bene- 
fits, without any of the burdens of sovereignty. If 
still attached to Great Britain, the colonists might aid 
her to conquer other territories ; returned to her al- 
legiance, they would threaten the safety of any nation 
which had possessions in America. But separated 
from her, their interest and their inclination would 
lead them to pursue a pacific policy towards all the 



148 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

world for many generations ; by reason of their cus- 
toms and the immense expanse of their territory, they 
would long give their exclusive attention to agri- 
culture, which was, they added in a phrase inspired by 
Rousseau, " the most natural, the most interesting and 
the most innocent of all human occupations." Nor 
would they ever, even when they had acquired suffi- 
cient strength, become embroiled with European states 
holding possessions in America, nor invade their ter- 
ritory. Few have the gift of prophecy. No Monroe 
Doctrine, no Mexican nor Cuban war loomed up before 
the imagination of our first representatives in Europe. 
Nor did they foresee any more accurately the future 
of England. Not for six months, they declared, would 
her finances allow her to carry on war with France. 
The loss of her commerce with America would soon 
render it impossible for her to borrow a shilling.^ 

But the French ministers were not certain that 
American friendship would compensate for the dan- 
gers of a war with England. " We know," Vergennes 
wrote the Spanish minister, " that republics are less 
sensible than monarchies to the requirements of honor, 
and that they regard fidelity to their engagements 
only as a means to advance their interests, by which 
alone their action is determined." ^ The request for 
ships was declined, but the King promised to show his 
good-will by furnishing secret succor to the colonists, 
and making them a gift of two million livres.^ This 
advance enabled the commissioners to proceed with 
the purchase of greatly needed supplies, and was the 
first of many gifts and loans which went far towards 

1 Memoir of Dec. 31, 1776; Beane Papers, i, 434-442. 

2 Vergennes to Ossun, Jan. 12, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 128. 
8 Doniol, ii, 121. 



FRANKLIN 149 

preventing the collapse of the American Revolution 
from lack of funds. 

The French hesitated at the prospect of war with 
England, yet the American commissioners had every 
reason to believe that sooner or later such a contest 
must come. Vergennes and his associates realized in- 
deed how serious this might be. The arguments which 
Turgot had used against interference in the American 
quarrel were as forcible now as when they were ad- 
vanced a year earlier. It is doubtful if Louis XVI at 
any time really desired an alliance with the colonies. 
His timidity and his common sense were affected by 
Turgot's arguments, his monarchical instincts were 
offended by republicans rebelling against their king. 
The enthusiasm for the Americans, which pervaded 
French society and literature, found no echo in his 
dull mind. 

But the King was not an important factor in the 
administration ; it was not he who decided whether 
France should make war in behalf of American inde- 
pendence, and his ministers were agitated by conflict- 
ing hopes and fears. The Americans suggested the 
evils that might come to France and Spain if the col- 
onists should be forced to submit to Great Britain ; 
that country could then turn her aims to driving her 
rivals from America. It was of such a result, of some 
reconciliation by which the rebellious colonists should 
again become loyal Englishmen and seek consolation 
for their defeat by laying violent hands on the French 
and Spanish West Indies, that Vergennes and his as- 
sociates lived in constant dread. The evils of war with 
Great Britain were admitted ; but it was declared that 
a worse evil would be the submission of the colonists 
to the dangerous power of England, which would then 



150 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

be strengthened by the profits of American trade and 
by the arms of her American subjects. 

To these apprehensions was added a strong suspicion 
that England would declare war on France, without 
waiting for that country to form an alliance with the 
colonists. It was known that France was giving to the 
colonists all the aid she dared to give, without incur- 
ring a certain rupture ; she lent them money, she fur- 
nished them arms, she received their envoys, she vio- 
lated all principles of international law in the manner 
in which American cruisers were allowed to seek a 
refuge for themselves and a market for their prizes in 
French ports. 

Lord Stormont complained with good cause, and 
threatened war with much justification. Vergennes 
met his reproaches with entire disingenuousness and 
small regard for truth. " Franklin," wrote Vergennes, 
when the English minister complained of the encour- 
agement given that fugitive rebel, — "I don't know 
what Dr. Franklin has come to do among us. At first 
one might suppose he had some important commissions, 
and then suddenly he shut himself up with the philo- 
sophers, and if he is engaged in any political intrigues, 
it is not with the ministers of the King." ^ 

The English were not deceived by such assurances ; 
if the objects of Franklin's mission were unknown to 
Vergennes, they were well known to the British min- 
isters; the French, so they complained, were furnish- 
ing the insurgents with succor of every kind; Frank- 
lin and Deane held frequent conferences with the 
ministers of the Most Christian King ; ships loaded 
with money and clothing for the rebels had already 
left the ports, and if the voice was that of Beaumar- 
> Vergennes to Noailles, Feb. 22, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 326, 327. 



FRANKLIX 161 

chais, the hand was believed to be that of Vergennes.^ 
If such action led the English to declare war upon 
a power whose conduct was so inconsistent with its 
professions, naturally the American representatives 
would have viewed the result without regret. 
1 Report, March 7, 1777. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE PRIVATEERS 

It was not only by assisting the enterprising house 
of Roderigue Hortalez and Company that the French 
government sought to help the colonists : it rendered 
aid xjuite as important to the Americans, and quite as 
inconsistent with the neutrality towards England 
which was steadfastly proclaimed, in furnishing re- 
fuge and shelter to American privateers. The treat- 
ment of American privateers in France excited the 
just complaints of the English, and Americans can 
excuse it only by the reflection that it was for their 
benefit. International law was indeed in a very prim- 
itive condition, and England had been so persistent 
a violator of all principles of neutrality, that her com- 
plaints came with a poor grace when she was herself 
a sufferer from their infraction. 

No sooner had war broken out, than the equipment 
of privateers became a favorite industry in the colo- 
nies. The hardy New England sailors were admirably 
fitted for such work ; and privateering not only in- 
flicted great injury on English commerce, but fur- 
nished the foundation of many a snug American for- 
tune. The industry had much fascination ; there was 
the possibility of greater gain than in whaling, and 
not much more danger ; a good prize might turn the 
captain into a well-to-do man, and furnish the sailor 
with the wherewithal for a month's steady debauch 
when he landed at Newport or Boston. There was less 



THE PRIVATEERS 153 

everyday hardship than on a merchantman or a fish- 
ing boat, more leisure, and better food. The bill of 
fare as given in the log of one of these privateers is 
not unattractive. Breakfast was served at eight and 
dinner at noon. Each man had six pounds of bread 
per week, butter for breakfast, a pound of beef at din- 
ner three days in the week, and on the other three a 
pound of pork with pulse, while on Sunday there was 
rice and molasses for breakfast, and bread and beef 
for dinner. When to this was added a half pint of 
rum per day, the sailor should have been contented 
with his lot, though his grog was stopped for wran- 
gling, quarrelling, or getting drunk. Of course, sup- 
plies sometimes failed on a long cruise. " I am afraid 
I shall be obliged to get a puncheon of rum, although 
dear," writes a captain to the owner ; " there is no 
doing without it. We were once entirely out for eight 
days, but, to do our people justice, I never heard the 
least murmur on that account, as they knew it could 
not be had." 

While the exploits of these cruisers were confined to 
our side of the Atlantic, their prizes could be taken 
into American ports, and there was no fear of inter- 
national complications ; but they soon extended their 
field of operations to the English Channel and the 
Irish Sea. It was impracticable to sail across the At- 
lantic with their prizes, and they sought shelter in the 
friendly ports of France. The American navy came 
into existence as a result of these enterprises, and it 
then consisted of a few ships commanded by enter- 
prising and daring captains, who devoted themselves 
to the capture of English merchantmen. They prob- 
ably did more harm to the enemy than a larger and 
more formidable fleet, which would have occupied its 



154 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

energies in fighting men-of-war. John Paul Jones was 
the best known of those freebooters, but the names of 
Wickes and Nicholson and. Conyngham were almost 
as much dreaded by the British merchant and shipper. 

The field of operations furnished rich profits. Here 
is the record of Captain Wickes, who brought Frank- 
lin to France, and then turned his energies to cruising 
along the British coast. It reads like the record of 
Don Juan's triumphs when sung by Leporello : — 

"June 19, when we took two brigs and two sloops; 
. . . 20th, took the sloop Jassans from White Haven; 
. . . 21st, took Scotch ship from Prussia . . . loaded 
with wheat ; took a small Scotch smuggler and sunk 
her ; 22nd, took the John and Thomas from Norway 
. . . loaded with deals, the brig Jenny and Sallie from 
Glasgow ... in ballast ; . . . 22nd, took a brig from 
Dublin . . . sunk her. Took three large brigs loaded 
with coals . . . bound for Dublin, sunk them in sight 
of that port. . . . Took the brig Crawford from Glas- 
gow, ... in ballast ; 23rd, took the ship Grace from 
Jamaica . . . loaded with sugar, rum, cotton, and to- 
bacco, and the brig Peggy from Cork . . . loaded with 
butter and hides . . . ; 25th, took the sloop John and 
Peter from Havre de Grace . . . ; 26th . . . took a 
skow . . . from Gibraltar . . . loaded with cork." 

After so active a cruise, it is not strange that the 
captain went to St. Malo to refit, and he was cer- 
tainly justified in asking Franklin for a credit of 
money as soon as possible.^ 

When Paul Jones became famous, France was the 
ally of the United States, there was war with England, 
the French ports stood open for American ships of 

^ Wickes to the Commissioners, June 28, 1777 ; Hale, Franklin in 
France, i, 122. 



THE PRIVATEERS 155 

war with their prizes, as did those of their own land. 
But the hardy pirates who carried devastation to 
British commerce, while France still pi-ofessed to be 
at peace with England, found some embarrassment in 
the successful prosecution of their trade. They recog- 
nized the principles of international law only when 
they could be applied in their own behalf. It is 
pleasant to note the rigid views of Captain Wickes 
in this respect, for when returning from his cruise, he 
fell in with an English ship of war, and forthwith 
ran for St. Malo in order to find a safe harbor. The 
English ship chased him all day ; he escaped, but he 
says indignantly: "They pay very little regard to 
the laws of neutrality, as they chased me and fired 
as long as they dared stand in for fear of running 
ashore." ^ If the English men-of-war did not regard 
the laws of neutrality when pursuing these piratical 
craft, the French observed them no more when the 
privateers had escaped into port. The Americans ex- 
pected the same facilities which they would have 
found at Gloucester or Boston, opportunities to refit 
their ships, to buy ammunition and supplies, and sell 
their prizes, and they received very nearly what they 
desired. 

It was plainly the duty of the French to refuse 
these cruisers any shelter, except in stress of weather 
or urgent need. Apart from the general principles 
of international law, the Treaty of Utrecht between 
France and England provided that privateers should 
not fit out their ships nor sell their prizes in ports 
of either country, nor even purchase victuals except 
such as would enable them to get " to the next port of 
the Prince from whom they have their commission." 
1 Hale, Franklin in France, i, 124. 



156 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The French were willing to see any harm done to 
England, but they did not wish to be forced into a 
war. Therefore they closed their eyes to infractions 
of neutrality until a complaint was lodged, and then 
made much ado, with the purpose of accomplishing 
the smallest possible result. But even Vergennes 
dared not violate all laws of propriety, and the con- 
duct of these freebooters was so shameless that at 
times he took, or at least threatened, sharp action. 

In addition to his other duties, Franklin was prac- 
tically secretary for the incipient American navy; he 
had to do with the purchasing of boats, the payment 
of men, and the complications which, constantly re- 
sulted from the actions of these buccaneers. It was 
his own theory that all privateering should be abol- 
ished. He urged not only that free ships should make 
free goods, but that unarmed trading vessels should 
be undisturbed in time of war, and an article to that 
effect he endeavored, without success, to have inserted 
in the treaty of peace between England and the 
United States. But no such principles had been 
adopted, and the doctor's abstract views did not pre- 
vent his assisting the American cruisers to do the 
greatest possible harm to English commerce. He had 
constantly to make excuses of questionable truth, and 
more questionable validity, for the conduct of Ameri- 
can ships that were refitting In French ports. Such 
action was forbidden, the ships were sometimes seized, 
and the officers imprisoned ; but these troubles were 
sure to be adjusted, and in due time the cruiser, again 
in good order, with a fresh supply of powder and her 
money-bags well filled from the sale of prizes, sailed 
out from a French port to carry destruction to Eng- 
lish shipping. 



THE PRIVATEERS 157 

The English, in justifying their conduct daring our 
Civil War in reference to the Florida and the Ala- 
bama, could have found precedents in the action of 
France in the time of our Revolution. Their attempts 
to prevent Confederate cruisers sailing from English 
ports were marked by the utmost good faith, when 
compared with the procedure of France at that period; 
if there had then been a Geneva Commission, acting 
on the principles established at the Alabama Arbitra- 
tion, France would have been unanimously condemned 
to pay many millions of indemnity for damages to 
Snglish commerce, caused by a reckless disregard of 
the obligations of international law. 

Franklin came over in the Reprisal, commanded 
by Captain Wickes. So well was the tiuie employed 
during the voyage, that the captain sailed into the 
harbor at Nantes, carrying not only the American 
minister, but two prizes in tow. These he proposed to 
sell in order to equip his boat for a protracted cruise 
of privateering, but the English officials stoutly re- 
monstrated. Vergennes replied in the tone which 
must have become very wearisome to the English be- 
fore open war was at last declared two years later. 
" Though a faithful execution of the treaties," he wrote, 
" was strictly commanded, infractions would occur. If 
prizes taken by the Reprisal had been sold, and French 
merchants had purchased them, nothing could be more 
irregular, but he felt sure that the owners would find 
redress if they brought action in the courts." ^ 

In the mean time, Wickes peacefully pursued his 

illegal courses, and made strenuous protest when he 

was disturbed. " I have this day," he writes, " very 

extraordinary orders from the intendant of this port, 

1 Doniol, ii, 334. 



158 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

demanding me to leave the port in twenty -four hours. 
... I shall run into Nantes and there enter a pro- 
test, . . . though I am ordered not to go into any port 
in France. These are very extraordinary orders, such 
as I little expected to receive in France." ^ Three 
weeks later, writing from the same place, having re- 
mained there notwithstanding all orders to quit, he 
complains : the commissary of the port " still con- 
tinues to threaten to drive me out immediately. ... It 
vexes me very much to be treated in this manner, and 
I would not submit to it elsewhere.'' ^ 

A few months later, having returned from a suc- 
cessful cruise and taken refuge in St. Malo, he 
writes in great distress that the authorities there would 
not allow him to take on board cannon, powder or 
military stores. " I am told they have wrote [sic] to 
the minister informing of my having taken my cannon 
on board clandestinely at the night. ... If so," 
says the captain, and doubtless with truth, "you may 
safely deny the charge, as I took them on board at 
noonday publickly." ^ 

In fact, these freebooters made no concealment, and 
when upon complaint of the British minister an order 
came down from Paris stopping their proceedings, 
they wrote to Fyanklin and he, in due time, got the 
order modified, or else tlie local authorities decided 
that they could safely wink at its infraction. Even 
this was very galling to men like Captain Wickes. 
" I am heartily tired of France," he writes. " I can 
only say I am sorry our situation is such as puts us 

1 Wickes to the Commissioners, Feb. 26, 1777 ; Hale, Franklin in 
France, i, 115. 

2 Same to Same, March 15, 1777 ; Ibid., 119. 
« Same to Same, Aug. 12, 1777 ; Ibid., 126. 



THE PRIVATEERS 159 

under the disagreeable necessity of submitting to such 
indignities as are exercised over us in the ports of 
France." * 

Franklin did all he could to assist the success of 
these enterprises, although he deemed them so repre- 
hensible. He wrote a French merchant, who doubtless 
wished to pick up some of the good bargains furnished 
by the sale of these prizes : " The prize cannot, as you 
observe, be sold and delivered in your port, it being 
contrary to treaties. . . . But I suppose it may be 
done in the road without the port, or in some con- 
venient place on the coast where the business may be 
transacted and conducted with discretion, so as to 
occasion no trouble to the ministers by applications 
from the English Ambassador. . . . But a formal 
order from the minister to permit such a sale and 
delivery in any port of France is not to be expected 
while the peace continues." ^ 

Some of the documents in the French Foreign Office 
read curiously like those of the English law officers, 
when our minister was endeavoring to stop the Ala- 
bama. "We must admit," wrote Maurepas, speaking 
of the complaints of selling prizes in French ports, 
"that means have been found to avoid the prohibi- 
tions, . . . but it is necessary to apply to the Admir- 
alty to obtain legal proof and we will not fail to send 
them there." ^ If Wickes was disturbed by orders that 
wounded his feelings but did not hinder his enterprise, 
Lord Stormont, with better reason, was angered 
because the American cruisers sold their prizes and 
refitted their ships with almost as much impunity as 

^ Wickes to the Commissioners, Aug. 12, 1777 ; Hale, Franklin in 
France, i, 128. 
2 Ibid., 134. 8 Doniol, ii, 335. 



160 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

if they were in their own land, instead of in a country 
which professed to be at peace with England. 

Vergennes wrote in July, 1777, that Lord Stormont 
had called, complaining of the action of the three 
American cruisers, Reprisal, Lexington, and Dolj)hin, 
that were then ravaging the British coast. " I will not 
endeavor," says the minister, " to report to you the 
warmth of his expressions. It was exti-eme." ^ To such 
complaints Vergennes replied, complaining of the heat 
of his adversary's remarks : " We do not use a tone of 
arrogance," he wrote; " our style is simple, honest, and 
firm. The King does not seek to justify wrongs ; he 
fears the less to do justice because that is in his char- 
acter, and he regards the exercise of this as one of the 
fairest jewels of his crown, one of the most sacred 
duties of his office." ^ i^fter this outburst of eloquence, 
he continues: "The position we take of holding these 
corsairs until we can have security that they will 
return to their own country without again infesting 
the waters of Europe, is all the satisfaction we can 
give." 

To the American commissioners he wrote at the 
same time : " I call your attention to the article of the 
treaty which forbids our allowing privateers free ac- 
cess into our ports, unless through pressing necessity. 
. . . You promised, gentlemen, to conform thereto." 
And he then related the trials he had experienced from 
the conduct of Captain Wickes and his consorts. 
" You are too well informed, gentlemen, and too acute 
not to see how far such conduct affects the dignity 
of the King, my mastei-, and at the same time violates 
the neutrality which his Majesty professes. I expect, 

1 Vergennes to Noailles, July 19, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 514. 

2 Doniol, ii, 515. 



THE PRIVATEERS 161 

therefore, from your sense of justice, that you will be 
the first to condemn conduct so contrary to the laws 
of hospitality and of propriety." ^ The cruisers must, 
accordingly, said Vergennes, give bonds for their im- 
mediate return to their own country. 

In reply, the commissioners said that as soon as the 
ships had taken in sufficient provisions, they would 
sail for America, eschewing all privateering on the 
British coast. Nothing of the soi-t was done, nor was 
it probably expected or really desired on either side 
that any such thing should be done, but the official 
representatives of the two nations at least observed 
the proprieties. 

Sometimes the indignation of Vergennes, as well 
as of Stormont, was excited by the boundless audacity 
of the American freebooters. In the spring of 1777 
a privateer was fitted out in the port of Dunkirk, 
Deane, then one of our representatives, taking an ac- 
tive part in the enterprise. The cruiser set sail, under 
the command of Captain Conyngham, and at once 
captured the Harwich packet-boat, plying between 
England and Holland, and sailed back in triumph, 
bringing her prize, with all on board, into Dunkirk. 
But this was too flagrant an infraction of the law 
of decency as well as neutrality. The capture of the 
packet created a panic in England ; rates of insurance 
went up, boats running between Dover and Calais had 
to pay ten per cent, travellers were afraid to go to sea. 
The English minister remonstrated with his usual vehe- 
mence, and even Vergennes was angry. The cruiser 
was seized, and Captain Conyngham, who seems to 
have expected a triumphant reception after his suc- 
cessful trip, was thrown into jail ; the packet, and a 

^ Vergennes to the Commissioners, July 16, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 521. 



162 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

brig that Conyngham had also captured, were returned 
to the English, much to the chagrin of the captors. 

Deane, who had taken an active part in this pirat- 
ical enterprise, remarked sadly that this gave the 
English a temporary triumph. Their triumph was 
only temporary. A new and better ship was bought 
for Conyngham and equipped with thirty-six guns. 
The release of the captain and crew was obtained on 
the agreement that they would sail at once for Amer- 
ica, and Mr. Hodge, who apparently was a partner in 
the enterprise, signed a bond to that effect. Conyng- 
ham then sailed out from Dunkirk, ostensibly on a 
trading expedition, and as soon as he was out of sight 
of land, began to pursue every English boat he saw, 
and captured all he could ; he even endeavored to 
burn a few towns along the English coast. On hearing 
of this violation of the agreement, Vergennes had 
Hodge arrested and put in the Bastille, but the 
American commissioners applied for his release, pro- 
testing that they could not believe a man of Hodge's 
standing capable of any willful offence against the 
laws of the nation. Upon this certificate of character, 
Hodge was released from prison, and Conyngham 
proceeded on his privateering cruise along the English 
coast. ^ 

A few months later. Captain Conyngham was un- 
lucky enough to be made a prisoner, and the English 
proposed to hang him as both a rebel and a pirate. 
The specific act charged against him was capturing 
the Harwich packet, having, as was alleged, no com- 
mission from the United States government. Conyng- 
ham averred that he held a commission, which was 
probably true, but, unfortunately, this he had lost at 

1 Beam Papers, ii, 108, 109. 



THE PRIVATEERS 163 

the time the French government shut him up in jail 
at Dunkirk. Thus the capture of the packet, which 
had disturbed all England, very nearly cost the cap- 
tain his neck. But Franklin and others asserted that 
he was a regularly commissioned officer, and the pos- 
sibility of retaliation, more than any belief in the regu- 
larity of Conyngham's status, saved his life. Con- 
gress held three English officers in close confinement, 
to abide the decision as to Conyngham's fate. At 
last he made his escape from prison, and he wrote 
Franklin, dwelling upon his sufferings. " Irons, dun- 
geons, hunger, the hangman's cart, I have experienced. 
. . . Sir George Collier ordered irons on my legs, 
with a sentry on board the ship. Mr. Collier, going 
on an expedition, ordered me to jaole, there put me 
into the condemned room. The first night a cold 
plank my bed, a stone for a pillow. . . . Then, not 
contented, they manacled my hands with a new-fash- 
ioned pair of ruffels fitted very tite." ^ As Franklin 
said when Couyngham was captured, " He has done so 
much harm to the enemy that he can expect no mercy, 
at their hands." 

Early in 1778 France signed an alliance with the 
United States, and the English declared war. Amer- 
ican cruisers enjoyed hardly more privileges in French 
ports after this than they had when France was at 
peace, but no one could longer complain that the 
hospitality thus extended was contrary to the laws of 
nations and the principles of neutrality. 

1 Hale, Franklin in France, i, 347, 349. 1 



CHAPTEE IX 

LA FAYETTE 

Apart from the aid surreptitiously given by the 
French government, and the supplies sent over by 
Beaumarchais and other friends and speculators, there 
were numerous offers from a class who made arms 
their profession and who wished to enter the American 
army. Many of these, it is to be feared, were actuated 
by the hope of personal gain rather than by any zeal for 
the cause of American liberty. They were well-bred 
adventurers who had little to furnish except valor, 
and for this they demanded a high price. When their 
own country was at peace, they were ready to bear 
arms in America, and they would have been equally 
ready to enlist under the flag of the Great Turk if 
he had been in need of troops. The field in America 
seemed to present special attractions. Among a new 
and little-known people they could entertain hopes 
of gaining wealth and promotion that would have 
seemed absurd in Europe. In most continental wars 
the countries involved possessed a sufficient number 
of trained officers, and were not eager for foreign 
volunteers. Frederick declined the services of the 
young English noblemen who wished to serve under 
his flag during the Seven Years' War, because he 
thought they would be an embarrassment rather than 
an assistance. 

But the American colonists, it was felt, must be 
ignorant of anything deserving to be called the art 



LA FAYETTE 165 

of war ; they had no body of trained officers ; they 
had little experience in fighting except with Indians, 
and the conflicts in which they had taken part bore 
no resemblance to scientific warfare. The selectman 
of the town, or the keeper of the country store, must, 
it was argued, be unfit to act as a captain or a colonel ; 
and yet from them, and those like them, the officers 
in the new army were selected. That men with some 
knowledge of wilderness life, who had hunted wild 
animals and been hunted by wild Indians in the pri- 
meval forests, were better fitted for conditions in 
America than an officer who could manoeuvre a regi- 
ment with the utmost precision on the plains of Ger- 
many or France, was not understood in the military 
circles of Europe. 

But it was not the love of adventure and the hope of 
reward alone, that led so great a body of young French- 
men to seek out Deaue and Franklin and tender their 
services. The American cause was truly popular, and 
young nobles who sighed for the excitement of war felt 
also a sincere sympathy for the principles for which 
the American colonists had taken up arms. Inspired 
by philosophers who predicted a new era of felicity, 
by politicians who declared the time was ripe for new 
forms of government, by nobles who discovered a new 
interest in the welfare of the people, many a young 
soldier, with a genuine enthusiasm for the cause, 
wished to help the American patriots in their efforts 
to throw off kingly misrule. 

Whatever their motives, the number and the ur- 
gency of those who sought positions in the American 
army soon became embarrassing. Deane wrote in No- 
vember, 1776 : " The rage, as I may say, for entering 
into the American service increases and the conse- 



166 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

quence is that I am crowded with offers and proposals, 
many of them from persons in the first rank and em- 
inence." ^ He writes a little later : " I am well-nigh 
harassed to death with applications of officers to go 
out for America " ; and he added, with a confidence 
that unfortunately was not well founded, "Those I 
have engaged are, I trust, in general of the best char- 
acter." ^ 

In the following March the commissioners wrote : 
" The desire that military officers here of all ranks 
have of going into the service of the United States 
is so general and so strong as to be quite amazing. 
We are hourly fatigued with their applications and 
offers, which we are obliged to refuse, and with hun- 
dreds of letters which we cannot possibly answer to 
their satisfaction." ^ 

When Franklin arrived, the pressure to enter the 
American service was no less, but he was more cau- 
tious than Deane in giving employment. He wrote 
that many had been previously engaged by Deane, 
who could not resist the applications made him, but 
that he gave all the discouragement in his power, and 
he adds : " You can have no conception of the arts 
and interest made use of to recommend, and engage 
us to recommend very indifferent persons. The im- 
portunity is boundless. The numbers we refuse in- 
credible." * All these officers, so Franklin wrote, were 
reported to be full of courage and zeal, in short, 
" were Caesars." Some offered aid more valuable than 

1 Deane to Committee, Nov. 6, 1776 ; Deane Papers, i, 342. 

2 Same to Same, Nov. 28, 1776 ; Ibid., 375. 

^ Commissioners to Committee, March 12, 1777; Diplomatic Corre- 
spondence, Sparks's ed., i, 202. 

* Franklin to Lovell, Oct. 7, 1777; Writings of Franklin, Albert 
H. Smyth, editor, vii, 66. 



LA FAYETTE 167 

carrying a musket, and he notes an offer from a priest 
who wrote that if Franklin would pay his gaming 
debts, he would pray for the success of the American 
cause.* 

Notwithstanding Deane's confidence that he had 
selected only those of the best character, he was in- 
duced to send many who would have been of little value 
to any cause, and in addition to this, he sent over many 
more than were needed, even if they had been officers of 
the highest merit. He dealt with this matter with his 
usual indiscretion, and enrolled many volunteers, un- 
der liberal promises of rank and pay which Congress 
was unwilling to fulfil. It was not possible, so the 
committee of Congress reported, to provide for these 
gentlemen in the manner they wished, and many at 
once returned to France. " We have done all in our 
power to prevent discontent," they said ; but these 
efforts in many cases were unsuccessful. Congress had 
asked only for four engineers ; it received a host of 
volunteers, of whom there was no need, and for whom 
there was no place. American officers naturally were 
not willing to step aside for some foreigner who could 
not even give orders in a language which the men 
could understand, and the most of those whom Deane 
sent over were unfit for such service as was required in 
America. To command a company of French soldiers 
in a campaign in the Low Countries was a very differ- 
ent thing from having charge of a body of Americans, 
fresh from the plough or the shop, amid the priva- 
tions that awaited them in New Jersey or Virginia. 

One of the most troublesome of those chosen by 
Deane was du Coudray, who had so disturbed Beau- 
marchais by ordering back the ship on which he em- 
1 Hale, Franklin in France, i, 79. 



168 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

barked. Du Coudray was one of the first of the for- 
eign officers who arrived in America, and he did much 
to insure a cold reception for those who followed him. 
Deane had written Congress that the character and 
extraordinary exertions of du Coudray entitled him 
to much, and he hoped that the sum stipulated for 
him would not be considered extravagant. Kelyiug 
on Deane's agreement, du Coudray at once asked for 
a commission as major-general, and to be put in com- 
mand of the artillery and engineer corps. He was a 
soldier of some experience, and the American officers 
were probably less versed in the art of engineering or 
the use of artillery, but they had no thought of yield- 
ing the chief command to an unknown foreigner. 

General Knox was in command of the artillery at 
this time ; if we can believe Steuben, he had no idea 
of the use of cannon either in attack or retreat, but 
he had no desire to be superseded or taught by a for- 
eigner. It was reported that du Coud ray's demand 
had been acceded to, and thereupon Generals Knox, 
Greene, and Sullivan sent their resignations to Con- 
gress. For this act they were properly reprimanded, 
but Congress declined to recognize Deane's agree- 
ment, and created for du Coudray the position of in- 
spector of artillery with the rank of major-general. 

Du Coudray had a high sense of his own impor- 
tance and a strong desire for his own advancement ; 
he insisted that he would have everything or nothing 
and would suffer no abatement in his demands. He 
sent memoirs to Congress, magnifying his own serv- 
ices and belittling anything done by Beaumarchais or 
others; he refused the commission offered him and 
said that he would enter the army merely as a volun- 
teer, with the rank of captain. This act of magnanim- 



LA FAYETTE 169 

ity was only to prepare for further intrigues ; but for- 
tunately, on September 16, 1777, when crossing the 
Schuylkill, he was drowned, and his career came to 
an end. Even the charitable La Fayette writes that 
du Coudray's death was perhaps a happy accident. 
After his death, most of those who came over with 
him returned to France, having found neither gain 
nor glory in their American expedition. 

Yet among these volunteers were some whose serv- 
ices exceeded any promise of reward they received 
from Deane. La Fayette, Kalb, Steuben, and Pulaski 
were among these early recruits, and when France 
became our ally they were followed by many others 
who did good service in the cause of American liberty. 

The name of La Fayette is more familiar to the 
American people than that of any other actor in the 
Revolution, with the exception of "Washington. When 
very young he gained an extended fame which has not 
waned vvitli the progress of time. He was not a man 
of unusual intellectual powers, nor of uncommon abil- 
ity as a soldier, but he possessed courage, enthusiasm, 
and an amiable character, he threw himself with zeal 
into a great cause, and he attained the fame which 
he so eagerly desired. 

The Marquis de La Fayette belonged to an ancient 
and illustrious house. They traced their lineage back 
beyond the year 1000, and had no need of the inge- 
nuity of genealogists to prove the antiquity of their 
race. Members of the family served in the Crusades, 
one of them fell at the battle of Poitiers, another was 
marshal of France in the days of Charles VII, and 
many won distinction in their country's wars during 
the centuries that followed. If the men were renowned 
for their bravery, some of the women were equally 



170 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

noted for their charms. The beautiful Mademoiselle 
de La Fayette, who excited the chaste affection of 
Louis XIII, and Madame de La Fayette, the author 
of several novels and tales, of which the "Princesse 
de Cleves," the most famous, has still many readers, 
— these were among the celebrated members of the 
La Fayette family. 

The grandmother of our hero was a Chavagniac, 
and was married at the early age of twelve. She was a 
woman of good judgment and strong character. Her 
grandson writes that she was respected in all the pro- 
vince, and persons came from twenty leagues around 
i,o consult her on questions of importance. His mother 
was a daughter of the Marquis de la Riviere ; she pos- 
sessed virtue, piety, and illustrious pedigree and very 
little money. The father of La Fayette, like almost 
all of his ancestors, served in the army, and in July, 
1757, he was killed at the battle of Hastenbeck. It 
was a tradition that the La Fayettes fell on the field 
of battle, and that they met their fate when young ; 
the father was killed at twenty-five, his only brother 
had already fallen in Italy, a young man of twenty- 
three. 

On the 6th of September, 1757, the famous Mar- 
quis de La Fayette was born, a posthumous child. He 
lived for some years with his mother and grandmother 
in the Chateau Chavagniac, in what is now the de- 
partment of the Haute-Loire. It was an ancient and 
massive building, erected in the fourteenth century 
for purposes of defence, strongly fortified and flanked 
by towers, and from it one had an extended though 
somewhat austere view. It still stands with its heavy 
and severe lines, little changed in appearance since the 
days when La Fayette was a child. 



LA FAYETTE 171 

In his early years the family was poor. His father 
and uncle left small estates ; the lands about Cha- 
vagniac were not fertile, the climate was cold, and the 
revenues were small. The lad led an active and hardy 
life, taking much exercise and growing up stout in 
body and courageous in mind. The wolf of Gevaudan, 
whose real or imaginary misdeeds made it famous all 
over France, committed its ravages in this part of the 
country, and La Fayette tells us that when only eight 
his walks were animated by the hope that he might 
encounter this extraordinary beast and become famous 
by killing it.^ He never met the wolf, and he owed his 
fame to other exploits. 

When still a youth La Fayette inherited from an 
uncle of his mother a great estate. He was taken to 
Paris and received into the ranks of the highest no- 
bility. Though not brilliant, he was pleasing, amiable, 
rich, and young, and he was everywhere made wel- 
come. Early marriages were the custom of the time in 
the circle to which La Fayette belonged. When only 
fourteen he was proposed as a husband for one of the 
five daughters of the Due d'Ayen, who was afterwards 
Due de Noailles. It seems to have been a matter of 
indifference which of the five should be agreed upon, 
and the father selected the second. But the mother 
hesitated about consenting to the match. 

We are apt to regard French society at this period 
as frivolous and corrupt. Of corruption and frivolity 
there was certainly enough, but there were in the 
highest classes, as well as among the bourgeoisie, 
many families in which piety ruled and every virtue 
was found. The women of the NoaiUes and La Fay- 

^ Memoires, Correspondance et Manuscrits du Gin^ral Lafayette, 
publics par safamille, i, 20. 



172 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ette families were examples of purity of life and 
elevation of character ; we hear less of such than of 
the Montespans and the Pompadours, but they were 
always numerous, and without them French society 
would have ceased to exist. The Duchesse d'Ayen 
was one of these women. She was educated in a con- 
vent, filled with a sincere piety, entirely devoted to 
her husband and her children, and she trained the 
latter to follow the same paths she had herself pur- 
sued. Like other women of her class, she was scrupu- 
lous, we may think over scrupulous, in the perform- 
ance of religious duties. Though fond of chess, she 
would not play on Saturdays because she found that 
recollections of the game sometimes distracted her 
thoughts at mass on the following morning. Such 
things savor of a narrow devotion; but narrowness 
should not be charged against a woman who trained 
five children to lead pure lives, and who herself met 
death on the scaffold during the Terror with the cour- 
age of a soldier and the tranquillity of a saint. 

Such a mother was not ready to consent to the pro- 
posed marriage of her daughter to La Fayette merely 
because he had wealth and rank. The future bride 
writes that the extreme youth of the proposed hus- 
band, the loneliness of his situation, having lost all 
his near relatives, and his great fortune, which her 
mother regarded as a danger rather than an advan- 
tage, decided her to refuse her consent.^ In this she 
persisted for several months ; but the father manifested 
still greater pertinacity, the alliance was finally agreed 
upon, and in 1774, when La Fayette was sixteen and 
his bride not yet fifteen, the marriage was celebrated. 

1 Mme. Adrienne de La Fayette, Notice sur Madame la Duchesse 
d'Ayen. 



LA FAYETTE 173 

Though married, the parties were little more than 
children and they were treated accordingly. The mar- 
quis continued his military education at the Academy 
of Versailles and seems to have been regarded by the 
family of which he was now a member as an amiable 
child. 

His own rank and the position of his wife's family 
secured him admission everywhere, but the youth 
seems to have had by nature little taste for courts. 
He was, so he tells us, awkward in his manners, a 
small and by no means a brilliant talker, and little 
fitted to shine in society. His father-in-law wished to 
secure him a position at court ; but La Fayette, from 
chance or design, advanced some views that were dis- 
tasteful to the future Louis XVIH, and the place was 
refused. The young nobility of this period found court 
life less attractive than had their sires. His compan- 
ion, the Comte de Segur, rejected a similar position, 
and speaks of it as a gilded slavery. 

La Fayette, so Segur tells us, was cold and even 
dull in appearance, but lie concealed a firm character 
and an ardent spirit. In 1775 the marquis, then eight- 
een years of age, was performing duty at Metz. It 
was there, according to his statement, that his inter- 
est was first excited in the affairs of the American 
colonists. At a dinner given by the Comte de Broglie, 
the Duke of Gloucester, a brother of George III, was 
present. The brothers and sons of the House of Han- 
over were usually at loggerheads, and the duke was 
quite ready to criticize his brother's policy ; he told of 
the treatment the American colonists had received, 
and spoke warmly of these patriots struggling for 
their liberties. Every word met with a ready response 
from La Fayette, who was young and ardent, and 



174 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

filled with that vague enthusiasm for popular rights 
which had begun to show itself in the highest circles 
of the French aristocracy. He tells us that he then 
decided to enlist in the cause of American freedom, 
and there is no reason to question his word. Doubt- 
less he was influenced by the taste for military life, 
and by the desire for military glory that was common 
among young French nobles. But in addition to this, 
he was actuated by a strong and genuine interest in 
those whom he believed to be oppressed, and he was 
eager to have a hand in the establishment of a free 
government on the other side of the water. 

La Fayette's youthful enthusiasm was accompanied 
by a pertinacity and steadfastness of purpose unusual 
in men of any age. It was an easy thing to sympa- 
thize with the American patriots, but for a youth like 
La Fayette to leave his country and enter the insur- 
gent army was a difficult enterprise. He was young, 
rich, highly placed, newly married. Naturally all of 
his family were aghast at the suggestion that he should 
desert his home and take part in a war waged in a 
land which seemed more remote from France than 
Abyssinia now seems from New York. 

The very prominence of his position made it more 
difficult for him to go. An obscure young man could 
have taken ship to Boston and joined the army under 
Washington, and the French government would have 
disquieted itself very little. But the Marquis de La 
Fayette could not lightly be allowed to take such a 
step. The English might insist that such a man would 
not have enlisted in the American cause except with 
the tacit approval of his own government. The Amer- 
ican insurgents would believe the same thing, and 
expect that the adhesion of La Fayette would be 



LA FAYETTE 175 

the first step toward an alliance with the French 
King. 

Two other young nobles, hardly inferior to La 
Fayette in position, the Vicomte de Noailles, his bro- 
ther-in-law, and the Comte de Segur, who afterwards 
married another kinswoman, endeavored to embark 
with him in the American cause. All three applied to 
Deane, and he naturally was anxious to secure the 
support of such notable recruits. French opinion was 
already favorable to the Americans, and it would 
surely assist in obtaining the open support of the 
French government if representatives of the great 
French families were fighting for the patriot cause. 
But the prominence of the new recruits stood in the 
way of the accomplishment of their plan. Such a step 
was distasteful to the government and it was promptly 
forbidden. 

Noailles and S^gur sighed and obeyed, but La 
Fayette was made of more stubborn material. His 
family were incensed at his project and were equally 
surprised. La Fayette's reserved character and his 
slowness of speech were in marked contrast with the 
brilliant youths of his own class, and had created the 
impression that, if worthy, he was also dull. His 
father-in-law desired the Comte de Segur to breathe 
some of his own fire into La Fayette's sluggish tem- 
perament, and he was amazed when this silent youth 
of nineteen announced his decision to sail across 
the Atlantic and hazard his life in a land and for a 
people of which even educated Frenchmen had the 
vaguest notions. Surprise at this action was accom- 
panied by prompt resolve that it should be prevented. 
Even if the officers of the government had been will- 
ing to connive at La Fayette's escape, his father-in-law 



176 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

was persistent in demanding that, if necessary, the 
youth should be put under arrest to keep him from de- 
serting his country and his family on a fool's errand. 

With the stubbornness which was a marked fea- 
ture in his character, La Fayette persisted in his pur- 
pose, in defiance of the wishes of his family and the 
orders of his government. He applied for assistance 
to the Comte de Broglie, who, like any sensible man, 
advised him to abandon the project. "I saw your 
uncle die in the war in Italy," he said, " I was pre- 
sent at the death of your father at the battle of Min- 
den.^ I do not wish to contribute to the ruin of the 
sole remaining branch of the family." But the count 
at last was overcome by La Fayette's persistence, and 
agreed to assist him so far as he could. 

Baron Kalb had already decided to volunteer for 
the American service, and was Broglie's representa- 
tive in the scheme to make the count commander-in- 
chief of the American forces. By Kalb, La Fayette 
was, in 1776, presented to Deane, who had to deal 
with the numerous recruits who were eager to enlist 
in the American cause. Most of these volunteers set 
a value on their services that was justified neither by 
their past nor by their future performances. It was 
different with La Fayette — he had much to give 
and asked little in return. He had indeed no military 
record behind him, but he had a great name and large 
wealth ; he only asked the opportunity to serve, and 
wished no pay for his service. How valuable this serv- 
ice was to be, no one could foresee, and La Fayette 
tells us that " in presenting my nineteen-year-old face 

1 The count was mistaken in his recollection ; La Fayette's father 
■was killed at Hastenbeck. Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., 
i, 21. 



LA FAYETTE 177 

to M. Deane, I spoke more of my zeal than of my 
experience, but I made him realize the little ^clat that 
would result from my departure, and he signed the 
contract." 

A paper was drawn promising to La Fayette the 
rank of major-general in the American army, and 
positions for the various subordinates by whom he was 
to be attended. The rank of major-general was a high 
one for a young man of nineteen who had seen no serv- 
ice in war, but Deane justly thought it was not too 
high for a recruit who bore the name of La Fayette. 
" I have thought that I could not better serve my 
country, . . ." Deane wrote, "than by granting to 
him, in the name of the very honorable Congress, the 
rank of major-general, which I beg the States to con- 
firm to him. . . . His high birth, his alliances, the 
great dignities which his family hold at this Court, 
his considerable estates in this realm, his personal 
merit, his reputation, his disinterestedness, and, above 
all, his zeal for the liberty of our provinces, are such 
as to induce me to promise him the rank of major- 
general in the name of the United States." ^ 

Deane made some foolish contracts for the employ- 
ment of foreign officers in the American service, but 
the wisdom of this engagement should atone for 
many mistakes. The manner in which La Fayette ac- 
cepted the offer shows how far he was removed from 
the greedy adventurers who were pressing for high 
rank and high pay in the American cause. "I offer 
myself," he wrote, "... to serve the United States 
with all possible zeal, without any pension or allow- 
ance." And he added the unnecessary clause that he 
reserved for himself the liberty of returning to Eu- 

^ Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., i, 35. 



178 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

rope whenever his family or his King should recall 
him. Neither his King nor his family wished him to 
go, but he persisted in his purpose, and had no 
thought of abandoning the American cause at the 
bidding of any one. The news from the other side was 
unfavorable, and even the American commissioners 
advised La Fayette to postpone his undertaking, but 
he paid as little attention to their advice as to the 
orders of his own government. " We must show our 
confidence," he said to Deane ; " it is in time of trou- 
ble that I wish to share your fortune." ^ 

The plans for furnishing him transportation failed, 
and thereupon he resolved to buy a ship for himself. 
In order to get the ship he was obliged to purchase 
the cargo, and he bought from some merchants in 
Bordeaux, for 112,000 francs, a vessel that was to sail 
in March, 1777. In the mean time, perhaps in order 
to avert suspicion, he amused himself by a trip to 
England, where he was presented to George III. 

Though La Fayette was resolved to go to America, 
he was anxious to obtain the consent of his govern- 
ment, expressed or implied ; as an officer of the King 
he did not wish to desert his colors, and embark in a 
foreign service, without the permission of his supe- 
riors. From London he sent a letter to his father-in- 
law, stating that he was now a general officer in the 
army of the United States, and was about to start for 
that country. " I am filled with joy," he writes, " at 
having found so good an opportunity to increase my 
experience and to do something in the world. . . . 
This voyage is not a long one ; people go farther 
every day for the sole purpose of travelling, and, be- 

1 Lafayette, "M^moires de ma Main," in Mimoires, Correspon- 
dance et Manuscrits du General Lafayette (ed. 1837), i, 12. 



LA FAYETTE 179 

sides, I hope I shall return from it better deserving 
the esteem of ever^'body who is kind enough to miss 
me. . . . Good-bye, my dear father, I hope to see you 
soon again. Do not withdraw your affections from 
me." ^ 

This letter carried consternation to La Fayette's 
family ; his wife was plunged in tears, and his father- 
in-law was plunged in rage. The expressions of affec- 
tion with which the epistle was filled did not soften 
the duke's heart ; he went at once to the ministers 
and demanded of them to arrest the youth and compel 
him to return to his duties. It is doubtful if this de- 
mand was altogether agreeable : the ministers were 
quite content that La Fayette should try his fortunes 
in the New World, if only the English could be made 
to believe that he had gone without the knowledge or 
authority of his own government. 

In the mean time La Fayette left London and 
made his way to Paris. He did not wish his arrival 
to be known, and for three days he remained con- 
cealed in the residence of Baron Kalb at Chaillot. On 
March 16, in company with the baron, he set out for 
Bordeaux. There they arrived on the 19th, and on the 
25th of March, 1777, they sailed from that port on 
the ship Victory, which La Fayette had purchased.^ 
The forms of secrecy were still preserved. In the 
registry of passengers La Fayette inscribed himself 
as the Sieur Gilbert du Mottie, Chevalier de Cha- 
vaillac, aged twenty years, height tall, hair blond, 
about to sail to the Cape, on matters of business.^ 

1 Letter of March 19, 1777 ; Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., 
i, 37. 

2 Kalb's letters of March 24 and April 1 j Kapp, Life of Kalb, 104. 
8 Doniol, ii, 384. 



180 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

" We are weighing anchor in the most glorious 
weather," Kalb wrote his wife. "I shall write you 
once more before my arrival in America, because we 
shall touch at a European port." 

There was no reason why, once having set sail, the 
Victory should not have proceeded directly to Amer- 
ica. But La Fayette was anxious to receive the con- 
sent of his government, and still indulged the hope 
that his letters would soften the hearts both of his 
father-in-law and of the minister of foreign affairs. 
Accordingly he sent a courier to Paris to obtain the 
desired permission. This was exactly what the min- 
ister was loath to give, and what the Due d'Ayen was 
resolved should not be given. The Victory stopped at 
Los Pasajes, a small Spanish harbor on the Bay of 
Biscay, a few miles from the French frontier, and 
there the marquis received some correspondence that 
was little to his taste. A lettre de cachet^ forbidding 
his departure, had been sent to Bordeaux, and fol- 
lowed him to Los Pasajes. Accompanying this were 
letters from his family, which he informs us were 
terrible. He was directed to abandon his enterprise, 
to meet his family at Marseilles, and to accompany 
them on a long trip to Italy. 

La Fayette's matters had now become generally 
known, and excited the interest of every salon and 
every cafe in Paris. The sympathy of the public was 
with the young adventurer. His youth, his zeal, his 
willingness to leave wealth and station in order to 
share the fortunes of the American insurgents, aroused 
universal enthusiasm. Public feeling was already 
friendly to the Americans, and this was strengthened 
by La Fayette's resolution to join their cause. On the 
other hand, the conduct of his father-in-law and of 



LA FAYETTE 181 

the government excited much animadversion. The 
duke, said one enthusiastic lady, if he treated an esti- 
mable son-in-law like La Fayette in this manner, could 
not expect any one to marry his other daughters. 

La Fayette, however, was loath to continue his 
journey in defiance of the express orders he had re- 
ceived, and accordingly he returned to Bordeaux. 
His companion, Kalb, viewed this performance with 
great disfavor. He was anxious to sail for America 
as soon as possible, and he now regarded La Fayette's 
expedition as practically abandoned. " I do not be- 
lieve he will rejoin me," Kalb wrote his wife, "and 
have advised him to settle with the owner of the ship 
at a sacrifice of twenty or twenty-five thousand 
francs." ^ 

Kalb's letters to his wife disclose other anxieties 
which beset these volunteers in the cause of American 
liberty. The baron thought that La Fayette would 
return to Paris, and he intrusted to his wife the ad- 
justment of some pecuniary matters with the marquis. 
Evidently the young hero had spent money with a 
free hand on his trip to Bordeaux, and had failed to 
settle accounts with his older companion. If the mar- 
quis received back some part of the money which he 
had advanced for the ship, so Kalb wrote his wife, 
she might choose that moment to speak of a note 
La Fayette had given for 13,500 livres, not indeed to 
ask payment before it was due, but to suggest that he 
leave orders for its payment on the 20th of May ; and 
then the baron adds, "perhaps he will pay you at 
once." There was, moreover, a further account be- 
tween the associates. Kalb had bought the horses at 
Paris, La Fayette had paid the expenses of the 
1 Letter of April 1, 1777; Kapp, Life of Kalb, 105. 



182 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

journey to Bordeaux, and the fear that the marquis 
expected him to pay part of these disturbed the 
baron- La Fayette had expended at the inn at Bor- 
deaux 408 livres from Wednesday evening to Friday, 
because he gave many dinners and suppers which did 
not concern Kalb. " I think, therefore," he added, 
" you should delay to say anything of the expenses at 
Bordeaux, but say simply, ' Here, monsieur le mar- 
quis, is the account my husband has sent me of what 
he advanced for you, and he says he owes you two- 
fifths of the expenses to Bordeaux,' and see what he 
answers. I flatter myself it is his intention to repay 
part of my advances and perhaps all." ^ 

In another letter, Kalb says, " It is certain that his 
foolish enterprise will cost him dear. I call the enter- 
prise foolish, from the moment that he dared not exe- 
cute his project, and bid defiance to threats." But 
Kalb did not fully understand the stubborn resolution 
of his companion in arms. La Fayette returned to 
Bordeaux and there despatched letters to the ministers 
defending his conduct, and asking that he be allowed 
to continue his enterprise. 

The reports which he received from Paris held out 
little hope that either his family or his government 
would consent to his departure, and thereupon he re- 
solved to go without their consent. He notified the 
commanding officer at Bordeaux that he was about 
to start for Marseilles, in conformity with the royal 
order. Having done this, he took a carriage and set 
out in company with his friend, Vicomte Mauroy. As 
soon as they were fairly out of the city limits, they 
left the Marseilles road and turned their faces towards 
the Spanish frontier. Mauroy rode in the chaise, 
1 Doniol, iii, 208. 



LA FAYETTE 183 

while La Fayette went along on horseback disguised 
as a postboy. 

At Bayonne, while Mauroy attended to some neces- 
sary business, La Fayette remained concealed in a 
stable. At St.-Jean-de-Luz, La Fayette had to ask 
for fresh horses, and he was recognized by the inn- 
keeper's daughter as the gentleman who had been 
there a few days before on the road to Bordeaux. 
But she did not betray his incognito, and when some 
officials turned up in pursuit she sent them off on the 
wrong road. 

Thus befriended, on the 17th of April, La Fay- 
ette again reached Los Pasajes, and he was hin- 
dered no further by his government. Only the zeal 
of the Due d'Ayen had incited measures so active 
as those that were taken. The young marquis was 
now again safely in Spain, popular sympathy was on 
his side, the fashionable world in Paris praised his 
bravery and condemned the conduct of those who 
sought to keep him from winning name and fame. 
The ministers' were secretly willing that he should 
start on his expedition, and they gave him no more 
trouble. 

La Fayette's efforts to enlist as a defender of 
American liberty blew into flame the interest in that 
cause already kindled in France. "All Europe is for 
us," wrote Silas Deane exultantly on March 12 ; 
". . . the prospect of an asylum in America for 
those who love liberty gives general joy, and our 
cause is esteemed the cause of all mankind." ^ " La 
Fayette," wrote Deane and Franklin a little later, " is 
exceedingly beloved and everybody's good wishes 
attend him. . . . Those who censure it [his expedi- 

1 Wharton, ii, 287. 



184 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

tion] as imprudent in him, do, nevertheless, applaud 
his spirit." ^ 

On Sunday, the 20th of April, 1777, La Fayette 
rejoined his ship, and, accompanied by Baron Kalb 
and twelve French officers whom he took as his staff, 
he at last set sail for the coast of America. 

La Fayette always insisted that he had the consent 
of the government for his departure. A formal con- 
sent certainly he did not have, but it is quite possible 
that intimations reached him that, though he could 
expect no authorization of his enterprise, yet his fu- 
ture fortune at court would not be imperilled if he 
persisted in it. He himself wrote to Maurepas that, 
as he had received no answer to his letters, and the 
government had not refused to remove its interdict, 
he should interpret this silence as signifying consent. 
This he probably regarded as a pleasantry, and ap- 
parently the ministers did the same ; at least they 
expressed no serious indignation. 

The Marquis de Noailles, then ambassador at Lon- 
don, was disturbed that his young kinsman, after 
being presented to the English King, should at once 
start to join the insurgents against that King's au- 
thority. But Maurepas quieted his apprehensions. 
" Your family," he wrote, " has nothing with which 
to reproach itself, and the King will not bear you 
any ill favor for the action of a young man whose 
head has been turned." ^ Vergennes wrote, " Lord 
Stormont seems to be in a very bad humor over this. 
He has the talent of attaching much importance to 
very small things." ' 

^ Letter of May 25, 1777 ; Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc, 
i, 59. 

2 Doniol, ii, 410. « gee letter of May 2, 1777; Doniol, ii, 411. 



LA FAYETTE 185 

The forms of propriety were still maintjiined. An 
order was issued, forbidding any French officer to 
enter the service of the colonies, and enjoining- those 
who should arrive in the West India Islands, and 
especially the Marquis de La Fayette, to return to 
France forthwith. This was sent to the Minister of 
the Marine to forward ; but his clerical force seems to 
have been insufficient, for he returned the order for 
copies to be made that he might have one to send to 
each of the islands. It does not appear that copies 
were sent to any of them, and the matter apparently 
was intentionally neglected.* 

In the mean time the Victory was peacefully pur- 
suing her way to the New World. The young hero 
suffered from seasickness as well as homesickness. "I 
was very ill during the first part of the voyage," he 
writes his wife, " but I had the consolation of the 
wicked, that I suffered with many others." ' The 
weather was unfavorable, but they were lucky enough 
to avoid any English cruisers, and after a journey of 
fifty-four days they landed near Georgetown, South 
Carolina. 

The defenders of our country met at first with a 
cold reception. La Fayette and some of his officers 
rowed to the shore and proceeded to a house near by. 
It was now dark ; they were met by the howling of 
the dogs, and the people within prepared to repel 
them as a band of marauders. Fortunately Kalb knew 

1 The authorities for La Fayette's expedition are found in : his own 
Mimoires ; Doniol, volumes i and ii ; the account given by La Fayette 
to Sparks and contained in the latter's Writings of Washington, volume 
V, Appendix 1 ; Memoires de Sigur ; and the correspondence of La 
Fayette. A full account is given by Tower in his Marquis de Lafay- 
ette in the American devolution, volume i. 

2 Lafayette, Mimoires, etc., i, 112. 



186 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

some English, and when it was discovered who the 
strangers were, they were received with great hospi- 
tality. La Fayette was charmed with all he saw ; even 
the mosquito curtains around the bed interested him 
with their novelty and filled him with delight. He 
went to Charleston, and from there sent home enthu- 
siastic accounts of the new people among whom he 
found himself. They were, he wrote, all his fancy had 
painted them ; simplicity of manners, love of country, 
and a delightfvil equality prevailed everywhere ; the 
worthiest and the poorest were on a level; though 
there were some large fortunes, he discovered no dis- 
tinction in the manners of different classes towards 
each other. The city of Charleston he found one of 
the handsomest and best built he had ever seen, and 
its inhabitants among the most agreeable people. The 
women were pretty, simple in their manners, and 
neater even than their English sisters. Even the inns 
were charming, and the inn-keepers did not charge 
too much. Yet there were some trials in this para- 
dise. The heat, he wrote, was dreadful, he had dis- 
covered the sinister meaning of mosquito-nets, and 
was devoured by the insects.^ 

His companion was less enthusiastic. " I have ar- 
rived here," Kalb wrote his wife from Charleston, 
" after many toils and pains, and in an unsupport- 
able heat. . . . Everything is exorbitantly dear ; a 
shirt for the marquis's servant cost fifty livres. At 
Paris it would have cost four and a half at most, and 
everything else is in proportion, provisions, lodging, 
horses." ^ 

From Charleston, La Fayette and his officers made 

^ See letters to his -wife ; Lafayette, MSmoires, etc., i, 124. 
2 Letter of June 18, 1777 ; Doniol, iii, 213. 



LA FAYETTE 187 

their way to Philadelphia. The era of enthusiasm 
over natural beauty had arrived iu France, and La 
Fayette wrote of his delight in the vast forests aud 
the immense rivers which he traversed, the freshness 
and the majesty of the country through which he trav- 
elled. 

But the journey was a hard one, and his associates 
were more impressed by the difficulties of the way 
than by the beauties of the forests. Their carriages 
broke down and they suffered from heat and hunger. 
" We made a great part of the journey on foot," one 
of them writes, '' often sleeping in the woods, dying 
of hunger, overcome by heat, several of us sick of 
fever and dysentery. . . . There is no campaign in 
Europe harder than this journey. There the hardships 
are not continual, and are compensated by many 
pleasures, while in this journey our evils grew greater 
every day, and we had no solace except at last to 
arrive in Philadelphia." ^ That city they reached after 
thirty-two days of toil and trouble. 

The American Congress was already beginning to 
weary of the host of adventurers whom Deane was 
sending over, and to whom, in his indiscretion, he 
had promised rank and pay out of all proportion to 
the value of their services. The committee received 
this new arrival of recruits with a chilliness that was 
very distasteful to them. " We were received in the 
street by a member," writes one of the French offi- 
cers. " Y/hen he left us, after having treated us, in 
plain words, like adventurers, he finished by saying, 
* You have papers from M. Deane. We authorized 
him to employ four French engineers. He sent us 

^ M^moire d'nn des Officiers frangais [Chevalier du Bnysson] 
passes en Am^rique avec le Marquis de La Fayette ; Doniol, iii, 217. 



188 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

M. du Coudraj, with some pretended engineers who 
are not such, and some artillerymen who have never 
served. . . . The French officers come to serve us 
without our asking for them.' " ^ 

The unlucky volunteers were stupefied by their re- 
ception, but they finally admitted that the conduct of 
du Coudray and his associates had justly prejudiced 
the Americans against all foreign recruits. On the 
whole, they took their repulse with philosophy, were 
paid their expenses, after some delay and difficulty, 
and the most of them returned to France wiser if 
sadder men. They had no opportunity for distinction, 
nor did any period of cordial reception and social 
excitement atone for their disappointment. " For two 
months," writes the secretary of the expedition, 
" Baron Kalb and myself were reduced to two shirts 
and one suit, badly torn ; but despite my ill fortune I 
am glad to have made the voyage. My constant ill 
luck has accustomed me to suffer patiently, and to 
find moments of pleasure in the midst of trial and 
misfoi-tune."^ 

La Fayette brought special recommendations, and 
when he stated that the two favors he asked in return 
for his sacrifices were to serve at his own expense and 
to begin his service as a volunteer, the members of 
Congress found they were dealing with a recruit of a 
new order. On the 31st of July Congress passed a 
resolution in which they declared that inasmuch as 
the Marquis of La Fayette, by reason of his zeal for 
the cause of liberty, had left his family and was will- 
ing to expose his life without asking pay or indemnity, 
it was resolved that his services should be accepted 
and he should receive the rank of major-general. He 
1 M^m. d'lm des Officiers, etc. ; Doniol, iii, 218. 2 Doniol, iii, 221. 



LA FAYETTE 189 

was presented to Washington, who at once received 
him into his favor. " I came to learn and not to 
teach," said La Fayette, — a tone different from that 
of most of the foreign officers who expected to show 
the Americans how to fight. 

The arrival of a young man of twenty, untried 
either in warfare or in public affairs, might not seem 
of great importance. But the services of La Fayette 
were of inestimable value to the American cause; not 
only did he prove himself a good officer and an ex- 
ceedingly discreet adviser, but he was a connecting 
link between the Americans and the French govern- 
ment ; the influence of his counsels, the enthusiasm 
incited by his conduct, were of considerable weight 
in bringing the French authorities to espouse openly 
the American cause. 

His enthusiasm had a quality of Gallic effusion 
that was not always found among the Americans, 
even when fighting in their own behalf. He writes his 
wife soon after he reached here : " Defender of that 
liberty which I adore, ... I bring only my frank- 
ness and my good- will. ... In toiling for my glory 
I work for their happiness. . . . The happiness of 
America is linked to the happiness of all humanity ; 
she will become the sure asylum of virtue, honesty, 
tolerance, equality and a peaceful liberty." * 

Amid the dissatisfaction so common among the for- 
eign volunteers. La Fayette's zeal and amiability stood 
out in pleasing contrast. Kalb writes his wife in Jan- 
uary, 1778, complaining of the various annoyances he 
met. " One," he said, " is the mutual jealousy of al- 
most all the French officers, particularly against those 
of higher rank than the rest. These people think of 
1 Letters to his wife, June 7, 1777 ; Lafayette, Memoires, etc., i, 115. 



190 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

nothing but their incessant intrigues and back-biting. 
. . . La Fayette is the sole exception. . . . La Fay- 
ette is much liked, he is on the best of terms with 
Washington." ^ 

Washington at once appreciated the character of 
his new assistant, and reposed in him a confidence 
that was not misplaced. 

The sights which met the new arrival must have 
seemed strange to one accustomed to the armies of 
Europe, but he was discouraged by nothing. In Au- 
gust, 1777, he joined the army in which he was now a 
volunteer, and comments upon the appearance of the 
soldiers. He found some eleven thousand men, poorly 
armed and worse clad ; the best garments were a sort 
of hunting shirts, or loose jackets made of linen, while, 
as he says, the varieties of nakedness equalled the 
varieties of clothes, and the tactics were as primitive 
as the uniforms. In spite of these disadvantages, he 
recognized the fact that the men not only had in them 
the making of good soldiers, but were already well 
fitted for the requirements of an American campaign, 
and that bravery with them took the place of science.^ 

La Fayette soon had an opportunity to show his 
qualities as a soldier. He served as a volunteer at 
Brandywine with great courage, and received a bullet 
in his leg which laid him up for a few weeks. He was 
cared for by the Moravians, and they, like every one 
else, were impressed by his amiability ; in a diary of 
one of them is an entry recording that " the French 
Marquis, whom we have found to be a very intelligent 
and pleasant young man, came to bid us adieu." 

With all of La Fayette's zeal and amiability, he 

1 Kapp, Life ofKalb, 143. 

* Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., i, 217. 



LA FAYETTE 191 

was ambitious for distinction, and while serving cheer- 
fully as a volunteer was desirous of a more important 
command. Washington befriended him, and wrote 
the President of Congress in his behalf, stating the 
qualifications of the young volunteer with his usual 
justness of expression. " He is sensible, discreet in his 
manners, has made great proficiency in our language, 
and . . . possesses a large share of bravery and mili- 
tary ardor." ^ La Fayette's wish was gratified, and he 
was given the command of a division. So friendly 
was the feeling towards him, that this selection was 
criticized by none. He wrote his father-in-law : " I am 
cautious not to talk much, lest I should say some fool- 
ish thiug ; I am still more cautious in my actions, lest 
I should do some foolish thing, for I do not want to 
disappoint the confidence that the Americans have so 
kindly placed in me." ^ 

His judgment was soon put to a severe test, for 
the cabal sought to avail themselves of La Fayette's 
popularity and win him away from Washington, by ob- 
taining for him the command of an army that was to 
conduct a campaign in Canada. Naturally he was grat- 
ified by so flattering a selection, but he soon discov- 
ered the ill-will of the cabal to Washington, and no 
flatteries from them could affect his loyalty to the 
commander-in-chief. He writes to Washington of 
Conway : " I found that he was an ambitious and dan- 
gerous man ; he has done all in his power by cunning 
manoeuvres to take off my confidence and affection for 
you. ... I am now fixed to your fate, and I shall 
follow it and sustain it as well by my sword as by all 



1 Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed., v, 129. 

2 Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., i, 256. » Ibid., 262. 



192 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The young marquis not only detected the plans of 
his new associates and declined to join in them, but he 
soon found that the expedition against Canada was 
little more than a farce. He reported at Albany, in 
compliance with instructions received from Gates, who 
was then president of the Board of War, but he found 
the northern army a myth. He met General Stark 
at Albany, who told him he had never heard of the 
undertaking, and he soon discovered that the whole 
scheme was an impossibility. The disappointment was 
bitter, but he accepted it with his usual amiability. 
The Canadian expedition was abandoned and La 
Fayette returned to Valley Forge, and in the follow- 
ing summer took an honorable part in the battle of 
Monmouth. 

In the mean time, France had become the ally of the 
United States ; La Fayette was no longer nominally 
a fugitive from his own country, acting in disobedience 
to the orders of his sovereign ; he could now serve with 
his own countrymen in the cause in which his country 
had enlisted, a result which was to some extent due 
to the interest and admiration which his own example 
had excited. 



CHAPTER X 

THE AMBITION OF THE COMTE DE BROGLIE 

Of the French who wished to enlist in the Ameri- 
can cause La Fayette proved the most useful friend, 
and was among the most illustrious in rank. But there 
were others whose military reputation far exceeded 
his, and who had already won name and fame in the 
world. The Comte de Broglie was perhaps the most 
conspicuous of these would-be recruits, and the in- 
trigues by which he sought to obtain high emplojnment 
in this country possess a curious interest. To us it 
seems like a crazy dream to suppose that a foreign 
adventurer would be chosen to replace Washington as 
commander-in-chief of the American armies, that the 
American patriots would ask a French nobleman to 
become the dictator of the new republic. But to us 
the history of the war is known, and the record of 
the men who took part in it ; all this was veiled in 
mystery when Broglie cherished his ambitions ; the 
capacity of Washington for a great place in the world 
was still to be demonstrated, his fame was still to be 
won. 

The Comte de Broglie himself was a very consider- 
able person, and a member of a distinguished family. 
Though it was little over a hundred years since his 
ancestors had left Piedmont to push their fortunes in 
France, they had already furnished two marshals to 
the French army,^ they had filled important positions 
1 Due de Broglie, The King^s Secret, i, 23. 



194 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

under the government, and enjoyed the most intimate 
relations with the sovereign, and this great prosperity- 
had been justified by uncommon ability. The count 
himself was a typical member of this active and push- 
ing family. He was an experienced soldier and a life- 
long intriguer. He was a very small man, but his head 
was as erect as a bantam cock, said one contempo- 
rary; his sparkling eyes, when he was excited, made 
him resemble a volcano in eruption, said another. 
When a young man, he was sent as ambassador to 
Poland, and afterwards he returned to his occupation 
as a soldier and served in the Seven Years' War. 
After that, he had been associated with Louis XV in 
that secret diplomacy with which the King sought to 
dispel his ennui, but only succeeded in annoying his 
ministers. 

But while the count had gained a certain amount 
of prominence, his ambition was far from gratified. 
He was, moreover, regarded with ill-favor at the court 
of Louis XVI ; the ministers were not willing to ex- 
cuse the part he had taken in some of Louis XV's 
unlucky intrigues, and he was looked upon as an 
injudicious and dangerous man. This inclined him to 
turn his attention to a remote field of action. Its 
very distance lent enchantment, and made it easy to 
hope that vague dreams of ambition might there be 
realized. He knew the actual conditions in France 
and Germany, and he had little reason to expect any 
great advancement in those countries. But on a field 
of action over three thousand miles removed, among a 
people new in the politics of the world, there might 
be opportunities that it was idle to anticipate in set- 
tled governments, amid experienced and sagacious 
competitors for favor and fame. 



AMBITION OF THE COMTE DE BROGLIE 195 

It shows how little was known as to the character of 
the American people, that any one could believe they 
would accept a foreign nobleman as a practical dic- 
tator. Information as to the colonists was naturally 
very scanty. The French people knew that the Eng- 
lish colonies in America had white men as well as 
red men for their occupants, but their knowledge did 
not extend much further. That there could be found 
in those remote parts of the world men really compe- 
tent to govern a state seemed to them improbable ; and 
especially was this true at the beginning of the war, 
before it became the fashion to regard America as the 
home of virtue and wisdom. The colonial leaders were 
unknown on the continent, and many intelligent 
Frenchmen might think it doubtful if among them was 
a man fit to command armies and lead a revolt against 
Great Britain ; they deemed it unlikely that in re- 
mote and semi-civilized colonies a leader could be 
found to compare with a nobleman who had learned 
generalship in campaigns against Frederick, and had 
studied politics in the chambers of Versailles. 

There is to us a mild amusement in reading sug- 
gestions that our forefathers might fail under the 
leadership of Washington, but could insure success by 
taking a second-rate French general as their com- 
mander, and yet the arguments suggested in Comte 
de Broglie's behalf seemed plausible to many. It was 
in his interest that Kalb was led to volunteer for the 
American service. He went over as an advance agent, 
to suggest, if the opportunity seemed favorable, that 
the struggling patriots might wisely avail themselves 
of the sagacity and military prowess of the count, a 
man versed in warfare and accustomed to deal with 
the great questions of the world, and that, if the col- 



196 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

onists should ask him to come to their aid, upon fit- 
ting terms he would be willing to comply. 

In 1776 Kalb submitted to Deane a curious paper 
in which he stated the hopes of his patron. The very 
title of the communication suggested its great import: 
" A project of which the execution would pei'haps de- 
cide the success of the cause of liberty in the United 
States." " Congress," so Kalb declared, " should ask 
of the King of France some one who would become 
their civil and military chief, the temporary general- 
issimo of the new republic." The course which had 
been so beneficial to the Dutch provinces, when suf- 
fering from the tyranny of Spain, would be equally 
advantageous in the present case. " It was necessary 
to furnish the infant states with foreign troops, and 
especially with a chief of great reputation, whose 
military capacity would fit him to command an army 
against Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick or the King 
of Prussia himself ; who would join to a name made 
illustrious by many heroes great experience in war 
and all the qualities necessary to conduct such an en- 
terprise with prudence, integrity, and economy. . . . 
Numerous armies and courage," Kalb wrote, " are not 
sufficient to obtain success, if they are not sustained 
by ability and experience. (In speaking thus I have 
no intention to reflect on the glory, the conduct, or 
the achievements of the officers who are actually in 
command ; on the contrary I think they acted very 
well and bravely on all occasions, especially General 
Washington. But my plan is to have a man whose 
name and reputation alone would discourage the 
enemy.) . . . Many young noblemen would follow him 
as volunteers, for the sake of serving and distinguish- 
ing themselves under his eyes. That nobility, by its 



AMBITION OF THE COMTE DE BROGUE 197 

interest at court, by its own credit, or the manage- 
ment of its friends and kinsmen, could decide the 
King in favour of a war with England. . . . Such 
a leader," he declared with enthusiasm, "with the 
assistants he would choose, would be worth twenty- 
thousand men, and would double the value of the 
American troops. . . . This man may be found, I 
think that I have found him, and I am sure that once 
he is known he will unite the suffrages of the public, 
of all sensible men, of all military men, and I venture 
to sa}', of all Europe. The question is to obtain his 
acceptance, which, as I think, can only be accom- 
plished by loading him with sufficient honoui's to sat- 
isfy his ambition, as by naming him field-marshal 
generalissimo, and giving him a considerable sum of 
ready money for his numerous children, the care of 
whom he would have to forego for some time during 
his sojourn beyond the seas, to be equivalent to them 
in case of the loss of their father, and by giving him 
all the powers necessary for the good of the service." ' 

If it was suggested that the generalissimo might 
make himself a king or a tyrant, Kalb declared that 
such a thought woidd never enter Broglie's generous 
heart, and that the title of duke in Erance would be 
more acceptable than that of king in America. 

This document Kalb asked Deane to submit to 
Franklin, who had just arrived in Paris. It is doubt- 
ful if the doctor ever saw it, and it is certain that 
such a project would have been condemned by his 
common sense. But Deane seems to have been influ- 
enced by Kalb's arguments ; he was acting with much 
zeal and little wisdom in enrolling foreign officers for 
the American service, and the idea of furnishing 
1 Kalb to Deane, Dec, 1776 ; translated in Deane Papers, i, 427. 



198 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

not only colonels and major-generals, but a geueral- 
in-chief, was calculated to allure a man of not very 
sound judgment. 

On December 6, 1776, he wrote the secret com- 
mittee of Congress : " I submit one thought to you ; 
whether, if you could engage a great general of the 
highest character in Europe, such, for instance, as 
Prince Ferdinand, Marshal Broglie, or others of equal 
rank, to take the lead of your armies, whether such a 
step would not be politic, as it would give a character 
and credit to your military, and strike perhaps a 
greater panic in our enemies." ^ 

In the mean time Kalb had enlisted in the American 
service and received from Deane a promise of the 
rank of major-general, together with twelvfe thousand 
livres, for expenses and as an advance upon his ap- 
pointment. No less than fifteen other officers were 
also engaged by the eager Deane, with rank ranging 
from major-general down and with money paid in ad- 
vance for some. Nearly all of them, curiously, were 
adherents of Broglie ; they might advance his interest 
in the colonies, and be trusty members of his staff, 
when the count assumed his duties as general-in-chief 
of the American army.^ 

Broglie had remained quietly at his country seat at 
Ruffec while his friends were pushing his interests 
with the American representatives, but it was now 
supposed that Kalb would shortly sail for America 
on his mission, and on December 11, 1776, the count 
wrote, explaining fully his views. A certain reserve 
kept him from using his own name, but he described 

1 Deane confounds the Comte de Broglie with his brother, the 
marshal and duke. Deane Papers, i, 404. 

2 Kapp, Life of Kalb, 320; Doniol, ii, 50-84. 



AMBITION OF THE COMTE DE BROGUE 199 

himself with entire clearness and without any undue 
modesty. '" I am sure," he wrote, " that you approve 
the plan which M. Dubois has communicated to you." 
There was needed in America a militarj' and political 
leader who would unite all parties, and attract to 
himself brave and efficient followers. Kalb's mis- 
sion was to convince the colonists of the necessity of 
having such a man, one of elevated rank and large 
experience. " When you propose the man," said the 
wily count, " you must act as if you were ignorant 
whether he desired such a position, and you will make 
it understood that he will only consent to make the 
supposed sacrifices if he is granted extraordinary ad- 
vantages." lie then suggested what these advantages 
should be : the rank of generalissimo ; supreme au- 
thority over the army ; and he adds, " Great pecuniary 
advantages and a large pension for life, though the 
amount of these would be reimbursed a hundred-fold 
by the value of his services." Finally the envoj'- was 
instructed to report the actual condition of feeling, 
and the possibility of success. If all went well. Con- 
gress was at once to send full powers to Deane to 
engage the future commander. "^I leave this un- 
signed," adds the count at the end. " You know who 
lara."^ 

Such were the ambitions and the selfish desires of 
the man who thought he was better fitted than George 
Washington to serve the cause of American liberty. 
His agent was quite right in saying that Broglie had 
no thought of making himself a king or permanent 
dictator in America. He hoped to be well paid for his 
services, but what he most desired was that the dis- 
tinction he might win there would assist him to at- 

1 Doniol, ii, 70-73. 



200 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

tain the rank of duke and marshal when he returned 
to France. 

Kalb was long delayed in embarking for America. 
He expected to sail on the Amphitrite in December, 
but at the last moment the government forbade its de- 
parture, and some of the officers associated with him 
were discouraged by the delay and abandoned the 
project. At last, in the spring of 1777, he embarked 
with La Fayette on the Victory. La Fayette had seen 
much of Broglie, and had been assisted by him in his 
efforts to join the American cause. Kalb presented 
La Fayette to Deane, and sailed with him for America. 
It would seem probable that the marquis heard some- 
thing of these plans, but he took no part in them, nor 
in his memoirs does he disclose any knowledge of 
them. Certainly he went to America to gratify his 
own desire, and not to further the ambition of any one 
else. He fought for his own hand. 

Kalb also desired to become himself an actor in the 
western war; but he was ready to further Broglie's 
project, if it were at all feasible, and he hoped to 
create a feeling that might lead Congress to turn to 
the count as a protector and a savior. But he was a 
sensible man and soon discovered that the American 
Congress had small need of foreign volunteers, even 
of less rank than a generalissimo. It needed but a 
brief sojourn for him to see how chimerical were 
Broglie's schemes. Like an honest man, he at once 
sought to undeceive his patron, and in September, 
1777, he wrote : "If I return to Europe it is largely 
on account of the impossibility of succeeding in the 
great project with which I occupied myself with so 
much pleasure. M. de Valfort will tell you that the 
proposition is impracticable. It would be regarded as 



AMBITION OF THE COMTE DE BROGLIE 201 

a crying injustice against Washington, and an affront 
to the honor of the country." ^ 

• The desires of Brogiie to play a great part were 
not gratified either in America or in Europe. There 
was no more talk of choosing him as generalissimo of 
the American armies; even the count realized that 
this ambition had been only a day-dream, and he was 
no more successful in his efforts to obtain important 
employment from Versailles. He submitted to the 
King an elaborate plan for the invasion of England, 
and called attention to the confidence with which 
Louis XV had honored him during twentj^-three 
years. This did not secure him the confidence of 
Louis XV's successor, his memoir received no atten- 
tion, and he had no opportunity to show his skill as a 
general either in Europe or in America. 

It is interesting to watch the change in Kalb's 
opinion of the American general-in-chief. Though he 
was free from the excessive self-assertion of many of 
the foreign volunteers, yet he arrived here with the 
prejudices of a soldier who had seen long and im- 
portant service in great European wars, and with 
a readiness, that was neither unnatural nor blame- 
worthy, to criticize those who, in military experience, 
were far his inferiors. Washington had won no bril- 
liant victories, and while his campaigns had been 
marked by some degree of success, they had also 
been attended by some serious disasters. Kalb writes 
of Washington in September, 1777, soon after his 
arrival : " He is the most amiable, kind-hearted, and 
upright of men, but as a general he is slow and even 
indolent, much too weak and not without vanity and 

1 Letter of Sept. 24, 1777 ; Doniol, iii, 227. Translated by Kapp, 
Life of Kalb, 121. 



202 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

presumption. In my opinion, if he achieves some im- 
portant successes, it will be due more to fortune and 
the faults of his adversaries, than to his own capa- 
city." ^ A little later his judgment is somewhat more 
favorable. " It is unfortunate that Washington is so 
easily led. He is the bravest and truest of men, and 
has the best intentions and a sound judgment. I am 
convinced that he would accomplish some great re- 
sults if he would only act more upon his own respon- 
sibility, but it is a pity that he is so weak and has the 
worst of advisers in the men who enjoy his confi- 
dence." 

A letter written still later from Valley Forge shows 
that Kalb was slowly coming to appreciate the great- 
ness of the man. " He will rather suffer in the opinion 
of the world than hurt his country in making ap- 
pear how far he is from having so considerable an 
army as all Europe and great part of America believe 
he has. This would show that he did, and does every 
day, more than could be expected from any general 
in the world in the same circumstances, and that I 
think him the only proper person (nobody actually 
being or serving in America excepted), by his nat- 
ural and acquired capacity, his bravery, good-sense, 
uprightness and honesty, to keep up the spirits of the 
army and people, and that I look upon him as the 
sole defender of his country's cause." ^ " Washing- 
ton's integrity, humanity, and love for the just cause 
of his country, as well as his other virtues, receive 
and merit the veneration of all men," Kalb wrote in 
1778, and this judgment he never found occasion to 
modify.^ 

1 Doniol, iii, 226-227. ^ Kapp, Life of Kalb, 137, 145. 

3 Kalb to his wife, May 12, 1778; Ibid., 159. 



AMBITION OF THE COMTE DE BROGLIE 203 

Some account has been given of the long negotia- 
tions which at last resulted in France espousing the 
cause of the new republic. In the lengthy memoirs of 
Vergennes there is abundant statement of the reasons 
which led him at last to advocate such action, and in 
the French ministry his influence on this question cer- 
tainly was of the greatest. 

But a review of the diplomatic relations, an exam- 
ination of the memoirs prepared by ministers, and a 
study of the minutes which described the acts of the 
Council do not tell the entire story. The assistance 
given by France was so important to the United States 
that it is worth while to trace the varied causes which 
at last resulted in that assistance being given. I have 
already said that it seemed unlikely that the ancient 
monarchy of France should assist rebels against their 
king. It is interesting to consider why interference 
in behalf of the colonists, which certainly would not 
have been attempted by France if our Revolution had 
occurred in the early years of the reign of Louis XV, 
was enthusiastically decided upon in the early years 
of the reign of Louis XVI. 



CHAPTER XI 

AMERICA AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE 

Many reasons united in leading France to espouse 
the cause of the American colonists. Hatred of Eng- 
land and a desire to lessen her power and obtain re- 
venge for the calamities of the Seven Years' War, 
worked powerfully on the French mind. The hope of 
gaining commercial advantages from the gratitude of 
the new republic allured French statesmen. All these 
considerations had their weight in the deliberations 
of the French ministers, in whose hands were the 
issues of peace or war. 

And yet there was an influence more potent than 
any of these considerations of policy, of national ad- 
vantage and national dislike. If the American cause 
had not excited strong enthusiasm among the French 
people, unless interference in behalf of our fore- 
fathers had been not only approved but demanded 
by the representatives of French thought, it is doubt- 
ful if the government of Louis XVI would have 
taken up arms in behalf of American independence. 
The American Revolution occurred at a most oppor- 
tune time. If the struggle for independence had begun 
fifty years or even twenty-five years earlier, France 
would have been as unlikely to interfere in our behalf 
as Spain or Austria. But the principles for which 
our ancestors contended, the political and social ideals 
which they represented, touched a sympathetic chord 
in the France of Louis XVI. Our Revolution found 



AMERICA AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE 205 

a welcome in the ferment of French thought that had 
begun. It was for this reason that Franklin's influ- 
ence was of such value to the people he represented. 
At any time his talents and his wit would have in- 
sured him a hospitable reception among the French 
people. But when changes in scientific beliefs, in 
political faiths, in social aspirations, were preparing 
the way for a political and social revolution in France, 
Franklin was to an extraordinary extent able to ap- 
peal to the people, and to arouse among them enthusi- 
asm for the nation and the cause of which he stood as 
the exponent. Public opinion became at the last the 
most potent factor in controlling the decision of the 
French government. 

The problem of the American colonies attracted the 
attention of French statesmen when French society 
hardly distinguished Virginia from Massachusetts 
Bay ; but in the rapid changes of French thought, the 
public in 1778 exceeded the King's counsellors in 
eagerness for interference in the cause of American 
liberty. We are apt to think that public opinion has 
become an element to be reckoned with only in these 
later days, and that, in the time of an absolute mon- 
archy, it could be safely disregarded. Such a belief 
is far from correct. The influence of public thought 
was as potent perhaps in the reign of Louis XVI as 
it is in France to-day. It was indeed exercised by a 
much smaller body. The mass of the population were 
too ignorant to hold any views on public questions, 
except as these were brought home to them by the 
burden of taxation or by a dull perception that others 
further up in the social scale enjoyed unfair advantages. 
But if the body that formed public opinion was small, 
it was exceedingly active. There had never been a 



206 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

time when, among the nobility, the scholars and phi- 
losophers, the prosperous bourgeois, discussion had 
been so alert and so free. No subject was deemed too 
sacred to be talked about, no institution was too ven- 
erable to be questioned. 

To such expressions, which found utterance in lit- 
erature and in the journals of the day, in the talk of 
the court and of the salon, the ministers of the King 
could not turn a deaf ear. Necker, who became min- 
ister of finance only a few months after the Declara- 
tion of Independence, recognized to the fullest extent 
the influence of public opinion upon the administra- 
tion in France. " Favored by various causes," he says, 
" it is constantly increasing. It controls all spirits, and 
princes themselves respect it. . . . Most strangers can 
hardly form a just idea of the authority which it 
exercises in France. They comprehend with difficulty 
that invisible power which, without treasure, with- 
out guards, and without arms, imposes its laws on 
the city, on the court, and even in the palaces of 
kings." 

It might have been supposed that neither the prin- 
ciples nor the characters of our ancestors would have 
aroused sympathy in French salons or among the 
French people. Certainly this would have been true 
a century earlier, and that it was not so now showed 
how rapidly French thought was drifting from its an- 
cient bearings. The rebellion of 1640 in England 
excited no approval in France. The adherents of the 
Parliament were regarded by the French as men 
actuated by pernicious principles, who murdered their 
King, and illustrated the evils of an unbridled and 
lawless liberty. Nor were the strict morals, the long 
^aees, the formal dress of the Puritans any more pop- 



AMERICA AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE 207 

ular than their politics among the nobles and cour- 
tiers of Versailles or the wits and poets of Paris. 

A little more than a century had passed, and the 
descendants of the Puritans of 1640 were rebels 
against their King, and were proclaiming theories of 
government that would have seemed advanced to their 
ancestors. The social life, the religious beliefs of the 
American colonists were not altogether those of the 
soldiers of Cromwell, but they were quite as far re- 
moved from those of Paris. In their rigorous theology, 
in their strict and often tedious modes of life, there 
was apparently little to attract a French noble or a 
French philosopher. A people leading a provincial 
existence, very strict in its religious observances, very 
loose in its political orthodoxy, among whom a French 
philosopher would have found few listeners, and a 
courtier from Versailles would have died of ennui, 
seemed ill fitted to excite enthusiasm among the 
French people. And yet new political aspirations and 
discontent with existing social conditions led the 
French people to sympathize with the American col- 
onists in their struggle for independence. 

At the close of the reign of Louis XV, one who 
possessed the rare power of forecasting the future 
might have anticipated a revolution in France, quite 
as much as in America. The causes which at last 
resulted in the great upheaval in France had long 
existed. The expressions of discontent and of a de- 
sire for change had become so frequent that no one 
could disregard them, though few realized their signi- 
ficance. 

If one had contrasted the lot of the people in 
France and in the American colonies, he might have 
anticipated that in the one country revolution would 



208 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

result in a violent social upheaval, while in the other 
it would only modify political relations and leave the 
beliefs and condition of the people little changed. 
Great wealth was rare in the thirteen colonies, but 
their people as a whole enjoyed a prosperity which 
was not exceeded in any other land. Nowhere else in 
the world, probably, were there so few in actual need 
of the necessities of life, were beggars so rare, was 
the number so small of those who went hungry to 
bed. In France very different conditions prevailed. 
The lot of the peasantry in that fertile land was not 
worse than in most of Europe, but great was the con- 
trast between the peasant of Brittany or Auvergne 
and the farmer of Kent or the colonist of Massa- 
chusetts. 

No more accurate picture has been given of a peo- 
ple than Arthur Young drew when he visited France 
not long before the outbreak of the Revolution. In 
Salogne, he says, " the fields are scenes of pitiable 
management, as the houses are of misery " ; in Brit- 
tany " the country has a savage aspect, husbandry 
not much further advanced, at least in skill, than 
among the Hurons, . . . the people almost as wild 
as their country." From Montauban he writes, " one 
third of what I have seen of this province seems un- 
cultivated, and nearly all of it in misery." And thus 
he described the condition of a large part of the 
French people, and their deplorable lot he justly 
attributed to bad government and feudal exactions; 
he found only privileges and poverty.^ 

" The people of our country," wrote the Bishop of 
Clermont-Ferrand, " live in frightful misery, without 
beds, without furniture, . . . obliged to snatch bread 

^ Young, Travels in France, 19, 123, 125. 



AMERICA AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE 209 

from their own mouths and their children's to pay 
the taxes. . . . The negroes of onr islands are infi- 
nitely more happy." ^ Poorly fed, dressed in rags, 
living in a hut, with half his scanty earnings absorbed 
by tiixes and feudal dues, the lot of the French peas- 
ant was a melancholy contrast to that of the American 
farmer. 

The privileges of the aristocracy had become griev- 
ous. The peasant looked with anger on the game 
which fed on his crop and which he dared not kill ; 
he paid with bitterness the feudal dues that were still 
enforced ; he sullenly performed the corvees to which 
he was still subjected. The prosperous bourgeois, the 
wealthy farmer-general, better educated and better 
mannered than their ancestors, and eager for a social 
equality to which their great-grandfathers had not 
aspired, found in some artificial distinction, some 
high-bred sneer or snub, a sting more bitter and more 
irritating than the serious grievances of the peasant. 
The rise of a country in which equality prevailed, 
where the merchant and the lawyer held their recog- 
nized position in the best society, where farmers were 
prosperous, and ding}' huts and hungry children 
were unknown, helped to strengthen resentments that 
were already strong. 

To those who claimed for the people a voice in 
their own government, to those who pointed out the 
abuses of the old regime, the American Kepublic ap- 
peared as the ideal state of which they had declaimed. 
It has been said that the Orleans family committed a 
grave political error when they allowed the bones of 
Napoleon to be placed in a tomb in France, on which 
the Napoleonic legend might grow anew. The Bour- 
^ Clermont-Ferrand, Risumi de rHistoire d^Auvergne, 313. 



210 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

bon dynasty and the old regime made a like error 
when they assisted in holding up to the French people 
the spectacle of a newly created republic, inhabited 
by a prosperous and contented people, proclaiming 
the doctrines of popular sovereignty and the equality 
of all men before the law. At almost any other 
period the Declaration of Independence would have 
wakened few echoes in France. But French philoso- 
phy and French literature had prepared society to 
receive with enthusiasm the political doctrines and 
the pictures of social life which came from across the 
Atlantic. The desire to injure England, and the hope 
of profiting by the trade she might lose, had more 
influence on Vergennes and the advisers of Louis XVI 
than any sympathy with American colonists. But if 
these motives had most weight with the politicians, 
they did not account for the popular enthusiasm with 
which French society embraced the American cause. 

It was not among the peasantry, always ignorant 
and usually miserable, that sympathy was felt for the 
American colonists ; to most of them the existence of 
America was hardly known. But the condition of the 
common people now received from those better pro- 
vided with this world's goods a degree of attention 
unthought of in the past. It was the time, as has 
been said, when a man about to sup suddenly reflected 
that there were those who had not yet dined. When a 
new interest was felt in the lot of the masses, when 
plans were rife for improving agriculture, for reliev- 
ing poverty, for lessening the burden of taxation, so- 
ciety was ready to espouse a popular cause on the 
other side of the Atlantic. 

The seventeenth century was one of the great eras 
of French literature, but few indeed were the French 



AMERICA AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE 211 

books which treated of political theories or political 
questions. Of criticism of a man who held prominent 
position there was somewhat; the administration of 
Mazarin and the troubles of the Fronde created a 
copious literature of pamphlets and Mazarinades, but 
these discussed personal animosities rather than po- 
litical principles. In all the picturesque chapters of 
the Fronde there is little to be found except personal 
politics ; whether insurrections were led by princes of 
the blood or judges of the courts, they had for their 
object changes in the persons who should possess 
power, rather than changes in the system by which the 
state was to be administered. 

The influence of the salon was considerable in 
France long before the days of Louis XVI ; but until 
well into the eighteenth century, while the salons were 
centres of social and at times of literary action, in 
politics they took little part. The appointment of a 
minister, the granting of a pension, most of all, the 
selection by the sovereign of a new mistress, were in- 
deed eagerly discussed ; but the principles of govern- 
ment were not much more debated in the salon of 
Madame de S^vign^ or the palace of the Prince de 
Conti than they were in the home of some bourgeois 
of Tours or the hut of some peasant in the C^vennes. 

Under Louis XIV the burden of taxation fell 
heavily upon many, the lot of large portions of the 
population was hard, yet there came no demand for 
change ; conditions were unfavorable, but they were 
regarded as being as much a result of unchangeable laws 
as the devastating blasts that came from the mountains 
or the drought that destroyed the crops. In the reign 
of his successor, the situation was greatly altered. The 
sanctity that hedges round a king had been dispelled, 



212 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

criticism was outspoken, a desire for change was wide- 
spread. This was not due to the fact that conditions 
had become worse, that poverty was more general or 
distress more common. The contrary was the case. 
The latter part of Louis XVs reign witnessed a 
marked improvement in the economic condition of 
France. Business was more active, the accumulation 
of wealth was more rapid ; bad as was the condition 
of the peasantry, it was better than it had been in 
the reign of the Grand Monarque. Agriculture was 
still backward, and yet during the thirty years pre- 
ceding the Revolution it probably made more progress 
than it had in three centuries before. The rapid 
growth of Paris excited the dismay of those who re- 
garded this as a portentous omen, while Bordeaux, 
Marseilles, and other cities doubled in population dur- 
ing the century. 

The voice of complaint, the disposition to blame 
the government for unfavorable conditions, became 
more pronounced when these conditions tended to im- 
prove. Nor is this strange. When a man's lot seems 
hopelessly bad, he submits to it in dull despair ; when 
a measure of improvement suggests the possibility of 
still further gain, his discontent becomes more active 
and the demand for change more articulate. 

The demand for change had become not only aud- 
ible but insistent before Louis XV closed his career 
of shame. The nation, wrote the Austrian ambassa- 
dor, not long before Louis's death, "pours out sedi- 
tious words and indecent writings, in which the person 
of the monarch is not spared." * Kings are for the 
people and not the people for the king, declared a 
document issued by a body of lawyers, usually the 
^ Mercy- Argenteau to Maria Theresa, April 16, 1771. 



AMERICA AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE 213 

most conservative class in the community. A profes- 
sion of atheism would not have seemed a more mon- 
strous sentiment to Louis XIV. " The cause of the 
people, by whom and for whom you reign," said a 
remonstrance addressed to Louis XV ; and with simi- 
lar declarations in pamphlets and official documents, 
in the writings of philosophers, and from the mouths 
of the rich and the noble, from lawyers and littera- 
teurs, one could have filled volumes. 

At no era has conversation been more brilliant or 
the charm of social influence more alluring, and at 
few periods has there been greater freedom of discus- 
sion. Subjects which a century before would, in 
France, no more have been brought into controversy 
than would the inspiration of the Scriptures at a con- 
venticle presided over by John Knox, were now dis- 
cussed by all the world. There was no phase of reli- 
gious belief, no form of human government, hardly 
any institution of social life, that was not considered 
as freely as the state of the weather or the prospect of 
the crops. 

The customs of the times made it possible for social 
intercourse to be more attractive and more important 
than in our era of pressing business and brief conver- 
sation. Only those who lived before the Revolution, 
said Talleyrand, knew the charm of life. Neither the 
nobles nor the philosophers who met for constant dis- 
cussion were pressed for time ; the exchange of thought 
was not a diversion but an occupation. At Baron Hol- 
bach's, says an inmate of that salon, the conversation 
was the most animated and the most instructive that it 
was possible to hear ; the guests met at two, they dined 
and talked until seven, often to meet again in the even- 
ing, unwearied of discussions which never grew dull. 



214 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Few took an active interest in the affairs of state 
under Louis XIV ; their curiosity was satisfied when 
they were told of the latest victory of the Grand Mo- 
narque or of the last fete at Versailles. There was no 
such indifference under Louis XV. Thirty years ago, 
wrote Argenson, " the public was not curious about 
the news of the state, now every one reads the Ga- 
zette de France."^ The Gazette de France did not 
furnish as much information as a great daily of Lon- 
don or New York does now, but its readers gained some 
knowledge as to the affairs of their own country, while 
of transient publications, that discussed every act of 
government and often with great freedom, there was 
an unfailing supply. Words that had been little used 
in talk or literature now became common speech. An 
acute observer remarked that the word "nation," 
hardly pronounced under Louis XIV, was now on 
every tongue. An enemy of the new philosophy wrote : 
" This word ' liberty,' which is familiar in these days, 
is very dangerous." 

The influence exerted by the talk of the salon was 
less than that of the newspapers of to-day, but never 
has there been a time when literature so controlled 
public opinion. The great writers of the age had done 
much of their work before the troubles of American 
colonists were discussed in French salons. Voltaire 
had long been at the height of his fame, Rousseau 
had written his " Social Contract," Holbach's " Sys- 
tem of Nature " had appeared, the publication of the 
Encyclopaedia, extending over years, had been brought 
to an end. The popularity of these works was una- 
bated. Discussions of government and society, of reli- 
gion and science, found a widely extended audience. 

1 Mimoires cf Argenson, 1754 ; Miss Wormeley's translation, chap. x. 



AMERICA AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE 215 

The more vigorously did they attack the beliefs of the 
past, the more eagerly were they received ; boldness in 
thought, as well as skill in exj^ression, characterized 
the literature of the day, and however revolutionary 
the theories advanced, they circulated in France, prac- 
tically, with the same freedom as in England. There 
was indeed, nominally, a government censorship of the 
press ; only books which it authorized could be sold 
and read, and on the circulation of those under its 
ban ruinous penalties were imposed ; but this censor- 
ship was little more than a farce. The governmental 
supervision of literature in France in the latter half 
of the eighteenth century furnishes another illustra- 
tion of the impossibility of enforcing law^s which no 
longer find a support in public feeling. jSIany of the 
famous writers under Louis XV spent brief terms in 
Vincennes or the Bastille ; they emerged from a mild 
confinement into a blaze of glory. INIany a book was 
burned by the public executioner ; it was sold and read 
all the more. If a writer could be sentenced to im- 
prisonment and his books be condemned to the flames, 
he might regard his literary fortune as made. And 
thus a great mass of subversive and revolutionary 
matter was circulated in France, among a public ready 
to receive it ; the seed was cast upon a soil in which 
it speedily fructified. A society that a hundred years 
before would have regarded our ancestors as rebels 
against the just authority of the King, now saw in 
them the representatives of public liberties and politi- 
cal reforms, which Frenchmen advocated with all the 
more vigor because very often they did not under- 
stand them. 

Activity in scientific research is apt to be the pre- 
cursor of change in political as well as in religious 



216 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

beliefs. The scientific discoveries of the eighteenth 
century excited great interest in France, and French- 
men took an important part in them. " More new 
truths concerning the external world," says Buckle, 
" were discovered in France during the latter part of 
the eighteenth century than during all the previous 
periods put together." In geology and natural his- 
tory, in anatomy and chemistry, in electricity and the 
laws of heat and light, French students did pioneer 
work. Interest in scientific questions was not confined 
to those who studied them, but extended to the great 
numbers who wished to hear of them. The lecture- 
rooms of well-known professors of chemistry and 
anatomy were almost as crowded as the theatres, and 
more crowded than the churches. The work done by 
Franklin in electricity had much to do with the re- 
ception he received in France when he first visited 
that country. Fame in scientific discovery secured for 
him a more prompt and cordial greeting than if he 
had been known only in literature or politics. The 
experiments with the kite excited in France a degree 
of interest which was not exceeded, even if it was 
equalled, in his own country. 

It was not only religious thought that was affected 
by these new phases of intellectual activity; but a 
community which was interested in discussing the 
laws of the universe and the anatomy of man soon 
began to consider the laws of government and the 
anatomy of the state. A desire for change, new con- 
ceptions of government, a willingness to be done with 
the institutions of the past, an infinite confidence in the 
promise of the future, had taken possession of French 
literature and French society. 

An era of boundless hope preceded the French 



AMERICA AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE 217 

Revolution, and it has been well portrayed by one of 
the young nobles who crossed the Atlantic to fight for 
liberty in America. Describing this idyllic period, at 
the close of a long and active life in which he had 
seen the overthrow of an ancient monarchy, had been 
imprisoned in the Terror, had served under Napoleon 
at the height of his glory, and had witnessed the down- 
fall of the Emperor and the dismemberment of his 
empire, the Comte de Segur says : " Without regret 
for the past, without anxiety for the future, we 
walked gaily on a carpet of flowers that concealed an 
abyss. . . . All that was ancient seemed to us weari- 
some and ridiculous. The gravity of old doctrines 
oppressed us. The laughing philosophy of Voltaire 
amused and bewitched us. . . . We were ready to 
follow with enthusiasm the philosophical doctrines 
advanced by bold and brilliant leaders. Voltaire ap- 
pealed to our intelligence, Rousseau touched our 
hearts." ^ Naturally they praised the heroes of Greece 
and Rome and read the republican literature of 
Switzerland and Holland ; at the theatre the praise 
of liberty and the abuse of tyrants met with thunders 
of applause, " at the court they lauded the republican 
maxims of Brutus, we talked of independence in the 
camps, of democracy among the nobles, of philosophy 
at balls, and of morality in boudoirs."^ "Every one 
believed that he was marching to perfection, with- 
out being embarrassed by obstacles and without fear- 
ing them. We were proud of being French and still 
more proud of being French of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, which we regarded as the golden age brought 
upon earth by the new philosophy." ^ 

It was natural that in this condition of idyllic 
1 S^gur, Mimoires (2d ed.), i, 27, 41. 2 Ibid., 82. 8 if^ij., 257. 



218 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

hopefulness in the future progress of society, the prin- 
ciples declared by American colonists should captivate 
men who looked with distrust on all that was old and 
turned with eagerness to all that was new. Wearied 
with artificial modes of life, French aristocrats dis- 
covered what they believed to be their ideals among 
the American folk ; they were charmed by the simple, 
earnest life of New England farmers, and discovered 
the virtues of Roman worthies in American statesmen. 
The Continental Congress seemed the image of the 
Roman Senate, and its cause the cause of progress and 
liberty. The first cannon fired in the New World to de- 
fend the standard of liberty, says Segur, resounded in 
all Europe. Even at the watering-places the seekers 
for amusement made of America a fashion, and in- 
vented a game at cards which they styled Boston.^ 

Thus it was that popular sentiment exercised its 
influence in the councils of the King and that an 
alliance with the United States and war with England 
not only received the approval of statesmen, but ex- 
cited the enthusiasm of the nation. During the five 
years that the war continued, the French people re- 
mained constant in the cause. Doubtless some of those 
who were most eager would have stood aghast if they 
had realized that the part taken by France in the 
American Revolution was to have its influence in pre- 
paring the way for the French Revolution. The very 
causes, the conditions of thought, the relaxation of 
ancient beliefs, the confidence in advantages that 
would result from future change, distrust of the past, 
and hope for the future, which were preparing the 
French for their own revolution, made them enthusi- 
astic in their efforts to assist their American allies. 

^ S^gur, Mimotres, i, 81. 



CHAPTEK XII 

PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 

Franklin's presence gave to the negotiations for 
French support an importance they had not possessed 
when Deane, with an ill-defined errand, had been the 
sole representative of the States. And though Lord 
Stormont affected to regard Franklin as a fugitive 
seeking safety in a foreign land, he at once recognized 
the assistance which the party in France eager for an 
American alliance derived from the presence of the 
famous philosopher. "If reports are true," writes Stor- 
mont of Franklin, "he has already abused their ig- 
norance . . . concerning the Americans so far as to 
proclaim roundly . . . that the affairs of the rebels 
are in a flourishing condition, while ours are desper- 
ate. When I hear such talk I make no reply. I leave 
that to General Howe, and I am sure that sooner 
or later it will be as good a reply as ever has been 
made." * 

The alliance with France and the fate of the Amer- 
ican colonies depended on the reply that Howe should 
make. Our ancestors were fond of using Roman names 
in their letters to newspapers, and Roman anathemas 
in their bursts of eloquence. If they had shared in Ro- 
man superstitions, they might have anticipated with 
confidence the enormous prosperity in store for the gov- 
ernment they sought to establish. The old Romans 
found in lucky incidents at the beginning of any great 
1 Doniol, ii, 103. 



220 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

undertaking the assurance of its happy accomplish- 
ment. No nation in the throes of birth was ever 
more favored in the character of its enemies than the 
American Republic. The stupidity of kings and min- 
isters, the inefficiency of generals and admirals, per- 
mitted a rebellion to succeed which, with vigor, enei-gy, 
and intelligence, could have been suppressed before 
the French made up their minds whether it was wise 
to assist the rebels. 

Stormont left General Howe to make response to 
Franklin's prophecies of American success, but the 
expected response did not come. The prospect was in- 
deed sufficiently unfavorable to delay the French in 
interfering in behalf of the colonists, but the procras- 
tination and bad judgment of English generals gave 
Franklin plenty of time in which to obtain the assist- 
ance of a people already inclined to grant it. When 
he sailed from Americn in October, 1776, the oppor- 
tunity to capture the American army on Long Island 
and win an advantage that would have crippled the 
insurgent cause beyond the power of resuscitation had 
been neglected by Howe. This crowning mercy was 
not, however, followed by any special prosperity for 
the colonists. While Franklin was on the sea, Fort 
Washington was captured with three thousand troops. 
The news followed him to France, and this calamity 
was succeeded by a long season of misfortune. The 
army under Washington was fast disintegrating, and 
only his wisdom and fortitude kept together a few 
thousand ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-armed men. The 
indignation excited by the brutalities of the Hessians, 
and Howe's failure to destroy the remnants of Wash- 
ington's army, were all that the colonists could count 
in their favor, and the French ministers hesitated to 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 221 

declare in behalf of a rebellion which seemed to be in 
its last gasp. 

Amid such discouragements, Franklin and his as- 
sociates continued their efforts to obtain French aid, 
receiving all that the ministers dared grant without 
coming to an open breach with England, but failing 
to make of a secret friend an open ally. Not only the 
ill-success of the American armies, but the unfortu- 
nate character of some of the American envoys, added 
to the difficulties of the situation. 

The American representatives at Paris were, as has 
been shown, far from harmonious ; their relations were 
always unfriendly, and at times became almost a pub- 
lic scandal. The blame for this did not rest upon Dr. 
Franklin, who at Paris, as elsewhere, was one of the 
most affable and politic of men. But his associates 
had been selected with less judgment, and the charac- 
ter of many of our representatives in Europe during 
the Eevolutionary War was not all that could be de- 
sired. Congress had sent over envoys and ambassa- 
dors accredited to various European courts, but few 
of them were received, and at Paris most of them 
made their headquarters. The finances of the United 
States were in great confusion, and as a result its 
representatives abroad were often put in embarrassing 
positions. Their pay was uncertain, their duties were 
ill defined, and most of them were ill fitted for any 
duties they had to perform. 

Franklin, Deane, and Lee constituted the commis- 
sion to France. Of Deane's embarrassments and mis- 
fortune^ we have already spoken, but Arthur Lee did 
most to involve his associates in constant trouble. He 
came over to Paris filled with a sense of his own im- 
portance, and ready to regard his fellows with jeal- 



222 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ousy and ill-will. He soon decided that Deane was 
surely dishonest, Franklin was perhaps dishonest and 
surely incompetent. Lee was unquestionably an hon- 
est man himself, but he believed that no one else pos- 
sessed that virtue. His scheme for the proper arrange- 
ment of American affairs on the Continent he stated 
to his brother. Dr. Franklin, he thought, should be 
sent to Vienna, a respectable, quiet place, and Deane 
to Holland. "France remains the centre of political 
activity, and here, therefore, I should choose to be 
employed." 

Even the affability of Franklin could not soothe 
Lee's vanity nor allay his irritation. He sent constant 
complaints to Congress, and not only abused his as- 
sociates behind their backs, but quarrelled with them 
to their faces. There prevailed at headquarters, so he 
wrote, " a spirit of neglect, abuse, plunder, and intrigue 
in the public business, which it has been impossible 
for me to prevent or correct. . . . Things are going 
on worse and worse every day among ourselves. . . . 
I see in every department neglect, dissipation, and 
private schemes. . . . There is but one way of re- 
dressing this and remedying the public evil," and that 
was to send Franklin to Vienna, and leave Lee at 
Paris. ^ 

Lee found a fit associate in Ralph Izard, who was 
sent over as envoy to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. 
Izard made no attempt to visit the court to which he 
was accredited, but remained at Paris, demanding 
from Franklin large amounts of money, and pouring 
out the most virulent abuse when he did not. get it. 
He received from Franklin two thousand guineas, 
and a few months later asked for five hundred more. 

1 Wharton, i, 499. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 223 

Franklin refused to honor the draft, calling atten- 
tion to the fact that Izard had not incurred the 
expense of going- to Tuscany. " You ai-e a gentleman 
of fortune," Franklin added. " You did not come to 
France with any dependence on being maintained 
here with your family at the expense of the United 
States in the time of their distress, and without ren- 
dering them the equivalent service they expected." 
That Izard should reimburse his country for what it 
had already spent on his fruitless mission, was Frank- 
lin's final suggestion. 

If Lee regarded himself as a proper representative 
of the United States to France, that belief was not 
shared by the ministers of the French government. 
Nominally Franklin was one of three commissioners; 
practically he was treated as the sole representative, 
and a position of inferiority was irksome to Lee's 
jealous vanity. He resolved to seek other fields for 
his activity, a course which was agreeable to his as- 
sociates and authorized by his instructions. In the 
minute prepared in October, 1776, Congress had said 
that the commissioners at Paris would doubtless 
have opportunities for conversing with the represent- 
atives of other European princes, and had added : 
" You shall endeavor, when you find occasion fit and 
convenient, to obtain from them a Recognition of our 
Independency and to conclude Treaties of Peace, 
Amity and Commerce between their Princes or 
States and us." 

The representative of Spain at Paris was the Conde 
de Aranda, who exceeded Vergennes in his zeal for 
immediate action in behalf of the American colonies. 
The ardent minister and the ardent commissioner 
conferred together, troubled only by the necessity of 



224 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

having an interpreter. " English," wrote Aranda, " is 
the only language that Lee knows." ^ Encouraged by 
the zeal of the count, which unfortunately was not 
shared by the government he represented, Lee re- 
solved to start for Madrid, in the sanguine hope of 
obtaining from that country a treaty of alliance before 
Franklin could overcome the cautious resistance of 
the French ministry. 

The announcement of Lee's purpose created violent 
commotion at the Spanish court. He was indeed to 
preserve the strictest incognito, to pass for a merchant 
attending to his affairs, furnished with a passport 
which described him as an Englishman. But this did 
not reconcile the Spanish to his visit. " This intelli- 
gence," writes the prime minister, " has been very dis- 
agreeable to the King. ... It would be most unfor- 
tunate to have Lee at Madrid." He adds : " There 
was no necessity for the voyage." He would be dis- 
covered, and the English ministers would complain. 
" And still we don't want in any way to disgust or 
irritate these colonists." ^ 

To avoid such embarrassment, the Spanish minister 
adopted an expedient that was simple and effective. 
He sent an emissary to meet Lee at Vittoria, who was 
to keep him there in genteel confinement and prevent 
his penetrating to Madrid. Even Lee was obliged to 
yield to so firm a refusal to receive him. At Vittoria 
he remained, offering to conquer Pensacola and other 
possessions in return for Spanish aid, obtaining some 
promises and a little money. " A virgin state," Frank- 
lin said to him, using a metaphor of which he was 
fond, " should preserve the virgin character, and . . . 

1 Letter of Jan. 31, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 197. 

2 Letter of Feb. 17, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 196. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 221 

wait with decent dignity for the application of others. 
. . . "While we are asking aid it is necessary to . . . 
comply with the himiors of those we apply to." ^ 
There is no doubt that the virgin state, when coun- 
selled by so astute a politician as Franklin, showed 
much readiness to meet the peculiarities, not of those 
who pursued her, but of those whom she pursued. 

After these vain efforts to penetrate the recesses of 
Spain, Lee turned to another country, where in some 
respects he met with better fortune. No one could be 
more indifferent than Frederick II to the fate of the 
American colonies, but no fear of English complaints 
would make him arrest an American envoy at the 
Prussian frontier. If he wasted no more affection on 
the Americans than on any other foreign people, he 
had some vigorous animosities that would be grati- 
fied by American success. Though Frederick was not 
willing to spend the money or the blood of his own 
people, even for so desirable an end, he was not only 
willing but very desirous that the French King should 
do so. A war that might cripple England, and would 
perhaps weaken France besides, was certainly a pleas- 
ing prospect. Frederick was constant in his efforts 
to incite the French to take up arms for the colonies, 
and indirectly he gave valuable aid to the American 
cause by his assurances that while France was thus 
engaged he would not stir up any continental ques- 
tion that would require her attention. 

It would not cost Frederick one groat to allow an 
American representative to visit Berlin, and accord- 
ingly Lee made his way undisturbed to the Prussian 
capital. But there he met with small success. Lee 
had already sent a request that American ships be 
^ Franklin to Lee, March 21, 1777 ; Wharton, ii, 298. 



226 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

allowed to enter any Prussian port, but this Frederick 
politely evaded, not willing, as he wrote his minister, 
to irritate the colonists by an absolute refusal.^ Arriv- 
ing at Berlin, Lee asked that some port be indicated 
where American privateers could sell their prizes, and 
he sought to form a treaty of commerce with Prus- 
sia. These suggestions were unfavorably received by 
the Prussian monarch. Until the independence of the 
colonists was more firmly established, he states in 
another letter, any commerce with them would be 
perilous and not worth the risk ; and as for a treaty, he 
was in no humor to embarrass himself by complica- 
tions with England in order to favor the Americans.'^ 
A new interest was given to the situation by an ex- 
traordinary incident. Elliot was the English ambas- 
sador at Berlin, and, proceeding with a degree of vigor 
that modern diplomacy would not approve, he had 
some one force his way into Lee's chamber and steal 
his papers. This high-handed act enraged Frederick, 
though it also answered his purpose, for it furnished 
him abundant excuse for showing some attention, 
even to an unofficial representative of an unacknow- 
ledged state, who had been so indecently treated by 
the English ambassador. But the prudent King had 
no thought of spending a florin of his own in assisting 
American rebels, and no emissary could have been 
less to his taste than a vain and injudicious intriguer 
like Arthur Lee. The British government made due 
apologies, Lee soon left Berlin for Paris, and employed 
himself in sending home lies about Franklin. 

Though the American commissioners were con- 
stantly wrangling among themselves, they united in 

1 Douiol, ii, 345. . ^ Doniol, ii, 557. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 227 

efforts to obtain further assistance from the French 
government. Their first requests for assistance were 
moderate, but in March, 1777, they submitted a more 
ambitious proposition in which they ofitei'ed to form 
an alliance with France and proceed to the conquest 
of Canada, Newfoundland, and the "West India islands. 
Of these spoils Canada and Newfoundland should be 
the share of the colonists, and the British West Indies 
should become the property of France. 

AVhile the French ministers were not specially 
allured by this project, they were rapidly reaching 
the point where they were ready to exchange the pre- 
tence of neutrality for the reality of an alliance. In 
April, 1777, Vergennes declared that, having done so 
much for the colonists, they must now do moi-e. " We 
cannot expect," he wrote, " that wdiat we have thus 
far done for the United Colonies is enough to secure 
their gratitude, and if they unite their forces with 
those the English already have in the New World, 
we should have small means with which to resist." ^ 

While the French minister constantly asserted that 
his government was giving no heed to the demands 
of American representatives, the English ambassador 
was not deceived. In March he writes : " That M. de 
Vergennes is hostile to us in his heart, and anxious 
for the success of the Rebels, I have not a shadow of 
doubt," and he adds : " The provocation they give us 
is great, and there is nothing that w^ould please me so 
much as to unmask their artifice and confound their 
duplicity and fraud ; but that must not be attempted 
until the day of retribution comes." ^ 

1 Letter, April 7, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 341. 

2 Stormont to Weymouth, March 26, 1777; Hale, Franklin in 
France, ii, 430. 



228 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

It was because Yergennes had so bad a conscience, 
and knew full well that the assistance he was secretly 
giving the Americans would justify the English gov- 
ernment in declaring war on France, if a favorable 
opportunity should oft'er, that he was in constant fear 
of such action, and was the more inclined to begin a 
contest that he believed was inevitable. But still he 
did not wish to act without the cooperation of Spain, 
and his arguments were insufficient to induce that 
timid and uncertain power to undertake war in behalf 
of American independence. 

The Spanish minister went so far as to promise aid 
to the Americans, but his assurance was marked by 
commendable thrift. He wished to give "a little so 
as to nourish their hopes." Even this promise was not 
kept, for some Spanish ships were captured by Amer- 
ican captains, who, unfortunately, were not well read 
in Pufendorf and Grotius. By such an act Spanish 
dignity was offended, and it at once assumed its 
sternest aspect. Some French ships also were cap- 
tured, but Vergennes accepted the situation philoso- 
phically, and sought to avert such evils in the future. 
This was not the policy of the Pardo ; the ministers 
stormed and the King stopped the promised pay- 
ments ; luckily for the Americans, the promised pay- 
ments were small. The American commissioners ex- 
pressed their regrets and reproached the injudicious 
corsairs, but this did not smooth the ruffled feathers 
of Spanish diplomacy. 

Undisturbed by such incidents, the French would 
probably have formed an alliance with the colonists 
during the summer following Franklin's arrival, had 
it not been for the ill-success of the American arms. 
During the weary months of 1777, when the commis- 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 229 

sioners at Paris fluctuated between the joyful belief 
that France would at once take up arms in behalf of 
the colonists, and the disappointment caused by con- 
stant delay, the reports from America for the most 
part brought tidings of disaster, and it seemed that 
the colonists would be forced to succumb before their 
possible allies could decide upon assuring their salva- 
tion. In July Ticonderoga was captured, and this suc- 
cess was regarded as of far more importance than it 
really was. George III declared that the Americans 
were now surely beaten, and Vergennes was afraid 
that such was the case. " It is a problem," he wrote, 
after the news of the abandonment of Ticonderoga 
reached France, " whether they can preserve the lib- 
erty for which they have taken up arms ; attacked in 
the rear by the English army of Canada, while Gen- 
eral Howe assails them in front. Have they the force, 
the unity, the leadership, to resist this storm ? " * 

Another note states some of the embarrassments 
which hindered any decisive action : the divisions 
among leading men, it declared, the intrigues of the 
Tories, the inaction of the Quakers, or some untoward 
event might overthrow the edifice so hastily erected, 
and the powers that espoused the American cause 
would find themselves exposed to danger without being 
of any assistance to their allies.^ 

Bat if these disasters chilled Vergennes's ardor, his 
delay aroused a storm of criticism that was valuable 
to the colonists. French public sentiment had long 
favored interference ; the philosophers and litterateurs 
lauded the principles professed by the American 
patriots ; ladies and gentlemen of fashion sang the 
praises of Franklin and Washington and their asso- 
1 Sept. 19, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 572. 2 Doniol, ii, 628. 



230 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ciates ; young men of gallantry and ambition, like 
La Fayette, were embarking in the American cause. 
The disasters of the year were now charged by the 
French people to the remissness of the French gov- 
ernment ; they had delayed too long, they had let the 
critical and auspicious moment go by. The enemies of 
Vergennes filled the King's ears with complaints of 
the inert and unwise conduct of the minister. Even 
Frederick II declared that France had allowed the 
opportune moment for her interference to pass. 

Vergennes was disturbed by these criticisms, and 
in November, 1777, he sent a M. Holker to visit the 
United States and ascertain the disposition of Con- 
gress, the resources of the people, what they were 
ready to do for a nation that would embark in their 
cause, and the actual condition of the English army.* 

Holker's mission was not important, for the die was 
cast long before he could make his investigations and 
send his report. On October 31, 1777, at ten o'clock 
on a fine morning, the brigantine Perch sailed from 
the Long Wharf in Boston, carrying Jonathan Loring 
Austin of that city, with messages from the Massa- 
chusetts Council announcing the surrender of Bur- 
goyne and the capture of his army of six thousand 
men. Saratoga is justly reckoned by Creasy among 
the fifteen decisive battles of the world. If Bur- 
goyne's expedition had been successful, it is doubtful 
if France would have interfered in the American 
cause, and still more doubtful if the colonists, without 
such assistance, could have achieved their independ- 
ence. 

The Perch was favored by remarkably fine weather, 
and in thirty days reached the French coast. On 

1 Doniol, ii, 615. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 231 

November 30, writes Austin, he first announced the 
news in France, and it was received with manifest joy 
by French as well as Americans. Leaving Nantes in 
a chaise drawn by three horses abreast, he made his 
way to Versailles, and from there to Passy. As he 
drove into the courtyard of the Hotel de Valentinois, 
he was met by Franklin. 

" Sir, is Philadelphia taken ? " asked the doctor. 

"It is," replied the messenger; " but, sir, I have 
greater news than that. General Burgoyne and his 
whole army are prisoners." ^ 

Beaumarchais was^ then visiting the commissioners 
at Passy. He started to carry the news to Paris in 
such hot haste that his carriage tipped over and he 
nearly broke his neck. Such casualties seemed unim- 
portant to so eager and impetuous a friend of the 
American cause. "My right arm is cut," he writes, 
"the bones of my neck were nearly crushed, . . . 
but the charming news from America is a balm to my 
wounds." ^ It is sad that the American Congress, in 
settling Beaumarchais's accounts, showed so little of 
the alacrity with which he carried to the French 
court the good news of Amei-ican success. 

Upon receiving the intelligence of Burgoyne's sur- 
render, the French government decided to espouse 
the cause of the American insurgents. They had long 
hesitated, and during the disasters of the summer, 
critics had declared that the ministers had hesitated 
too long: the golden moment had passed and the 
Americans, aided by no helping hand, had been over- 
powered by the British. It was then thought that 
France had delayed until the ruin of the colonies had 

1 Hale, Franklin in France, i, 159. 

2 Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Dec. 5, 1777 ; Doniol, ii, 682. 



232 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

been consummated : it was now feared that she had 
waited until the victory of the colonists would force 
England to grant acceptable terms, and the oppor- 
tunity to gain the friendship of the new republic 
would be lost. 

Vergennes had always been haunted by a vision of 
some sort of reconciliation between England and her 
colonies, and of their united arms turned to despoil 
France of her American possessions. He had feared 
this when it seemed that the cause of the colonists 
was hopeless; he now feared it when he thought the 
victory of the colonists was assured. The English, he 
said, were irritated because France had given so much 
aid to the colonists; the colonists were irritated be- 
cause she had given so little. 

" If the English learned wisdom from their misfor- 
tunes," wrote Vergennes as soon as he heard of Bur- 
goyne's surrender, ..." and made terms of peace, 
what could France do to prevent a reconciliation ? " 
And he continued with inaccurate prophecy: "The 
power which first recognizes American independence 
will gather all the fruits of this war." ^ " France 
must anticipate such action on England's part," he 
wrote again, " by greater speed in making the colo- 
nists our friends. . . . My reflections are not agreea- 
ble," he said, " as I see the fatal period approach which 
I have always regarded as the most critical." ^ In his 
uncertainty he did not derive the amusement which 
otherwise would have been furnished him when Lord 
Stormont had to announce the tidings from Saratoga. 
"He should have blushed," wrote Vergennes, "if he 
had recalled the audacious statements he had lately 
made about those cowardly insurgents, . . . but the 
1 Doniol, ii, 632. « Doniol, u, 622, 623. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 233 

present crisis demands something more than pleasant- 
ries." ^ 

The American commissioners at once renewed their 
demands, with the confident expectation that a favor- 
able answer would not be long deferred. It was a 
year, wrote Franklin to his associates, since they had 
proposed to France a treaty of commerce and alli- 
ance. Their overtures had remained without definite 
reply, but now a favorable response would establish 
the credit of the United States and discourage their 
enemies. Thanking the King for his gracious gift of 
three million livres, they pressed for a further answer, 
desiring, next to the liberty of their own land, a firm 
and everlasting union between the two nations.^ 

To these suggestions a reply was soon made. The 
long months of delay and uncertainty were at last 
a thing of the past. Vergennes at once prepared a 
paper in which he outlined the policy required by the 
new condition of affairs. At heart he had long been 
ready for an alliance with the United States and its 
necessary result, a war with England, but the ill-suc- 
cess of the colonists and the unwillingness of Spain 
to cooperate had prevented any final decision. Now 
he felt that the time for action had surely come, and 
there must be no more delay. He therefore prepared 
for the King's approval a paper in which he advised 
that a treaty of alliance be forthwith made with the 
United States. 

His arguments were submitted to Maurepas, the 
chief minister, and by him they were presented for 
the consideration of the King. Maurepas fell ill of 
the gout, Louis visited him for further consultation, 
and the whole matter was gone over again. Ver- 
1 Doniol, ii, 704. « Letter of Dec. 8, 1777; Wharton, ii, 445. 



234 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

gennes's decision was made, at last the entire Council 
agreed, and the resolution to form an alliance with 
the United States was unanimous. 

At an earlier period Louis XVI had regarded in- 
terference as unwise ; he had believed with Turgot 
that French finance would not stand the strain of war; 
he felt that good faith to England and a just regard 
for the cause of kings forbade his espousing the cause 
of rebellious subjects. But now, if we may credit 
the statements of his ministers, the King was con- 
vinced of the wisdom of action, and ready to meet the 
risk of war. Louis XVI's judgment was indeed 
largely formed by the opinion of those around him ; 
he had not an intelligence sufficiently active to form 
his own conclusions and control the action of his min- 
isters by his own will. With different advisers he 
could probably have been persuaded that it was the 
part of wisdom for France to leave England and her 
colonies to fight out their own battles. On the other 
hand, so strong was the pressure of public opinion, so 
universal was the enthusiasm for the American cause, 
that any other ministers would probably have reached 
the same conclusion as Vergennes and his associates. 

It was certainly a critical moment, and the deliber- 
ations between the King and his ministers were of an 
importance that it is hard to overestimate. The his- 
tory of the war makes it seem at least probable tliat 
the colonists, left to themselves, would have failed in 
their effort to throw off British rule. Notwithstanding 
the judgment and patriotism of Washington and the 
fortitude of the men who bore patiently the sufferings 
of Valley Forge, exhaustion, the lack of arms, the lack 
of money, might at last have reduced the colonists to 
submission. After three years more of war, with the 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 235 

benefit of French assistance, the result still seemed 
doubtful, until the capture of Yorktown secured a suc- 
cessful termination. "Without French aid, the capture 
of Yorktown and of Cornwallis's army would have 
been impossible. The United States might have won 
their liberty after a longer struggle ; they might have 
failed, and at some later period have become an inde- 
pendent state ; they might have obtained practical in- 
dependence and still remained a portion of a greater 
England. 

Nor were the results of the alliance of much less 
importance to France. They modified her political 
development, and had a large influence on the events 
that were soon to change the form of French govern- 
ment, to lead to the reign of the greatest conqueror of 
modern times, and at last to leave France a republic 
instead of a monarchy. These issues were considered 
by men who were sagacious but not great, and who 
did not realize the importance of the questions they 
had to decide. But the same thing can be said of 
most statesmen in great crises. The gift of prescience 
is given to few, and tlie most far-sighted can penetrate 
but little into the infinite complexity of future events. 

If the motives which actuated the French ministers 
in their decision were not wholly philanthropic, they 
were neither petty nor sordid. The advantages for her- 
self which France could hope for, and the only ones 
for which she asked when peace was made, were not, 
as Vergennes justly said, of sufiicient importance to 
justify an appeal to arms : release from the ignomin- 
ious conditions at Dunkirk imposed by the Treaty of 
Utrecht, some increase in fishery rights on the coast of 
Newfoundland, and the recovery of some petty islands 
in the West Indies. These were of small importance. 



236 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

To separate the Uuited States from England and 
weaken the insolent enemy of the House of Bourbon 
was the object and the justification of the war.^ 

In all these long diplomatic papers we find no dis- 
cussion of wrongs suffered by the American colonists, 
of rights to be protected, or liberties to be assured. 
Vergennes thought that France should interfere in 
behalf of the colonies because thereby she could 
humble a rival and avenge past defeats. But though 
he was not moved by altruistic motives, the assistance 
was none the less valuable. Moreover, the spirit which 
led La Fayette to risk his life in aid of a people strug- 
gling to be free, represented the feelings of the French 
people better than the arguments of a minister who 
saw in this war only an opportunity for selfish advan- 
tage. Among the French people, the desire to assist 
the colonists in their struggle for independence was 
as unselfish as it was universal. The Americans 
loomed up before enthusiastic French eyes as heroes 
possessing the virtues of antiquity, and struggling 
for the freedom which had been dear to patriots of 
old. The subjects of an absolute monarchy sang the 
praises of liberty, and were enthusiastic for the suc- 
cess of its cause across the ocean. The popular feel- 
ing was strong and generous, based upon no selfish 
considerations of state, but upon genuine sympathy 
for fellow men. 

Such sentiments were less potent among the states- 
men in whose hands rested the final decision. It was 
their duty to consider the interests of their own land, 
and not to enter into war without proper regard for the 
welfare of the people whose servants they were. And 
yet, though the reasons for helping the Americans 
1 Doniol, ii, 781-788. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 237 

were discussed in grave official papers, with as little 
pretence of philanthropy as if it had been a question 
of the balance of power in Europe, it was the popular 
enthusiasm for American liberty which penetrated 
the council chamber and influenced the ministers in 
their decision, even if they failed to recognize such a 
motive. 

As is often the case, the generous intuitions of the 
people were truer guides than the selfish counsels of 
statesmen. The advantages, so carefully considered by 
Vergennes and his associates, were realized in small 
degree. For some years a strong feeling of grati- 
tude and kindliness toward France was cherished by 
our ancestors. This was agreeable to the French, but 
it was of small practical value. France did not ob- 
tain the chief share of American trade; that went 
to England, which had more to sell us, and was ready 
to buy more from us. The decline of English power, 
which Vergennes so confidently anticipated, he was 
not destined to behold. English merchants made more 
money out of the people of the United States than 
they had ever made from the American colonists ; the 
power of England was greater under Pitt, when the 
people of the United States were independent, than 
it had been under North, when they were grumbling 
and discontented subjects. Nor is there any reason to 
believe that if peace had been made between England 
and the colonists before France interfered, they would 
have joined arms in order to strip the French of their 
possessions in the West Indies. Thus the arguments 
on which statesmen based their action were not jus- 
tified in the future. But the instincts of the French 
nation were right : they assisted a people to gain their 
freedom, they took part in one of the great crises of 



238 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

modern progress, tliey helped the world in its onward 
march. For nations, as for individuals, that is the 
greatest work. The reward is not to be found in more 
vessels sailing, laden with wares, nor in more dollars 
gained and deposited in banks, but in the conscious- 
ness of the unselfish performance of good work, of 
assistance rendered to the cause of freedom, and to 
the improvement of man's lot on earth. 

On the 17th of December, 1777, Gerard went to 
the ho^se of Franklin and his associates at Passy, and 
impayred to them the momentous intelligence that 
Louis XVI had decided to recognize the independ- 
enoe of the United States, and to make with them a 
treaty of commerce and friendship. A ship was to 
,^2a[ forthwith that would carry the news to America, 
and the commissioners had the pleasure of reporting 
to Congress the resolution of the French King. The 
news of the surrender of Burgoyne, they wrote, had 
been received by the French with as universal joy as 
if it had been a victory won by their own troops over 
their own enemies. This joy had soon ripened into 
action. Gerard yesterday, they said, informed them 
that the King was ready to acknowledge our inde- 
pendence and make a treaty. " In this treaty no ad- 
vantage would be taken of our present situation' to 
obtain terms from us, which otherwise would not be 
convenient for us to agree to, his Majesty desiring 
that the treaty once made should be durable and our 
amity subsist forever." ^ 

As the representatives of France were ready to 
agree to the terms which the American commissioners 
proposed, there was little delay in the negotiations. 
On February 6, 1778, treaties of alliance between the 

1 Letter of Dec. 18, 1777 ; Wharton, ii, 452. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 239 

King of France and the United States were signed 
by the French ministers in behalf of Louis XVI, and 
by Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee for this country. 
The commissioners reported that in the negotiations ■ 
the promise to make no effort to take advantage of 
present difficulties in order to obtain disadvantageous 
conditions was fulfilled. The states were in great 
need and France could have driven a hard bargain in 
return for her aid, but the treaty was drawn as if the 
two powers had been of equal strength and equally in 
need of the alliance. Such had been the King's good- 
ness, reported the commissioners, that nothing had 
been proposed which they could not well have ac- 
cepted in a condition of complete prosperity and re- 
cognized power. Equality and perfect reciprocity had 
alone been desired, commercial privileges had been 
mutual, and nothing had been granted that could not 
be accorded to any other nation. Having reason to be 
satisfied with the good-will of the court and of the 
French nation, they hoped that Congi-ess would adopt 
every means that could render the alliance lasting.* 

Vergennes, in reporting the treaty to the French 
ambassador at London, took the same view of it as 
the American envoys. " AVe have not wished to pro- 
cure," he said, "commercial advantages which could 
make any other nation jealous, and which the Amer- 
icans would regret in the future that they had granted 
us." 2 

Two treaties were executed : one of commerce, and 
the other providing for mutual defence and alliance. 
The terms of the treaty of commerce conformed largely 
to the proposals which Congress had intrusted to the 

1 Letter of Feb. 8, 1778 ; Wharton, ii, 490. 

2 Vergennes to Noailles, March 10, 1778 ; Doniol, ii, 822. 



240 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

commissioners. Each party was placed on the footing 
of the most favored nation. The French King pro- 
.mised his good offices with the Emperor of Morocco 
and the rulers of Algiers and Tunis, that those much- 
dreaded pirates might leave the ships and citizens of 
the United States in peace. Our own privateers and 
their prizes were granted free access to French ports, 
but they obtained few advantages by treaty which 
they had not already been allowed by favor. How 
remote were the two sides of the Atlantic was shown 
by the provision in reference to the carriage of goods 
belonging to citizens of a power with which either of 
the contracting parties might in the future be at war. 
Two months were granted to ascertain the fact that 
such a war had begun. At the expiration of that 
period it was to be presumed that the news would 
have crossed the Atlantic, and penetrated into the 
ports, of seafaring men. 

Of greater importance was the second treaty, by 
which France agreed to come to the aid of the thir- 
teep states. The only condition that France imposed 
upon her Amei-ican allies was that they should make 
no peace until their independence was recognized, and 
that the allies should unite in any treaty. This surely 
was not a grievous condition. France guaranteed to 
the United States her independence, and in turn our 
country guaranteed to France her possessions in the 
West Indies. It must be confessed that at that period 
the French guarantee would have been regarded as 
of higher value. By secret agreement it was provided 
that Spain might join in the alliance, but of this 
privilege she never availed herself. 

The American commissioners at once reported to 
Congress the great intelligence, with a pardonable 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 241 

pride in the result of their negotiations. It was with 
good cause that they congratulated their fellow citi- 
zens on an event destined to thwart the desires of 
their enemies and fortify the hopes of their friends. 
To this they added fervent expressions of gratitude 
to France, and of admiration of the upright and dis- 
interested conduct of Louis XVI. ^ 

Vergennes endeavored, but in vain, to have Spain 
join France in an alliance with the American colonies. 
When it had been finally resolved that a treaty should 
be made with the United States, the Spanish King 
was at once notified of the decision reached by his 
nephew in France. The critical moment had at last 
arrived, he was told, and the French King could no 
longer remain inactive. "Providence has marked this 
epoch," it was said, " for the humiliation of a power, 
greedy and unjust, which has never known any other 
law than its own interest " ; and the letter proceeded 
with a statement of the somewhat dubious political 
morality which then prevailed in every European 
monarchy. " Kings, when the welfare of their people 
is concerned, are not perhaps subjected to the rules 
of as rigid a morality as binds private persons in their 
actions." 

Yet without any necessity of appealing to such a 
principle, there were many reasons which made an 
immediate war with England entirely just. Such a 
contest was certain sooner or later ; the question was 
whether it was better to meet it with America as a 
friend, or with America again united to England. 
"Shall we sleep in false security, and lose the one 
chance which may ofPer itself for centuries to reduce 
England to her true position ? . . . Never was such 
1 Wharton, ii, 490. 



242 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

an opportunity furnished the House of Bourbon " to 
lower the pride of her enemy, and to form with the 
United States an alliance of which the benefits should 
be incalculable.^ 

But Spain could not be moved to sudden action by 
any arguments. The French ambassador visited the 
Spanish minister and debated the matter with him 
for five hours, but neither hours of argument nor 
reams of correspondence could induce the Spanish 
government to reach a decision. There was no haste, 
said Florida Blanca, and he submitted a letter con- 
taining not less than sixteen elaborate questions, to 
which answers must be given before any decision 
could be made. Vergennes sent the answers, but he 
did not wait for the close of a debate which would 
surely occupy many months. It was most painful to 
the King, he wrote the French ambassador at Madrid, 
to make this decision alone, but the interests of the 
two monarchies would not permit his Majesty to re- 
main in a state of inactivity which might be fatal to 
both. 2 

Though with much reluctance, Louis XVI signed 
the treaty of alliance with the United States without 
waiting for his Spanish kinsman. The Spanish were 
neither ready for action nor jDleased that the French 
should act without them. While unwilling to reach a 
conclusion himself, the Catholic King manifested 
considerable annoyance because his Most Christian 
nephew had decided to help the Americans without 
waiting for the cooperation of Spain. As they disap- 
proved of any treaty, naturally they were ready to 
criticize the terms of the one made, and declared 
them absurdly liberal. The Spanish minister com- 
» Doniol, ii, 627, 664. 2 jan. 8, 1778 ; Doniol, ii, 730. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 243 

pared the American commissioners to the Roman con- 
suls whose aid eastern kings had begged, and said 
that the treaty, on the part of France, was quixotic in 
its liberality.^ 

Now that the French King had formally recognized 
the new republic and had entered into treaty with 
it, the position of the American commissioners was 
altered. They had been kept in obscurity, had nego- 
tiated in stealth, and been received by under-secreta- 
ries or at private interviews. This was now changed. 
On March 16 Stormont left Paris for London, and on 
the 20th the American commissioners were formally 
presented to Louis XVI by Vergennes. They were 
not, indeed, received with all the ceremonial of ac- 
credited ambassadors, but their interview was as 
agreeable as if every detail of diplomatic etiquette 
had been complied with, and the presentation excited 
a degree of attention which was rarely given when 
the representatives of powerfid governments and an- 
cient monarchies were received at Versailles. 

It was indeed a notable event in Franklin's extraor- 
dinary career. His government had been acknow- 
ledged by a great European power, and a treaty made 
that insured the liberties of his nation, and this was, 
in lai'ge degree, the fruit of his own labors. His ad- 
mirers recognized how great was the triumph. As he 
proceeded to the interview he was greeted by applause, 
not only in the streets of the city, but in the sacred 
precincts of the palace. The King was less enthusi- 
astic, but he was civil, and all w^ent well. The im- 
pressions produced upon Franklin himself, as he has 
recorded them, are characteristic of the man. He was 
little affected by the splendors of Versailles, but the 

1 Doniol, iii, 23. 



244 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

fact that the palace was ill kept, that sweeping and 
other sanitary provisions were neglected, impressed 
his practical and somewhat prosaic mind.^ 

After the reception was over the commissioners 
called to pay their respects to Madame de La Fayette, 
who was then at Versailles, and assured her of their 
gratitude for her husband's efforts ; and they then 
dined with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 

These formalities had been preceded by another 
ceremonial still more interesting. Paul Jones was 
then commanding the Ranger, from the mast of which 
floated the flag of the new republic. The hardy cor- 
sair, who now found himself the officer of a recog- 
nized government, wrote to Deane telling him of the 
first salutes exchanged between the flag of liberty and 
that of the ancient monarchy of France. On arriving 
at Nantes, Jones inquired if the French admiral 
would return his salute, and was informed that, as a 
senior officer of the American navy now in Europe, 
he would be givea the salute authorized for an ad- 
miral of Holland. A little after sunset on March 14, 
the Ranger discharged thirteen guns in honor of the 
French admiral, and in reply nine guns saluted the 
flag of the United States. Jones would have preferred 
equal honors, but the difference between an ancient 
monarchy and a new reimblic had to be recognized. 
French officers visited the Ranger and delighted 
Jones's heart by declaring her a " perfect gem." ^ It 
was fitting that the founder of the American navy 
should receive the first honors rendered to the Amer- 
ican flag. 

In April the news of the French alliance reached 

^ Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence, i, 374, 

^ Translation of intercepted letter ; Doniol, iii, 3. 



PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 245 

America and was welcomed with an enthusiasm be- 
fitting its importance. In Cong-ress a resohition was 
passed expressing its high " sense of the magnanimity 
and wisdom of his most Christian majesty," and pre- 
senting " grateful acknowledgments " for the " gener- 
ous and disinterested treaties." It sincerely wished 
that the friendship so happily commenced might be 
perpetual. 

The treaty excited no less enthusiasm in the army, 
and no one appreciated its importance better than the 
commanding general. No one recognized more clearly 
than he the defects in our military and financial sys- 
tem and the importance of an alliance with a great 
military power. In an order issued by Washington 
at Valley Forge on May 6, he declared that it had 
pleased the Almighty Ruler of the universe to raise 
up for us in our need a powerful friend among the 
princes of the earth. In recognition of this the bri- 
gades were to meet at nine the next morning, when the 
chaplains would communicate the intelligence, offer 
up thanksgiving, and pronounce discourses suitable 
to the occasion. The men were then to be inspected, 
amid discharges of cannon, and at a given signal the 
whole army should huzza "Long live the King of 
France," and this should be followed by a huzza for 
the American states. 

Our ancestors celebrated the alliance in a manner 
befitting good Puritans by listening to lengthy ser- 
mons, but they indulged also in other festivities. The 
sermon was followed by a great dinner, a somewhat 
rare occurrence at headquarters, where supplies were 
often scanty. It was attended by the officers and their 
wives and many distinguished personages. Washing- 
ton, Greene, and many other generals were present; 



246 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

conspicuous among them all was the youthful La 
Fayette, who had done so much to excite among the 
French people an interest in the American cause. 
Mrs. Washington, Lady Sterling, and other ladies 
were among the guests. 

Similar celebrations occurred in many places. Min- 
isters preached and cannon roared in honor of the 
great event. Yet, while the intelligence of the alli- 
ance was hailed by all earnest patriots as the guar- 
antee of ultimate success, the old distrust of France 
appeared in the outcry with which some greeted the 
treaty. Dancing-masters, said the critics, would now 
instruct the Puritans in manners, and priests would 
save their souls ; Americans had left a loving though 
severe mother for a treacherous step-mother, and the 
French alliance would bring to the American cause 
inevitable ruin. Such were the predictions made by 
the Tories, but they were not to be verified in the 
future.^ 

1 C. H. Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution, 152- 
156. 



CHAPTER XIII 

FRANCE SENDS A PLENIPOTENTIARY 

The new republic was now a recognized ally of 
the ancient monarchy, and this recognition was at once 
followed by sending to the states an accredited diplo- 
matic representative. For some years Franklin and 
his associates had represented the United States at 
Paris, but France had sent to America only unofficial 
agents, whose duty was to spy out the land. The posi- 
tion of minister to this new and unimportant republic 
was not regarded like the great ambassadorships, to 
Vienna, London, and Rome, and it was rendered less 
attractive by the perils and discomforts of the long 
voyage across the water. Furthermore, life at Phila- 
delphia among a strange people, with different manners 
and customs, possessed no charm for a diplomat used 
to the society of the large cities of Europe. Yet, with 
the certainty of war with England, it was important 
to have a representative who could judge accurately 
of conditions among the new allies and stimulate 
them to zealous action in the common cause. 

The choice fell on a man who did not belong to 
the great nobility, to which the most important diplo- 
matic posts were usually assigned, but who was pecu- 
liarly fitted for this position. Conrad Gerard de 
Rayneval had been Vergennes's first assistant, and 
was familiar with all the negotiations which led to 
the alliance with the United States. To long expe- 
rience he added a qualification less common among 



248 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

French diplomats, a good knowledge of English. 
Partly for this reason the negotiations with the 
American colonies had been largely committed to 
his charge. When Franklin first arrived and Ver- 
gennes wished neither to repel the Americans nor to 
excite the wrath of the English ambassador by treat- 
ing with them too publicly, it was easy to refer them 
to Gerard, who could talk their language, and was 
therefore a fit person to conduct the negotiations. 
Gerard entertained the American representatives at 
his house, and was the mouthpiece of the ministry, 
before the French government decided on open ac- 
tion in behalf of the colonies; when this resolution 
had at last been reached, Gerard was intrusted with 
the agreeable duty of visiting the American commis- 
sioners at Franklin's house in Passy, and informing 
them that Louis XVI was ready to form an alliance 
with the new republic. Gerard's name was signed to 
the treaties, and it was natural that he should be 
chosen as the minister from France to the Republic 
of the United States ; there was no Frenchman more 
familiar with the conditions to be encountered in 
America or better fitted to deal with them. He was 
the first of a long line of distinguished representa- 
tives. 

The instructions given Gerard disclosed the hopes 
and the fears of the French government. He was to 
guard against the possibility of Congress making a 
separate peace with Great Britain, and to assure that 
body in the most positive terms that Louis XVI would 
listen to no propositions from the enemy, and would 
not lay down arms until the absolute independence of 
the thirteen states had been recognized by England. 

The relations of France with Spain now, as during 



FRANCE SENDS A PLENIPOTENTIARY 249 

all the progress of the war, were a source of embar- 
rassment. While Spain had made no treaty with the 
United States, France was bound to act in their in- 
terest and to secure for them Florida and a possible 
share in the Newfoundland fisheries. Gerard, there- 
fore, was to dissuade Congress from any plan that 
might include the acquisition of the Floridas. Nor did 
France desire that Canada should be added to the thir- 
teen states, for reasons which the instructions stated 
with unaltruistic clearness : the retention of Canada 
by England would make the Americans feel their 
need of the friendship of France. 

Gerard's skill was sufficient to secure these objects, 
but the final instruction which he received was beyond 
his power to accomplish. " It is probable," said the 
document, " that Congress will show a desire for sub- 
sidies from France." Such requests Gerard was to 
check, by explaining that the efforts which France 
must make in the common cause would involve great 
expense and render it impossible for her to furnish 
pecuniary aid ; he must convince the Americans that 
the French fleet was worth more to them than French 
money. " His Majesty was persuaded," so the docu- 
ment ran, " that Congress would easily yield assent to 
such conclusive reasons." ^ 

If the King was thus persuaded, he was much mis- 
taken. In part, perhaps, influenced by Gerard's ad- 
vice, Congress displayed no covetous desire for Flor- 
ida and made no vigorous effort to conquer Canada, 
but nothing could keep it from demanding subsidies ; 
fortunately for the interests of the states, the French 
King was not persuaded by his own arguments, and 
gave to repeated requests repeated satisfaction. 

1 Instructions to Gerard, March 29, 1778 ; Doniol, iii, 153. 



250 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

It was thought desirable that Gerard should con- 
ceal his departure, and on April 11 he sailed from 
Toulon, ostensibly for Antibes ; but when off Hyeres 
he embarked on the Languedoc, one of d'Estaing's 
fleet, bound for the United States. After a journey of 
ninety-one days he reached his destination and was 
landed a few miles from Philadelphia. 

There was no lack of interest in the reception of 
the representative of our powerful ally. A delegation 
from Congress met him, and he drove to Philadelphia 
in Hancock's carriage. Soldiers were drawn up in the 
streets to greet his entrance, and salutes were fired. 
The importance of the event was not underestimated. 
" I had the honor of being present the last Sabbath," 
writes Henry Marchant, a member of Congress from 
Rhode Island, " at the most interesting interview that 
ever took place in America, or perhaps in the world, 
between Monsieur Gerard, the plenipotentiary of 
France, and the President of Congress. . . . This in- 
terview was most cordial, generous, and noble." ^ 

No permanent residence had yet been selected, and 
Gerard was entertained temporarily by Benedict 
Arnold, who was then commander at Philadelphia. Al- 
though arrangements were not yet made for his formal 
reception, the house overflowed with visitors ; most of 
the members of Congress and the principal officers 
of the city, " even the most phlegmatic," we are told, 
hastened to pay their respects. Representatives of the 
English King had lately visited Philadelphia in the 
hope of recalling the colonists to their allegiance by 
the offer of liberal terms. The news of the alliance 
with France destroyed even the remote possibility of 

^ William Read Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, 
191. 



FRANCE SENDS A PLENIPOTENTIARY 251 

success in such an effort. The English, it was charged, 
were provided not only with arguments, but with 
money, with which to persuade the members of the 
Continental Congress. Xone of the money seems to 
have been used, but presents which indicated good 
fellowship had been scattered about. These were now 
put to a use which would have been distasteful to the 
donors. A grand dinner was given Gerard, and he 
wrote home that the guests feasted on turtle and wine 
that had been sent members of Congress by the Eng- 
lish commissioners.^ 

The members of Congress were most pleased to 
have a representative of France accredited to them, 
but they were somewhat uncertain as to the proper 
manner of receiving him. So embarrassing -was the 
question that a special committee was appointed, which 
investigated the reception of foreign representatives 
with great care. They found that the proper form 
when an ambassador arrived was to have three mem- 
bers " wait upon him in a coach belonging to the 
states " and that " the person first named of the three 
shall return with the ambassador and his secretary in 
the coach " ; and on reaching the chamber of Congress 
he should be seated on a chair raised eighteen inches 
above the floor. Since Gerard was only a minister, he 
must be content to be waited on by two members and 
was not entitled to have his chair raised from the 
floor at all.^ 

Not until August 3 did Lee and Samuel Adams, 
as commissioners of Congress, formally notify Gerard 
that on the 6th, at noon, Congress would give him 
audience. On the morning of that day Lee and Adams 

1 Doniol, iii, 270. 

2 Journals of Confess, Ford's ed., July 17, 1778 ; Doniol, iii, 302. 



252 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

called on him, and mounted in a carriage, drawn by- 
six horses, they proceeded to the hall of Congress. 

There the minister was placed in a chair opposite 
the president. The thirty-two members of Congress 
were arranged in a half -circle around the room ; we 
are told that the chairs of the president and the min- 
ister were large and of equal size, while those of the 
other members of Congress were of modest proportions. 
Gerard presented his letters, which were first read in 
French, and the thirty-two members listened atten- 
tively, though few understood them. Afterwards an 
English translation was read. The minister was then 
formally presented and delivered his address stand- 
ing ; the president made his reply, also standing ; the 
minister saluted Congress and Congress saluted the 
minister, and the function was closed.^ 

As we have seen, if Gerard had been an ambas- 
sador instead of minister plenipotentiary, etiquette 
would have required a larger delegation for his es- 
cort, and that he should have read his address sitting. 
"Congress has somewhat confused notions," wrote 
Gerard, " concerning the dignity and etiquette befit- 
ting a sovereign state, but they desire no unnecessary 
ostentation and pomp." 

Marchant writes of the reception : " It was an im- 
portant day, . . . and I hope replete with lasting 
advantages to the United States in general and to the 
State of Rhode Island in particular. ... I think the 

^ A doggerel verse ran : — 

" From Lewis M. Gerard came 
To Congress in this town, sir ; 
They bowed to him and he to them, 
And then they all sat down, sir." 
Rivington's Gazette, Oct. 3, 1778. — See Frank Moore, Diary of the 
American Revolution, 607; Journals of Congress, Ford's ed., Aug. 6, 
n78:Doniol, Hi, 311-318. 



FRANCE SENDS A PLENIPOTENTIARY 253 

connection brought about by the hand of Heaven, and 
that thereupon it promises to be lasting." ^ 

A great dinner at the city tavern ended the day. 
Twenty-one patriotic toasts were drunk, to the boom- 
ing of cannon and to the reasonable exhilaration of 
those who joined in all of them. 

Gerard proved himself a useful representative 
for his government. He was judicious, discreet, and 
avoided any diplomatic entanglements. His reports 
on the country to which he was sent were not always 
laudatory, but they were reasonably accurate. He was 
in sympathy with Vergennes's resolve that no peace 
should be made until the independence of the United 
States was acknowledged, and to that end he was al- 
ways loyal. When the question of the western bound- 
aries arose later, though Gerard was guilty of no un- 
fairness to the Americans, his sympathies were more 
with Spain. He wrote Vergennes, advising him to en- 
courage Spain to get possession of whatever posts she 
could in the Mississippi Valley. He had told Con- 
gress that its persistence in an effort to establish its 
power on the Ohio, and the Illinois, and at Natchez 
would show an unfair spirit of conquest, that such an 
acquisition was absolutely foreign to the principles of 
the French and American alliance. He declared " that 
his King would not prolong the war one single day to 
secure to the United States the possessions which they 
coveted. . . . ]l^esides the extent of their territory 
already rendered a good administration difficult, and 
so enormous an increase would cause their immense 
empire to crumble under its own weight." ^ 

Nor was his sympathy any stronger for our fore- 

^ Staples, Ehode Island in the Continental Congress, 193. 
2 Doniol, iv, 72-75. 



254 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

fathers on the question of the fisheries. He was indeed 
content that the Americans should get what they could, 
but he did not feel that France was bound to pro- 
long the war in order to gain for its allies advantages 
which were not stipulated in the original treaty. But 
in this there was no cause for complaint. Gerard was 
the representative of France and not of the United 
States. His career was marked by courtesy, by regard 
for the obligations which France had undertaken, and 
by a sincere desire to assist the allies of France to bring 
their struggle for independence to a successful termi- 
nation.^ 

In September, 1779, Gerard was relieved from his 
position as minister to the United States, and returned 
to the French Department of State. He carried with 
him the good-will of those to whom he was accredited. 
Congress asked that his portrait might be placed in its 
halls, so that it should recall how much his constancy 
and zeal had contributed to the consolidation of the 
alliance and the prosperity of the two nations. The 
merchants of Philadelphia presented him an address. 
All joined in wishing him godspeed, and to this friendly 
greeting he was fairly entitled.^ He had done his work 
satisfactorily to his own government and with reason- 
able regard to the interests of the people of the United 
States. The most important part of the work was now 
accomplished. He was glad to return to his own laud, 
while La Luzerne assumed the positic^ of French min- 
ister at Philadelphia. 

C^sar Anne de La Luzerne arrived in Philadelj^hia 
September 21, 1779, but did not have his first audi- 
ence with Congress until the 17th of November. From 
that time until the end of the war he performed his 
1 Doniol, iv, chap. 3. 2 Doniol, iv, 209, 210. 



FRANCE SENDS A PLENIPOTENTIARY 265 

official duties faithfully, winning the esteem of the 
American people by the suavity of his manners and 
the discretion of his conduct. He tried to carry out 
the spirit of the alliance on principles of equity and 
reciprocal interests. He remained in the United 
States for five years, and was succeeded by Barbe- 
Marbois.^ 

1 Wharton, i, 423. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE FRENCH FLEET 

The French ministers had anticipated that a treaty 
with England's rebellious colonies would be followed 
by war with England, and in this expectation they 
were not disappointed. There was little delay in an- 
nouncing that France had thrown in her lot with the 
colonists ; indeed, it was impossible that such an alli- 
ance could long be kept secret ; the news had been 
officially communicated to Congress, and would soon 
return from across the Atlantic, even if any effort at 
concealment were made in Europe. Lord Stormont 
had been insistent in his inquii'ies as to the nego- 
tiations between France and the American commis- 
sioners, and though he had always received untruthful 
answers, he had not been deceived. 

The treaty had now been made, and Vergennes was 
willing that it should be known to all the world. On 
the 13th of March, the Marquis de Noailles, the am- 
bassador at London, received an order to convey to 
the English minister the important tidings. He per- 
formed his errand with alacrity. At four o'clock of 
the same day he waited upon Lord Weymouth, and 
read the official announcement of the treaty. The 
statement that his Majesty made public this act in 
pursuance of his resolution to cultivate good intelli- 
gence between France and England, and in the hope 
that the British sovereign would avoid anything that 
might disturb this harmony, could hardly have been 



THE FRENCH FLEET 257 

regarded as sincere. A private letter to the ambassa- 
dor expressed the more reasonable expectation that 
the declaration would excite not only surprise but 
effervescence.^ 

The effervescence was for the time repressed. 
Though "Weymouth could have been little surprised 
at this declaration, yet, if we may trust the account 
of the French minister, he was almost moved to tears 
, of wrath in listening to it.^ But he contented himself 
with saying he could make no reply until he had re- 
ceived the instructions of the King, his master. 

The instructions were brief and to the point. On 
March 14 a courier crossed the channel in hot haste, 
passed from Dover to Calais in less than three hours, 
with orders for Lord Stormont to demand his pass- 
port at once, without the formality of paying any 
farewell visits. On the 16th he left Paris ; he had 
issued invitations for a dinner on the following 
Thursday, but the guests were notified that their 
host could not have the pleasure of receiving them. 
Noailles was likewise recalled by his government, and 
left London forthwith. 

One benefit France at once obtained from the 
rupture. Under the humiliating terms of the last 
peace, an English representative was stationed at 
Dunkirk, charged with the duty of seeing that France 
did not seek to restore the fortifications of that place. 
This irritating condition was at once ended: by an 
order sent on the 19th of March, the English com- 
missioner was notified that his errand was closed, and 
Dunkirk was freed from foreign dictation.^ 

The treaty of alliance with the United States was 

1 Doniol, ii, 823-828. 

2 Letter of Noailles, March 15, 1778 ; Doniol, ii, 827, 828. 
8 Doniol, ii, 833. 



258 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

regarded both by France and by England as equiva- 
lent to a declaration of war, and yet some little time 
elapsed before the beginning of hostilities. The action 
of France excited bitter resentment in England, and 
quickened the war spirit even among those who had 
regarded with disapproval the treatment of the colo- 
nists by the home government. The dying protest of 
Chatham against the dismemberment of the British 
empire was incited by the hostile act of that nation 
whose pride he had done so much to lower. 

Though no collision had as yet occurred, the French 
prepared actively for a contest that was inevitable. 
The plan of an invasion of England, so often consid- 
ered and so seldom attempted, was discussed, and re- 
sulted only in talk. But on the 17th of June a frigate 
and sloop detached from the English fleet opened fire 
on the French frigate La Belle Poule cruising off 
Brest. The engagement began about six and, aided 
by the prolonged light of a June day, the frigates 
continued firing until nearly midnight. They were at 
close range and some forty men were killed. At last 
the firing was stopped by the darkness and the ships 
parted, not very seriously harmed.^ 

Meanwhile the French government had resolved to 
send a fleet to Amei-ica, which might render useful 
service, both in the United States and in the West 
Indies, The command of the expedition was intrusted 
to an officer who had achieved a moderate, though 
not a brilliant, reputation in the Old World, which 
he did not enhance by his exploits in the New. 

The Comte d'Estaing belonged to an ancient and 
honorable family. Some of its members sought to 
trace their pedigree to origins as illustrious as they 

^ Doniol, iii, 163. 



THE FRENCH FLEET 259 

were remote, and counted, among other ancestors, the 
last king of the Visigoths, who died in the eighth 
century. Without asserting any uncertain claims, the 
record of the family covered more than five centuries 
of faithful service and honorable position.^ The count 
who took part in our Revolution was born in 1729 at 
the Chateau of Ravel, a feudal castle of vast propor- 
tions, furnished with much luxury and commanding 
an extensive view over the surrounding country. The 
castle had been captured and sacked several times 
during the internal wars of France, and was again 
ravaged and many of its treasures were dispersed 
when it was seized as the property of a suspect in the 
year IV. 

The young d'Estaing entered the army when a lad 
of nine, and he was a colonel when nineteen. He 
served with merit in India, and after that he was for 
two years governor-general of San Domingo. His rule 
was not acceptable to those he governed. The resi- 
dents of the island complained of him as headstrong 
and passionate ; they said he had much zeal but little 
judgment; that he loved pomp and lost his temper; 
that his plans were vast, but his performance un- 
satisfactory.^ 

D'Estaing had passed middle life before he trans- 
ferred his activity from the land to the sea. Such 
changes were not uncommon in the French service, 
but it is doubtful if they were often judicious ; start- 
ing as cabin-boy is usually better training for an 
admiral than service on land, however long and 
honorable. 

The count was almost fifty years of age when he 

1 Doniol, iii, 197. 

2 Mini, de la chambre d' agriculture de Port-au-Prince ; Doniol, iii, 179. 



260 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

was given command of the fleet bound for New York. 
The generals and admirals whom Louis XVI sent 
over to America were, for the most part, men of ma- 
ture years. La Fayette was the only one holding an 
important command who still retained the enthusiasm 
of youth and its readiness to take great chances. 
D'Estaing showed in this expedition a deliberation 
and a prudence which were in keeping with his years, 
but were not calculated to secure brilliant results. 

On receiving his appointment he at once devoted 
himself to preparing a fleet for the expedition, and 
on April 13, 1778, twelve men-of-war and four fri- 
gates weighed anchor at Toulon. They encountered 
adverse weather and the ships were not in the best of 
order; thirty-five days were spent on the Mediterra- 
nean, and not until the 17th of May did they pass the 
Straits of Gibraltar and enter the Atlantic Ocean. 

The fleet had sailed under sealed orders, and on 
May 20, when they were well out in the Atlantic, 
these were opened and read by the ofiicers on the 
various ships. They contained a formal declaration of 
war against England. The fleet was directed to make 
prize of English ships wherever found, and, if the 
vessels should become separated, they were ordered to 
rendezvous at Boston. Cries of " Vive le roi ! " greeted 
the reading of these instructions ; the long-restrained 
hostility against Great Britain was at last to be grati- 
fied, and the prospect of an expedition to a remote 
part of the world, with the possibility of plunder and 
the certainty of excitement, was agreeable to all. A 
solemn mass was said on board the Languedoc, the 
admiral's flagship ; the officers were arrayed in their 
most splendid raiment, the vessel was covered with 
flags, the priest blessed their arms and prayed God to 



THE FRENCH FLEET 261 

send them victory over their enemies.^ The English, 
doubtless, were praying God with equal fervor to send 
victory to them. 

The instructions to d'Estaing, while leaving him a 
large liberty of action, bade him, before sailing to the 
West Indian islands, to perform " some action ad- 
vantageous to the Americans, glorious for the arms of 
the King, and fitted to show the protection which his 
Majesty extends to his allies." ^ The admiral discussed 
his plans at great length with Gerard, the minister to 
the United States, who accompanied him on the jour- 
ney. He gave utterance to many apothegms, both wise 
and epigranunatic. " Promptitude is the first quality," 
he wrote Gerard ; " to astonish the enemy is almost to 
have conquered them ; it is this which is desirable, 
which perhaps will be shown, and to reach which we 
shall surely do all that is possible. ... A combina- 
tion of rapid operations might overcome the ordinary- 
firmness of the British troops. . . . The least act of 
feebleness or timidity might be very fatal." The count 
then discussed at much length and with much vivacity 
the conduct to be pursued in the various contingencies 
of American warfare. 

Unfortunately, his apothegms were not fully carried 
into effect. As is often the case, the faculty of epi- 
grammatic utterance was not accompanied with efficient 
execution. Even before the fleet reached America 
it seemed doubtful whether the desires of the King 
would be gratified, and any result accomplished that 
would be advantageous to the Americans or glorious 
to the French arms. The time occupied by the journey 
was lamentably long ; the vessels were of unequal 
speed, and the rapid sailers had to delay on account 

1 Journal de campagne du Langnedoc ; Doniol, iii, 233. 

2 Doniol, iii, 238. 



262 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

of their slower companions. Moreover, the admiral 
could not resist making captures, and the pursuit of 
stray merchantmen occupied much valuable time. 
D'Estaing also occasionally exercised his fleet in 
maritime evolutions in mid-ocean. These may have 
been valuable as practice, but they occupied hours 
that could have been better employed. As a result of 
all this, it was not until July 7, eighty-five days after 
they had left Toulon, that the French fleet anchored 
at the mouth of the Delaware.^ It was short of water, 
short of provisions, and, what was still worse, it was 
too late for the destined prey. It had been hoped that 
d'Estaing would surprise and defeat Lord Howe's 
squadron ; but two weeks before his arrival, the Eng- 
lish evacuated Philadelphia and Lord Howe sailed 
tranquilly to New York City. 

D'Estaing reported his arrival to Washington in a 
letter couched in the ardent terms which the French 
always used in reference to the American commander- 
in-chief, and which expressed a sincere admiration, 
that was still further augmented in the yeaxs during 
which they were his companions in arms. Intrusted 
by his King, said the admiral, with exhibiting his 
affection for his American allies, the pleasure was in- 
creased by the prospect of serving with the American 
commander. " The talents and great achievements of 
George Washington," he added, " have secured him 
in all Europe the truly sublime title of the liberator 
of America."^ 

As a result of the long cruise the fleet was in great 
need of provisions. Some officers were sent to Phila- 
delphia to ask for supplies ; they received from Con- 
gress good words but little else. " It is impossible to 
1 Doniol, iii, 189. 2 Letter of Aug. 8, 1778 ; Doniol, iii, 322. 



THE FRENCH FLEET 263 

show more good-will," Gerard wrote, "... but their 
resources are almost nothing." ^ 

An officer visited Washington at his camp, and 
reported his reception in favorable terms. " I was 
weighed down with politeness," he stated. Washing- 
ton at once wrote, expressing his pleasure that the 
command of the fleet had been given to one so recom- 
mended by talent, by experience, and by reputation 
as the Comte d'Estaing. The American general was 
quite the equal of French courtiers and diplomats 
in the skill with which he bestowed courteous and 
honeyed phrases. 

As Howe had already escaped, nothing remained 
but to sail to New York in pursuit of him. The 
French fleet reached Sandy Hook ; at a little distance 
they could see the Union Jacks floating at the Eng- 
lish mast-heads, with some appearance of disorder 
about the ships, which had made a hasty retreat. It 
was expected that the fleet under Admiral Byron 
would soon come to Howe's relief, but the French 
were unable to pursue liim farther and attempt his 
destruction. At Sandy Hook they encountered insur- 
mountable obstacles. The French ships were large 
and clumsy, some of them drew twenty-three feet of 
water, and over the bar at that time such vessels could 
not pass. D'Estaing offered one hundred and fifty 
thousand francs to the pilots if they could bring his 
fleet into the bay, but they either could not or would 
not.^ Possibly the pilots were Tories, and had little 

1 Gerard to Vergennes, Aug. 18, 1778 ; Doniol, iii, 323. 

2 The bay -would allow only vessels drawing seventeen feet or less 
to pass. — Barras to Rocliambeau, Aug. 12, 1781 ; Doniol, v, 522. 

The reports on file at Washington show that there has always been 
from 22 to 24 feet of water over the bar at low tide and five feet more 
at high tide. 



264 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

heart in the cause; but if they were correct in stating 
that no vessel could pass drawing more than seventeen 
feet, it would have been disastrous to make the at- 
tempt. 

As it was impossible to enter the New York har- 
bor, d'Estaing now sailed on to Rhode Island, in the 
hope of capturing the English force at Newport. If 
this enterprise had been successful, it would have been 
of considerable importance. The garrison consisted of 
nearly six thousand men, and its capture, following 
the surrender of Burgoyne, and shedding lustre upon 
the first appearance of the French in the war, might 
have hastened the termination. There seemed to be 
good reason for anticipating a successful result; 
Washington was to keep the English stationed at 
New York in check ; General Sullivan was placed in 
command of the forces in Rhode Island, supposed to 
be ten thousand strong, and it was expected that he 
would cooperate with the French fleet in capturing 
the English army. 

The arrival of the French fleet filled La Fayette 
with delight, and his letters to d'Estaing combined 
youthful enthusiasm with vigorous animosity towards 
England. " I love to think," he wrote the admiral, 
" that you will give the first blow to an insolent na- 
tion, for I am sure you will appreciate the pleasure 
of humiliating it and that you know it sufficiently to 
hate it. . . . May you begin the great work of de- 
struction which will put their nation at the feet of 
ours. May you do them as much harm as they wish 
to do us." ^ 

Washington showed his appreciation of La Fay- 
ette's good work by giving him command of a detach- 

1 Doniol, iii, 324. 



THE FRENCH FLEET 265 

ment which was to join Sullivan and cooperate in the 
capture of Newport. La Fayette's attachment to the 
Americans did not prevent his observing their peculi- 
arities. " You must find it ridiculous to see me a sort 
of general officer," he wrote, speaking of his new com- 
mand. " I confess it makes me laugh myself, and that 
in a country where there is not as much laughter as 
in ours." ^ He hoped that some of the French soldiers 
might also be placed under his orders; to see his com- 
patriots and his brothers of America serving together 
under his command was, he said, his dearest dream.^ 

On his arrival with his command, he at once re- 
ported to the French admiral. The situation in which 
he met his compatriots was somewhat grotesque. Nom- 
inally he was a deserter from the French army, hav- 
ing come to America in defiance of the orders of his 
government. The order was still in force, directing 
any French vessel to arrest the fugitive marquis and 
return him to France. But in the mean time, tlie na- 
tion had followed w^here the marquis had led ; he was 
now at the head of a detachment of American troops, 
ready to cooperate with a French fleet in an attack on 
the common enemy. When he visited the flagship he 
was received with due honors, and the order for his 
arrest was regarded as abrogated by the progress of 
events. 

The movement against Newport which promised so 
well resulted only in disappointment and recrimina- 
tion. If the forces on land and sea had been handled 
with skill, and the attack made at the earliest possible 
moment, it might have been attended by success ; but 
the progress of events was very different. For the de- 
lays that occurred, the French admiral does not seem 
1 Doniol, iii, 336. 2 Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., i, 429. 



266 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

to blame ; the responsibility rested, perhaps, solely on 
the lamentable condition of the American army. On 
the 29th of July the French fleet came to anchor op- 
posite Newport. It was intended that Sullivan with 
his forces should land on the island, under the pro- 
tection of the French guns; the French ships would 
then force their way up the channel and assist in the 
capture of the town. Unfortunately, the American 
army, in Sullivan's judgment, was not ready to com- 
mence the attack. Washington had sent two thousand 
Continentals under the command of La Fayette, but 
the rest of Sullivan's army was to be made up by mili- 
tia from the New England States, and the militia were 
not on hand. 

" Sullivan's soldiers," said d'Estaing, " are still at 
home "; and they showed no haste toleave.^ " Do not 
trust the figures," a Frenchman already in the United 
States wrote to the admiral ; " the figures have no 
reality. Three thousand to-day will be three hundred 
to-morrow. Certainly the number on paper will be 
double the number in the field." 

In fact, Sullivan seems to have displayed the quali- 
ties of a Fourth of July orator rather than of an effi- 
cient commander. As he had had much experience in 
politics and little in warfare, this perhaps was not 
strange. The men under his command, for the most 
part, were not regular soldiers, and it was difficult to 
fit them promptly for efficient work. If their com- 
mander drilled them but little, he gave them much 
praise. He expected to have his army ready for the 
advance on August 12, and on the 11th he issued what 
was justly called a "patriotic general order." He was 
happy, so he said, " to find himself at the head of an 
1 Doniol, iii, 449. 



THE FRENCH FLEET 267 

array actuated by a sacred regard for the principles 
of their country, and fired with just resentments 
against those barbarians who have deluged their coun- 
try with innocent blood. . . . The prospect before 
us is now exceeding promising. The several corps 
have everything to animate and press them on to vic- 
tory." The general himself did not yield to his sol- 
diers in courage or patriotism, for he adds : " The 
general assures his brave army that he shares with 
them every danger and fatigue, and is ready to ven- 
ture his life in every instance where his country calls 
for it." 

"A noble spirit of patriotism," so ran another gen- 
eral order, "brought numbers of brave men on the 
ground, whose particular interest loudly called for their 
presence at home." The general wishes, he continues, 
" to do everything in his power to forward the return 
of those brave men to their respective families and 
business, for which reason he exhorts every one to use 
their best endeavors to make the siege as short as 
possible." 

Unfortunately, militiamen collected as were the 
forces under Sullivan, however brave and patriotic, 
were a very uncertain element. He was unwilling to 
begin the attack until the troops for which he hojDed 
had assembled, and thus time went by. The days that 
were consumed, as d'Estaing truthfully said, "were 
those most favorable ones, the precious moments of the 
arrival, when all are astonished, and most frequently 
no one resists." ^ Nine days passed before Sullivan 
was ready to move, and when he was ready the fateful 
moment had gone by. 

On the 8th of August the French ships forced their 
1 Doniol, iii, 337. 



268 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

way up the middle passage, and on the next morning 
a large force was landed on Conanicut Island. But on 
the 9th Howe made his appearance off Newport with 
thirteen men-of-war and seven frigates, and the situa- 
tion at once changed. The French were unwilling to 
remain in the harbor with the chance of being taken 
at a disadvantage. Accordingly, they started to force 
their way past the English batteries and gain the open 
sea. In this they succeeded, but the noise of the artil- 
lery informed Howe of the movement, and as the 
French boats one after another came out from the 
inner bay, he forthwith weighed anchor and sailed for 
New York. 

At a little after eleven o'clock of the morning of 
the 10th, d'Estaing's ships were in the open sea and 
the signal to give chase was at once raised. There 
was little wind at first, but it freshened, and it was 
soon evident that the French could overtake the 
fugitives. Late in the afternoon they were up with 
the rear division ; but in the mean time the wind had 
been growing stronger, by six it was blowing a gale, 
and the weather was so thick that the fleets lost sight 
of each other. The misfortunes of the French had 
only begun ; the gale continued, and at half-past 
three in the morning the masts of the Languedoc 
went down with a tremendous crash, and the rudder 
also gave way. The flagship was now helpless and in 
great peril. All the 12th the storm continued, and 
not until the 13th did it begin to abate. The French 
ships slowly gathered ; the Languedoc, though she 
had not been shipwrecked, was helpless, and the 
Marseillais was in little better shape. The English 
had escaped, and with two of their best ships dis- 
mantled, the French were now in no condition to meet 



THE FRENCH FLEET 269 

them.* Some of the officers desired to proceed at once 
to Boston, but d'Estaing had promised Sullivan that 
he would return, and on the 20th of August the 
damaged fleet sailed ingloriously to Newport, severely- 
battered by the storm and in great need of repairs. 

Sullivan was now eager to attempt the capture of 
Newport, and demanded the assistance of the French; 
but d'Estaing and his officers felt that they could un- 
dertake nothing until the ships were put in shape for 
service. The English fleet might reappear at any 
time and the French ships would be almost helpless 
before them. There was nothing to do, so they de- 
cided, but to sail forthwith to Boston and have the 
needed repairs made. The decision was prudent, but 
it was unfortunate. La Fayette told the admiral of the 
unfavorable effect such a movement would have, but 
d'Estaing said he had no right to risk the destruction 
of the King's fleet, and on the 21st he set sail for 
Boston. 

The wrath of the Americans was even fiercer than 
La Fayette had anticipated, and it was expressed with 
impolitic frankness. Sullivan had shown little mili- 
tary skill in the campaign, but he manifested much 
vigor as a polemic. An order of the day,^ signed not 
only by Sullivan but by many of his subordinates, 
declared that the departure of the squadron was in- 
jurious to French honor, contrary to the King's inten- 
tions and to the interests of the United States, and 
harmful to the alliance between the two peoples. 
Articles of a similar tone appeared in the news- 

1 Journal de eampagiie du Languedoc ; Doniol, iii, 374. D'Estaing 
to Laurens; Doniol, iii, 384—392. 

2 T. C. Amory, Military Services and Public Life of John Sullivan, 
77. 



270 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

papers; where officers in the service indulged in such 
expressions, restraint was not apt to be found among 
irresponsible journalists. The situation was grave 
enough at best, and this outburst of vituperation 
bade fair to make it much worse. La Fayette was 
summoned to the council at which the resolutions 
were adopted, but he left in great dudgeon when he 
discovered the object of the conference. Resolved 
that their views should be known, Laurens sailed to 
Boston in pursuit of d'Estaing, and there on his own 
ship presented him in person with the offensive doc- 
ument.* 

Naturally, this outburst of ill-will had its effect at 
Boston. The air was full of abuse of the French, the 
mob was hostile, and there were some disagreeable 
scenes. In a riot in the town, two officers of the 
French fleet were dangerously wounded, and one died 
from his injuries. The situation was now serious. 
Such an incident as this might result in an open 
breach between the United States and the ally of 
whose assistance they stood in such need. The au- 
thorities at Boston, naturally, were much disturbed 
by the death of the French officer. The City Council 
proposed to give him a public funeral, but his asso- 
ciates wisely thought that the less publicity given to 
the matter the better, and he was buried without 
parade at a private chapel. 

There was the possibility that this unfortunate 
affair might have more serious results than the fail- 
ure to capture Newport. Not only might the French 
feel ill affected towards an alliance in which thus far 
they had gained no glory, but an affront openly of- 
fered to the French admiral and his command might 
* Doniol, iii, 351. 



THE FRENCH FLEET 271 

result in a refusal to aid further an ally that repaid 
assistance by insult. No one realized these possibili- 
ties more keenly than Washington. He realized also 
that the aid of France was indispensable to American 
success, and he at once exerted himself to restore 
harmony. He wrote General Heath, exhorting him to 
see that the French received all proper assistance and 
courtesy at Boston. To La Fayette he sent an assur- 
ance of his appreciation of d'Estaing's services, 
while to Sullivan, the chief offender, he sent a letter 
expressed with the courtesy in which he never failed, 
but calculated to calm Sullivan's wrath and point out 
the indiscretion of his conduct. Congress acted with 
equally good judgment. Sullivan had communicated 
his complaint to that body. Gerard asked that it be 
not made public, and this was at once agreed to. 
Steuben was sent to Sullivan to assist in extricating 
him from the difficulties in which his intemperate 
speech had involved him. 

D'Estaing received this outburst with entire calm- 
ness. He answered Sullivan, defending his own con- 
duct and saying it was impossible that the ships should 
now assist in the attack on Newport ; but in order to 
show his own zeal in the cause, he offered to lead the 
soldiers under his command by land, to report to Sul- 
livan and serve under his orders. In his report of this 
transaction to the Secretary of the Navy, he writes : 
" I desire that there shall not be a single man in 
America who does not love the French. ... I have 
offered to become a colonel of infantry, under the 
command of one who, three years ago, was a lawyer, 
and who certainly must have been an uncomfortable 
person to his clients." ^ To Washington he wrote that 

1 Doniol, iii, 363. 



272 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

he wished to show the French were not offended by 
hasty expressions of untimely zeal, and that he him- 
self would always remain one of the most devoted and 
faithful servants of the United States. 

He was not required to serve as a colonel under a 
general who had been so lately studying Blackstone 
instead of Vauban. Sullivan had already withdrawn 
his forces, and the British garrison had been so rein- 
forced that it was now useless to attempt their cap- 
ture. But harmony was restored; if Sullivan was not 
placated, he was silenced. Washington wrote d'Es- 
taing thanking him for his services, and regretting 
that an accident which human wisdom could not avert 
had prevented the success of sagaciously formed plans. 

The restoration of harmony was not followed by 
any important results. The repairs to the ships were 
completed, but d'Estaing did not attempt further 
action. The fleet was needed in the West Indies, and 
his orders were to proceed there, after having accom- 
plished something in the United States. It must be 
confessed that he had not accomplished much, except 
perhaps to divert the attention oif the English and 
keep them from new undertakings. But he was not 
unwilling to leave a field of action in which he had 
met with much annoyance and reaped tio glory. 

On November 4 the French fleet sailed for the 
West Indies. It encountered bad weather and many 
of the ships were more or less injured, and not until 
December 9 did they come to anchor in the bay of 
Port Royal. 

The campaign carried on in the West Indies had 
no special effect on the progress of the war. D'Es- 
taing was a man of much bravery and of some energy, 
but he could not handle ships with the skill of one 



THE FRENCH FLEET 273 

whose life had been spent on the sea. Little was 
accomplished for some months. D'Estaing certainly 
did not overestimate his successes, and he was never 
afraid to tell the truth about himself. He wrote home 
in January, 1779, that he had gone from one misfor- 
tune to another, and the King's squadron had not even 
been able to retake St. Lucia. " If I do not entirely 
succumb under the weight of misfortune which has 
characterized the events of this ruinous campaign, I 
am none the less filled with extreme regret not to 
have been more useful in the service of the King."^ 

In the summer of 1779 he was somewhat more for- 
tunate. The French captured Grenada and St. Vin- 
cent, and d'Estaing defeated the English under Lord 
Byron, who was by no means as great an admiral as 
his nephew was poet. Even then d'Estaing was criti- 
cized, and perhaps justly, because he did not utilize 
his victory to the utmost ; apparently, if he had pos- 
sessed greater talent as a sailor, he might have de- 
stroyed the English fleet. " If he had possessed as 
much sea-craft as bravery," wrote an officer, " we 
would not have allowed four disabled vessels to make 
their escape." 

He now made a second attempt to cooperate with 
the American troops, but it was attended with no 
more success than his luckless expedition to Rhode 
Island in the preceding year. His assistance was ear- 
nestly demanded in the southern states. Georgia was 
largely in the hands of the English, and South Caro- 
lina was in great peril. General Lincoln and the 
French consul at Charleston wrote to d'Estaing, ask- 
ing for aid, and to these appeals he decided to yield. 
" The news which I find at San Domingo," he wrote 

1 Doniol, iv, 130. 



274 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR ^ 

the French Minister of Marine, " shows much tjioAex- 
tainty as to the constancy of the Americans.*^f we 
only go there and show ourselves, this will produce 
an effect which I believe will be of the greatest 
importance." 

Before this. Congress had made a request that 
d'Estaing should send part of his fleet to the Georgia 
coast.^ He was then unwilling to do this, and proposed 
instead an expedition to capture Halifax and New- 
foundland. This was submitted to Washington, and 
he, with his usual good judgment, discouraged the 
plan, and advised that d'P^staing should act in the 
South and afterwards turn his attention to New York. 
The condition in the South was bad and there was 
sore need of aid. "Never," wrote the Marquis de Br^- 
tigny from South Carolina, "was this country in more 
need of succor. It is necessary to defend it against its 
enemies and against itself. All is in lamentable con- 
fusion, few regular troops, no assistance from the 
North, a feeble and ill-disciplined militia, and a great 
lack of harmony among the leaders." ^ 

This account of conditions in the South was not 
overdrawn, and d'Estaing acted with good spirit in 
endeavoring to aid his allies. But he still clung to his 
plans of conquering Newfoundland, and he wrote in 
a manner that indicated somewhat hazy notions of the 
distances and of the difficulties of the task. " If pos- 
sible we will enter at Charleston, and then we will sail 
up as far as Newfoundland." ' 

On the 16th of August, 1779, d'Estaing sailed for 

1 Doniol, iv, 128-129. 

2 Br^tigny to d'Estaing, July 17, 1779 ; Doniol, iv, 297. 

' Archives Maritimes, Aug. 21, 1779; cited by the Vicomte de 
Noailles, Marins et soldats franqais en Amdrique, pendant la guerre, 
etc. 



THE FRENCH FLEET 275 

the United States at the head of a fleet of some forty- 
ships, carrying about four thousand soldiers. On the 
first of September the expedition came to anchor sear 
the mouth of the River St. John's in Florida, and on 
the following; day it suffered severely from one of the 
storms which infest that coast. As a result of the 
losses sustained by the fleet, d'Estaing decided to 
abandon the thought of an expedition farther north, 
and to confine his activities to assisting in an attack 
on Savannah, which was defended by a small garrison 
of English under the command of General Prevost. 
" The damage done my ships," he wrote the minister, 
" has imposed on me the melancholy necessity of act- 
ing where I should not and did not wish to act." 

Notwithstanding this unfavorable opinion, good re- 
sults might have been hoped from the cooperation of 
the French with the American army, but they were 
not realized. The vessels that were in condition to 
proceed with the cruise anchored near the mouth of 
the Savannah on September 8.^ The French took 
possession of Tybee Island, but they could make lit- 
tle progress in a maze of creeks and marshes, and 
after some fruitless efforts the fleet sailed south to 
the mouth of the Ossabaw. There, during the night 
of September 11, some fifteen hundred men disem- 
barked. The weather was bad, the soldiers had brought 
with them rations for only three days, and provisions 
became scarce ; they had little ammunition and no tents, 
and there for six days they remained, suffering from 
a never-ending rain, in a position where, if the enemy 
had known of their plight, they might have been 
attacked with great advantage. At last the weather 
cleared and the disembarkment was finished ; but 

1 The Siege of Savannah in 1779 (C. C. Jones, Jr., trans.), 13. 



276 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

d'Estaing was able to land in all only about thirty- 
three hundred men, and with these he joined the 
American army under General Lincoln, some eighteen 
hundred strong, and advanced toward Savannah. 

D'Estaing sent a formal summons to the English 
commander, asking him to surrender, and giving him 
twelve hours to consider the proposition.^ It probably 
would have been wiser if he had made no demand, 
but had at once attempted an assault of the town. 
Prevost had only a few hundred men under his com- 
mand, but during the delay he received reinforcements 
to the number of eighteen hundred. He thereupon 
notified the French commander " that though we can- 
not look upon our post as absolutely impregnable, yet 
... it may and ought to be defended." ^ , 

The entire force of the allies taking part in the 
siege was about six thousand, of whom two thirds were 
French, and they largely exceeded the numbers of the 
garrison, even after it was reinforced. But the defence 
was stout, and the assailants encountered obstacles of 
every kind. Savannah was encircled by creeks, streams, 
and marshes, over which any advance was slow and dif- 
ficult. The French boats attempted to cooperate in the 
attack, but some of them ran aground and they could 
accomplish little. An active bombardment was carried 
on ; many of the houses in the city were burned, but 
the intrenchments were of earth and suffered little 
damage. In the mean time provisions were running 
low, and the time was approaching when the French 
must rejoin their fleet and sail for home. There was 
nothing to do but abandon the siege or attempt to 
carry the city by storm, and d'Estaing decided on the 

1 C. C. Jones, Jr., History of Georgia, ii, 379. 

2 Ibid., 383. 



THE FRENCH FLEET 277 

latter course. At midnight of October 9 the allies 
began their march, in the hope of surprising the Eng- 
lish garrison ; but the English were prepared, while 
the eagerness of some of the French to be among the 
foremost resulted in considerable disorder. The at- 
tack was characterized by much gallantry and no suc- 
cess. The French lost over six hundred in killed and 
wounded, a considerable portion of their small army. 
The American loss was less than half that of the 
French, but among those killed was General Pulaski, 
one of the best of the foreign volunteers who came to 
assist the cause of American independence. D'Estaing 
himself was severely wounded, and upon his assistant, 
Colonel Dillon, devolved the melancholy duty of re- 
embarking the French troops and sailing ingloriously 
away.^ 

During this unsuccessful attempt, those left on board 
the ships fared almost as ill as their companions on 
land. Food was scanty and good water lacking. The 
scurvy raged with such violence that an officer of the 
fleet declared that on an average thirty-five men who 
had died from disease were committed to the sea each 
day. " We could not relieve our poor sailors," he says, 
"wanting coats, destitute of linen, without shoes, and 
absolutely naked. . . . The bread . . . was so much 
decayed and worm-eaten . . . that even the domestic 
animals on board would not eat it. . . . Behold," he 
adds, " a part of the frightful picture of the cruel and 
miserable condition of our crews during . . . the siege 
of Savannah." ^ 

Even if we allow for exaggeration, the conditions 

1 Journal dn Si^g^e de Savannah ; Doniol, iv, 303-307. The Siege 
of Savannah in 1779 (C. C. Jones, Jr., trans.), 28-39. 

2 Ibid., 62. 



278 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

were very bad, and the expedition was a melancholy 
failure. It is hard to say to what extent this was due 
to bad judgment, and to what extent it was due to bad 
luck ; the result was the same. 

The Americans retreated to Charleston, and on 
October 28 the French fleet sailed away. "The pre- 
cautions and sagacious arrangements employed by the 
officers," says the official report, " are the highest praise 
of their zeal and their talents." Doubtless this was 
so; but the second attempt at cooperation between the 
French and their American allies had resulted, not 
merely in accomplishing nothing, but in actual defeat. 
To end this unlucky campaign, a violent storm caused 
the loss of several of the French ships with all on 
board. 

If the result was unfortunate, at least there was 
harmony between the allies. D'Estaing had failed in 
his efforts, but all recognized the zeal and courage 
with which he had come to the aid of the American 
cause. No one, wrote General Lincoln, could doubt 
that the Comte d'Estaing had the interests of America 
at heart. He had shown it in coming to our aid, by 
his endeavor to take Savannah by storm, and by the 
bravery with which he had led his troops to the as- 
sault ; he could find consolation for his wounds and his 
reverses in the assurance that America appreciated his 
efforts, and his merit was not obscured by his misfor- 
tune.^ With the consolation derived from such tributes 
the unfortunate count was forced to be content; he 
returned to the West Indies and was shortly succeeded 
in command by the Comte de Grasse. 

D'Estaing took no further part in the war. Like so 
many others who served in the American Revolution, 

1 Doniol, iv, 265. 



THE FRENCH FLEET 279 

he was to meet a sad end in the revolution of his own 
country. In 1787 he was a member of the Assembly 
of Notables, and he was afterward a deputy to the 
States-General. He was a friend of the revolutionaiy 
cause, and proved his zeal by enlisting as a grenadier 
in the Parisian Guards. But his service was found 
insufficient by those who distrusted all aristocrats. In 
due time he was imprisoned at Sainte-Pelagie, and 
brought to trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal. 
There his rank and early associations were enough to 
secure his condemnation, and on April 28, 1794, he 
died upon the scaffold. 



CHAPTER XV 

LA FAYETTE TO THE EESCUE 

The unfortunate result of the expedition conducted 
by d'Estaing added to the discouragement which was 
now widespread in the country. For almost two years 
the colonists had been allied with a great European 
power, and yet the situation of affairs seemed worse 
at the end of that period than at the beginning. Eng- 
land was apparently no nearer acknowledging the 
independence of the United States in the fall of 1779 
than she was in the spring of 1778. Indeed, our alli- 
ance with France had inspired the English with a cer- 
tain amount of new zeal in the war against us. Those 
who had been reluctant to make war on their own 
colonists, speaking the same language and allied in 
blood and race, were stirred to fresh ardor when the 
war was against France, the ancient and immemorial 
enemy of England. 

The confident hopes excited among the American 
patriots by the announcement of the French alliance 
in the spring of 1778 had by no means been fulfilled. 
The expedition against Newport had accomplished 
nothing, the endeavor to capture Savannah had ended 
in defeat, conditions in the South had been so bad as 
to induce d'Estaing to go to their aid : they were ren- 
dered worse by the failure of his efforts. The years 
1778 and 1779 were perhaps the most disheartening 
of the war. France as an ally, instead of bringing 
speedy victory, seemed less valuable than when she 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 281 

was furnishing secret aid. Sucli an opinion was indeed 
unfair. If Newport had not been captured, at least the 
enemy had been kept from undertakings which might 
have proved fatal to the American cause. Though the 
English had made large gains in the South, conditions 
in the North remained practically unchanged. 

In one respect, however, it might be argued that the 
French alliance worked actual harm. Five years had 
passed since the first blood was shed at Lexington. 
With the long continuance of the war had come a 
weariness of the sacrifices that were required for its 
vigorous prosecution. The states furnished neither 
the men nor the money that Congress demanded and 
Washington needed, and when the French alliance was 
announced, many were willing to believe that a rich 
kingdom like France would now supply whatever was 
wanted; she had great armies and strong fleets and 
much wealth, with which she could insure the success 
of her ally, and there was little need for further exer- 
tion. Zeal for the cause had been lacking before the 
French alliance, and it was no more active after it ; 
the duration of the war and increasing disturbances 
from a disordered currency made it more difficult to 
furnish pecuniary aid, and it became harder for Con- 
gress to obtain the support that was necessary to carry 
on the struggle. Thus the situation after five years of 
warfare was far from satisfactory, and patriotic men 
still doubted what the end would be. 

It was a critical period in the history of the war, 
and the most sanguine patriot might fear that unless 
efficacious aid were soon furnished, the American 
Revolution would end as an unsuccessful rebellion. 
When the surrender of Burgoyne was followed by the 
French alliance, American patriots hoped that the war 



282 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

would be brought to a speedy and successful termina- 
tion. These hopes had been by no means realized; 
though the English had won no notable victories, the 
ability of the colonists to persist in their resistance 
seemed more questionable in 1780 than in 1778. 

Financial evils were the most serious, and in this 
respect conditions could hardly have been worse. No 
other nation has increased in wealth with the rapidity 
of the United States ; no people ever began its na- 
tional existence with less promise of financial wisdom. 
In the printing-press our ancestors placed their hopes, 
and its free use brought the country to a condition 
of business anarchy. The financial enormities of the 
French Revolution were as great, and a worthless cur- 
rency depreciated with the same rapidity, but an ex- 
traordinary outburst of popular enthusiasm, controlled 
by men as full of vigor as they were lacking in scru- 
ple, enabled France to carry on war with success. 

In America conditions were different : lack of funds 
and the inability to raise money by taxation threat- 
ened to disband the army and disrupt the government; 
and had it not been for the money advanced by France, 
it is hard to see how such a disaster could have been 
averted. At the beginning of 1780 a dollar of Conti- 
nental money was worth only two cents, and this worth- 
less currency was practically the only asset with which 
Congress was to carry on the war. The condition 
seemed the more hopeless because public men still 
clung to the printing-press as a source of revenue, and 
charged the state of affairs to the misconduct of those 
who were unwilling to receive the paper, instead of to 
the folly of those who issued it. 

When a bushel of corn sold for one hundred and 
fifty dollars and a suit of clothes for two thousand, it 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 283 

■was evident that an army could not be supported, nor 
could business be transacted under such conditions. 
To some extent, men in their ordinary affairs could 
resort to the primary usages of barter, but the sol- 
diers had nothing with which to barter. When an army 
is partially unfed, largely unclothed, and wholly un- 
paid, its dissolution is imminent. Such was the condi- 
tion of the force under Washington ; the shadow of an 
army that remained, so he wrote, had no motive save 
patriotism to continue in the service, and no hope of 
better things. "If either the temper or the I'esources 
of the country will not admit of an alteration, we may 
expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating condition 
of seeing the cause of America in America upheld 
by foreign arms." When Congress could not pay a 
courier to carry important despatches to the general- 
in-chief, it was evident that the cause of America in 
America could be upheld only by foreign money. ^ 

In May, 1779, Washington wrote that the rapid 
depreciation of the currency, the extinction of public 
spirit, the want of harmony in council, and the de- 
clining zeal among the people were symptoms of the 
most alarming nature, and he added, " If the enemy 
have it in their power to press us hard this campaign, 
I know not what may be the consequence. Our army 
as it now stands is little more than the skeleton of an 
army." 2 « I have no scruple," he writes a little later, 
"in declaring to you that I have never yet seen the 
time in which our affairs in my opinion were at so low 
an ebb as at the present." And in July he writes that, 
except four hundred recruits from Massachusetts, he 

1 Report, La Luzerne, April 1, 1*780 ; Doniol, iv, 345. 

2 Letter of May 8, 1779 ; Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed,, vi, 



284 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

had received no reinforcements since the last cam- 
paign.^ 

While such was the condition of our army and our 
treasury, La Fayette did work for his American 
friends at Versailles quite as* valuable as any service 
which he rendered on American battlefields. In Octo- 
ber, 1778, after the failure of the attempt to capture 
Newport, the marquis asked for a furlough to return 
to his own land. He hoped to serve again in the Ameri- 
can army ; but now that his country was at war with 
England, he wished to see what part might be assigned 
to him in the struggle. Both Washington and the Con- 
gress expressed with entire sincerity their apprecia- 
tion of the services which La Fayette had rendered. 
Congress, in extending a leave of absence, gave him 
a vote of thanks, and directed that a sword should 
be presented to him by our minister at Versailles.^ 
Washington wrote of the many evidences of La Fay- 
ette's zeal and ardor, and expressed his own very par- 
ticular friendship for one who combined the fire of 
youth with uncommon maturity of judgment. All 
these words of commendation were well deserved. La 
Fayette had not only shown himself a brave officer, — 
of such there is always an abundance, — but he had 
manifested an extraordinary combination of unselfish- 
ness, zeal, and good judgment. Coming a stranger to 
a strange land, given an important command while 
still under twenty-one, the French minister could 
write without exaggeration that La Fayette's conduct 
had made him the idol of Congress, of the army, and 
of the people. 

In January, 1779, he sailed for home, and escaping 

^ Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed., vi, 312. 
2 Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., ii, 41, 43. 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 285 

the dangers of capture by the English and the perils 
of an attempted mutiny on his own vessel, on Febru- 
ary 12 he reached Brest in safety. He at once made 
his way to Paris ; but while he returned as a trium- 
phant hero, he returned also as a disobedient officer. 
He had left France in defiance of the King's orders, 
and of this offence he was still unpurged. There was 
indeed no reason to anticipate a severe sentence upon 
a youth who came back crowned with laurels, when 
his own country had followed his example and en- 
listed in the cause of American liberty. But he was 
forbidden to appear publicly at Versailles, and was to 
regard himself as in prison at the residence of his 
father-in-law at the Hotel de Noailles. Imprisonment 
in this charming home, adored by his family and flat- 
tered by his friends, was not a rigorous ordeal, and 
after a week of such punishment he was allowed to 
visit Versailles and present himself to the sovereign.^ 

The arrival of La Fayette increased the enthusiasm 
for the American cause among the class to which he 
belonged. Even Marie Antoinette bade him visit her 
and tell her the news about "our good Americans, 
our dear republicans." The young marquis enjoyed 
the two things most dear to him, assisting a good 
cause in which he sincerely believed, and receiving an 
unlimited amount of popular applause. 

The enthusiasm with which La Fayette was greeted 
upon his return to Paris did not make him forget his 
American friends ; he was constant in season and out 
of season in soliciting the ministry to continue with 
vigor the war against England. He had left France 
two years before, a young man unknown to fame, 
owing to his wealth and social position his only claim 
^ Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., ii, 56, 57. 



286 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

to be listened to in matters of political importance. 
He was still very young, but be was now a man of 
mark. He bad received tbe public tbanks of tbe Amer- 
ican Congress, be had been bonored by tbe closest 
confidence of tbe American general-in-cbief . Tbe in- 
terest wbicb bad been excited by bis departure, tbe 
enthusiasm wbicb bis conduct bad aroused in France, 
tbe courage, tbe devotion, and tbe singularly good 
judgment wbicb be bad displayed in America, made 
bim on bis return a man witb wbom tbe minister must 
consult in any projects relating to tbe American colo- 
nies. His letters sbow tbe zeal with which he utilized 
his favorable position. To Washington he wrote, after 
lamenting the enormous distance that separated him 
from his dearest friend, that he was occupying him- 
self witb getting money from the French government. 
"I have been so insistent that the superintendent of 
finance fears me as he would the devil himself. . . . 
To serve America, my dear General, is for me an in- 
expressible happiness. . . . What would render me 
the most happy of men would be to rejoin tbe Ameri- 
can banners, and put under your orders a division of 
four or five thousand of my own compatriots." ^ 

His letters to the President of Congress also show 
the manner in which he utilized his influence at court 
for the benefit of bis friends. " I shall always regard 
the interests of America as my principal affair while I 
am in Europe. All the confidence of the King and the 
ministers, all my popularity among my compatriots, 
all of tbe means of which I can dispose . . . , will be 
employed in a cause so dear to my heart." ^ 

1 La Fayette to Washington, June 12, 1779 ; Lafayette, Mimoiresy 
etc. (1837), ii, 62, 64. 

2 June 12, 1779 ; Ibid., 55. 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 287 

With amiable but unwearied pertinacity, La Fayette 
continued his labors in behalf of the American cause. 
He lamented that the cost of a fete at Versailles was 
enough to equip the American army, and he was ac- 
cused, justly enough, with being ready to strip the 
palace in order to buy clothing for American soldiers. 
" I suppose the expense of this is a million of livres," 
he writes of a great illumination when home on a visit. 
" As much as I respect this country, particularly the 
King and the royal family, I could not help reflecting 
how many families in another country would this tal- 
low make happy for life ; how many privateers would 
this tallow fit out for chasing away the Jerseymen and 
making reprisals on Messieurs les Anglais." 

The illuminations were not abandoned, the tallow 
still continued to light the halls of Versailles and was 
not used to equip privateers, Marie Antoinette would 
not give up her balls, nor the King sell his furniture 
to aid the American cause, and yet the labors of La 
Fayette were by no means unproductive. He persisted 
in his demands that more aid should be given the 
new republic, both by furnishing supplies and money 
and by preparing for further hostilities. His demands 
to some extent were answered. 

The enterprise to which the attention of the French 
government was first given resulted indeed in no ad- 
vantage either to France or her allies. Plans for an 
invasion of England have allured French statesmen 
and generals from a remote period, and the fact that 
from the days of William the Norman no such enter- 
prise has met with any large degree of success has not 
disturbed the hopefulness of the Gallic mind. 

The proposed invasion of England met the decided 
approval of Spain. Whether Spanish statesmen were 



288 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

naturally inclined to favor this plan because at was 
unwise, or for whatever reason, they expressed their 
desire to cooperate with the French in landing an 
army on British soil. An invasion of England was 
accordingly planned, and this was not a mere scheme 
of the Cabinet ; troops were gathered, ships equipped, 
and commanders chosen. La Fayette was promised a 
command of some importance, and he was filled with 
delight at the prospect. He wrote Vergennes : " The 
idea of seeing England humiliated, annihilated, makes 
me tremble with joy. . . . Judge then if I am eager 
to know whether I shall be the first to arrive on that 
coast, the first to plant the French flag in the midst 
of that insolent nation." ^ 

During all the summer of 1779 troops were drilling, 
ships preparing, and soldiers gathering for the expedi- 
tion. The chief command was intrusted to the Comte 
de Vaux ; he was ordered to assemble his forces at 
Havre and St. Malo, and from there sail to England, 
land his army, and proceed to the invasion of perfidi- 
ous Albion.^ The count came and went from Havre 
and St. Malo. La Fayette was feverishly active, now 
at Havre and now at Paris, but still the expedition 
did not set sail. Though the Spanish had been eager 
for the invasion, when the time for action came they 
were not ready. A convoy was sent to meet them at 
Cape Finisterre, but when, after two months' waiting, 
the Spanish ships at last arrived, they were in much 
need of repair and ill fitted for the expedition. But 
the combined fleet now numbered sixty-six ships of 
the line, and it sailed up the Channel, exciting a mild 
alarm at Plymouth and along the English coast. 

1 La Fayette to Vergennes, June 10, 1779 ; Doniol, iv, 291. 

2 Doniol, iv, 294. 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 289 

La Fayette found the thought that the French flag 
now floated over English roadsteads a delicious morsel 
for his pride. ^ It was the only enjoyment he was to ob- 
tain from this abortive expedition, and he had no op- 
portunity to plant the French flag in the midst of that 
insolent nation. The condition of the French ships was 
better than that of the Spanish, but still the work of 
preparation had been very imperfect. A violent wind 
scattered the fleet, many of the ships were out of water 
and provisions, and they sailed back to Brest with a 
sick-list of nearly half the men on board. The storms 
of autumn now began, and the health of the soldiers 
grew no better. In October it was decided to abandon 
the expedition. Itwas justly described by Rochambeau, 
who was "assigned to a command in it, as an exceed- 
ingly expensive and an exceedingly ill-arranged enter- 
prise. 

Yet the money expended in this foolish project was 
not altogether wasted, for it led the French to under- 
take the expedition which resulted in the capture of 
Yorktown. The decision of the French government to 
send not only a fleet, but a considerable force of sol- 
diers, to cooperate with the American army was in large 
degree due to La Fayette. In July, 1779, he submitted 
a carefully prepared plan for the assistance of their 
American allies,^ — for a new expedition, to consist 
not merely of ships, but of land forces, which should 
act in cooperation with Washington ; the plan con- 
tained in substance the project which was put into ef- 
fect a year later under the command of Rochambeau. 
This was submitted to the ministers ; it received the ap- 

1 Doniol, iv, 243. 

2 Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed., vii,479; Tower, The Mar- 
quis de Lafayette, etc., ii, 499. 



290 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

proval of Vergennes, and even of the aged and infirm 
Maurepas. La Fayette not only asked that these re- 
inforcements should be sent, but he insisted that they 
should depart, at the latest, by the following spring. 

In the summer of 1779 the French were absorbed 
in their plans of English invasion, but when the fail- 
ure of that project was admitted. La Fayette's request 
for a new expedition to America was seriously con- 
sidered. Such an enterprise was attended by a good 
deal of embarrassment. It was not only that the cost 
was large, that there were serious difficulties in send- 
ing several thousand men across the Atlantic, exposed 
both to the perils of the sea and to the vigilance of 
English men-of-war, but it was not certain that assist- 
ance in this form would be agreeable to the Ameri- 
cans, or that French soldiers could cooperate success- 
fully with the American army. The expedition led by 
d'Estaing in 1778 had not been productive of advantage 
to the common cause. The French troops finally sailed 
away from America, having accomplished nothing ex- 
cept to create discontent, the unseemly expression of 
which was only checked by Washington's prudent 
counsel. To place several thousand French soldiers on 
American soil might lead to complications that would 
destroy the alliance instead of insuring its success. 

La Fayette himself, who knew better than any other 
Frenchman the condition of American feeling, was 
somewhat apprehensive of the effects that might be pro- 
duced by the presence of a French army. The Ameri- 
cans had asked for money, for supplies, and for ships, 
but they had not been zealous in requesting the assist- 
ance of French soldiers. When Adams heard of the 
proposed expedition, he wrote to Vergennes, insist- 
ing that a French fleet should remain in American 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 291 

waters, but stating his belief that on land the colo- 
nists were quite capable of dealing with the English 
forces. There was always a possibility of misunder- 
standings between two armies of different nationalities, 
differing in speech, faith, and customs.* Some of the 
Americans had complained openly of the conduct of 
their French allies, and some of the French officers, 
if they made no open complaint, sent to the French 
minister unfavorable comments on the American sol- 
diers and the American people. 

The unfortunate expedition of 1778 had bred a 
good deal of discontent on both sides : the French 
thought that they had done all in their power for 
helpless allies, and had received as their only reward 
ingratitude and unfriendly criticism; many of the 
Americans declared that their French allies might 
have done much and had done little, and they were 
more inclined to find fault than to return thanks. 

Vergennes's zeal in the cause of the insurgents had 
perhaps cooled a little. The war in America had not 
met with the prompt success that had been hoped, 
and the count felt that the Americans were inclined 
to rely too much on French aid and did too little for 
their own salvation; he complained that the burden 
of the struggle was cast on France, and that her ally's 
appeals for help were becoming excessive. It was ap- 
parent to him, also, as to all, that the average ability 
in Congress was less than it had been four years 
before. " There are," Vergennes wrote his represent- 
ative in Spain, " poor heads and dishonest hearts to 
be found in Congress." 

The quarrels between different factions of Con- 
gress were known at Paris, and their importance was 

1 Works of John Adams, vii, 220-226. 



292 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

perhaps exaggerated, while the open and unseemly 
wrangling between the representatives of America in 
Europe was only too familiar. La Fayette was as 
much distressed by these bickerings as the most 
zealous American patriot. "Nothing injures our in- 
terests ... so much," he wrote the President of 
Congress, " as these stories from which it is supposed 
that there are disputes and divisions among the 
Whigs." And he wrote with more frankness to Wash- 
ington: "There is a very important subject which 
demands all your influence and all your popularity. 
For the love of God prevent these clamorous quarrels, 
the account of which does more harm than anything 
else to the interests and the reputation of America." * 
While La Fa3^ette recognized the delicacy of the 
situation, yet he felt that the assistance of a French 
army was indispensable to American success, and he 
was confident that with proper precautions the danger 
of complications could be avoided. He thought there 
would be least danger of misunderstanding between 
the allies if he were himself given the command of 
the French reinforcements. This aspiring young man 
was not coy in his demands for important position, 
but he was quite justified in this request. His service 
in the United States had displayed considerable mili- 
tary ability; what was of still more importance, he 
had the entire confidence of Washington, he was by 
far the most popular of the foreigners who had come 
to our aid, he had shown tact in dealing with a 
strange people in a strange land, and by his enthusi- 
asm and his unselfish zeal for the cause had gained 
the sincere affection of the American people. 

^ Lafayette, Mimoires, etc., ii, 62 ; Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, 
etc., ii, 73. 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 293 

" I agree with you," he wrote Vergennes, " as to 
a certain distrust that can be remarked in our Amer- 
ican allies . . . but if to-morrow the King would send 
me with a French detachment ... I would wager 
all most dear to me, not only that the troops would 
be well received, but that their union with the Conti- 
nental army would be of great service." * And he 
added that though Franklin was not authorized to ask 
that troops be sent, he greatly desired it. 

In this La Fayette was correct ; yet while the 
American government asked much from France, they 
did not formally request the aid which was to prove 
most valuable of all. Franklin had instructions to 
ask for money but not to ask for troops. There were 
good patriots, La Fayette said, who feared that such 
assistance might increase too much their obligations 
to France. Moreover, the marquis recognized a trait 
which has always been strong in the people of this 
country. " It is in the American character," he wrote, 
" to hope that when three months have passed, they 
will no longer be in need of anything." 

Un discouraged by such obstacles, La Fayette con- 
tinued his efforts in behalf of his American friends. 
The proposition which he submitted in the summer of 
1779 had been approved by the ministry, even if not 
formally sanctioned. Since then, not only had the 
project of English invasion proved abortive, but news 
now came of the disastrous failure of d'Estaing's ex- 
pedition against Savannah. Yet this lack of success 
did not lead to rejection of La Fayette's requests ; it 
rather impressed upon the French ministry the neces- 
sity for some vigorous action. 

In January, 1780, La Fayette submitted to Mau- 
1 Doniol, iv, 272. 



294 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

repas an elaborate paper, in -which he declared that 
the dangerous successes of the English in the South 
and the unsatisfactory conditions in the North ren- 
dered it necessary to send at once a French army to 
Washington's assistance. There were two objections 
raised, said the marquis : one, that their American 
allies lacked the resolution and courage to act with 
the necessary vigor, and the other, that the presence 
of French soldiers might breed jealousy and dispute. 
The first, he declared, his own experience in America 
enabled him to refute ; and as for the second, if the 
command could be given to him, they would escape 
even the shadow of jealousy or strife.^ 

There is no doubt that this was true, and the selec- 
tion of La Fayette as commander of the French ex- 
pedition seemed the natural course for the French to 
pursue. But he was still a very young man, with a 
modest position in the French army; to j^lace him over 
officers of longer service and higher rank was sure to 
be distasteful, and it was decided that he should not 
command the forces to be sent to America. No com- 
mander could have brought the expedition to a more 
successful conclusion than did Rochambeau, yet there 
is no reason to think it would not have achieved the 
same success had La Fayette been at its head. But if 
the French government did not satisfy his ambition, 
they were ready to gratify his zeal for the cause of his 
American friends. In February, 1780, the momentous 
decision was reached, and it was decided to send a 
French army to the relief of the United States. 

Though the command was not given to La Fayette, 
no mistake was made in the selection of a leader for 
the forces to be sent to America. The Comte de Ro- 
1 La Fayette to Maurepas, Jan. 25, 1780; Doniol, iv, 308, 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 295 

chambeau had been chosen for an important command, 
in the proposed invasion of England. He had there no 
opportunity to reap glory, and he expressed his just 
disapproval of the folly with which the Minister of 
Marine made his arrangements for that enterprise, 
and of the prodigality with which he expended money 
to no avail. Eochambeau had already had a consider- 
able career, though on the expedition on which he was 
now sent rests his permanent fame. He was born in 
1725, a member of a good French family. As he was 
the second son and his health was delicate, it was de- 
cided to make a priest of him. He was first placed in 
a college of the Oratory, and was there exposed to 
dangers more serious than threatened him during the 
years of his service as a soldier. The fathers of the 
Oratory were strongly suspected of the damnable 
heresy of Jansenism, and the Bishop of Blois, friend of 
Rochambeau's family, interfered to save the youth from 
the spiritual perils to which he was exposed. He car- 
ried the lad away from the Oratory, a brand snatched 
from the burning, and put him in a Jesuit school at 
Blois. In this pious work he was assisted by the Abb^ 
Beaumont, who afterwards became Archbishop of 
Paris, and showed his Christian zeal by refusing to 
allow the sacrament to be administered to dying Jan- 
senists. 

But it was not Rochambeau's fate to become a 
Jesuit priest ; when he was about to receive the ton- 
sure, his elder brother died. The good bishop, who 
had saved him from the Jansenists, now told him that 
his duty was to serve his country with the same zeal 
that he would have shown in the service of God. 
Accordingly young Rochambeau left the college, and 
when only sixteen, like many another young French 



296 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

noble, he began his career as a soldier. He obtained 
a commission in the cavalry in December, 1741, and 
served during the War of the Austrian Succession 
with credit. 

He served throughout the Seven Years' War, al- 
ways acquitting himself as a good soldier and rising 
steadily in rank, though he performed no startling 
feats of arms. After the peace he was made a major- 
general and received the grand cross of the Order of 
Saint Louis, an honor bestowed for faithful and gal- 
lant service. In 1780 he was made a lieutenant-gen- 
eral, and was given command of the army which the 
King was to send to the relief of his American allies. 
He was then a man of past fifty-five. He had less than 
La Fayette of the fire of youth, but he had the sound 
judgment which comes as a result of years of active 
service. 

'It is proof of La Fayette's loyal zeal that he was 
more interested in obtaining an army for his allies 
than in obtaining for himself the position of its com- 
mander. If he was disappointed in his hopes, he acqui- 
esced with the cheerfulness that endeared him to his 
associates. He was not backward in asking, but he al- 
ways accepted the duty assigned without sulking, and 
performed his work with diligence. Even if he was 
not to command the French army, the reputation he 
had won secured him a prominent part in the future 
campaign. If the command was not given him, he 
asked that he should be sent to announce to Wash- 
ington the assurance of aid, and to resume his position 
in the American army. 

This request was granted. As soon as the expedi- 
tion was decided upon, La Fayette was ordered to re- 
turn to America in order to announce the important 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 297 

news, and to incite the Americans to an active coop- 
eration, that would secure to them the utmost advan- 
tage from the assistance France was about to extend. 
He was to inform Washington that the French King 
would shortly send to him six ships of the line and six 
thousand soldiers. They were to be placed under his 
command ; it would be for him to decide in what man- 
ner they could most profitably be used ; the King's 
only desire, said the instruction, "is that the troops 
which he sends to the succor of his allies . . . shall 
cooperate effectively to deliver them for all time from 
the yoke and tyranny of the English." 

"While the French soldiers were placed wholly at 
Washington's disposal, yet, with a certain pathos he 
was asked to watch them with care and to spill no 
unnecessary blood. The well-known humanity of Gen- 
eral Washington, concluded the instruction, "makes 
it certain that he will have specially in care the pre- 
servation of a body of brave men, sent more than a 
thousand leagues to the rescue of his country. Though 
ready to undertake anything for the safety of Amer- 
ica, they should not be sacrificed rashly nor lightly." ^ 

The progress of the war increased the respect in 
which Washington was held in Europe, and lessened 
the esteem bestowed upon Congress. The French aux- 
iliaries were to be entirely under Washington's orders, 
and to him La Fayette was to report. The French de- 
sired that even the pecuniary assistance they were to 
render should be placed within Washington's control, 
in order that from it the best results might be ob- 
tained. It was announced that the money granted by 
the French King this year for the purchase of sup- 
plies, must be drawn on orders from General Wash- 

1 Instruction and Project, March 5, 1780; Doniol, iv, 314-320. 



298 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ington ; only after representations from Franklin that 
such a procedure would be contrary to all the usages 
of his government, were the officials of Congress 
again intrusted with handling the funds. 

The Hermione was directed to convey the marquis 
on his important mission, and the captain was ordered 
to render all the attention due to so distinguished a 
passenger. " I shall have for M. le Marquis de La 
Fayette," said the polite captain, "all the regard and 
respect which are not only directed by your orders, 
but dictated by my own heart, for a man whose ac- 
tions have inspired me with the strongest desire to 
know him." ^ 

A favorable wind seconded the captain's zeal, and 
on March 14, 1780, the Hermione sailed from La 
Rochelle carrying La Fayette and his momentous se- 
cret. Duplicates of the papers intrusted to him had 
been sent to the French ambassador at Philadelphia, 
to be used in the contingency, by no means improba- 
ble, of the capture of the marquis by some English 
cruiser. But the good fortune which deserted La Fay- 
ette in his late career still attended his youth. The 
voyage of the Hermione was prosperous, and on April 
28 she came to anchor in Boston harbor. 

There the marquis received new proofs of the affec- 
tion which the colonists felt for one who had labored 
so indefatigably in their behalf. On the 28th he landed 
at Hancock's Wharf, where he was met by a proces- 
sion of soldiers and escorted to the governor's mansion. 
He then visited the Legislature, where he was received 
with many honors, and in the evening there was gen- 
eral rejoicing in the town. Such a reception, in a for- 
eign city, would be gratifying to any one, and popular 
. 1 Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette, etc., ii, 93. 



LA FAYETTE TO THE RESCUE 299 

applause was especially dear to La Fayette. He wrote 
Vergenues that the warmth of his reception and the 
inexpressible marks of kindness which the American 
people bestowed upon him increased, if possible, his 
ardor in their cause. ^ 

He soon left the enthusiastic Bostonians and made 
his way to Washington's headquarters, where he ar- 
rived on May 10. He then visited Congress, and that 
body passed resolutions, commending the disinterested 
zeal and persevering attachment of so gallant and 
meritorious an officer. He was at once assigned to the 
command of two thousand men, a considerable force, 
when the entire army of the general-in-chief did not 
exceed six thousand. 

La Fayette always displayed an extreme liberality 
to his soldiers; he possessed amiable virtues which 
made him, if not one of the greatest, yet certainly 
one of the most lovable of men. In France he had 
purchased with his own money a large stock of cloth- 
ing and arms which he now distributed among his 
command. A good coat and a whole pair of shoes were 
usually a mark of distinction for a Continental sol- 
dier, and La Fayette's corps were the best-dressed 
men in the army. 

1 La Fayette to Vergenues, May 2, 1780 ; Doniol, iv, 351. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 

In the mean time preparations for the expedition 
that was to go to the relief of Washington's army were 
carried on in France with vigor. The French govern- 
ment was not a military machine that worked with the 
efficiency of the administration of Frederick II, and 
yet, with many delays and disappointments, something 
was accomplished. At first it had been proposed that 
an army of four thousand men should be sent out 
under Rochambeau ; but when he accepted the com- 
mand, he justly remonstrated at the smallness of the 
force. " I accept with the liveliest gratitude," wrote the 
count, " the mark of confidence with which his Majesty 
has honored me, . . . but yet I venture to suggest, . . . 
that a body of four thousand men is soon reduced." 
It might well happen, he added, that one third of 
those engaged should be lost in a single engagement. 
At the battles of Laufeldt, Crevelt, and Klostercamp, 
he had lost two thirds of the men under his command, 
and such a contest in America would leave the re- 
mainder of the force in sorry shape. A body of twelve 
battalions, or six thousand men, he wrote the minister, 
would allow one third to act in the reserve, and though 
the Americans had asked for only four thousand men, 
an increase in the number furnished would naturally 
fill them with the liveliest gratitude.* 

These suggestions were favorably received, and it 

^ Rochambeau to the King ; Doniol, v, 313. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 301 

was decided to increase the force to eight thousand; 
but this wise resolution was not entirely carried into 
effect. In fitting out the expedition for America, as 
with the proposed invasion of England, the ineffi- 
ciency of the naval department was manifest. " The 
watch of M. de Sartine is always slow," said Choiseul 
of the Minister of the Marine. The required number 
of soldiers gathered at Brest with commendable de- 
spatch, but though the men were ready, the boats on 
which they should sail were lacking. 

The Spanish might have furnished some aid, but 
they were not inclined to do so. When the resolution 
to send an army to America was communicated to Ma- 
drid, the Spanish ministers manifested a strong desire 
to have the expedition sent to the southern states, 
where it might assist Spain in her designs on Florida. 
Vergennes did not receive this suggestion kindly. The 
war against England in Europe was conducted on 
lines by which Spain hoped to gain some advantage, 
and a large force was occupied in the siege of Gibral- 
tar ; but in America the French minister resolved to 
furnish aid where it would be most advantageous to 
their American allies. The Spanish, therefore, viewed 
the expedition with indifference, and the French naval 
department found it impossible to get together a suf- 
ficient number of transports. Seventy-six hundred sol- 
diers were at Brest ready to depart for America, but 
only five thousand five hundred actually sailed under 
Rochambeau, and this was entirely due, wrote one' of 
those who took part in the expedition, " to the negli- 
gence and incompetency which attend everything in 
this country." ^ 

^ April 4, 1780 ; Diary and Correspondence of Count Fersen, relat- 
ing to the Court of France (translated by Miss Wormeley), 22. 



302 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The situation was urgent : America needed aid, and 
delay would increase the danger of an attack from the 
English fleet. Instead of waiting indefinitely for boats 
for all the men, it was decided to sail promptly with 
as many as could be carried. Rochambeau had in- 
tended taking horses enough to mount a small body 
of cavalry, but this plan had to be abandoned ; even 
his own horses he left behind. Not a horse shall be 
taken, he wrote : " It is with the greatest regret that 
I separate from two war-horses that I can never re- 
place, but I do not wish to reproach myself that they 
are occupying the room of twenty men, who otherwise 
might have embarked." ^ 

The supplies occupied a large amount of space ; 
there was little certainty of obtaining on the other side 
the articles necessary for the comfort and the effi- 
ciency of the men ; munitions of war, clothes, tents, 
supplies of every sort had to be carried with them. 
The soldiers en route for our country were provided 
with everything necessary for their sustenance and 
comfort, with the same care that would now be shown 
in an expedition about to start for Central Africa. 
Especial attention had to be given to a sufficient pro- 
vision of money ; this required as careful attention as 
if the army were to embark for a land whose only cur- 
rency was beads and cotton cloths, and indeed the 
currency system of our forefathers was not far supe- 
rior to that which now prevails in Uganda. Ameri- 
can paper money, wrote Rochambeau, had fallen into 
such disrepute that they must carry French coin to 
pay the men and to purchase supplies. Everything 
which the French army needed they must buy ; and 
the count added, with just prevision, that for all they 

^ Rochambeau to Montbarey, March 27, 1780 ; Doniol, v, 331. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 803 

bought in America they would be obliged to pay good 
prices.^ The expedition was a costly one, and nearly 
eight million livres were at once advanced for its 
needs. 

While Rochambeau desired to sail as soon as possible 
with the men who could embark in the transports, he 
fully expected that a second detachment would speed- 
ily follow and furnish him with the number of soldiers 
that he had asked and had been promised. In this 
expectation he was doomed to be disappointed, and 
the second detachment of his army never crossed the 
Atlantic. 

In all about fifty-five hundred soldiers sailed, whose 
fortune it was to cooperate in the capture of York- 
town and assist in the establishment of American in- 
dependence. They were divided into four regiments: 
Bourbonnais, Soissonnais, Saintonge, and Royal Deux- 
Ponts. The names of the commanding officers show 
that members of the most ancient and illustrious 
French families took part in the struggle of Ameri- 
can backwoodsmen for independence. Of the first 
regiment the colonel was the Marquis de Laval-Mont- 
morenc}^ and the Vicomte de Rochambeau lieutenant- 
colonel ; the Comte de Saint-Maime was colonel of 
the Soissonnais regiment, and the Vicomte de Noailles 
lieutenant-colonel ; the Saintonge was commanded by 
the Comte de Custine and the Comte de Charlus ; of the 
Royal Deux-Ponts the Comte Christian Deux-Ponts 
was colonel and the Vicomte Guillaume Deux-Ponts 
was lieutenant-colonel. In addition to this was the Le- 
gion of Lauzun, consisting of six hundred men, under 
the Due de Lauzun, amember of one of the greatest 
French families, and a man whose reputation for 
^ Eochambeau to Montbarey ; Doniol, t, 315. 



304 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

gallantry in love affairs gave him preeminence among 
the beaux and libertines of the time. Such follies did 
not prevent his being a brave and efficient soldier, 
and during two years in America he not only ac- 
quitted himself as a good officer, but conducted him- 
self with as much discretion as if he had been a 
descendant of a governor of Massachusetts instead of 
a favorite of Louis XIV. The Vicomte d'Arrot and 
the Comte Dillon served under him, and the fleet was 
commanded by Admiral Ternay, an officer of long 
and honorable service.^ 

There was much complaint from those assigned to 
the second division, when at the last moment they 
found that they were to be left behind. The young 
French officers were eager for an opportunity for 
distinction, and those who could not embark were 
bitterly disappointed. Many efforts were made to ob- 
tain an assignment which would secure passage with 
the first division, but for the most part they were in 
vain. " These poor young men," wrote Rochambeau, 
" are very much interested and they are in despair, 
but the Chevalier Ternay literally does not know 
where he can put them." 

In April the men were on board and ten ships of 
war and thirty convoys were ready to sail, bearing 
the soldiers, equipment, and provisions. On the 12th, 
Rochambeau wrote that as soon as the weather cleared 
and the north wind blew they would be under way. 
But there was tedious delay waiting for fair weather. 
Not until the first of May was the wind favorable, 
and in the mean time the soldiers wearied of their 
long detention on board ship and the number of sick 
was considerable. At last a start was made from 

* Les Combattants Fr anqais, eto., edited by H. M.4ro\i, passim. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCUAMBEAU 305 

Brest, and on May 3 Rochambeau wrote from his 
ship : " We are sailing by a fair northeast wind . . . 
and traversing the gulf in the very weather we could 
desire." 

This favorable condition did not long continue. A 
violent storm scattered the fleet, but they gathei'ed 
without loss, while the same storm drove into port the 
English fleet under Admiral Graves, which was in- 
tended to check the expedition. Graves was unable 
to sail again for two weeks, and in the mean time, 
favored at last by fair winds and undisturbed by the 
English fleet, the French ships made their way slowly 
but safely, sailing well to the south and by the 
Azores, in the hope that the good weather would re- 
main with them, — a hope that was not disappointed. 

On June 5, five English ships were in sight, but 
Ternay did not wish to delay his progress by seeking 
any adventures on the way. " This occasion showed 
how little taste the commander had for chasing and 
pursuing vessels one might meet," a disappointed 
officer entered on his log ; " it is a great misfortune." 
In this the officer was probably mistaken ; the voyage 
was long and perilous at best, and Ternay was re- 
solved it should not be made longer by any pursuit of 
prizes. On June 11 a sloop was taken, sailing from 
Halifax, and by this capture they got a cargo of cod- 
fish. On the 18th they took a cutter, with no cod, but 
with the unwelcome news that the English had cap- 
tured Charleston and taken four thousand prisoners. 
On the 20th the fleet was south of Bermuda, and there 
they fell in with some English men-of-war and had a 
mild engagement. If Ternay had been more adven- 
turous he might have captured one of the English 
ships, but he allowed her to escape and proceeded on 



306 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

his way.^ On the 4th of July the French were opposite 
Chesapeake Bay and saw a fleet of eleven sail, mer- 
chant-ships under convoy. Greatly to the disgust of 
some of his followers, Ternay declined to pursue them, 
and on July 11, after a voyage of seventy days, the 
entire French fleet anchored safely off Rhode Island. 
Admiral Ternay had performed his duty with vigi- 
lance and ability and with commendable caution; a 
few days later it would have been possible for the 
English fleet to interpose a stout resistance; as it 
was, the French soldiers disembarked at Rhode Island 
as peacefully as if they had been landing at Brest. 

As soon as the French troops were safely landed, 
Rochambeau reported their arrival to. the commander- 
in-chief. " My master's orders," he wrote Washington 
on July 12, " place me at the disposal of your excel- 
lency. I am arrived full of submission and zeal, and 
of veneration for yourself and for the talents you 
have shown in sustaining a war that will be forever 
memorable." ^ 

On the whole, the French troops reached this side 
in good condition, though the tedious waiting at Brest 
and ten weeks spent on the Atlantic had resulted in a 
long sick-roll. But no serious malady had shown itself, 
and Rochambeau reported that a three weeks' rest in 
their comfortable quarters at Rhode Island would put 
the army in condition for service. General Heath met 
the French with a thousand men, to insure them a safe 
landing ; as there was no opposition the American con- 
tingent was soon allowed to return, but in the mean 
time the officers met in what General Heath affably 
called " happy fraternity." The friendly intercourse 

1 Doniol, V, 342. 

2 Rochambeau to Washington, July 12, 1780 ; Doniol, v, 348. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 307 

of soldiers and citizens and the social functions which 
greeted the new arrivals afforded, so a newspaper de- 
clared in the sounding periods in which journals of 
that day indulged, " a pleasing prospect of the future 
felicity and grandeur of this country, in alliance with 
the most polite, powerful and generous nation in the 
world." 

Both the officers and men of Rochambeau's com- 
mand conducted themselves with a discretion which 
healed old grievances and prepared the way for ef- 
fective cooperation. " The French officers of every 
rank," says a correspondent, " have made themselves 
agreeable by that politeness which characterizes the 
French nation." Polite our guests certainl}' were, and 
yet, by a most judicious respect for American social 
usages, they did not attempt to be too polite. This 
was the peril most to be apprehended, but the officers 
recognized how broad a gulf at that pei-iod divided the 
social life of Paris and Newport. The Due de Lauzun, 
if we may credit current reports or unauthentic auto- 
biography, had in France made love to almost every 
woman he met. In Newport he was quartered for the 
winter with Mrs. Deborah Hunter. He was keen 
enough to recognize the difference between Mrs. Hun- 
ter and Madame du Barry. 

The citizens of Newport celebrated the arrival of 
the French fleet with proper festivities. On July 11 
all the houses in certain streets were directed to be 
illuminated, and such other homes as the abilities of 
the inhabitants would permit, and these illuminations 
were to be continued until ten of the evening, which 
was then a late hour for the residents. With laudable 
prudence. Job Easton, Rob Taylor, and some others, 
were appointed a committee to prevent damage from 



308 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

fire and to preserve the peace of the town. Newspapers 
had a small circulation, and therefore this resolution 
of the council was made known to the citizens by beat 
of drum. To assist those who were ordered to illu- 
minate, but were too poor to furnish lights, the coun- 
cil directed that in such case the lighting should be at 
the public expense; but, with a judicious thrift charac- 
teristic of our forefathers and little practised in mod- 
ern city governments, the treasurer was ordered to buy 
one box of candles which must answer the needs of 
all.* If the celebration was economical, it was accept- 
able to our guests, and many social entertainments 
and balls were given by the French officers and their 
American hosts. The Due de Lauzun gave a great 
ball, and so did the officers of the Royal Deux-Ponts, 
and dinners were a frequent mode of entertainment. 

The appearance of the French regiments was suffi- 
ciently gay to furnish pleasure to the Newport of to- 
day, and was a rare spectacle for the Newport of the 
eighteenth century. The dress of officers and men bore 
little resemblance to the ragged regimentals of the 
American army. The uniform of the Deux-Ponts was 
white ; Saintonge white and green ; Bourbonnais black 
and red. All wore cocked hats and their hair was care- 
fully done up in pigtails. The regiment of Soissonnais 
was especially picturesque, with rose-colored facings 
to their coats, and grenadier caps adorned with white 
and rose-colored plumes. The artillery were dressed 
in blue with red facings. 

These well-equipped and well-drilled regiments ex- 
cited confident hopes of victory in the hearts of Ameri- 
can patriots, while the officers, as charming in man- 
ners as they were in dress, the representatives of 
^ Magazine of American History, iii, 4.33. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 309 

ancient names and historic titles, excited admiration, 
or even stronger feelings, among the American ladies. 
There were no multi-millionaires at Newport, few- 
Americans had visited France, and French counts, 
dukes, and princes were new elements in American 
society. The French nobility of to-day has lost its 
ancient power, much of its social prominence, and 
almost all of its ancient wealth, yet its members are 
often attractive to young ladies far more experienced 
in society than the Newport belles of 1778. 

Variety was furnished by the visit of a band of In- 
dians. The French were always adroit in dealing with 
the Indians, and these warriors, mostly Oneidas and 
Tuscaroras, were much pleased by their reception. 
General Heath also entertained them, and he says 
with satisfaction that he gave them a " sumptuous 
feast " ; the Indians showed their appreciation by 
performing a war dance, which perhaps pleased the 
French officers as much as the general's dinner.^ 

Some of the Indians who had visited Rochambeau 
at Newport went to West Point, and Dr. Thacher 
describes them in terms which expressed the views of 
nine tenths of the New England men of that period. 
"The army was paraded to be reviewed by General 
Washington accompanied by a number of Indian 
chiefs. His Excellency, mounted on his noble bay 
charger, rode in front. . . . Six Indian chiefs fol- 
lowed in his train, appearing as the most disgusting 
and contemptible of the human race ; . . . dressed in 
a miserable Indian habit ; some with a dirty blanket 
over the shoulders, and others almost naked. . . . 
These bipeds could not refrain from the indulgence 

1 Memoirs of Gen. William Heath, written by himself ; Aug. 29, 
1780. 



310 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

of their appetites for rum on this occasion, and some 
of them fell from their horses on their return to head- 
quarters." ^ Admiration for the noble red man is 
modern. 

The social intercourse between the Americans and 
their new allies was agreeable, but it was not for din- 
ners and balls, nor to enjoy the smiles of Newport 
belles, that an army of over five thousand men had 
been sent across the Atlantic. As soon as the soldiers 
had fairly recovered from the fatigues and discomforts 
of their journey, the question of the action to be taken 
against the English occupied the attention of their 
leaders. Another French fleet had come to America, 
but had sailed away, having accomplished no impor- 
tant work, sowing discontent rather than gratitude 
among those it came to aid. Such a result for the sec- 
ond expedition was as much dreaded by Rochambeau 
as by Washington, and yet almost a year elapsed be- 
fore the French army took any active part in the war. 

It seemed possible at first that some slight shadow 
of pique and misunderstanding — the evil which the 
French ministers had feared when considering the ex- 
pedition — might hinder its usefulness. Washington 
reposed the fullest confidence in La Fayette, and it 
was natural that he should especially rely upon the 
marquis in dealing with his own coimtrymen, but La 
Fayette's eagerness led him to manifest a zeal that, 
if not undue, was perhaps unfortunate. 

A movement against New York naturally suggested 
itself as the most desirable that could be undertaken. 
" It seems to me," La Fayette wrote to Rochambeau 
and Ternay, "that New York is in every respect an 

1 James Thacher, A Military Journal, during the Revolutionary 
TTar/Sept. 13,1780. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 311 

object preferable to any other. This city is the pivot 
on which turn the operations of the enemy, and upon 
which rest any hopes which the King of England can 
still entertain. ... In a word, it is clear that an 
expedition against New York would be the most 
glorious and the most advantageous to France and 
America, the most desired by the two nations, and, in 
a certain sense, the only one that is practicable." ^ 

In this and following letters the marquis demon- 
strated to his own satisfaction the feasibility of such 
an attack and pressed the measure upon Rochambeau 
with increasing urgency. After stating Washington's 
views, he added: "I assure you . . . in my own name 
that it is important to act in this campaign, that all 
the troops you hope to receive from France the com- 
ing year, as well as all the projects with which you 
flatter yourself, will not repair the fatal injury result- 
ing from our inaction." - 

Rochambeau was not persuaded by these reason- 
ings, and while he recognized the importance of the 
capture of New York, he asserted with positiveness 
that the success of such an attempt was impossible 
unless the French possessed a decided superiority on 
the sea. This certainly they did not have, and further- 
more the forces under his command, even when united 
with the small army under Washington, he regarded 
as entirely unequal to the capture of New York. 

Rochambeau confidently expected that he would 
soon receive additional troops from France. He had 
been promised that eight thousand men should follow 
him to America. Nearly eight thousand soldiers gath- 
ered at Brest, ready to sail, but a third of the army 

1 Doniol, V, 356. 

2 Aug. 9, 1780; Lafayette, Mimoires, etc. (1837 ed.), ii, 125. 



312 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

had been left behind on account of the insufficient 
number of convoys. Rochambeau sailed with the as- 
surance that the twenty-five hundred men composing 
the second division of his command would soon fol- 
low. For some months their arrival was constantly 
anticipated; when rumors came of ships seen at sea, 
the count flattered himself that the long-expected re- 
inforcements would soon be at hand. But the twenty- 
five hundred men who had gathered at Brest to form 
part of Rochambeau's army, never sailed to America. 
For a while there was talk of their departure, and 
preparations for the expedition were carried languidly 
along, but it was at last announced that the plan of 
sending them had been for the present abandoned. 
Apparently the explanation of this failure was the 
inefficiency of the French naval department, of which 
the war furnished so many illustrations. It was diffi- 
cult to procure transports, it required energy to secure 
provisions to equip the fleet for the long journey, and 
at last the undertaking was abandoned. 

Not only did Rochambeau desire to await the arrival 
of the second division, but he was somewhat nettled 
at the peremptory zeal with which a youth like La 
Fayette assumed to direct his movements. The rela- 
tions of the two men were friendly, but after all Ro- 
chambeau was a much older officer, and he was the 
commander of the expedition; he was subject to 
Washington's orders, but not to those of La Fayette. 
The marquis, so Rochambeau wrote the French min- 
ister, had sent him a despatch twelve pages long, in 
which, " at the instigation of some foolish heads, he 
proposes extravagant things, such as taking Long 
Island and New York without a fleet." ^ He would in 

^ Rochambeau to La Luzerne, Aug. 14, 1780; Douiol, v, 364. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 313 

the future, so the count continued, write directly to 
"Washington, whose letters were always judicious, and 
thus avoid correspondence "with young and ardent 
persons." 

La Fayette's amiability was proof against any re- 
buff, and secured him the affection of those who were 
annoyed by an eagerness which sometimes savored 
of impertinence. Rochambeau remained the sincere 
friend of the young marquis, who was as ardent in 
affection as in advice. These feelings are shown in 
letters that bear little resemblance to the ordinary cor- 
respondence between generals in the field. " Permit, 
my dear marquis," wrote Rochambeau, " an old father 
to answer you as a son whom he loves and esteems 
infinitely." After arguing against an attack on New 
York, he adds : " It is well to believe the French in- 
vincible, but I confess to you in secret, after the expe- 
rience of forty years, there are few soldiers easier to 
beat when they have lost confidence in their leaders, 
and this they lose when they are put in perilous posi- 
tions to please some personal ambition. ... I have 
spoken of some things that displease me in your last 
letter; I judge that the warmth of your soul has a 
little affected the correctness of your judgment. . . . 
But it is always the old father Rochambeau who talks 
to his dear son whom he loves and will love and 
esteem to his last breath." ^ 

Washington had been inclined to allow La Fayette 
an active part in the negotiations with his country- 
men, but, with his usual tact, he felt that his associate 
wished to receive orders directly from the general-in- 
chief , and that it was judicious to accede to his request 

1 Rochambeau to La Fayette, Aug'. 27, 1780 ; Tower, The Marquis 
de Lafayette, etc., ii, 154. 



314 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

for a personal interview. Rochambeau had been in- 
sistent for this, and hostilities were not so active that 
Washington could not find time for a conference. 

It was accordingly agreed that the commanders 
should meet at Hartford. This town was about equi- 
distant between Newport and Washington's head- 
quarters, and both French and Americans occupied 
some three days in riding to the rendezvous. Wash- 
ington was accompanied by La Fayette, Knox, and 
six aides, of whom Hamilton was one. Rochambeau 
and Ternay left Newport September 18, accompanied 
by four French officers, and reached Hartford on the 
21st. The French and American commanders met for 
the first time and each created a favorable impression 
on the other. If the interview produced no important 
result, it was valuable because the generals of the two 
nations conferred in harmony and parted with in- 
creased respect for one another. The courtesy and dig- 
nity of Washington's bearing corresponded to the idea 
which the French already entertained of the American 
commander. " I had time to see this man, illustrious, 
if not unique, • in our century," writes one of the 
French aides. " He looks a hero. He is very cold, 
speaks little, but is courteous and frank. A shade 
of sadness overshadows his countenance, which is not 
unbecoming and gives him an interesting air." ^ 

Washington and his suite arrived first at Hartford 
and were received with imposing ceremonies. The 
governor with his guards and his artillery came out to 
meet the commander-in-chief, and the crowd was en- 
thusiastic. The French officers arrived soon after and 
they were received with the same formalities. Every- 

1 Fersen to his father, Oct. 16, 1780; Diary and Correspondence of 
Count Fersen, etc. (translated by Miss Wormeley), 30. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 315 

body was civil. " The highest marks of polite respect 
and attention were mutual," says the Hartford "Cou- 
rant." Even the bills of the members of the conference 
were paid by the state, as they found when they came 
to leave. Judging from the complaints of many offi- 
cers as to the unconscionable sums they were obliged 
> to pay in their travels, this experience must have been 
both rare and agreeable. 

La Fayette acted as interpreter, as Washington 
could neither speak nor understand French and Ro- 
chambeau was unable to speak English. This difficulty 
did not interfere with the freedom of the interview, 
nor with its agreeable character for the participants. 
The results of the conference illustrated the extreme 
caution of Washington's character. He was inclined 
to make an attack upon New York, but when he found 
the French generals regarded such a movement as 
premature and ill-advised, he at once acceded to their 
views. To some extent he may have been convinced 
by their arguments, but he realized, also, that, although 
the French contingent was subject to his orders, 
his authority must be exercised with great discre- 
tion. The interview at Hartford, he wrote La Fay- 
ette, showed how nominal was the authority which he 
exercised over the French auxiliaries.^ This was not 
strictly correct, for Rochambeau was ordered, not only 
to cooperate with Washington, but to act under his 
command. He was, however, expected to exercise his 
own judgment as to the plans of the campaign, and 
Washington was far too cautious to insist upon the 
adoption of any course of action which would not re- 
ceive the hearty cooperation of his associates. 

1 Washington to La Fayette, Dec. 14, 1780 ; Writings of Washing- 
ton, Sparks's ed., vii, 322. 



316 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The French government was informed of the dif- 
ference of opinion between the two generals, and ap- 
proved the decision of its own officer. "The King 
approves of your conduct at the conference at Hart- 
ford," wrote S^gur, "and especially the care you 
showed not to allow your own views to be controlled 
by those Washington might hold." ^ Owing to the* 
tact and consideration shown by Washington, the con- 
ference was entirely harmonious, and the French oiBfi- 
cers expressed the utmost admiration of the American 
commander-in-chief. 

As a result of their deliberation Washington, Ro- 
chambeau, and Ternay joined in a despatch, asking 
the French government for further assistance, both in 
men and money. A memorandum, signed by them, 
declared that the capture of New York would be the 
most advantageous operation that could be under- 
taken ; but that for the success of any movement the 
French must have a superior naval force, while, if they 
were to undertake the capture of New York City, the 
allied armies ought to be thirty thousand strong. All, 
therefore, joined in a memorial to the French govern- 
ment, asking that a naval force might be sent suffi- 
cient to insure the success of future operations, that a 
liberal supply of money be furnished for the neces- 
sities of the French army, and that, if possible, their 
force might be increased to fifteen thousand men.^ 

While the generals were in conference at Hartford, 
alarming intelligence hastened their return to their 
commands. News came that Admiral Rodney, with a 
fleet of thirty-one ships, had arrived at New York, 1 
and in view of this great increase in strength, an im- 1 

1 S^gur to Rochambeau, Feb. 25, 1781. 

2 Hartford Conference ; Doniol, vi, 404-407. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 317 

mediate attack on the French fleet seemed probable. 
Washington rode back to the Hudson, to make dis- 
coveries more alarming than the arrival of Rodney. 
On his way from Hartford he held a conference with 
La LvLzerne ; from there he went to West Point and 
was met with the news of Arnold's treachery. Both 
the American and the French armies were shocked by 
this blow to the common confidence. 

In the mean time the army under Rochambeau rested 
comfortably at Newport. The troops landed in July, 
1780, and there still remained four months of pleasant 
weather before winter set in, but these were passed in 
tranquillity. Yet the presence of the army at Newport 
was by no means without value. La Fayette, when he 
was arguing for an attack on New York, wrote that a 
French army at Rhode Island was of no use to Amer- 
ica, to which Rochambeau replied, rather tartly, that 
he had yet to hear that the French at Rhode Islaqd 
had done the Americans any harm. If they took part 
in no important movement, at least they rendered 
valuable service in fostering hearty good-will between 
the Americans and the allies, and preparing the way 
for harmonious cooperation in the future. 

If the French gained no victories, they escaped any 
disaster, though with a more enterprising general op- 
posed to them a different result might have ensued. 
The American army was scattered along the Hudson 
and in New Jersey. The English had some thirteen 
thousand men at New York, and their fleet was su- 
perior to that of the French, but Rochambeau and his 
command were left undisturbed.^ Owing to the prudent 

^ B. F. Stevens, Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives relat- 
ing to America, no. 730, p. 8. 



318 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

celerity with which Ternay conducted the expedition, 
the lauding at Rhode Island had been unopposed. The 
fleet which sailed from England under Admiral Graves 
was driven back to Plymouth by a storm and remained 
there two weeks. At last they started in pursuit of the 
French convoy, but they could not recover the time 
lost; on July 11 the French were at Newport and on 
the 13th Graves reached Sandy Hook. 

The English ships stationed at New York made no 
endeavor to hinder the French landing, but, upon 
Graves's arrival, the combined forces at once set sail 
for Rhode Island. On the 21st of July the English 
appeared off Newport with a fleet of nineteen men-of- 
war. In the mean time, the French had been actively 
engaged in fortifying their jjosition, and the English 
admiral decided that it would not be prudent to 
attack by water, but that he would await the arrival 
of the land forces under Clinton. Clinton was re- 
ported to have ten thousand men, with which to be- 
gin hostilities, and the allies continued with vigor the 
work of fortification. The Continental soldiers under 
Heath and the militia from Rhode Island and Massa- 
chusetts engaged in the work with much zeal. Re- 
doubts were built and cannon were put in position; 
the allied forces numbered some eight thousand men 
and were ready to give the English a warm reception. 

Clinton proceeded with his customary procrastina- 
tion and vacillation. Six thousand of his soldiers 
were embarked on transports ; they sailed across the 
Sound, and on July 31 they disembarked at White- 
stone. But, in the mean time, their commander had 
changed his mind. He was informed that the French 
were strongly intrenched and that Washington was 
preparing to move against New York ; to attack the 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 319 

French successfully and then return to meet the 
American arm^^ required decision, celerity, and bold- 
ness. Clinton possessed none of those qualities, and 
the idea of an attack on Newport was abandoned. 

The English fleet lay outside the harbor ready to 
intercept any expedition the French might attempt ; 
it did not venture an attack, but, as it was superior 
in numbers to the French, they could undertake 
nothing in behalf of their allies. On Sej^tember 16 
Rodney, with thirty-one ships, arrived at New York, 
and thus reinforced it was thought the English would 
enter Newport harbor and destroy the French fleet. 
The English had a large preponderance in force; if 
the attempt had been made and had* proved success- 
ful, it would greatly have altered the future of the 
war. The daring that takes great risks and accom- 
plishes great results had been common in the officers 
who were inspired by Chatham, but it was not found 
in the generals and admirals whom George III sent 
out to fight with his rebellious subjects. In Sep- 
tember the English vessels arrived off Newport. Later 
Eodney won important victories in the West Indies, 
but he now decided against an attack; presently he 
returned to New York, and in November sailed back 
to the Antilles, leaving twelve vessels to strengthen 
the fleet under Arbuthnot, which continued, from 
Gardiner's Bay, its watch upon the French. Thus the 
autumn ended with nothing of importance undertaken 
by the French and their American allies. 

During the winter Washington thought it might 
be possible to attempt some action jointly with the 
Spanish. Spain was not indeed an ally of the United 
States, but she was an ally of France and engaged 
with her in war with England. The Spanish at this 



320 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

time contemplated sending an expedition from Ha- 
vana to Florida, and Washington thought this might 
furnish an opportunity for achieving results important 
to all combatants. If they would unite with the 
French and Americans, he wrote Rochambeau, in an 
attack on Georgia and the Carolinas, this would not 
only be invaluable to the Americans, but the defeat 
of the English in the southern states would procure 
for the Spanish the tranquil possession of Florida. If 
the scheme met Rochambeau's approval, he desired 
that a vessel should at once be despatched with the 
proposition. If you approve, he wrote, there is no 
time to lose In making your reply. ^ 

Washington's judgment was rarely at fault, but he 
anticipated from Spanish aid advantages that were 
never realized. Rochambeau knew the Spanish better 
than the American general. He knew that It was use- 
less to expect cooperation from them ; that they would 
take part in no movement, unless the advantages were 
to be reaped solely by Spain, and that It was impossible 
for them to realize that Florida could be conquered 
in Georgia or Carolina. The Spanish commander, he 
assured Washington, having received orders from his 
own court, would not disturb them for a single 
moment in order to cooperate with the allies.^ The 
plan was, therefore, abandoned, and Rochambeau 
fared no better in an endeavor to get assistance from 
the French fleet in the West Indies. 

Thus the year 1781 arrived, and as the winter wore 
away the Americans and French began to prepare 
themselves for what it was hoped might prove a de- 

1 Washington to Rochambeau, Dec. 15, 1780 ; Writings of Wash- 
ington, Sparks's ed., vii, 325. 

* Rochambeau to Washington, Dec. 22, 1780; Doniol, v, 398. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 321 

cisive campaign. That this could not long be post- 
poned AYashiugton thoroughly realized. The mutinies 
of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey soldiers had been 
quelled ; but it was impossible that an army should 
much longer be kept together without money, and, 
with the best of will, they could not serve indefinitely 
without food and clothes. Nor was it certain how 
long Washington could rely upon French assistance. 
These auxiliaries were not sent here for any definite 
period ; pestilence, defeat, or other discouragement, 
might induce a speedy return to their own land, and 
if this expedition failed, it was most unlikely that the 
French King would send another army to assist in an 
unlucky war waged three thousand miles away. 

The French were equally desirous for an active 
campaign. The responsibility of the result of the war 
did not rest upon them ; but they sighed for activity, 
they were weary of inaction, and eager to be led 
against the English. The first movement was made by 
the French fleet. The English ships in Gardiner's 
Bay, and between Block Island and Point Judith, 
kept vigilant watch, but their position was much ex- 
posed to bad weather, and a January gale disabled 
several of Arbuthnot's ships. Encouraged by this, 
Des Touches, who, owing to Ternay's sudden death, was 
temporarily in command, resolved to break the mo- 
notony of inaction. On March 8 the French fleet, car- 
rying twelve hundred troops, set sail for Chesapeake 
Bay, to cooperate with La Fayette in his campaign 
against Arnold. Washington came to Newport in or- 
der to view the embarkment, and was received with 
the formalities of which the French were masters. In 
the instructions issued at Versailles it was directed 
that the American general-in-chief should receive the 



322 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

honors of a French marshal, and these were not de- 
nied him. Salutes were fired, and the ships and the 
city were illuminated. Not only did the French show 
their enthusiasm, but the town council voted to buy 
candles for the occasion. Thirty boys bearing lighted 
candles marched before the father of his country. 
The illumination 
patriotic hearts.^ 

In the mean time the fleet had sailed away, but it 
did not accomplish any important results. The French 
had been slow in getting off ; Arbuthnot had time to 
repair the injuries to his ships, and he sailed in pur- 
suit after an interval of only twenty-four hours. At 
the mouth of Chesapeake Bay an engagement took 
place, each side having eight men-of-war. The victory 
was doubtful. Both sides fought with resolution, and 
neither gained any marked advantage. But the French 
vessels had been roughly handled, and Des Touches 
decided to return to Rhode Island. Twenty days 
after the French ships had sailed away they were 
back in port, having gained nothing but experience 
by their expedition. 

Letters were so frequently intercepted that one 
needed to be discreet in his correspondence, and 
Washington now became involved in an annoying 
experience. He wrote Lund Washington, after the 
return of the Des Touches expedition, that it was unfor- 
tunate the French fleet had not undertaken the en- 
terprise when he advised; Arnold's forces would then 
have been destroyed, while, by reason of the delay, 
the little squadron sent out had been unable to accom- 
plish anything. The reproach cast upon his associates 
was not severe, yet it is strange that even this should 

1 Thomas Balch, The French in America, etc., i, 137. 



THE ARRIVAL OF ROCHAMBEAU 323 

have been indited by Washington's cautious pen. The 
penalty for a rare offence was prompt and disagree- 
able. The letter was intercepted, the English published 
it in "Rivington's Royal Gazette," and Rochambeau 
at once sent a communication to Washington, ex- 
pressing his doubts as to whether such remarks could 
have been made by him, and sharply criticizing the 
criticism.^ 

Washington surely told the truth when he replied 
that Rochambeau's letter had caused him great pain. 
Naturally the man who as a boy could not lie about a 
cherry tree would not tell a lie in mature years ; be- 
sides there would have been no advantage in doing so. 
He had no copy of the letter, so he wrote ; he could 
not say whether it was correctly published, and prob- 
ably it was not. But still he must admit that the 
report was substantially correct; the letter was ad- 
dressed to a private person in whose discretion he 
could rely ; only by an unlucky accident had the con- 
tents become public, and he added, in soothing words, 
that at that time the causes for the delay in sailing 
were not known to him ; with these explanations, he 
said in closing, " I leave the matter to your candor." * 

Rochambeau was too sensible to cherish any ran- 
cor; it was certainly indiscreet for the American 
general to criticize his French associates, and the con- 
sciousness of such indiscretion, to a man as rigid as 
Washington in the scrupulous observance of every 
propriety, was probably the most disagreeable feature 
of the episode. It bore no evil fruit, and it is certain 
that all his subsequent letters could have been inter- 

^ Rochambeau to Washingion, April 26, 1781 ; Writings of Wash- 
ington, Sparks's ed., viii, 27-28. 

2 Washington to Rochambeau, April 30, 1781 ; Ibidem. 



324 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

cepted and published in the " Gazette" without danger 
of wounding the susceptibilities of his allies. 

This unsuccessful enterprise was succeeded by move- 
ments of far greater importance. The arrival of intel- 
ligence from the other side enabled Washington and 
Eochambeau to form their plans for the campaign of 
1781. 



CHAPTER XVII 

"THE SINEWS OF WAE," 

RoCHAMBEAu's son had been chosen to convey to 
the French government the result of the deliberations 
at Hartford. He did not sail at once, for there was 
still hope that the second detachment might appear, 
and the arrival of these new recruits would render 
unnecessary any appeal for assistance. But neither 
French soldiers nor word of any sort from the French 
government arrived at Newport. Communications be- 
tween distant parts were slow at best, and because 
the delivery of letters was so uncertain, it often seemed 
simpler not to send any at all. The representatives of 
governments were left uninstructed and uninformed 
to an extent that seems amazing, and was often em- 
barrassing. Silas Deane wrote to his employers in 
Congress, in November, 1776, that he had received 
no letter from them for five months ; and in the fol- 
lowing year reported that in the twelve months since 
he had left Philadelphia on a diplomatic errand he 
had received from his principals three letters in all.* 
Franklin was left equally unadvised as to the progress 
of events or the desires of Congress ; for long months 
his only communications from Congress were the drafts 
they drew upon him, without informing him of their 
dates, or taking steps to provide the funds with which 
they could be honored. Generals were in as bad a 
plight as diplomats. For months Rochambeau expected 

1 Beane Papers, i, 340 ; ii, 18. 



326 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the arrival of recruits, who were never sent, ar.d he 
was not even notified that it had been resolved not to 
send them. 

It had been agreed that if no soldiers arrived by 
October 15, Eochanibeau's son, a colonel in the French 
army, should sail for France with a full report of the 
Hartford conference, and ask in person for the relief, 
which was unlikely to be granted in answer to any writ- 
ten application. The envoy was in some respects spe- 
cially well fitted for his task. In case of capture all 
his papers and instructions were to be thrown into the 
sea ; but the son had so good a memory that he could 
deliver to the minister, word for word, the contents of 
his despatches. * His memory was not put to so severe a 
test. Not until October 28 was there a favorable wind, 
but on that day the French frigate Amazon went to sea, 
starting in a violent gale that she might better avoid 
the vigilance of the British squadron. She was dis- 
covered and chased, but made her escape, and reached 
the French coast without further peril and after an 
unusually fast voyage. On the 26th of November the 
Vicomte de Rochambeau made his bow to Louis 
XVI at Versailles. 

If the voyage had been auspicious, the time of the 
arrival was less so. During the three years since the 
treaty of alliance was signed, little but discouraging 
news had come from France's ally across the water, 
and Rochambeau had to bring still more unfavorable 
reports : to tell of small armies, of soldiers who were 
receiving poor food, poorer clothing, and no pay at 
all, and to ask further aid from France to buy for 
them muskets and uniforms and rations. 

France had just gotten through the third campaign 

1 Mim. de Bochambeau, i, 256, in Doniol, iv, 384. 



THE SINEWS OF WAR 327 

of the alliance at an outlay of one hundred and fifty 
million livres, and the fourth campaign bade fair to 
cost much more. At this era of discouragement, the 
Spanish were strenuous in their advice that France 
should get such terms as she could for her American 
allies and make peace without more delay. The Span- 
ish were engaged in negotiations with England, from 
which they hoped to get the utmost for themselves, by 
conceding to England the best possible terms with 
the United States. The Spanish ministers looked 
forward with Christian resignation to sacrifices to be 
made by the American colonies, in order to secure 
the blessings of peace for Spain. The French, said 
the Spanish pi'ime minister, would become the victims 
of their own folly, and would find that the Ameri- 
cans, when once independent, would be zealous allies 
of England.^ So if a treaty could now be made which 
would leave the contesting parties where they were, 
France and the colonies ought to be content. 

But the English were in possession of New York 
and Charleston, and practically of three of the thir- 
teen states; a truce for ten or twenty years on such 
terms would have left the colonies in evil plight. Yet 
Louis XVI, in the autumn of 1780, was in so de- 
spondent a mood that he was ready to authorize Spain 
to act as a mediator to secure peace between France 
and Great Britain. 

At this crisis, as during all the war, Vergennes 
showed himself not only a friend to our country, but 
a statesman of no inferior rank. He was no interna- 
tional philanthropist, he considered first the interests 
of France, but he knew that a cowardly and unsatis- 
factory peace was neither for the interest nor for the 

1 Doniol, iv, 509. 



328 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

fair fame of his own land. " If we impose on Spain 
the duty of obtaining peace for us," he wrote the 
King-, "no one can answer for the results, nor assure 
your Majesty that your reputation and your honor 
will not be compromised." ^ 

It was easy for a strong will to control the vacillat- 
ing purposes of Louis XVI, but requests at this time 
for still greater exertions in the war naturally re- 
ceived a somewhat languid reception. Rochambeau 
transmitted to the ministry the messages of the Hart- 
ford conference, but any response was long delayed. 

The French treasury was in need ; it was rarely in 
any other condition, but the cost of the war aggra- 
vated its chronic distress. Yet Vergennes was not 
discouraged, and the French government was not re- 
miss in its responses to calls for aid. " It would be 
a misfortune," Vergennes wrote, in February, 1781, 
" if this campaign should pass like the preceding one, 
without any important result. . . . We must occupy 
ourselves in ending the war, and this we cannot do 
without striking some great blow. If we. succeed, that 
will bring an honorable peace ; if we fail, we shall 
not suffer the shame of having neglected anything in 
our power to procure it." ^ 

Not until March 9 was the answer to the proposi- 
tions of the generals at Hartford formally announced.^ 
Their demands were not agreed to, and yet the aid 
promised was of still greater importance. Rocham- 
beau's request for ten thousand more men was refused, 
and he was informed that the second detachment, 

1 Vergennes to King, Sept. 27, 1780 ; Doniol, iv, 488. 
^ Doniol, iv, 544. 

2 Rdponse aux conclusions arret^es k Hartford, le 9 Mars, 1781 ; 
Doniol, iv, 584, 548. 



THE SINEWS OF WAR 329 

which he had so long expected, would never be de- 
spatched. If more troops were required, the French 
government thought it best to supply Washington 
with money, so that he could strengthen his command 
with American volunteers. Accordingly, six million 
livres were promised, not as a loan but as a free gift, 
to be placed at Washington's disposal. ^ The most im- 
portant decision was imparted in secret, for the infor- 
mation of Washington and Rochambeau. Tlie Comte 
de Grasse was to depart with a powerful fleet for the 
Antilles, with instructions later in the year to sail to 
the coast of North America and there cooperate with 
the French and American armies in some joint move- 
ment against the English. " Provided we strike a 
great blow at the common enemy, and the result is 
fortunate, . . . the place of action is of no impor- 
tance." 

While the French ministers were ready to extend 
aid liberally, both in men and money, they felt very 
doubtful about the result. They had been discouraged 
by years of ill-success, and still more so by the diffi- 
culties under which their American allies now labored 
in obtaining recruits and keeping an army in the field. 
News of the mutiny of the Pennsylvania regiments 
had reached Paris, and it was feared that Washing- 
ton's entire army might dissolve. Should this calamity 
ensue, said the instructions to Rochambeau, he must 
abandon the lost cause and sail away with his army to 
San Domingo or the Antilles. 

The Vicomte de Rochambeau departed with these 
promises of aid, but the colonists were to receive from 
their French ally during this eventful year a still 
larger measure of assistance. Not only had Washing- 

1 Doniol, iv, 587. 



// 



830 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ton and Rochambeau sent requests for help, but Con- 
gress had resolved on a special mission, to ask for 
money with which to pay the expenses of a war that 
could no longer be defrayed from American resources. 
In December, 1780, a resolution was passed that a 
special envoy repair to Versailles, and ask a loan of 
twenty-five million livres, in order that an army of 
thirty-two thousand American soldiers might be kept 
under arms until the end of the war. The demand 
was large, but the need was gi'eat. 

This action was accompanied by parliamentary ma- 
noeuvres, which, if they had proved successful, would 
have been most harmful. The most enthusiastic ad- 
mirer of the Continental Congress cannot feel that it 
always showed wisdom in the selection of its agents. 
Intrigues in the halls of Congress resulted in the in- 
competent Gates being sent to replace the competent 
Schuyler, and were often directed against Washington 
himself. By similar processes it was now sought to dis- 
place the minister who, next to Washington, did most 
to secure success in the war of independence. Lee and 
Izard had returned from their unproductive errands 
abroad, and were doing all the harm they could at 
home. Of Franklin their denunciations were as per- 
sistent as they were virulent. If, said Lee in one of 
his jealous attacks, " the total disorder and neglect 
which prevails in the public affairs committed to him 
will not satisfy gentlemen that the continuance of him 
in office is incompatible with the public honor and in- 
terest," there is no use of my making further charges. ^ 

If Franklin had enemies at home, he had firm 
friends in the government to which he was accred- 
ited. " His conduct leaves nothing for Congress to de- 

1 Wharton, iv, 184. 



THE SINEWS OF WAR 331 

sire," wrote Vergennes. " It is as zealous and patriotic 
as it is wise and circumspect. . . . The method he 
pursues is much more efficacious than ... if he were 
to assume a tone of importunity in multiplying his 
demands, and ... in supporting them by menaces, 
... which would only tend to render him personally 
disagreeable." ^ 

That Franklin made himself agreeable to the French 
minister was a cause of offence in the minds of some 
of his enemies. They believed that the way to get the 
most help from France was to complain of the past 
and threaten for the future, and that some patriot who 
would bluster to Vergennes, with bad manners, and 
in worse French, would obtain more than the smiling 
plenipotentiary. No idea could have been more mis- 
taken. No man could have obtained so much from 
France as the minister who during long years com- 
bined unfailing tact and unbroken courtesy with un- 
wearied zeal for the land he served. 

The effort to remove Franklin failed, but it was 
resolved to send a special envoy to urge the demand 
for a loan of twenty-five million livres which Congress 
now made. The choice lay between two of Washing- 
ton's aides, Alexander Hamilton and John Laurens. 
There was no one better fitted for such a task than 
Hamilton, but the Congress preferred Laurens and he 
was selected. The mission was regarded as of much 
importance. No reply had yet come to the requests 
sent from Hartford, and the need of immediate aid 
was great. "Washington, most of all, realized how 
critical was the situation. A little before this he had 
written Mason : " We are without money, and have 

1 Vergennes to La Luzerne, Dec, 1780 ; Writings of Washington, 
Sparks's ed., vii, 379. 



332 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

been so for a great length of time ; without provision 
and forage except what is taken by impress ; without 
cloathing, and shortly shall be (in a manner) without 
men. In a word, we have lived upon expedients till we 
can live no longer." ^ 

He wrote Sullivan, who was now in Congress, to the 
same effect : " I will take the liberty in this place to 
give it as my opinion that a foreign loan is indispensa- 
bly necessary to the continuance of the war. Congress 
will deceive themselves if they imagine that the army, 
or a state that is the theatre of war can rub through 
a second campaign as the last. ... To depend, under 
these circumstances, upon the resources of the coun- 
try, unassisted by foreign loans, will, I am confident, 
be to lean on a broken reed." ^ 

With still more emphasis did he seek to impress 
upon the envoy who was to visit the French court in 
search of aid the importance of success in his mission. 
" Be assured, my dear Laurens, day does not follow 
night more certainly than it brings with it some ad- 
ditional proof of the impracticability of carrying on 
the war without the aids you were directed to solicit. 
As an honest and candid man, as a man whose all de- 
pends on the final and happy termination of the pre- 
sent contest, I assert this, while I give it decisively as 
my opinion, that without a foreign loan, our present 
force, which is but the remnant of an army, cannot be 
kept together this campaign, much less will it be in- 
creased and in readiness for another." ^ 

A little earlier Washington had written. Laurens: 

1 Washington to Mason, Oct. 22, 1780; Writings of Washington, 
Ford's ed., ix, 13. 

2 Washington to Sullivan, Nov. 20, 1780 ; Writings of Washington, 
Sparks's ed., vii, 297. 

^ Washington to Laurens, at Paris, April 9, 1781 ; Ibid., viii, 5. 



THE SINEWS OF WAR 333 

"Without efficacious succor in money " we may make a 
feeble and expiring effort the next campaign, in all 
probability the period to our opposition." * "We are 
at the end of our tether," he writes again, " and now 
or never deliverance must come." 

The words of Washington had their full weight at 
the French court ; all recognized him as the bulwark 
of the American cause, they knew he would send no 
request for aid that was not justified, and that he 
would utilize to the utmost whatever assistance in men 
or money was granted. There were others who also 
sought to impress on the French minister the gravity 
of the crisis. The last campaign, La Fayette wrote in 
January, had been conducted by the Americans, with- 
out having a shilling, but that miracle could not be 
repeated.^ Rochambeau told the American envoy to 
speak the absolute truth, and state the condition of 
distress in which his unhappy country would be unless 
she received prompt support.^ The Americans were at 
the end of their resources, Rochambeau wrote his gov- 
ernment, and if aid were not given, the dissolution of 
their army was not only possible, but probable. 

Thus fortified, Laurens sailed for France, and he 
arrived there in March, 1781. The French had just 
transmitted, by Rochambeau's son, a promise to fur- 
nish six million livres to the colonies as a gift, besides 
sending a fleet under de Grasse, to assist in the cause. 
Naturally, still further demands were not agreeable 
when made upon a benefactor which was itself very 
hard up. Vergennes complained that he was beset 

^ Washington to Laurens, Jan. 15, 1781 ; Writings of Washington, 
Sparks's ed., vii, 371. 

2 La Fayette to Vergennes, Jan. 30, 1781 ; Tower, The Marquis 
de Lafayette, etc., ii, 194. 

8 Rochambeau to Washington, Feb. 2, 1781. 



334 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

from every side, and that of requests for money there 
was no end. France was, unluckily for herself, the 
only country where the United States could get money. 
Nothing could be obtained from Spain ; no other 
European country was willing to risk a penny in aid 
of the American colonies or to discount their promises 
to pay at any price. Frederick the Great wished them 
well, but not a groschen could be extracted from his 
firm grasp. 

Holland was friendly with the states, and at war 
with England, but she would not lend a guilder unless 
the French King would guarantee the debt. Our 
country was ready to send ministers to Tuscany, to 
Russia, to any country that would receive them ; 
rarely did they obtain a courteous reception, and never 
a dollar in hard money. An American envoy was 
looked upon as we regard an acquaintance who, if he 
obtains an interview, is sure to ask for a loan, and 
whose ability to repay is very doubtful. A few months 
before,. Jay, unable to raise a dollar at Madrid on the 
credit of the United States, had written to see if the 
French King would not guarantee a loan of one hun- 
dred and fifty thousand dollars. " I experienced the 
sad sensation," he said in his letter, "of those, who- 
already weighed down by benefits, are forced by cruel 
necessity to ask for more." ^ 

Vergennes, with many apologies, had been obliged 
to decline this request; but when Franklin a little 
later asked for money with which to meet drafts for a 
million livres, drawn upon him by Congress with no 
provisions for payment, the French minister saved the 
American ambassador from bankruptcy. Those at 
home who declared that Franklin was an aged trifler, 

1 Doniol, It, 388. 



THE SINEWS OF WAR 335 

too absorbed in social pleasures to attend to his polit- 
ical duties, should have been comforted with the un- 
broken success with which their representative found 
means to open the French treasury, and extract money 
of which the French government itself had great need. 

Laurens was far from an ideal envoy. He had little 
experience and much impetuosity, he desired to storm 
the French ministry, as, at the head of his regiment, 
he would have stormed a barricade ; he did not ask 
aid but demanded it ; he uttered few thanks and many 
threats. Such conduct was little to Vergennes's taste, 
and in his letters to La Luzerne he complained bit- 
terly of Laurens's procedure. This officer " is little 
familiar with the usages and consideration which are 
due the ministers of a great power ; he has made his 
demands, not only with unfit importunity, but even 
employing threats." ^ 

But if the young officer was often indiscreet, and 
sometimes impolite, he was assisted by the unfailing 
adroitness of Franklin, and moreover the situation 
spoke for itself. In a pathetic letter Franklin pressed 
the claims of his country. " I am becoming old, I am 
weakened by my last illness, and it is not probable 
that I shall be long occupied with these matters. 
Therefore I seize this occasion to let you know my 
opinion on the subject. The present conjuncture is 
critical. Congress is in danger of losing its influence 
with the people ; if it cannot obtain the aid it needs, 
the whole system of a new government in America 
may be overthrown." ^ 

The Dutch would not lend to the United States, 
but it was decided that Louis XVI should borrow of 

1 Vergennes to La Luzerne, May 11, 1781 ; Doniol, iv, 560. 
^ Cited by Doniol, iv, 540. 



336 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

them ten million livres and let his allies have the 
money. This was added to the six millions already fur- 
nished, to the cost of the French troops at Newport, 
and of the expedition to be despatched under de 
Grasse. 

Laurens sailed for home in May well satisfied with 
the result of his mission. " This court," wrote Frank- 
lin in a letter he sent with Laurens, " continues firm 
and steady in its friendship, and does everything it can 
for us. Cannot we do a little more for ourselves ? " ^ 

A little later Laurens arrived in Boston, bringing 
with him the money that had been raised in answer 
to the supplications of the American representatives. 
Louis had promised to assist the Americans in all to 
the amount of six million livres. A considerable part 
of this was spent in the purchase of arms, clothing, 
and ammunition for the American troops, but two 
million and a half Laurens brought with him in cash. 
It was a most seasonable gift; for it is hard to say 
how, without it, it would have been possible for 
Washington to conduct successfully his expedition to 
the South. It should not detract from the gratification 
which an American feels in the capture of Yorktown 
that it could not have been accomplished without the 
cooperation of French troops, and without the as- 
sistance of French money. 

Not only did France increase her military strength 
in America in preparation for the campaign in 1781, 
but changes in administration relieved somewhat the 
scandalous inefficiency of late years. The average of 
administrative efficiency under the old regime was 
poor. There were indeed illustrious exceptions : Col- 
bert devoted to the finances of the kingdom not only 

1 Doniol, iv, 562. 



THE SINEWS OF WAR 337 

a disinterested zeal, but great ability ; Louvois made 
the army of Louis XIV the best-equipped military 
machine in Europe ; but the average of executive abil- 
ity was very moderate. Of corruption there was much ; 
of inefficiency there was more ; of indolence and neg- 
lect of duty there was most of all. By court intrigues 
and personal preferences, most of the great positions 
in the state were filled. The traditions of public life 
were low. No man was thought the worse of because 
he became rich through the opportunities of office, while 
for the zealous reformer there was no room. Turgot 
and Malesherbes and Necker were ministers of Louis 
XVI, but none of them had a long tenure of power. 
An ancient trifler like Maurepas was selected as chief 
minister when Louis XVI became king, and held his 
place for seventeen years, until death released his 
grasp upon it. Sartine had been minister of the ma- 
rine and Montbarey of war. Both were nobles, men 
of the court and of the world, agreeable to Maurepas, 
amiable and inefficient. Ships were not ready when 
expeditions should sail ; provisions were unfit for use, 
or were not supplied at all ; money flowed freely, but 
the results were not to be seen. " The expenses of the 
marine," wrote Vergennes in 1779, " are really fright- 
ful, and I was far from having a true idea of them." * 
The Minister of War was no better. His private con- 
duct, wrote the Queen, as well as the pillage which he 
tolerated in his department, made it impossible for him 
to accomplish any good. 

These positions were now filled by men who were at 
least far superior to their predecessors. Castries suc- 
ceeded to the marine, and the Comte de S^gur to the 
bureau of war. It was a son of the Minister of War 

1 Doniol, iv, 491. 



338 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

who served in America in the patriot cause, and has 
left agreeable memoirs in which he has described the 
impressions produced on an habitu^ of Versailles by 
the modes of life he found in the remote west. They 
excited in him only enthusiasm. Segur was one of the 
most zealous of the patrician youths who sighed for a 
new society and new modes of government, and who 
saw only felicity in a future which was to overthrow 
the class to which he belonged and bring to the block 
many of his associates. 

The Segur family displayed the contrasts so com- 
mon in this period of unrest. If S^gur's views seem 
out of due season when France was assisting at the 
birth of a republic, and was herself on the verge of a 
revolution, he was an efficient administrator, and un- 
der him the condition of the army steadily improved. 

Another change in the French administration had 
little effect on the fortunes of the American war, but 
was of evil omen for France herself. Necker, unlike 
his predecessor Turgot, was neither a great statesman 
noif a great man. He was, however, a person of finan- 
cial ability and honest purpose. 

The conditions of the French treasury grew steadily 
worse ; the unfair imposition of its burdens and the re- 
pudiation of its obligations were potent causes of the im- 
pending cataclysm. If the French government would 
have paid its debts regularly, spent its money wisely, 
and imposed its taxes justly, the revolution, if not 
arrested, might have had a different history. Necker 
was honest and wise, he endeavored to strengthen 
credit, to prevent waste, and to check fraud. In one 
year five hundred sinecures were swept away. Inter- 
nal duties which obstructed trade were abolished, the 
government received more money from its taxes and 



THE SINEWS OF WAR 339 

made better terms for its loans. By his most famous 
act, Neeker published the "Compte Rendu" and gave 
to the public some account of the use of the money 
which was taken from it.^ 

If such acts pleased the public which paid the 
taxes, and encouraged the bankers who bid on the 
government loans, they aroused a spirit of discontent 
among those who had favor at court. Every courtier 
who had lost a position or feared to lose a pension 
was ready to intrigue against the man who questioned 
his right to live from the public purse. Neeker was 
harassed at every turn. The King was weak in his 
support, Maurepas was active for his overthrow. The 
minister was denounced as a foreigner and a Protest- 
ant by those who hated him as a reformer and an econ- 
omist, and in 1781 he fell from power. A successor 
was found in Joly de Fleury, who fostered every abuse 
and opposed every reform. As a result of his manage- 
ment the court was content and the treasury was 
empty. 

^ Charles Gomel, Les Derniers Controleurs, chaps. 1 and 2. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE FRENCH TROOPS IN AMERICA 

On May 10, 1781, the Concorde reached Newport, 
bringing Rochambeau's son and the Comte de Barras, 
who was to succeed Ternaj in command of the French 
fleet. The intelligence conveyed was of the highest 
moment, for it brought a reply to the requests which 
Washington and Rochambeau had sent to France 
after their conference at Hartford. In some respects 
the answer was not wholly satisfactory; the ten thou- 
sand French troops that had been asked for were not 
to be sent, and it was announced that the second di- 
vision, which Rochambeau had so long expected, would 
never set sail. These were discouraging announce- 
ments ; but the aid now given, and the still more val- 
uable assistance that was promised, atoned for any 
disappointments. Six million livres were brought 
Washington, that he might sustain his troops in the 
field ; and such were their needs that, without this as- 
sistance, it is doubtful if even the small army which 
Washington then commanded could have been kept 
under arms. 

But the most important intelligence was contained 
in Segur's letter to Rochambeau.* The Comte de 
Grasse, so he was informed, had already sailed for 
the West Indies with a powerful fleet, and at some 
time during the summer he would cooperate in any 
expedition upon which Washington and Rochambeau 
1 S4gui to Rochambeau, March 9, 1781 ; Doniol, v, 466. 



THE FRENCH TROOPS IN AMERICA 341 

might agree. In view of this information, it was de- 
cided that the commanders of the two armies should 
meet and discuss the campaign for the ensuing year. 
On May 21 AA^'ashington and Rochambeau met at 
Wethersfield. Rochambeau was accompanied by the 
Marquis de Chastellux, while Washington was ac- 
companied by Knox and Duportail. The generals 
were not altogether in accord. Washington had long 
felt that the capture of New York would be the 
most serious blow that could be inflicted on the 
enemy, and with the cooperation of the two armies 
and the assistance of the French fleet, he thought 
this was not impossible. Rochambeau was inclined 
to think that operations in Virginia, in cooperation 
with de Grasse's fleet, might be more efficacious. 
The ships of one French fleet had been unable to get 
over the bar at New York City, and this might prove 
to be the case with the present expedition, while the 
place was defended by an army equal in strength to 
that which could be led to the attack. It was finally 
decided that a movement against New York was the 
only practical one at present. The French ships at 
Newport were not equal to transporting the armies 
by sea, and the march to Virginia by land was long 
and arduous.^ Intercepted despatches indicated that 
Clinton would probably send some of his forces to 
Virginia; either the English at New York might be 
taken at a disadvantage if he did so, or the threat of 
an attack might prevent his sending reinforcements 
to complete the ruin of the American cause in the 
South. It was therefore decided that the French 
should march to the Hudson, and there join their 
American allies in the hope of a successful movement 

1 Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed., viii, 53. 



342 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

against New York. In the mean time a frigate was de- 
spatched to de Grasse to ascertain when and where 
his arrival could be expected. When the answer came, 
the commanders could then decide upon their future 
plans, so as to cooperate most efficiently with the 
fleet that the French admiral would bring to their 
aid. 

If the arrival of a French fleet secured a naval 
superiority to the allies and made it possible to trans- 
port an army by sea, Washington contemplated the 
possibility of changing his plans and transferring the 
campaign southward; but the difficulties of the long 
march by land, the danger of disease in the southern 
climate, and the disinclination of the troops for such 
an undertaking, decided him to concentrate his forces 
upon New York.^ 

He was not without hope of success. Unless New 
York were reinforced from the south, he thought, the 
city would fall; while to compel Cornwallis to send 
troops to Clinton's relief would be a godsend to the 
struggling patriots in Virginia and the Carolinas. 
Accordingly he wrote Sullivan that at the Wethers- 
field conference it had been decided that both armies 
should take the field and advance upon New York 
City.^ This letter, by some good luck, fell into the 
hands of the English, and Clinton's delusions as to 
Washington's plans proved so valuable later in the 
campaign that some have imagined the despatch was 
prepared in order to be intercepted. Nothing was 
further from Washington's thoughts ; the letter stated 
the decision which had actually been reached, and it 

1 Diary, May 22, 1781 ; Magazine of American History, vi, 112. 

2 Washington to Sullivan, May 29, 1781 ; Writings of Washington, 
Sparks's ed., viii, 58. 



THE FRENCH TROOPS IN AMERICA 343 

was not until months later that the movement against 
Cornwallis was decided upon. 

Curiously enough, a similar letter from a French 
officer fell into Clinton's hands and strengthened his 
conviction that New York was to be the objective 
point of the allies in this campaign. Chastellux wrote 
the French minister at Philadelphia, stating that at 
last he had induced Rochambeau to agree with Wash- 
ington, and the siege of New York had been decided 
upon. This letter was also intercepted ; and as it 
contained some caustic and unseemly criticisms by 
Chastellux on his commander, it was forwarded to 
Rochambeau, — "certainly not," writes the count, 
" with the purpose of fostering peace in my military 
family." ^ 

It was debated whether Newport should not now be 
abandoned, and the French fleet that was gathered 
there take refuge at Boston. Such a change was ap- 
proved by the French admiral, who desired to under- 
take a separate expedition in the North, and was little 
inclined to a course of action that would result in his 
serving as a subordinate in the South, with de Grasse 
as his commander. After much discussion it was de- 
cided that the French ships should remain at New- 
port, from which point they could more readily reach 
de Grasse should his fleet arrive at New York or the 
Chesapeake, but that the army should join the Ameri- 
can forces under Washington. 

The eventful campaign of 1781 now really began. 
It was the only year in which American and French 
armies fought effectively side by side ; and through 
their successful cooperation the independence of the 
colonies was forever assured. Not even Rochambeau's 
1 M6m. de Rochambeau, i, 274. 



344 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

judicious course had prevented discontent from spring- 
ing up among the French during the long months of 
inactivity. His army was vegetating in sight of the 
enemy, so said the grumblers ; plunged in idleness, 
with its only employment the monotonous toil of watch- 
ing defences, it was a burden to its allies, consuming 
supplies and rendering no service. The generals dis- 
puted and the soldiers grumbled, the commander was 
reserved and distrustful, the officers were dissatisfied 
and querulous.^ 

Such discontents evaporated when the order for ac- 
tion was at last given. The soldiers had been com- 
fortably lodged, and had suffered little from sickness ; 
their number was not much less than when they had 
landed at Newport almost a year before. At five in the 
morning of June 10, the French broke up the camp 
in which for eleven months they had been stationed ; 
they were taken on boats to Providence, and there at 
nine in the evening the first brigade arrived. At Prov- 
idence they halted for a week, making their camp 
on land adjoining the burying-ground. Washington 
wrote, desiring that the armies should unite for joint 
action as soon as circumstances would admit, and 
thereupon the French began their march toward the 
Hudson. On the 18th the regiment of Bourbonnais, 
and on successive days the Royal Deux-Ponts, Sois- 
sonnais and Saintonge started on their wa^, keeping 
a day's march apart.^ Crowds of friendly onlookers 
cheered them as they went. If the French had as yet 
won no victories for the American cause, they had 
made fast friends of the American people among whom 
they had been stationed. 

^ Count Fersen, Magazine of American History, iii, 304, 375. 
* Baron Cromot-Dubourg's Journal ; Ibid., iv, 293. 



THE FRENCH TROOPS IN AMERICA 345 

On the 23d the van reached Hartford, and the other 
detachments followed in turn. A local paper expresses 
the approval excited by their conduct and their ap- 
pearance : " A finer body of men was never in arms. 
. . . The exact discipline of the troops and the atten- 
tion of the officers to prevent injury to individuals, 
has made the march of this army through the country 
very agreeable to the inhabitants." This good conduct 
was rewarded by a good receiDtion, and they met with 
friendly greetings ; the farmers harnessed up their 
oxen to help the baggage trains at a pinch ; at the 
cider-mills new cider was freely furnished to the 
thirsty soldiers. 

Kochambeau decided that he must stop two days at 
Hartford, in order to mend the broken carriages and 
give a rest to the artillery horses and oxen. The move- 
ment of an army was attended with many difficulties 
in those days, yet the French proceeded, not only in 
good order, but with considerable celerity. The officers 
set an excellent example to the men ; the Vicomte de 
Noailles and the Comte de Custine made the entire dis- 
tance from Providence to the North Eiver on foot, at 
the head of their regiments. The French aristocrats, 
who came over to aid the embattled farmers of Amer- 
ica, had many faults and foibles, but they were good 
soldiers. In eleven days the army marched two hun- 
dred and twenty miles ; the weather was at times very 
hot, but they bore it well, and their commander boasted, 
with good cause, of the fact that perfect order pre- 
vailed ; more than half the officers marched on foot 
with the men; there was no waste and no confusion.^ 

On the 30th the French encamped at Newtown. 
There a courier arrived from Washington, stating that 
1 Rochambeau to S^gur, July 8, 1781 ; Doniol, t, 511. 



346 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

he had planned a surprise of one of the enemy's posts, 
and urging Rochambeau to send on a portion of his 
force with all possible haste.^ In compliance with this 
the Due de Lauzun, with two regiments under his com- 
mand, left Newtown at early dawn on July 4, in order 
to cooperate with the Americans under General Lin- 
coln. Washington hoped to surprise a body of refu- 
gees under Delancey, then encamped at Morrisania, 
but the endeavor proved a failure. The English had 
received some intimation of the plan, and they were 
not taken by surprise. There was a little skirmishing 
with a trifling loss. The refugee corps made its escape 
and nothing of importance was accomplished. Lauzun 
mildly criticized Lincoln's movements ; ^ some of the 
Americans suggested that Lauzun, with all his zeal, 
did not reach the appointed place quite on time. But 
Washington was prompt to recognize the celerity with 
which his allies had come at his request, and he never 
forgot to express an ample though judicious commen- 
dation. He now issued a general order thanking Lau- 
zun, his officers and men, for the extraordinary zeal 
they had displayed in their rapid march and prompt 
action.^ The commendation was well deserved; it was 
no one's fault that the English succeeded in escaping. 
To Rochambeau he wrote that, while he had not been 
so fortunate as to succeed according to his wish, yet 
from the opportunity to reconnoitre the enemy's posi- 
tion he hoped some benefit would result. 

On July 5 Rochambeau met Washington at White 
Plains, and the two armies were at last united. Wash- 

^ Washington to Rochambeau, June 30, 1781 ; Writings of Wash- 
ington. Ford's ed., ix, 288. 

^ Balch, The French in America, etc., i, 1.55. 

^ General Order, July 3, 1781 ; Writings of Washington, Ford's ed., 
ix, 295. 



THE FRENCH TROOPS IN AMERICA 347 

ington gave fitting recognition of this important event. 
In a general order he expressed his thanks to the 
Comte de Rochambeau for the unremitting zeal with 
which he had prosecuted his march, in order to form 
the long-wished-for junction between the French and 
the American forces. It was, as he truly said, an event 
from which the happiest consequences were to be 
expected ; the future was to show that such expecta- 
tions would be more than realized. 

The impression produced was favorable on both 
sides. The fatigue of a long and hot march did not 
injure the brilliant appearance of the French regi- 
ments. The contrasts of white and pink, of blue and 
green, the well-setting long coats, the three-cornered 
hats, all had a pleasing aspect, and the manoeuvres of 
the men were as precise as their dress. The French 
were well impressed, if not by the clothes, at least by 
the soldierly qualities of their new associates. The 
American regiments had no regular uniform, but their 
clothes were kept clean, their discipline was good, they 
supported heat and fatigue with ease. Their table 
equijjments were the simple ones to which they had 
become accustomed by years of simple fare, varied at 
times by no fare at all. " Their cooking gives them 
little trouble," writes the Abbe Robin, ^ " they are sat- 
isfied to broil their meat and cook their corn-cake in 
the ashes." 

The army now numbered about ten thousand men, 
composed equally of French and Americans. The 
American forces rested on the Hudson, while the 
French were at their left, their line reaching to the 

^ Abb^ Claude Robin, Nouveau Voyage dans V Amiriqut Septentri- 
onale dans I'annie 1781, et campagne de Varm^e du Comte de Rocham- 
beau. 



348 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Bronx. Rochambeau's headquarters were at Hart's 
Corners, near where the line of the Harlem Railroad 
was subsequently built. 

Dinners to the officers were frequently given, and 
the difference in customs furnished the opportunity 
for some criticism. The French commissary, naturally 
critical in such matters, writes of a dinner given by 
Washington, that it was served in the American fash- 
ion and abundantly provided, but vegetables, beef, 
lamb, chickens, salad dressed with only vinegar, peas, 
pudding, and pie were all put on the table at the same 
time.^ "They gave," he says, "on the same plate, 
meat, vegetables, and salad." The dinner was served 
in Washington's tent, and this, in part, may excuse 
serving many viands together ; but after more than a 
century of development, the Americans are still infe- 
rior to the French in the judicious division of courses. 

If the order of the dinner was faulty, the manners 
of the host made amends. Critical French officers re- 
cognized the distinction of Washington's bearing and 
felt the dignity of his presence. " He received us," 
writes one of Rochambeau's aides on July 5, " with 
the affability which is natural to him and depicted on 
his countenance. . . . His physiognomy is noble in 
the highest degree, and his manners are those of one 
perfectly accustomed to society, a rare thing cer- 
tainly in America."^ "In his private conduct," says de 
Broglie, " he preserves that polite and attentive good 
breeding which satisfies every one and offends nobody. 
He is a foe to ostentation and vainglory." "Brave 
without temerity, . . . generous without prodigality, 

1 Catholic World, xi, 797. 

"^ Dubourg's Journal, July 5, 1781 ; Magazine of American History, 



THE FRENCH TROOPS IN AMERICA 349 

. . . virtuous without severity," says the academician, 
Chastellux,^ 

The manners of our ancestors seemed provincial to 
the habitues of Versailles, and doubtless they were so ; 
but the French admitted that if few of our officers had 
the tone of polite society, and none of the men could 
compare in appearance with the regiments of Bour- 
bonnais and Royal Deux-Ponts, they had the essential 
qualities of good soldiers. "The American army . . ." 
writes the same observer, " seemed to me to be in as 
good order as possible for an army composed of men 
without uniforms and with narrow resources. The 
Rhode Island regiment, among others, is extremely 
fine." And he adds a few days later: " I was aston- 
ished at the manner in which they march; perfect 
silence and order reigned, to which they added the 
greatest possible celerity. . . . An American regi- 
ment was sent forward to capture a Redoubt and 
marched under the fire of the cannon in the best style 
possible." ^ 

The two armies were now united, but no movement 
of importance was attempted. Washington and Ro- 
chambeau frequently conferred, occasional skirmishes 
furnished some slight excitement, but this was all. 
On July 18 the generals, with an escort of one hun- 
dred and fifty men, crossed the Hudson at Dobbs 
Ferry, and from the Palisades observed the island on 
which stood the little town that has since become the 
greatest commercial city of the world. But no oppor- 
tunity for a successful assault revealed itself. 

^ Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America in the Years 
1780, 1781, 1782, i, 137 (ed. 1787). 

2 Dubourg's Journal, June 7 and July 22 ; Magazine of American 
History, iv, 299, 302. 



350 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

On the night of the 21st, a reconnoissance in force 
was attempted. At eight in the evening five thousand 
French and Americans were under marching orders 
and slowly advanced during the night. At five in 
the morning they met at Valentine's Hill, four miles 
from King's Bridge. The Connecticut militia and 
the regiment of Soissonnais, Lincoln and Waterbury, 
the Due de Lauzun and the Marquis de Chastellux, 
farmers' sons and the descendants of a feudal aristo- 
cracy, moved side by side, scouring the country around 
Morrisania and beyond. A few of the French soldiers 
forgot that the territory which they passed through 
was not a hostile land and indulged in plundering, 
but they were severely punished by their own officers. 
At Harlem Creek Rochambeau met with an experience 
new to him in his forty years of service. The recon- 
noissance was pushed on to Frog's Neck, and on the 
return the tide had risen and the bridge was down. 
The officers crossed in boats, while the horses were 
driven in a crowd and, following one or two leaders, 
swam across. The sight was a novel one to Rocham- 
beau, who likened it to the movement of a great herd 
of wild horses.^ 

The wildness of the country and the novelty of 
the modes of warfare gave to these western campaigns 
an indescribable charm for many of the French sol- 
diers. They were familiar with military movements in 
Flanders and by the Rhine, in a thickly populated 
country, and with great cities scattered about ; with 
marches over well-built highways, some of which had 
been first constructed for the use of Roman legions ; 
they were accustomed to the evolutions that were 

^ M4m. de Rochambeau ; Balch, The French in America, etc., i, 162. 
Washington's Diary ; Writings of Washington, Ford's ed., ix, 311. 



THE FRENCH TROOPS IN AMERICA 351 

possible where means of communication were perfect, 
where well-drilled soldiers could march in order over 
a finished country. They now found themselves amid 
very different surroundings. The people and their 
customs bore little resemblance to the peasantry of 
France or Germany, to the burghers of the Low 
Countries or the dwellers in sunny Italy. There was 
small chance for the tactics of Turenne or Vauban, 
where armies had to labor over almost impassable 
roads or make their way through primeval forests. It 
was necessary to learn lessons from the craft of the 
Indian, to avail one's self of the resourcefulness of 
the pioneer. Those who endeavored to carry on war 
in America on the model of a European campaign 
met with the disastrous overthrow of Braddock and 
Burgoyne. New phases of nature had to be encoun- 
tered, new problems in warfare solved, new privations 
borne, new difficulties overcome. 

Our French allies met these novel conditions with 
cheerfulness and skill. Occasionally some officer 
grumbled because the roads were impassable and his 
food was uneatable, but most of them found a relish 
in privations and enjoyed the campaigning. The men 
were equally philosophical in their trials and zealous 
in their service. To have served in the American war 
furnished a richer food for memory than to have 
fought by the Rhine and been defeated under Sou- 
bise. The abundant journals and memoirs in which 
our visitors told of their adventures disclose not only 
the enjoyment which they found in fighting anywhere, 
but the special pleasure they found in fighting by the 
swamps of the James and the banks of the Hudson. 

The reconnoissance led to no important action, and 
the allies and the English continued to watch each 



352 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

other without daring to hazard a battle. Some of the 
French officers complained because no definite plan 
was formed, because the movements of the army were 
slow and Washington seemed fluctuating in his pur- 
poses. He could be nothing else. It was impossible, 
he said to Eochambeau, in the uncertainty in which 
they were, to fix on a definite plan of campaign ; their 
measures must depend on circumstances, and on the 
situation of the enemy at the time of de Grasse's ar- 
rival. 

He wrote in his diary on July 19: "I could not but 
acknowledge that the uncertainties under which we 
labour, — the few men who have joined, . . . and 
the ignorance in which I am kept by some of the 
states on whom I mostly depend, — especially Massa- 
chusetts, from whose governor I have not received a 
line since I addressed him from Weathersfield on the 
23rd of May last, — rendered it impracticable for me 
to do more than to prepare, first, for the enterprise 
against New York as agreed to at Weathersfield, — 
and, secondly, for the relief of the southern states, if, 
after all my efforts and earnest application ... it 
should be found at the arrival of Count de Grasse 
that I had neither men nor means adequate to the 
first object."^ 

The anticipations of any successful operation against 
New York were fast disappearing. Washington had 
been more hopeful of capturing the city than his 
French allies, and his disappointment was correspond- 
ingly greater. " We would have been in readiness to 
commence operations against New York," he wrote 
on August 1, "if the states had furnished their quo- 

1 Washington's Diary, July 20 ; Magazine of American History, vi, 
122. 



THE FRENCH TROOPS IN AMERICA 353 

tas, agreeable to my requisitions." Unfortunately, 
they had been far fi'om complying with the requests 
of the commander-in-chief, and not one half the men 
needed and asked for had joined the army. 

He wrote the governors of the four New England 
states, calling on them in vigorous terms to complete 
their battalions, and to adopt effective means for 
furnishing supplies to their troops during the cam- 
paign. Unless they filled their battalions, he said, the 
result would be an inactive and inglorious campaign, 
and at that critical moment such a thing would be 
ruinous.* But these appeals met with very insufficient 
response. There was indeed little encouragement to 
enter the service ; more as a result of vicious legisla- 
tion than from any exhaustion of the national re- 
sources, the finances of the country were in a condi- 
tion of collapse, the absence of any central authority 
left the army dependent upon the exertions of the 
states, and these were either slack in performance or 
unsuccessful in accomplishment. 

"In view of this," Washington writes, "I turned 
my thoughts more seriously than before to southward." 
He had long contemplated transferring the seat of 
war to the South, and on August 2 he wrote to Morris, 
the superintendent of finance, suggesting the possi- 
bility of a movement to Virginia, and asking that ves- 
sels and supplies might be prepared for that contin- 
gency.2 

The English, meanwhile, wishing to gather their 
army where the allies were to make a serious attack, 
executed various manoeuvres, and each side was mys- 

1 Writings of Washington, Sparks'a ed., viii, 124. 

2 Ibid., 122. 



354 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

tified as to the purposes of the other. A plentiful crop 
of deserters furnished either army with information 
more or less accurate. On July 30 news was brought 
to the American camp that Cornwallis, with a strong 
detachment from the forces in Virginia, had arrived 
at New York. This was important, but it proved not 
to be true. The arrivals were the garrison from Pensa- 
cola, captured by the Spanish and sent to New York 
on parole. But on August 11 the long-expected rein- 
forcements from Europe reached their destination. 
Three thousand Hessians, thirteen weeks out from 
Bremen, landed at New York and were added to Sir 
Henry Clinton's army. He now had eleven thousand 
men, and the defenders of New York were more nu- 
merous than the forces that hoped to capture the city. 
On August 13 news of this arrival reached Wash- 
ington, but still more important information was to 
settle his plans and bring on the crisis of the war. It 
had been uncertain as to when, and where, de Grasse 
would make his appearance. Rochambeau had advised 
him to sail to Chesapeake Bay, but it was possible 
he might proceed directly to New York, and lookouts 
watched from the Jersey Heights, expecting any day 
that the French fleet might be seen sailing up the 
New York harbor. On the 14th of August information 
reached Washington that the fleet under the Comte 
de Grasse had sailed for Chesapeake Bay, and it 
shortly after arrived there. 



CHAPTEK XIX 

THE EXPEDITION OF DE GRASSE 

We must now follow the fortunes of the expedition 
which had sailed from France under the command of 
the Comte de Grasse, and which was to exercise a 
decisive influence on the fortunes of the American 
Revolution. 

The count was a member of one of the oldest 
French families. They traced their line back to a 
Prince of Antibes in the tenth century, and boasted 
that members of their family had intermarried with 
many royal houses. They had, at all events, a long 
and honorable ancestry, and their forefathers had 
for centuries acquitted themselves with valor in the 
wars in which France took part. Francois Joseph de 
Grasse was born in 1723, in the chateau of Bar, on a 
property that had belonged to his ancestors for five 
hundred years. His father was a captain in the army, 
but the son sought his fortune in the marine. In that 
service he worked his way with success, though with- 
out special distinction, and he was a captain when 
war was declared between France and England. He 
served under d'Estaing in the West Indies, and in 
1781 was selected as commander of the expedition 
to be sent to America. His enemies asserted that he 
owed this command to court intrigues rather than to 
past service ; his friends declared that he assumed it 
unwillingly and only by the express order of Louis 



356 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

XVI.^ However this may be, the expedition was to 
bring him permanent fame, and yet to involve the re- 
mainder of his life in unhappiness and disgrace. 

Active preparations were made to equip the new 
fleet, and it was a more formidable reinforcement 
than any of those which the French had thus far sent 
to the assistance of their American allies. 

The fleet sailed from Brest on Thursday, March 22, 
1781. Privateers were so numerous that merchant 
ships delayed long for an opportunity to proceed 
under convoy; no less than two hundred and fifty 
sail, with cargoes valued in all at thirty million livres, 
accompanied the expedition. On the 29th of March, 
forty of them parted from the rest and proceeded to 
the East Indies under the guard of five men-of-war. 
Later, on April 5, the Sagittaire, with a convoy of 
forty sail, steered for Boston and reached there in 
safety. But the rest of the merchant ships were bound 
for the West Indies, and they proved a serious im- 
pediment to any rapid movement of the fleet. Before 
they reached their destination, each of the men-of- 
war had a merchantman in tow.^ 

The fleet proceeded without interference from storm 
or the enemy, and on April 28 the mountains of Mar- 
tinique were sighted. The chronicler of the expedition 
expresses a relief which was probably felt by many of 
his companions : " What a vast desert does not the 

1 See The Operations of the French Fleet under the Count de Grasse in 
1781-2, as described in Two Contemporaneous Journals (New York, 
1864), 27, 28, 139. The author of the first Journal, the Chevalier de 
Goussencourt, asserts that de Grasse "obtained the command by 
his intrigues at court ; the second diarist," an ojBBcer in the Naval 
Army in America, says that the count accepted the command reluc- 
tantly. The volume cited is number 3 of the publications of the 
" Bradford Club." 

2 Operations of the French Fleet, etc., 30, 32, 34. 



THE EXPEDITION OF DE GRASSE 357 

solitude of the sea then present ! . . . What a secret 
pain does not a man then experience who, accustomed 
to live with his f ellowmen, lives but with the fish ! " ^ 

These gloomy reflections were dispelled by the sight 
of land, and, to increase the pleasure of the young 
Frenchmen, who were spoiling for a fight, they found 
themselves at once engaged off Martinique, with the 
English fleet under Hood. The combat was of short 
duration, and it was not followed by any action of im- 
portance.^ The West Indies were the chief object of 
de Grasse's cruise, and any expedition to the United 
States was regarded as of secondary interest. But as 
matter of fact, the fleet accomplished little during its 
first stay among the islands, and met with serious dis- 
aster in the year following, while the expedition to the 
Chesapeake ended a long and momentous contest. 

The future importance of the West Indies was then 
much overestimated. These fertile tropical islands 
were more considered than the colder and less allur- 
ing mainland, and both France and Spain attached 
great weight to their possession. Moreover, the French 
West Indies were enjoying an unprecedented season 
of prosperity, which naturally encouraged great hopes 
for the future. San Domingo was then an important 
possession of France. It has since come under colored 
rule, and from the accounts given by members of the 
French fleet of its former condition, we can see how 
lamentable a decline the island has suffered as a result. 

At Cap Francois the fleet had their headquarters. 
It was then regarded as the most agreeable town of 
the West Indies, the Paris of the islands. It was the 
handsomest and, next to Havana, the richest city; 

1 Operations of the French Fleet, etc., 39, 40, 41, 140. 

2 Ibid., 42-45, 141-147. 



358 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

regularly laid out, built largely of stone, and enjoying 
lucrative trade. In the French portion of San Do- 
mingo there were excellent roads over which an active 
commerce was carried on, and the island aspired to 
become a rival of Jamaica in its products. Luxury 
under a hot sun had indeed brought its frequent re- 
sult in a low morality. Some of the rich planters paid 
six and seven thousand francs for handsome mulatto 
girls, a great price for that period. The prosperity of 
this region has departed, without, it is to be feared, 
any improvement in its morality. Cape Haytien, to 
use its present name, has now hardly a quarter of the 
population of a century ago, and the whole island has 
sunk into anarchy and barbarism. 

The English were not anxious for an engagement, 
and the French could not compel one, because the 
English ships were the better sailers. The French 
captured the unimportant island of Tobago, and the 
months passed uneventfully until the Comte de Grasse 
was ready to unite his forces with Rochambeau and 
the American army. 

The count had not been unmindful of his instruc- 
tions to attempt some enterprise for the relief of the 
American colonies ; even before he reached the West 
Indies he wrote Rochambeau, saying that by the end 
of June he wished to be fully informed as to the 
strength and position of the English armies in North 
America, as a guide for his future action. Not before 
the middle of July could he leave the West Indies, 
and as the time for his stay on the American coast 
must be short, it was important for him to have full 
information at the earliest possible moment.^ The time 
required for communication between these widely sep- 

1 De Grasse to Rochambeau, March 29, 1781 ; Doniol, v, 488. 



THE EXPEDITION OF DE GRASSE 359 

arated forces added to the difficulty of the situation. 
De Grasse wrote on March 29. Not until the 10th 
of June did the convoy by which the letter was sent 
reach Boston, after many vicissitudes and much bad 
weather. 

Immediately after the conference at Wethersfield, 
Rochambeau communicated to de Grasse the views 
held by Washington and himself. On May 28 he wrote 
saying that, as it was impossible for the fleet under 
the Comte de Barras to transport the French army to 
Chesapeake Bay, a movement against New York had 
been decided upon, in the hope of capturing the city 
or at least of relieving the situation in the southern 
states. After dwelling on the insufficiency of the army 
for any important movement, he added : " Such is the 
crisis in which America, and especially the southern 
states, are now involved. The arrival of the Comte de 
Grasse may save the situation. The resources which we 
have can accomplish nothing without his assistance, 
and the naval superiority which he can furnish us. 
There are two points where the enemy can be attacked \ 
the Chesapeake, and New York. . . . You will proba- 
bly prefer Chesapeake Bay, and it is there we think 
you can render the greatest service." To this he added 
a request that de Grasse would bring with him soldiers 
as well as ships. The American and French armies 
united would not exceed twelve thousand men, and if 
de Grasse could bring five or six thousand soldiers and 
a million livres, of which the need was almost as great, 
he would render invaluable assistance.^ 

On the receipt of de Grasse's letter of March, Ro- 
chambeau at once despatched another communication, 

1 Rochambeau to de Grasse, May 28 and 31, June 6, 1781 ; Doniol, 
V, 475. 



360 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

in which he portrayed the needs of the situation in 
gloomy but truthful colors. He sought to impress on 
de Grasse the necessity for prompt relief in men and 
money. He informed the admiral of the contemplated 
advance on New York, and then added : " I ought not 
to conceal from you that these people are at the end 
of their resources ; Washington will not have half the 
troops he counted upon, and I believe, although he 
conceals the fact, that he has not now six thousand 
men. . . . Such is an actual picture of the lamentable 
condition of the forces in this country. ... It is, 
therefore, of the greatest importance that you take in 
your ships the largest number of soldiers possible ; 
four or five thousand will be none too many. ... I 
am certain you will assure us maritime superiority, but 
I cannot tell you too often to bring us also soldiers 
and money." ^ " You can see," he wrote again, '\how 
necessary it is that you bring troops with you. This 
country is in extremity ; all its resources have failed at 
once; Continental paper has become worthless." 

Eochambeau had advised that the French fleet should 
proceed to Chesapeake Bay, but in a postscript he said 
that a letter of La Luzerne's indicated that Washing- 
ton preferred that de Grasse should first make land at 
the Hook before New York, in order, if possible, to 
cut off the squadron under Arbuthnot. " I yield, there- 
fore," he added, " as is proper, my opinion to his ; al- 
though the latest information tells us that the enemy's 
squadron, after anchoring a few days off the Hook, has 
sailed for the South." 

While Washington regarded the capture of New 
York as the most serious blow that could be inflicted 
on the English, he recognized its difficulty and was 
1' Rochambeau to de Grasse, June 11, 17S1 ; Doniol, v, 489. 



THE EXPEDITION OF DE GRASSE 361 

ready to adopt other plans which his associates favored 
and which promised good results. Two days later he 
wrote Rochambeau saying that, while New York had 
been considered the only practicable object, other op- 
portunities might present themselves. He then sug- 
gested that it might be well to leave de Grasse, in view 
of all the information he had, to decide for himself 
where he should first make land.^ 

This letter was forwarded, and the French admiral 
was left to govern his own conduct as he deemed most 
judicious. He decided ou the Chesapeake, and there 
can be no doubt that he decided wisely. No one, in- 
deed, could foresee that Cornwallis would allow him- 
self to be captured with such ease ; it might well have 
been expected that Clinton and the English fleet would 
make vigorous efforts to furnish him succor ; but in 
any event the chance of impoi'tant success was much 
better in Virginia than in New York. It is unlikely 
that the forces under Clinton could have been forced 
to surrender, even by the junction of an army and fleet 
as large as that which beleaguered Yorktown. An at- 
tempt to capture New York in the short time that de 
Grasse could be absent from the West Indies would 
probably have failed, and the campaign of 1781 have 
ended in disaster. The French might have wearied of 
an inglorious war, and the history of the American 
Revolution have been different. 

An additional difficulty in a movement against New 
York was the uncertainty whether de Grasse's boats 
could get into the harbor. The passage was intricate 
and the bar would not allow the entrance of the great 
ships which now sail past Sandy Hook. The French 
boats were heavier than the English and drew more 
— 1 Washington to Rochambeau, June 13, 1781 ; Doniol, v, 491. 



362 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

water. When d'Estaing made his luckless cruise, he 
was stopped at Sandy Hook, and not by any promise 
of money could he hire pilots who would undertake to 
guide his ships over the bar. Clinton was confident 
that de Grasse would be stopped by the same obstacles 
as was d'Estaing ; those long-legged French ships, he 
said, could never get over the bar. 

But de Grasse followed Rochambeau's suggestion 
and decided to proceed to the Chesapeake, there to take 
part in whatever enterprise might be decided upon. 
On the 28th of July he wrote Rochambeau a letter in 
which, referring to the appeals made upon him for 
help, he said : " I see with regret the distress in which 
the American continent is involved, and the necessity 
for the prompt succor which you ask." He then an- 
nounced the steps which he had taken, and that on 
August 13 his fleet would sail for Chesapeake Bay, and 
in addition would carry three thousand French soldiers 
from San Domingo, under the command of the Marquis 
de Saint-Simon. " This destination," he added, " seems 
to be indicated to me by you and by Washington, 
Luzerne, and Barras as the best fitted to secure the 
advantages which you wish to obtain." When they 
arrived at Chesapeake Bay they would await further 
orders, but their assistance must necessarily be brief ; 
the soldiers were borrowed and must be returned ; his 
own fleet must soon sail back to southern waters. By 
the 15th of October they must all start on their return. 
" Employ me promptly and usefully that time may be 
turned to profit. . . . You will appreciate the neces- 
sity of employing well time that is precious." ^ 
1 De Grasse to Rochambeau, July 18, 1781 ; Doniol, v, 520. 



CHAPTER XX 

THE TORKTOWN EXPEDITION 

On the 14th of August the momentous letter of the 
Comte de Grasse reached Washington's headquarters. 
The situation required immediate decision, upon which 
might depend, and in fact did depend, the result of 
the war. When the letter arrived de Grasse's fleet 
was already under sail, and in two months they would 
start on their return. But during that brief period 
the allies would have an army of considerable strength, 
supported by a preponderance on the sea which they 
had not before enjoyed during the war. The possi- 
bilities were great and the time was exceedingly 
brief. 

There was no delay in deciding on the course to 
pursue. For de Grasse to reach New York would con- 
sume some of the brief space of time he had at his 
disposal; there might be trouble at the bar, and there 
was a certainty of meeting an English army, hardly 
inferior to that of the allies even after the arrival of 
de Grasse's troops. In the mean time, Cornwallis, pro- 
ceeding in his injudicious campaign in Virginia, and 
relying on the naval superiority of the English, was 
placing himself in a position that might be fatal when 
he should be attacked by a superior army on land, 
assisted by a powerful fleet at sea. When the critical 
hour came the decision was quickly made. On the 
day the letter was received, Washington entered in 
his diary that the shortness of de Grasse's stay, the 



364 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

disinclination of the French officers to force the har- 
bor of New York, and the feeble compliance of the 
states with his demands for men, had compelled him 
to abandon his idea of taking New York, and he 
should cooperate with the French in a campaign in 
Virginia. On the next day a messenger was de- 
spatched to La Fayette, urging him to do all in his 
power to prevent Cornwallis from retreating into the 
Carolinas.^ 

The utmost celerity was required. The soldiers must 
march or be transported over three hundred and fifty 
miles, capture a hostile army, and all within two 
months. Such a march was a formidable undertaking 
in days when there were no means of rapid communi- 
cation, and yet, if modern inventions would have 
rendered the enterprise easier, they would also have 
prevented its success. It took a long time to go from 
the Hudson to the James, but the news of Washing- 
ton's approach could be kept from the victim in a 
way that would now be impossible. No telegraph wires 
informed Cornwallis of the dangers by which he was 
threatened, and such information as could have been 
given was delayed by the masterly way in which 
Washington concealed his purpose from Sir Henry 
Clinton. 

Clinton had long been convinced that New York 
was the objective point of Washington's campaign, 
and in this he was perfectly correct ; if he was slow 
to discover that changed circumstances had caused a 
change in the plan, every effort was made to conceal 
the truth from him. The soldiers were actively en- 
gaged in repairing roads that might be required in 
an advance on New York ; at Chatham, near Staten 
^ Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed., viii, 134, 127. 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 365 

Island, the French were busy erecting large bakeries, 
apparently to be used in the siege of the city.^ 

All, except those favored with Washington's confi- 
dence, were uncertain as to what the next movement 
would be. In a letter of one of the French officers, on 
August 15, it is noted : " Those who hoped we were 
going to Virginia begin to fear they have been 
deceived; the roads below here have been repaired 
towards New York ; orders have also been given to 
repair those on the other side towards Staten Island, 
and even to build ovens there. . . . What to believe ! 
This resembles the scenes at a theatre ; the interest and 
uncertainty of the spectators constantly increase." ^ 

The first movement was entirely consistent with an 
attack upon New York, and did not enlighten Clinton 
as to Washington's plans. The allied army was en- 
camped round Dobbs Ferry and White Plains. A 
change to the other side of the river might well indi- 
cate an intention to move toward Staten Island and 
cooperate with de Grasse when his fleet reached New 
York from the South. On August 19 the entire 
French army, about five thousand men, and two V 
thousand American troops marched to King's Ferry 
and prepared to cross the Hudson. The remainder of 
the American forces, some three thousand men, were 
left under General Heath. His duty was important and 
difficult; he was, so long as possible, to keep up the 
illusion that a strong force was before New York, and 
when that was removed, he must guard against a pos- 
sible attack from an army much larger than his own.' 

1 Washingrton's Journal, Aug-. IS ; Henry P. Johnston, The York- 
town Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis, 88. 

2 Abb^ Claude Robin, Nouveau Voyage, etc., 75. 

8 Memoirs of William Heath, Wilson's ed., 314, 315. 



366 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

King's Ferry was about eight miles below Peeks- 
kill, and Washington declared it to be the best and 
only passage of the river for his army below the 
Highlands. At two o'clock in the morning of August 
20 the American forces began to cross, and by the 
night of the 21st they were safely over. It was a more 
serious undertaking to transport the French army. 
They were more numerous, they had more baggage," 
and they had heavy siege-trains. On the 19th rain 
fell in torrents, and when the French halted for the 
night half of their wagons were in the rear, stuck in 
the mud. Not until the 22d were they encamped on 
the brow of the hill at King's Ferry overlooking the 
river. ^ All the ferry-boats that could be impressed in 
the cause were kept busy. The weather was fine and 
the sight was an imposing one. A large number of 
boats were constantly crossing, bearing French sol- 
diers arrayed in full military attire. They were com- 
manded by the flower of the ancient French nobility, 
the reading of whose names, as has been said, sounds 
like a page from the chronicles of Froissart. 

Not until the 26th was the entire army on the west 
side of the river. Washington superintended the cross- 
ing, watching the operation from Verplanck's Point. 
He was, wrote one of the officers, " manifestly elated 
at the spectacle ; he seemed to see a better destiny 
arising as he watched the French army embarking on 
this expedition." ^ Weakened as his own army was, and 
destitute of resources, this joint enterprise promised 
the great success which was sorely needed. 

Washington's headquarters were at a stately man- 

^ Dubourg's Journal, Aug. 19-22; Magazine of American History, 
iv, 306-307. 

* Blanchard's Journal ; Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign, etc., 89. 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 367 

sion, which had been the scene of Arnold's plot for 
the surrender of West Point, and had gained the op- 
probrious title of Treason House. It stood on a table- 
land, overlooking the Hudson for many miles. There 
he invited Roehambeau to breakfast when the French 
commander had crossed the Hudson, and on the high 
land about the house the French troops made their 
camps as they arrived on the west side of the river. 

No sooner was the crossing completed than the 
allied armies resumed the march, but their move- 
ments were consistent with an advance upon New 
York. On the 27th the French officers were still de- 
bating whether the object was Staten Island or Paulus 
Hook, opposite New York, where Jersey City now 
stands. By the 29th the pretence could be sustained 
no longer, and, turning its back on New York, the 
army marched with all possible despatch to Philadel- 
phia. From King's Ferry to Philadelphia was one 
hundred and thirty miles, and on September 2 the 
army entered that city. 

The French occupied the right of the position and 
marched through Somerset Court House, Princeton, 
and Trenton, moving with rapidity and making about 
fifteen miles a day. The visitors expressed their ap- 
proval of the country through which they passed. The 
roads were good, the foliage rich, the climate exhilarat- 
ing, existence was a delight on those bracing plains ; 
the farms were large, cattle plentiful, and fruit, espe- 
cially peaches, were abundant. The land needed ma- 
nure, but apparently little else was required to make 
of Jersey an earthly paradise. The country was chiefly 
inhabited by Dutch, nearly all of whom were rich. The 
women who brought provisions to camp were adorned 
with jewelry, and their wagons, driven by themselves, 



368 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

were generally drawn by two or three spirited horses.* 
Princeton they found a well-built town, pleasantly sit- 
uated, with a fine college, attended by fifty students. 
Trenton, though not as pleasant, was a larger place ; 
it contained one hundred houses, while Princeton had 
only about sixty. 

The level plains of New Jersey seem to have been 
more agreeable to our visitors than scenery which tour- 
ists now come from all the world to view. The taste for 
the picturesque, and certainly the taste for wild scen- 
ery, was little developed in the last century. One of 
the visitors praises the banks of the Delaware and says, 
by way of commendation, that they presented nothing 
of the sombre and savage aspect of the banks of the 
Hudson.^ 

The commanding officers had ridden ahead, and on 
August 30 Washington, accompanied by Rochambeau 
and Chastellux, entered Philadelphia. They were 
received with fitting honors. The object of the march 
had ceased to be a mystery, and the city was excited 
to an unusual degree of enthusiasm. On Thursday, 
says the "Packet," the commander-in-chief, Rocham- 
beau, and their suites, were received by the militia 
light horse and escorted into the town. They dined 
with the Superintendent of Finance, and the ships 
lying in port fired salutes as the toasts were drunk, to 
the United States and His August Majesty, to the 
allied armies, and the speedy arrival of the Comte de 
Grasse.^ 

On September 3 the first division of the French 

^ Dubourg's Journal, Aug., 1781 ; Magazine of American History, 
W, 376. 

2 Robin, Nouveau Voyage, etc., 84. 

^ Diary of Morris, Aug. 30 ; Diplomatic Correspondence, Sparks's 
ed., xi, 462; Frank Moore's Diary of the American Revolution, 1002. 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 369 

army marched througli the city, and the second divi- 
sion entered on the following day. It was an inspiring 
sight ; the veteran regiment of Soissonnais, brilliant 
in pink trimmings and grenadier hats with white 
plumes floating in the air, astonished, so we are told, 
and doubtless also delighted the beauties of the town. 
The soldiers paraded in the presence of Congress, and 
the President of that body, not versed in the etiquette 
of the great world, asked if he should return their 
salute. Being informed that the French King was ac- 
customed to salute his troops with kindness, the Pre- 
sident profited by the royal example, for the "Packet " 
tells us that he took off his hat and bowed in return 
for every salute of officers and standards. The sol- 
diers, so the paper continues, presented a most martial 
and grand appearance, and it adds with the fervor of 
the period, that the spectators were filled with grati- 
tude to that noble prince, the soldier's king. "Angels," 
wrote the enthusiastic editor, "envy him his acquired 
glory." 1 

On the 5th of September there was a review of the 
French soldiers that was attended by a great crowd. 
Twenty thousand people watched the evolutions, 
which were performed with the utmost precision. The 
President of Congress was there ; but he had not ad- 
vised with the French about his dress, as he did in 
regard to the salutes, and he was arrayed in a long 
black velvet coat, which they found very extraordinary. 

In the evening a great banquet was given by La 
Luzerne, the French minister. He entertained in 
princely fashion ; covers were laid for eighty guests, 
and at the dinner there was a diversion that could be 

^ Dubourg's Journal ; Magazine of American History, iv, 383 and 
V, 15 ; Packet. Sept., 1781. 



V 



370 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

provided at few banquets. " Hardly were we seated," 
writes one of the guests, " when a courier arrived. 
An unquiet silence prevailed among all the guests. 
All eyes were fixed on the Chevalier de La Luzerne, 
each one sought to divine in advance what the news 
might be. ' Thirty-six ships of the line,' he said, ' com- 
manded by the Comte de Grasse, are in Chesapeake 
Bay, and three thousand troops have disembarked and 
are now in communication with the Marquis de La 
Fayette." ^ 

The toasts were drunk with renewed vigor when the 
great news was announced, every one was filled with de- 
light, our impatient warriors counted the time when 
they should be face to face with the enemy. 

Philadelphia was then the largest city in America, 
and even those accustomed to European capitals found 
in it much to admire. The population was about forty 
thousand, the buildings were good, the streets broad 
and straight, and they were even provided with side- 
walks. The shops were numerous and richly supplied. 
Some of the brick buildings on Market Street were 
of such proportions that the visitors called them im- 
mense.^ 

The town was s6en at its best. The citizens had 
been fairly cordial in their treatment of the English 
army ; the intense patriotism which at Boston scowled 
at invaders, was less pronounced in the City of Bro- 
therly Love. Still, the prevailing spirit was loyal to 
the American cause, and the allied army was now 
greeted with genuine enthusiasm ; even those who 
were not stirred by patriotic fervor were pleased at 

1 Robin, Nouveau Voyage, etc., 90; also in Granite Monthly, iv, 425. 

2 Dubourg's Journal, Sept. 1, 1781 ; Magazine of American History, 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 371 

the good order, the good discipline, and the good 
clothes of the French allies.^ The interest was greater 
because the object of the march was generally under- 
stood, and even the boys in the streets knew that 
Washington and the French soldiers had started to 
capture Cornwallis. Secrecy was no longer enjoined, 
as there was no danger of information being trans- 
mitted to Yorktown. The news of the arrival of de 
Grasse's fleet soon spread through the town ; it aroused 
enthusiasm among the patriotic, and furnished excite- 
ment to all. 

Washington and Rocharabeau did not wait for all 
these reviews and dinners, but pushed on, eager to 
reach the Head of Elk and embark the army for its 
destination. On September 5 the first division of the 
French army arrived at Chester. Rochambeau took 
a boat down the Delaware, and, as he approached, 
Washington was on the bank waving his hand. The 
news of de Grasse's arrival had reached him, and he 
was aroused to a degree of elation very rare in him. 
All were impressed by an excitement so unlike his 
habitual reserve. " He threw off his character as 
arbiter of his country," writes the Comte de Deux- 
Ponts; "a child whose wishes had been satisfied could 
not have expressed a more lively sensation of pleas- 
ure." The good news was soon known by all, the 
prospect of capturing Cornwallis excited both officers 
and privates, and all were sanguine of the result. 

Even at this critical time the need of money threat- V v' 
ened to check effective operations, and only from the 
French could it be obtained. The American treasury 
was bare of anything except debts and paper currency. 

^ Magazine of American History, v, 13-18 ; Thacher, A Military 
Journal, etc. (1827 ed.), 264. 



372 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The small army which Washington still had under his 
command was eager for the southern expedition, and 
well qualified for the work, but it was in serious need 
both of supplies and money. On the 17th of August 
Washington wrote Morris, saying it would be neces- 
sary to give the American troops destined for southern 
service a month's pay in specie. To this Morris re- 
plied that he had none to give, and though he would 
make every exertion, he was not sanguine of success.* 

On the 27th Washington wrote again asking that 
deposits of flour, salt, meat, and rum might be made 
at the Head of Elk, and entreating that the troops 
under his command might receive one month's pay in 
specie. Part of them, he added, had not been paid 
anything for a long time, they were going on a disa- 
greeable service, and a little hard money would put 
them in a proper temper. As was so often the case, 
the money which the states failed to raise was fur- 
nished by their good ally the King of France. 

"I made application to the Count de Rochambeau 
for a loan of twenty thousand hard dollars," says 
Robert Morris. "General Washington was extremely 
desirous that the troops should receive their month's 
pay, as great symptoms of discontent had appeared on 
their passing through the city without it. This affair 
being considered of great importance, I desired Mr. 
Gouvei-neur Morris, my assistant, to accompany me 
on account of his speaking fluently the French lan- 
guage." 

The interview was had at Chester, and apparently 
Gouverneur's fluency was efficacious, for Rochambeau 
agreed to supply twenty thousand hard dollars, that 

^ Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed., viii, 134 ; Diplomatic Cor- 
respondence, Sparks's ed., xi, 431. 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 373 

were to be repaid by October 1.^ The necessity of the 
case had stirred "Washington to a poetry of expression 
unusual with him. I cannot leave, he wrote, "without 
entreating you in the warmest terms to send on a 
month's pay at least, with all the expedition possible. 
I wish it to come on the wings of speed." ^ 

The march thus far had been rapid and successful, 
but difficulties were encountered at the Head of Elk. 
It was at the mouth of this little river, running into 
Chesapeake Bay, that Washington expected to put 
his army on transports and have them carried to 
Yorktown. This would save a long- and severe march 
through Maryland and Virginia, and with the French 
fleet in control of Chesapeake Bay, transportation by 
water would be both easy and safe. Before the expe- 
dition was decided on, Washington had written to see 
what boats could be obtained in case of need, and he 
had made every effort to have facilities ready. But 
when the army reached its destination, the means of 
transportation were lamentably deficient. Washington 
wrote to persons of influence in the neighborhood, be- 
seeching them to furnish any sort of vessel that would 
serve the purpose, but few responded. There was no- 
thing to do but to use what could be found; a thou- 
sand American soldiers and portions of some of the 
French regiments were embarked, and the rest of the 
army proceeded on foot. They pressed on, crossing 
the Susquehanna and averaging twenty miles a day 
over a woody country and indifferent roads, and by 
September 12 were at Baltimore. This city also im- 
pressed the French officers very favorably as a eom- 

^ Diary of Morris, Sept. 5 ; Diplomatic Correspondence, Sparks's ed., | / 
xi, 464, 465. 

2 Washington to Robert Morris, Sept. 6, 1781 ; Ibid., 467. 



374 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

mercial town, well built, with straight streets, a fea- 
ture which drew the attention of those accustomed to 
the intricate and devious highways of Paris and conti- 
nental cities. They also noticed here the existence of 
sidewalks.^ 

Some of the French officers were too impatient to 
wait for the ships, and made their way overland from 
Baltimore to Williamsburg. They found the country 
monotonous. Indian corn and tobacco were the only 
crops, and the corn-bread, which was nearly all they 
had to eat, they unjustly denounced as "the meanest 
and worst thing in the world." ^ 

The bulk of the army was transported by water. 
The first detachment, which sailed from the Head of 
Elk, made its way down Chesapeake Bay without 
molestation and landed safely on the peninsula. The 
troubles which the others encountered were relieved 
at Baltimore. The defeat of the English fleet by de 
Grasse enabled the French to provide the necessary 
transportation, and after the withdrawal of Graves, 
Chesapeake Bay was free from hostile ships and could 
be traversed with safety. Five frigates with nine 
transports sailed to Annapolis, and on them most of 
the army which had marched to Baltimore was speed- 
ily embarked. They had a prosperous journey, sailed 
peaceably into the James River, and landed without 
opposition. By September 28 the troops had taken 
their places under Washington's command, and all 
was ready for a vigorous siege. 

Washington and Rochambeau did not wait for the 
embarkment of the army, but pressed on to reach the 

^ Dubourg's Journal, Sept. 11, 1781; Magazine of American His- 
tory, iv, 441. 
2 Id., Sept., 1781 ; Ibid., 443. 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 375 

scene of action. On September 8 they left the Head 
of Elk, and on the same day reached Baltimore. There 
Washington received addresses from his admiring fel- 
low citizens ; but he did not tarry long. 

They left Baltimore and rode through Virginia, 
making sixty miles a day, and on the 9th they arrived 
at Mount Vernon. Washington visited his home for 
the first time since he had left it on May 4, 1775, 
to enter the Continental Congress. There he made 
a brief stay, and entertained the French officers in 
his stately mansion overlooking the Potomac. His 
plantation had not suffered from the ravages of war, 
having been spared by the English. Fond as he was 
of his estate and the care of it, there was no time to 
tarry now. On the 12th he and his associates were 
again on horseback. They rode at top speed, and on 
the 14th they readied Williamsburg. There Wash- 
ington assumed command of the allied armies en- 
camped before Yorktown. 

The accuracy with which the different sections of 
the army and navy formed their union was unusual, 
and reflected high credit on both the French and the 
American commanders. It was this which makes the 
capture of Yorktown a notable military achievement, 
as well as a momentous political event. The distances 
which separated the different forces of the expedition 
would be considerable now, and they were prodigious 
then. In July de Grasse's fleet was in the West In- 
dies, anchored off Cape Haytien ; the French troops 
under Saint-Simon were stationed on the island of San 
Domingo ; while the army under Eochambeau and 
Washington was by the Hudson, and the fleet under 
Barras was still stationed at Newport. By land and 
sea these different detachments made their way to 



376 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the scene of their common action. On August 3 de 
Grasse sailed from San Domingo, and a month later 
the French troops of Saint-Simon were landed at 
Jamestown. On August 25 Barras sailed from New- 
port, and on September 10 he made his junction in 
safety with the fleet from the West Indies. On the 
19th of August the allied army before New York 
broke camp, they marched over two hundred miles by 
land, sailed down the Chesapeake, and on September 
23 entered the James River. Not a serious mishap had 
attended the union of two fleets and two armies, which 
had been separated by sixteen hundred miles of land 
and water. The fleet under de Grasse had to come 
from the West Indies by a sea prolific in storm. The 
troops made a journey of over three hundred and fifty 
miles, a large part of it through virgin forests and 
over primitive highways. The extraordinary accuracy 
with which the forces from either section assembled 
at Yorktown assured the success of the enterprise. 

The Comte de Grasse performed his part with great 
exactitude, and is entitled to a large share of the 
credit for the capture of Yorktown. He brought an 
important reinforcement to the forces on land, he 
prevented the English from relieving Cornwallis ; the 
capture of Yorktown would have been impossible if 
his fleet had not arrived promptly and remained 
until the work was done. 

Rochambeau had written in the spring and early 
summer, describing the needs of the American army 
and asking for prompt cooperation against the com- 
mon foe, and de Grasse proceeded with vigor and bold- 
ness in the steps he took in answer to these pressing 
calls for help. No plan of cooperation had been marked 
out for him ; in transporting a body of soldiers from 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 377 

the ^"est Indies to Virginia lie acted upon his own 
responsibility: he had to negotiate with Spaniards 
who felt no interest in the American allies of France ; 
he had to incur the risk of disapproval from his own 
government. 

On July 16 he arrived at Cape Haytien and found 
the letters of Rochambeau and the French minister, 
stating the importance of prompt aid to the American 
cause. He at once endeavored to meet these requests 
to the utmost of his ability. A considerable force of 
French troops was stationed in San Domingo, but 
the French government had agreed that they should 
be at the disposition of Spain and might be utilized 
for an expedition to Florida. Fortunately, the Spanish 
admiral was not ready for his Florida campaign and 
wished to postpone it until winter. De Grasse availed 
himself of this opportunity, and asked the French 
governor to lend him these, troops for the interim. 
This was not an altogether simple operation. The 
French were careful to carr}^ out their agreements with 
Spain, for the Spanish were rancorous in their outcry 
over aught left undone, and torrents of vituperation 
were poured out over the slightest delay or hesita- 
tion in the performance of any promise. People who 
complain constantly and acrimoniously are usually 
promptly served ; the fear of reproach secures ad- 
vantages to the termagant which are not always ob- 
tained by the more amiable. De Grasse had therefore 
to incur the risk of severe censure by his own govern- 
ment, if the troops he borrowed were not returned to 
San Domingo in Readiness to embark for Florida 
whenever the Spanish asked for them. He was, how- 
ever, able to persuade the governor that these troops 
could be spared for two or three months. 



378 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

He could not obtain the five thousand men that 
Eochambeau had suggested, but it was decided that 
thirty-four hundred could be spared from San Do- 
mingo until November. They were borrowed from the 
governor upon the express promise that they should 
be returned by that time. In the mean time, Spanish 
ships were to keep guard of the island, and so indi- 
rectly the Spanish rendered some assistance to the 
colonists whose allies they had refused to become. 

It was impossible also to obtain the amount of 
money which Rochambeau had asked for, and it was 
not easy to obtain any. De Grasse sought, without 
success, to borrow from some of the merchants at San 
Domingo, though he offered to pledge his own estate 
as security for repayment. He then proceeded to 
Havana to see if he would have any better fortune in 
raising money there. Seventeen Spanish men-of-war 
were then lying peaceably at that port, with the in- 
activity that was habitual in Spanish warfare. "Is it 
not a shame for these vessels to lie rotting two years 
in port?" exclaims our chronicler. "It is only a 
nation as cowardly as the Spanish that can wallow so 
in inaction, leaving its allies to bear all the brunt of 
the war." ^ 

But if their fleet remained inert, the Spanish fur- 
nished de Grasse four million livres in cash, which was 
probably more useful than the cooperation of their 
ships. It supplied the necessities of his fleet and also 
left a considerable surplus which he gave to his asso- 
ciates in America. The necessary money being pro- 
vided and the fleet now being off Havana, its desti- 
nation was at last publicly announced. 

^ Operations of the French Fleet, etc. (Bradford Club Publications, 
no. 3), 63. 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 379 

On August 28, after a voyage of twenty-three days, 
de Grasse's fleet anchored off the roadstead of Ches- 
apeake Bay, and on September 4 and 5 the troops 
were landed at Jamestown Island. Cornwallis made 
no effort to prevent the landing; an enterprising 
general might have attacked the French in the con- 
fusion of disembarking, but the British left them 
imdisturbed, and they joined the forces under La 
Fayette, who now had an army of seven thousand 
men. 

La Fayette had been sent in the spring to take 
charge of the defence of Virginia, and early in May, 
when Cornwallis came .there after his unfortunate 
campaign against Greene in the Carolinas, he found 
La Fayette stationed at Richmond with an army of 
some three thousand men, of whom the majority 
were raw militia; Cornwallis had high hopes that 
with his five thousand veterans he could soon trap 
the young Frenchman, Pie begged Clin ton •to send 
aid from New York, but declared, " The boy cannot 
escape me." As Cornwallis advanced, however, the 
French Fabius retreated and wrote to Washington, 
"I am not strong enough even to be beaten.'^ Finally 
he reached a safe position across the Rapidan, and 
though Tarleton meanwhile made a very destructive 
raid, La Fayette was able, by uniting with one thou- 
sand troops under General Wayne, to prevent the 
British from seizing the military stores at Albemarle. 
Then La Fayette's force was augmented to some four 
thousand men and Cornwallis began retreating down 
the James toward Richmond. Though La Fayette 
was not strong enough to press him, the earl was 
anxious to make sure of his supplies and continued 
his retreat down into York peninsula. Cornwallis 



380 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

placed himself on Malvern Hill to keep watch, and 
meanwhile French and American allies were hasten- 
ing to his overthrow. 

Neither on land nor on sea did the French at first 
meet with any opposition, but on September 5 the Eng- 
lish fleet under Graves at last made its appearance. 
It was too late to prevent the landing of the troops ; 
however, if Graves could defeat the French fleet Corn- 
wallis would be saved and Washington's expedition 
would come to naught ; a decisive victory at sea would 
have rendered the capture of Yorktown impossible. 

But while Washington's army was hastening from 
the Hudson to meet the French fleet coming from the 
West Indies, the success of his enterprise was assured 
and the fate of Cornwallis was settled. Earlier it 
would have been possible for Cornwallis to retire into 
the Carolinas, but after the arrival of the French rein- 
forcements, to attempt this would have been a desper- 
ate chalice. Unless, however, the allies could keep 
control on the water, relief was sure to come to him, 
and on the superiority which had so long attended 
the English navy Cornwallis relied to his ruin. 

Whether Clinton did all he could to assist Corn- 
wallis in his danger was acrimoniously debated between 
those generals in their life-time, and has been a theme 
for discussion ever since. Clinton had shown little 
energy or capacity in the campaign about New York. 
Cornwallis proceeded on his own judgment in Virginia, 
and between the two commanders there was abundant 
jealousy and distrust. Clinton was long deceived by 
Washington's manoeuvres, but at last the truth was 
apparent even to him, and the fleet at New York was 
at once despatched to the Chesapeake. 

The management of the English fleets in America 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 381 

was as unfoi'tunate as the leadership of the English 
armies. Rodney was the only admiral who displayed 
the qualities that had been so common twenty years 
before, and he at the ci"itieal moment was obliged to 
return to England. Hood took command of the fleet 
in the West Indies ; he was informed of de Grasse's 
movements and started in pursuit. His vessels sailed 
well, perhaps too well, for they lost track of the French 
squadron and reached Chesapeake Bay three days be- 
fore de Grasse's arrival. Not finding the French there, 
Hood decided that they must have sailed to New York, 
and thither he accordingly proceeded. 

In the mean time. Admiral Graves had done what he 
could to render the English fleet stationed in North 
America useless to the English cause. Guided by mo- 
tives which no one can comprehend, he took the sum- 
mer months, when the French and Americans were 
planning for an expedition in the South, to sail north 
to Boston. Having reconnoitred Boston to his satis- 
faction, he then proceeded to Rhode Island and set a 
watch upon the French ships stationed there under 
Barras, in order to prevent their escape. This would 
have been of some service if it had been accomplished; 
but apparently the watch was not diligent, for Barras 
and his little fleet made their way out without being 
noticed, and sailed off to meet de Grasse at Chesapeake 
Bay. 

Finding that the bird had flown unseen, Graves re- 
turned to New York, after some weeks of idle sailing. 
By this time Clinton had discovered Washington's 
plans, and he realized the danger in which Cornwallis 
would soon be placed. Hood's vessels had arrived at 
New York, having missed de Grasse, as Graves had 
missed Barras; it was evident that the situation was 



382 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

critical and no time could be lost. Graves took com- 
mand of the united fleets and at once (August 31) sailed 
south, and on September 5 they made their appearance 
at the mouth o£ Chesapeake Bay. 

There they found the French fleet under de Grasse, 
and upon its defeat depended the possibility of rescu- 
ing the army under Cornwallis. The hostile fleets at 
once prepared for an engagement. In strength the 
French had some advantage, having twenty-four ships 
of the line, carrying seventeen hundred guns and about 
nineteen thousand seamen, while Graves had nineteen 
ships of the line and five frigates with about fourteen 
hundred guns. 

The ships manoeuvred for position, and as the wind 
finally brought them nearer together, about four o'clock 
in the afternoon the engagement began, and it lasted 
with considerable briskness until sunset. The French 
won no decisive victory, but they reaped the fruits of 
victory. On neither side did the losses exceed a few 
hundred men, but several of the English ships were 
seriously damaged. The French also suffered some- 
what; the Diademe, which had been especially exposed, 
lost one hundred and twenty men, her rigging and sails 
were shot away, she received one hundred and twenty- 
five balls in her hull and twelve below the water- 
line. 

For five days the fleets remained in sight of each 
other without attempting any further engagement. But 
the English fleet was seriously crippled and its position 
did not improve. The Terrible was so injured that the 
English blew her up ; the Irish and the Richmond, 
separated from the others, were captured, and on the 
9th the squadron from Newport under Barras sailed 
into the Bay. The English were now decidedly inferior 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 383 

in force, and Graves insisted that he could attempt 
nothing further until his ships had been repaired, and 
so with his damaged fleet he sailed away to New York.^ 
Perhaps he could have done no more, but his failure 
sealed the fate of Cornwallis, who was now left with- 
out hope of relief, surrounded both on land and sea. 

In order to bring together the armies and fleets 
which should cooperate in the capture of Yorktown, 
it was necessary, not only to overcome physical obsta- 
cles, but to sacrifice individual ambitions and quiet 
many heart-burnings. Unless the fleet under de Grasse 
had been strengthened by the arrival of the fleet com- 
manded by Barras, which had been stationed at New- 
port, it is not certain that the French could have kept 
control of Chesapeake Bay and rendered it impos- 
sible for any relief to reach Yorktown. Yet it was with 
much difficulty, and only by the repeated solicitations 
of Washington and Rochambeau, that Barras at last 
consented to join an expedition of which, as he justly 
foresaw, the credit would belong to another, and there 
would be small opportunity for gaining glory for him- 
self. 

Rochambeau left the French fleet at Newport, under 
Barras's command, and there they remained quietly in 
the harbor until the letter arrived in which de Grasse 
announced that he was to leave the West Indies and 
sail for Chesapeake Bay. Perhaps de Grasse hesitated 
to summon Barras to take part in an expedition of 
which de Grasse himself would be the commander, 
and the glory of which would redound chiefly to him. 
At all events, he wrote Barras that it was for him to 
decide whether he would join the expedition at Ches- 

^ Operations of the French Fleet, etc. (Bradford Club Publications, 
no. 3), (:6-75, 154-158; Report of Admiral Graves. 



384 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

apeake Bay, or act on his own account, as might be 
most advantageous to the common cause. 

Barras was eager to avail himself of the permission 
thus vaguely given. He had little desire to participate 
in this expedition as a subordinate ; he was now in an 
independent command, and he sighed for some enter- 
prise the glory of which would be his. It was easy for 
him to persuade himself that good military judgment 
coincided with his own desires. On the 12th of Au- 
gust he wrote Rochambeau that de Grasse did not 
count on him for assistance, and he thought, there- 
fore, that he would sail to Newfoundland. He asked 
Rochambeau to send a speedy reply, and he would em- 
bark as soon as it reached him.^ 

This letter came as a thunderbolt to Washington 
and Rochambeau, who were about to begin their march 
southward. Each of them felt that the expedition to 
Virginia might decide the fate of the war, and its suc- 
cess could only be insured if the French maintained 
a superiority on the sea. Yet here was Barras, with a 
considerable fleet, instead of taking his ships where 
their assistance might be of vital importance, contem- 
plating a voyage to Newfoundland that would proba- 
bly be without any result, and by no possibility could 
have an important result. Nor had Rochambeau the 
right to give a peremptory order ; he commanded the 
forces on land, Barras commanded the fleet; neither 
was dependent on the other ; joint action could only 
be secured by the agreement of both commanders. 

Rochambeau sent a letter forthwith, dealing very 
delicately with his associate, though stating with en- 
ergy his own opinion and that of Washington. "I con- 
fess, my dear Admiral," he said, " that the project of 
1 Barras to Rochambeau, Aug:. 12, 1781 ; Doniol, v, 522. 



THE YORK TOWN EXPEDITION 385 

Newfounclland has a little surprised General Wash- 
ington and myself." He then begged Barras to aban- 
don his project. " I beseech you," he said, " come and 
join us." ' Washington added a memorandum in his 
own hand, stating the probability that the English 
fleet might prove the stronger, if Barras persisted in 
his purpose not to join de Grasse. 

Barras yielded to these appeals, but very reluc- 
tantly. He described the advantages of the Newfound- 
land expedition, and dwelt on the perils of proceeding 
to Chesapeake Bay, where de Grasse did not need him.^ 
But if his acquiescence was sulky, his performance 
was prompt. He at once sailed from Newport, escaped 
Graves, who was watching for him with the dull inef- 
ficiency that seemed characteristic of the operations of 
the English in America, and reached the Chesapeake 
in safety. His union with de Grasse secured the su- 
periority of the French fleet and was another link in 
the chain which held Cornwallis firmly bound. His 
action deserves the more commendation because the 
fate which doubtless Barras anticipated in fact befell 
him. De Grasse commanded the united fleet; it was 
engaged in a great historic undertaking which brought 
honor to the participants at the time, and to the chief 
actors a prodigious amount of permanent fame. But 
Barras was not a chief actor : he did his duty faith- 
fully, got small reward at the time, and of the fame 
for which he longed, absolutely none at all. The names 
of Rochambeau and de Grasse are familiar to all Amer- 
icans ; even those who know little else of history, can 
tell who captured Cornwallis. But Barras is not on 
the list, and his name is unknown ; he performed his 

^ Rochambeau to Barras, Aug. 15, 1781 ; Doniol, v, 523. 
2 Barras to Rochambeau, Aug. 17 ; Doniol, t, 524. 



386 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

duty reluctantly but conscientiously, and reaped small 
reward except from the consciousness of virtue. 

After the arrival of the French recruits, La Fayette 
had under his command an army of seven thousand 
men. The French fleet was unopposed, and it could 
furnish from the marines considerable assistance for 
a land attack. At that time a man-of-war carried a 
small army on board, and the entire strength of the 
fleet was over twenty thousand men. 

The time for utilizing this formidable force was 
brief, for on the 15th of October de Grasse felt he 
must start on his return. It was now September, and 
there was as yet no sign of the troops under Washing- 
ton or Rochambeau. There was a strong feeling in 
favor of an immediate attack upon the English under 
Cornwallis ; if this seemed an attempt to gain the 
glory before their companions in arms could arrive, 
they had been warned how short was the time, and a 
great opportunity should not be allowed to escape on 
a question of etiquette. It was certain that under any 
circumstances there would not be time for the leisurely 
movements of a regular siege, and it seemed highly 
probable that Yorktown could be captured by assault. 
If the advice of some of the officers had been heeded, 
the attempt would have been made, and it is by no 
means certain that it would have failed. The resist- 
ance made by Cornwallis when the siege was under- 
taken was not so determined as to make it clear that 
he would have repulsed a vigorous assault. Consider- 
ing the ordinary impetuosity of French tactics, the 
self-control now exhibited deserves much commenda- 
tion. De Grasse had written on the day of his arrival 
at Chesapeake Bay that he hoped to find everything 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 387 

ready for the undertaking they had on hand. Five 
days passed, and yet there was no sign of the north- 
ern army. " Come quickly, my general, come quickly," 
one of the officers wrote Rochambeau ; " the 15th of 
October is near. ... I remember that a certain offi- 
cer, being ordered to reconnoitre a fort, found occa- 
sion to capture it. If such a thing should happen to 
us, I hope you will pardon it." ^ 

But it was finally decided that no assault should ^ 
be attempted, and this decision was due to the calm 
and mature judgment which La Fayette displayed in 
every phase of our Revolutionary War. There was the 
chance of brilliant success, but there was the possi- 
bility of disastrous failure. Even more than by this 
consideration, La Fayette was controlled by a feeling 
of loyalty to Washington. He had the opportunity to 
snatch the glory that afterwards. fell to Rochambeau 
and Washington ; but with all his desire for fame, he 
never tried to obtain it unfairly. His orders were to 
hold Cornwallis in check until the general-in-chief 
could arrive. He had no desire to snatch the glory of 
victory from the one to whom it justly belonged, no 
wish to hazard the success of his plans by hasty 
action. " I hope with my own eyes," he had written 
Washington in August, " to see you at the head of 
the combined armies." ^ " Thanks to you," he wrote 
again on September 1, "I am in a charming position, 
at the head of a superior body of men ; but I am not 
in such haste as the Comte de Grasse and, having a 
sure game to play, it would be folly by risking an 
attack to expose anything to chance." "Our young 

1 Doniol, V, 535-536. 

^ La Fayette to Washington, Aug, 21 ; Lafayette, Mimoires, etc. (ed. 
1837), ii, 237-247. 



388 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

General," wrote Duportail, " has a mature head, and 
with all his ardor he is able to wait the proper mo- 
ment and will not gather the fruit until it is ripe." ^ 

The French officers yielded to La Fayette's argu- 
ments; indeed, he was at the head of the array until 
Washington's arrival, and an attack upon Yorktown 
could only be made by his order ; but he convinced 
his associates that delay was the part of wisdom. 

On the 14th of September the commander-in-chief 
arrived at Williamsburg. At four o'clock in the after- 
noon the guns fired a royal salute as the generals ap- 
proached. Washington and Rochambeau, accompanied 
- by La Fayette, the commander of the American forces, 
and the Marquis de Saint-Simon, commanding the 
French, reviewed the two armies drawn up in bat- 
talion parade. The French officers then gathered at 
Saint-Simon's headquarters and were presented to 
the American commander-in-chief. An elegant supper 
was served, attended by all the principal officers ; 
American colonels and French marquises mingled to- 
gether in good fellowship ; the French band played 
selections from French operas, and at the seemly hour 
of ten the feast was ended.^ La Fayette's dream was 
at last realized, and he saw the united armies of 
France and America joined in a common enterprise 
under the command of Washington. 

Washington recognized that success was only pos- 
sible if the French fleet could hold its ascendancy on 
the sea ; if Cornwallis were reinforced it would be 
useless to attempt the capture of Yorktown ; on the 
maintenance of de Grasse's position in Chesapeake 
Bay rested the hope of victory. As soon, therefore, as 

1 Duportail to Rochanibeau ; Doniol, v, 535. 

* Butler's Journal ; Historical Magazine, March, 1864, 106. 



THE YORKTOWN EXPEDITION 389 

Washington had reached Williamsburg, he prepared 
to visit the French admiral, and arrange with him plans 
for the capture of Cornwallis's army. The Comte de 
Grasse was stationed at Cape Henry, and on Sep- 
tember 17 Washington set out with Rochambeau, 
Chastellux, and Knox, and by noon on the following 
day they reached de Grasse's flagship, the Ville de 
Paris. Washington was received with due honors, and 
the meeting was in all respects cordial. Not only his 
achievements, but his stately courtesy and perfect 
tact, peculiarly fitted him to deal with our French 
allies. The natural brusqueness of some of the Amer- 
ican officers was distasteful to those drilled in the 
elaborate etiquette of the French court and French 
society, but Washington was as well fitted for it as 
if he had been to the manner born. 



CHAPTER XXI 

YOKKTOWN AND DE GRASSE 

When compliments had been exchanged with due 
formality, plans for the campaign were discussed, and 
de Grasse agreed to furnish assistance as Washing- 
ton desired except in one respect. Washington was 
anxious that ships should be sent up the James River 
above Yorktown to cut off the possibility of Cornwal- 
lis's retreat, but to this plan the admiral would not 
agree.^ As Cornwallis made no effort to escape, the 
failure to guard this avenue of retreat was unimpor- 
tant. 

It had been announced that the French fleet must 
leave the American coast by October 15, and this was 
now less than a month off; but de Grasse agreed that 
the period should be extended to the first of Novem- 
ber. Even then the time for the reduction of a well- 
defended town was brief, and the siege had to be 
pushed with vigor if it was to be successful. No mat- 
ter what progress had been made on land, so soon as 
the French fleet sailed away, Yorktown could be re- 
lieved by water and the chance of capturing Corn- 
wallis's army would be lost. 

The return of the generals was delayed by the bad 
weather which is common on this roadstead. A vio- 
lent and contrary wind came up, and not until the 22d 
were Washington and his associates able to get back 
to Williamsburg. 

1 Doniol, V, 554. 



YORKTOWN AND DE GRASSE 391 

CornwalHs, meanwhile, hoped for relief, and the al- 
lies feared that a new English fleet might appear and 
destroy de Grasse's ascendancy. Admiral Digby had 
not yet been heard from, and the size of his fleet was 
multiplied by the fears of his opponents. De Grasse 
felt that he must prepare for the arrival of the Eng- 
lish admiral, and the preparations that he desired to 
make brought dismay to the generals at Yorktown. 

On September 24 he wrote them that he must sail 
out of the bay in order to meet Digby, but he would 
leave behind the forces under Saint-Simon. " If I am 
forced by the winds, or as the result of a contest, not 
to come back, have the goodness to send the regiments 
to Martinique on the boats left in the river." * This 
sudden announcement brought consternation. If de 
Grasse's fleet were driven to the West Indies by foul 
weather or ill fortune, it would be the end of the 
great plan for the capture of Cornwallis's army. 
Washington and Rochambeau were appalled at the 
possibility,^ and yet they could not interfere in move- 
ments which de Grasse thought were required for the 
safety of his fleet. Fortunately, the matter was not 
brought to a decision. The fleet under Digby did not 
appear at all, and de Grasse remained quietly in the 
bay, shutting off all relief from the besieged city. 

During the time that the armies were assembling it 
was possible for Cornwallis to avoid his fate, if he 
had broken through La Fayette's forces and made 
his escape southward ; but either because he did not 
realize his peril or deemed the effort dangerous, he 
did not attempt it. 

1 De Grasse to Rochambeau, Sept. 24, 1781 ; Doniol, v, 544. 

2 Doniol, V, 545 ; Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed., Tiii, 163- 
165. 



392 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The only hope of escape after the siege began lay- 
in its prolongation. The Comte de Grasse had ex- 
tended his stay somewhat and doubtless would have 
been reluctant to sail away when success seemed near 
at hand ; but the operations in the West Indies, really 
so much less important, he regarded as his chief mis- 
sion, and he was certain to sail from Chesapeake Bay 
before the winter began. 

The allies pressed their work with vigor, and the 
besieged made a feeble defence. On the 30th the ex- 
terior fortifications were abandoned, and for a week 
the French and Americans labored zealously in pre- 
paring fascines and trenches. On the 6th of October 
the trenches were sufficiently completed to cover the 
men, and on the 9th the batteries opened fire on the 
English forces before Yorktown. 

. On October 12 the second parallel was begun. 
The work was carried on vigorously under officers 
familiar with siege operations, and it progressed the 
more rapidly because the English made little attempt 
to check it. On the 14th Washington made a note of 
the casualties down to that day, which showed how 
slight had been the resistance, and also showed the 
preponderant part taken by our allies in what Crom- 
well would have called the " Great Deliverance." The 
Americans had lost twenty-three killed and sixty-five 
wounded. The French loss also was small, but it was 
more than twice that of the American army, and con- 
sisted of fifty-two killed and one hundred and thirty- 
four wounded.^ 

Each army praised the conduct of its associates 
and with good cause. The Americans, said Rocham- 
beau, showed a courage and an emulation which never 

1 Writings of Washington, Sparks's ed., viii, 181. 



YORKTOWN AND DE GRASS E 393 

allowed them to lag behind their allies, though these 
were more familiar with the operations of a siege. 
The French had the advantage of more experience in 
such matters, and exhibited equal courage and zeal. 
The operations were singularly free from bickerings 
and heart-burnings. All cooperated amicably, and 
there was no wrangling over the praise to be awarded. 
Washington and Rochambeau displayed moderation 
and judgment, and their example furnished a model 
for others to follow. The joint operations against New- 
port in 1778 had been attended with disputes and 
ended in reproach ; the fact that Sullivan commanded 
the Americans at Newport and Washington at York- 
town accounted for the difference in the spirit dis- 
played as \yell as in the result accomplished. 

On October 9 the allies were ready to begin an active 
bombardment, and on the 17th Cornwallis sent a flag 
of truce to consider terms of surrender. Two weeks 
remained of the time de Grasse had agreed to stay 
when the English general began to parley ; only seven- 
teen days had passed since the siege formally began. 
The importance of the victory was only exceeded by 
its ease; the English army was mild in resistance and 
prompt in surrender, and yet the disparity in numbers 
was less than in many a siege which has been long 
and stubbornly contested. The allied army contained 
about 15,000 men, and 7157 laid down their arms.^ 

The ease of the victory seems to have been regretted 
by some who loved war for the fighting there was in 
it. " I have wrott to you twice during the siege," says 
an ally whose zeal for our liberty surpassed his mas- 
tery of our grammar. " I hope my letters are arrived 
safe into your hands. Our successes have not, indeed, 
1 H. P. Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign, etc., 165, 195. 



394 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

costed very dear to us. However, we must not measure 
our glory by the dangers we run to obtain it, but by 
their utility. Cornwallys, the Southern Lyon, has been 
very tame to us." ^ 

It was for Washington to fix the terms of the sur- 
render; those which he imposed were not severe, but 
they were humiliating. The English were forced to 
march in solemn parade before their victors and stack 
their arms; the bands were instructed to play "The 
World Turned Upside Down." The English had in- 
sisted on similar terms when Lincoln surrendered at 
Charleston. They could not now complain, but they 
did not relish the requirements. It was undoubtedly 
a relief to British sensibilities that a large portion of 
the army to which they surrendered was composed 
of French. The French were hereditary enemies, they 
were the regular troops of an ancient monarchy, and 
they could be regarded as professionals in the art of 
war; it was less humiliating to yield to them than to 
American soldiers whom they stigmatized as rebels and 
despised as irregulars. 

Washington signed the articles of capitulation for 
the Americans, Rochambeau and Barras for their 
French allies, and Cornwallis and Thomas Symonds for 
the English. On October 19 the momentous ceremony 
took place. The English desired to surrender to their 
French opponents and not to their rebellious subjects ; 
but no desire for spectacular triumph induced Ro- 
chambeau to disregard the strictest observance of the 
proprieties. One of the French visitors has described 
the scene at the surrender. The lines of the allied army 
extended for more than a mile ; the Americans hold- 
ing the right. The youth of many of the American 

1 Marquis de Fleury, Oct. 31, 1781. 



YORKTOWN AND BE GRASSE 395 

troops, their lack of uniforms, their dirty and torn 
clothes, made the French appear to advantage ; for they, 
notwithstanding their long march and the fatigue of 
the siege, preserved a neat and warlike aspect. All 
were surprised by the good condition of the English 
troops. They had not suffered sufficiently from the 
siege to injure their health or their looks. The English 
soldiers were all smartly dressed in new clothes, but 
this, says our writer, seemed to humiliate them the 
more, as they contrasted themselves with their Amer- 
ican opponents. They dared not lift their eyes upon 
their conqueroi'S, he declares. The English officers were 
polite enough to salute the least important French offi- 
cer, but they would not condescend to salute Americans 
even of the highest rank.^ 

Notwithstanding the completeness of the victory, it 
was not supposed that the English would abandon 
their endeavors to reduce the colonists to subjection. 
" It is not in the character of the English to yield so 
easily," Vergennes wrote La Fayette ; " you must ex- 
pect great efforts on their part to recover what they 
have lost " ; and he bade the marquis to excite the 
Americans to greater exertions, in order that they 
might retain the advantage which had been gained.^ 

Washington had the same expectations, and he was, 
therefore, the more anxious to utilize still further the 
assistance which had already secured so great a victory. 
De Grasse had originally written that by October 15 
he must sail for the West Indies, but he agreed to re- 
main until November in order that the capture of York- 
town might be assured. On the 19th day of October, 
the English army surrendered, and Washington, stim- 

1 Abb^ Robin, Nouveau Voyage, etc. (1782 ed.), 140, 141. 

2 Vergennes to La Fayette, Dec. 1, 1781 ; Doniol, iv, 688. 



396 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR ' 

ulated by the success of this joint action of army and 
navy, wished to make new endeavors. On the day Corn- 
wallis surrendered he wrote de Grasse, suggesting a 
further expedition for the capture of Charleston. The 
capture of that city, he said, would be certain, and 
would destroy the enemy's last hope of continuing the 
war. The proposition was gilded with alluring sug- 
gestions. " It will depend upon your excellency, there- 
fore," wrote Washington, " to terminate the war, and 
enable the allies to dictate the law in a treaty. A cam- 
paign so glorious and so fertile in consequences could 
be reserved only for the Count de Grasse." ^ 

These compliments, however adroit, did not accom- 
plish their aim. The date had already passed at which 
de Grasse intended to sail for the West Indies, and 
he would not further delay his return. Washington 
had contemplated the possibility of this, and he sug- 
gested another and less ambitious scheme. If de Grasse 
did not find the expedition against Charleston prac- 
ticable, he might convey a body of soldiers to Wil- 
mington, who would capture that town and thus render 
valuable assistance to General Greene in his campaign 
in the Carolinas. To this plan de Grasse at first gave 
his consent. The orders of his court and his engage- 
ments with the Spanish, so he wrote, rendered it im- 
possible for him to remain for the expedition against 
Charleston, but he would transport two thousand 
troops to Wilmington, provided they sailed by No- 
vember 1, or as soon as possible thereafter.^ 

But before the expedition could be prepared, de 
Grasse withdrew his offer. The matter of his return 

1 Washington to Count de Grasse, Oct. 20, 1781 ; Writings of Wash- 
ington, Sparks'a ed., yiii, 186. 

2 Doniol, iv, 694. 



YORKTOWN AND DE GRASSE 397 

to the West Indies might be too much delayed. The 
undertaking was abandoned, and the troops sent to 
reinforce Greene had to make their way by land. 
Though disappointed in his hopes of further aid at 
present, Washington fully expected the cooperation of 
de Grasse in the following campaign. 

On November 4 the French fleet sailed out of Ches- 
apeake Bay.^ De Grasse left the scene of triumph 
behind him and sailed away to defeat and disgrace. 

The vicissitudes of the war in the West Indies did 
not affect the interests of the American colonists, but 
they deserve some brief mention. As a result of the 
assistance given the United States, France found her- 
self involved in hostilities in Europe, the East Indies, 
and the Western Main ; the sun never set on the con- 
test which had grown out of the protest of American 
colonists against illegal taxation. 

Exultant over the great success of the Virginia 
campaign, de Grasse set sail for the West Indies. 
There was the field to which he was specially bidden' 
to devote his energies; his interference in North 
America had been regarded as an interlude, and he 
now returned to the contest with Great Britain for 
the West Indian islands. After a stormy passage of 
three weeks, the fleet reached Martinique, and during 
the winter months it achieved some small successes. 
There were a few unimportant engagements, but not 
until the spring did the decisive action take place. 
On April 12, 1782, near some West Indian islands 
known as " The Saints," the fleet under de Grasse 
engaged the English under Rodney in what one of 

^ Operations of the French Fleet, etc. (Bradford Club Publications, 
no. 3), 88, 164. 



398 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the French officers pronounced the hottest and most 
terrible, and also the most disastrous, of sea-fights 
since the invention of gunpowder. 

The English had the advantage in numbers : they 
had about forty ships of the line and over twenty-six 
hundred cannon, while the French mustered thirty- 
three ships of the line and about two thousand can- 
non. More important to the English than this pre- 
ponderance of ships and cannon was their superiority 
in the officers who commanded them. In the weary 
investigations which followed this disastrous day, it 
was decided that de Grasse was not deserving of 
censure, and also, on the other hand, despite his ac- 
cusations, that his commands were not disobeyed by 
disloyal subordinates. If he was guilty of no grave 
mistake, he showed no military genius; but it is 
without question that some of his officers were disaf- 
fected and viewed with pleasure the defeat of their 
commander. Possibly the desire for personal distinc- 
tion was stronger with the French than with the 
English ; certainly disappointment in this respect 
seemed to bring more harmful results ; some of de 
Grasse's captains were discontented and they managed 
their ships with an inefficiency that came perilously 
close to disloyalty. 

Doubtless there were heart-burnings among the 
English also, — they are found in eveiy army and 
every fleet ; but they did not show themselves in the 
day of battle ; the English captain who believed Rod- 
ney had not treated him fairly did not think Rodney's 
defeat would be a consolation to his lacerated feelings ; 
but in this disastrous battle, and in many an encounter 
on land and sea, some French officer, rankling over 
a real or supposed injustice, forgot his duty to his 



YORKTOWN AND DE GRASSE 399 

country in his enmity toward his commander or his 
associates. 

The battle of the 12th was brought on because an 
ill-managed vessel, after running into several other 
ships, was at last left unmasted at the mercy of the 
enemy. Some English boats started to capture the 
luckless Zele, the French fleet formed for action to 
protect her, and the engagement began. The manoeu- 
vres of the French have been severely criticized, and 
of every blunder Rodney took advantage. The Comte 
de Grasse showed abundant courage but little skill ; 
his ship was in the thickest of the fight until her am- 
munition was exhausted and she was forced to sur- 
render ; the flagship of the admiral fell into the hands 
of the enemy, — a disgrace which had attended few 
French defeats. The crew fought with desperation, if 
not with judgment ; rigging was gone as well as 
rudder, the masts were ready to fall and the ship to 
sink, when the flag was at last pulled down. Critics 
at Paris said it would have been more glorious to 
blow up the flagship than to allow her to be taken. 
But de Grasse's friends justly replied that even an 
admiral had no right to blow up his crew in order 
to save his own honor. Before he surrendered, the 
admiral signalled the other ships to save themselves 
as best they could ; at half-past seven the battle was 
over. 

The French had lost three thousand men and five 
ships. To add to the horrors of the fight, the sharks 
that abound in those waters followed its progress, in 
search of food ; over a thousand of them, it is said, 
were close by the ships, watching for the bodies that 
were constantly thrown over. What was left of the 
French fleet found refuge at Cajp Fran9ois, and their 



400 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

last degradation was in seeing ten Spanish ships come 
out to protect their entrance into the harbor.'^ 

The credit which de Grasse won at Yorktown was 
wholly obscured by the defeat of his fleet at " The 
Saints." The capture of Yorktown assured the inde- 
pendence of the United States; but its importance 
was hardly appreciated at the time ; no one realized 
how great a power the United States was to become, 
or what weight attached to the victory by which its 
existence was assured. While the French had taken 
an important part in the capture of Cornwallis's army, 
after all they acted as auxiliaries, and it seemed an 
American rather than a French victory. 

On the other hand, the defeat which de Grasse had 
sustained at "The Saints" was one of the most dis- 
astrous in the disastrous history of the French navy. 
His fleet was practically destroyed ; the admiral's 
ship was sunk and the admiral himself captured. 
Nothing could be more irretrievable. It is not strange, 
therefore, that, when de Grasse was finally released 
from captivity and returned to Paris, he met with a 
chilly reception from King and court. He insisted 
upon a court-martial, and it was accorded to him. 
After long and tedious investigation he was exoner- 
ated from blame, but he remained a disgraced man, 
and he was never again assigned to active service. 
He married for a third time and married unwisely. 
His wife brought him social reproach and domestic 
infelicity. Honors were heaped upon Rochambeau, 
who had taken part in the Yorktown expedition ; but 
though de Grasse's cooperation had assured the suc- 

^ Operations of the French Flefit, etc. (Bradford Club Publications, 
no. .3), 120-126, 176-178. Capt. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History (1889), 481-504. 



YORKTOWN AND DE GRASSE 401 

cess of tlie enterprise, he received no marks of royal 
approval ; subsequent disasters had obscured the 
recollection of prior service. In January, 1788, he 
died. Washington wrote to Rochambeau regretting his 
death, but he added: "Yet his death is not, perhaps, 
so much to be deplored as his latter days were to be 
pitied. It seemed as if an unfortunate and unrelent- 
ing destiny pursued him, to destroy the enjoyment of 
all earthly comfort. The disastrous battle of the 12th 
of April, the loss of favor with his King, and the 
subsequent connection in marriage with an unworthy- 
woman, were sufficient to have made him weary of 
the burden of life."^ 

1 Writings of Washington, Ford's ed., xi, 259. 



CHAPTER XXII 

CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 

The surrender of Yorktown proved to be the end 
of the Revolutionary War, but its importance was 
not at first realized, even by the victors. The French 
army remained for a year longer in America, and at 
the close of 1781 all looked forward to an active cam- 
paign in the following year. 

After the surrender, Washington and the northern 
army returned to the Hudson. The Continentals under 
La Fayette were transferred to Greene, the militia- 
men went home. Rochambeau and his command went 
into winter-quarters near Williamsburg in Virginia. 
They were looked on askance by the people among 
whom they were quartered ; the Virginians were anx- 
ious to believe that the war was over, and they did not 
wish to see either friendly or hostile troops. An army 
is usually a poor neighbor, but Rochambeau's soldiers, 
both in New York and Virginia, were kept in extraor- 
dinarily good order. Among a strange people, whose 
language they could not understand, the French sol- 
diers maintained a strict discipline. Rochambeau en- 
deavored to quiet the burghers of Williamsburg by 
telling of the good record his troops had made during 
a march of seven hundred miles. They were little 
comforted by this, but when Rochambeau proceeded 
to repair, at his own expense, any injuries done, the 
fears of the townspeople were somewhat quieted. The 
French durins: the winter were treated with reason- 



CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 403 

able cordiality by those whose liberties they came to 
establish. 

While Rochainbeau was endeavoring to get from 
France instructions as to the coming campaign, he 
desired himself to be relieved from duty. He had 
asked for his recall some time before, and only by 
fortunate circumstances was he kept in command and 
enabled to share in the glory of Yorktown. His 
statue would not stand in front of the White House 
at Washington had his first request for a release been 
granted. 

In June, 1781, four months before the siege of 
Yorktown, he asked for his recall. His health had 
long been poor, the campaign in America thus far 
had not been productive of glory, and he was anxious 
to return to France. Fortunately for his fame, this 
request experienced the delays of the period. Not 
until the 24th of August did it receive attention in 
Paris. The demand was a reasonable one and was 
promptly granted, and on that day S^gur, the minis- 
ter of war, wrote Rochambeau that he had commu- 
nicated to the King his wish to return to France to 
reestablish his health ; and that the King had ap- 
proved the request, leaving the count to fix the time 
of his return whenever he thought that his presence 
was no longer necessary and that no injury would 
residt to the good of the service. He was directed to 
turn over the command of the army to the Baron de 
Viom^nil. The despatch reached Boston on the 6th 
of November, but not until the 6th of December did 
it reach Rochambeau at his headquarters. 

The campaign of Yorktown was now over, the war 
was ended, and there was no reason why he should not 
return to France. " The air of Virginia," he writes, 



404 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

" while healthy In winter, is laden with fever in the 
summer, and I have never failed to catch a fever 
wherever I have found it epidemic." In the mean time 
Viomenil had been obliged to go back to Fi-ance on 
account of his health, but he returned, and when 
Kochambeau left, the remaining French troops were 
placed under his command. 

S^gur congratulated Rochambeau on these fortu- 
nate delays. " I am persuaded," he writes him on the 
7th of December, " that, notwithstanding your poor 
condition of health on the 20th of October, you are 
well pleased that you had not received consent for 
the leave of absence which you had asked." 

Not until June, 1782, did the French army start 
on its march northward. No plans were made for the 
campaign, because it now became evident that with 
the surrender of Yorktown the war had practically 
ceased. Parliament had voted to acknowledge the 
independence of the colonies, and negotiators were 
already engaged in agreeing on terms of peace. The 
war had become a picnic, and the anxieties and hard- 
ships of the past were succeeded by a year of leisure 
and comfort. At Baltimore the detachments united, 
and from there they marched north until, on Septem- 
ber 14, they reached the Hudson. 

Social diversions replaced military activity during 
this peaceful summer. A son was born to Louis XVI, 
who was not destined to inherit his throne, but the 
event was celebrated in a manner befitting its sup- 
posed importance. Washington had proper demon- 
strations in his army: the soldiers paraded, a great 
dinner was given, and a ball closed the day. The 
French minister at Philadelphia celebrated the event 
with special splendor. Eleven hundred tickets were 



CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 405 

issued for the entertainment. "The ladies," so read 
the card, " will be so obliging as to provide them- 
selves with partners before the evening." There was 
abundant opportunity for the dancing that was so 
carefully regulated. A dancing-room was erected, 
forty feet by sixty, and when the guests were weary 
of this they could walk into a garden, arranged in the 
highest style of eighteenth-century art. 

Hairdressing for men and women was then an 
elaborate process, and the artists of Philadelphia 
were hardly equal to the demand. At six in the morn- 
ing of the great day many ladies were found in the 
hands of their coiffeurs. Ten thousand outsiders were 
given an opportunity to watch the eleven hundred 
elect, and some Quaker ladies, who were unwilling to 
adapt their dresses to the occasion, looked at their 
more worldly sisters through a gauze curtain pre- 
pared for their use. Even the eleven hundi-ed were 
truly republican : there were found among them repre- 
sentatives of the army and the professions, of mer- 
chants and tradesmen, of families old and new, as we 
are told by a Philadelphian who himself belonged to 
one of the old families. The gayeties of our ancestors 
were not carried to excess ; by three o'clock in the 
morning all the guests had retired and the house of 
the minister was dark. 

In September the French army marched to King's 
Ferry, where it was received with due honors by the 
Continental forces under Washington. The American 
soldiers were drawn up in a double line, and through 
this the allies passed, the drums beating a French 
march.^ Rochambeau had commended highly the good 

^ Mimoires de Rochambeau, i, 309 ; James Thacher, A Military 
Journal, etc., 312. 



406 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

bearing of the American troops, and declared that 
Steuben had made of them soldiers worthy of the 
King of Prussia. Their appearance was certainly 
more pleasing now than in the trying years of the 
war. Large supplies of clothing had been sent from 
France, and large amounts had been captured at 
Yorktown. All of the latter the French had aban- 
doned to their allies, who certainly stood in need 
of them, and for almost the first time, the Ameri- 
can soldiers had stout clothing to cover their stout 
hearts. 

There was no more fighting for them, and the 
French troops began their march to Boston in order 
to be ready for the homeward journey. As they were 
leaving, an incident occurred which showed that seven 
years of conflict had not accustomed our people to the 
usages of war. As Rochambeau was about to start at 
the head of his staff, a sheriff appeared with a sum- 
mons in his hand, and, tapping the general on the 
shoulder, said, "You are my prisoner." Some of the 
young officers wished to resent such conduct, but 
Kochambeau more sensibly contented himself with 
telling the sheriff to take his prisoner away if he 
could. The sheriff replied that he had done his duty, 
and if the general decided to set justice at defiance, 
he only asked for himself a safe retreat.^ 

The writ was issued for the value of some trees, 
which one of the French regiments had cut down for 
firewood. The owner seems to have been more enter- 
prising than patriotic. Eochambeau amiably submitted 
the matter to the court, which awarded two thousand 
francs instead of fifteen thousand, the amount of the 
demand ; and as the award was less than the French 
1 Mimoires de Sigur ("1825 ed.), i, 414.. 



CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 407 

had offered to pay, the owner was condemned to pay 
the costs. 

Perhaps as a precaution against similar attempts, 
Governor Trumbull issued a proclamation to the good 
people of Connecticut, telling them that they must not 
charge the French soldiers more than current prices 
for provisions. The warning was heeded, and the 
French bore testimony to the moderation in price of 
all they bought during their last march through that 
state. 

When they reached Rhode Island in November, 
after their victorious campaign in the South, they were 
received with ardent felicitations. The Council and 
representatives adopted resolutions, expressing their 
appreciation of the services rendered by the French; 
they asked Heaven to reward these exertions in the 
cause of humanity and the regard which the French 
had shown for the rights of citizens, and they expressed 
the hope that these laurels might be crowned with the 
smiles of the best of kings, and the gratitude of the 
most generous of peoples.* To this Rochambeau made 
fitting reply, and his army again camped at their old 
winter-quarters in North Providence. 

The citizens were ready to welcome them, and the 
newspapers sought to excite their zeal by the stilted 
appeals to ancient history which suited the somewhat 
crude literary taste of that day. Let us consider, said 
the " Providence Gazette," " the great toils and hard- 
ships they have cheerfully undergone in America. 
Let our ladies be persuaded cheerfully to suffer a part 
of their houses and furniture to be used a few days by 
those who have rendered their country such essential 
services. This will be but a small sacrifice compared 

1 Rhode Island Colonial Records, ix, 619-620. 



408 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

with the Roman ladies, who repeatedly, in the exigen- 
cies of the state, cheerfully gave up their rings, dia- 
monds, and personal ornaments. They will thus raise 
their characters for patriotism and hospitality, to be 
carried on the wings of applause across the Atlantic." * 

Fortunately, our French friends demanded neithei 
jewels nor furniture. The officers were given a din- 
ner, and in return Rochambeau gave several balls. 
The amiable and enthusiastic Broglie found new ob- 
jects of admiration at these entertainments. "It was 
at the first of these balls that I saw for the first time 
the Misses Brown, sisters of the Governor of the city. 
I do not give their portraits here because I do not 
wish to turn all the men crazy, and render all the 
women jealous." But he does add a fervent descrip- 
tion of the manner in which Betsey's long eyelashes 
hid her great black eyes, " a thing," he says, " both 
rare and lovely." She told the prince that she had 
never imagined that this was a beauty, and he adds : 
" It is quite certain that it was for her a discovery." 
It is quite certain that this young beauty fooled the 
prince, that the charms of those eyelashes had been 
told by other admirers and were not unknown to 
Betsey. 

The army found comfortable quarters for the win- 
ter. Lauzun's legion of cavalry was to be quartered 
at Providence ; but Rochambeau was a prudent general, 
and he discovered that the dealers in forage in the 
town had raised their prices to an extravagant figure, 
considering that the French paid in louls d'or instead 
of Continental currency. Accordingly he declined the 
kind invitations and sent the cavalry to seek cheaper 
quarters near Lebanon, in Connecticut. At Hartford 
1 Providence Gazette, Nov. 2, 1782. 



CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 409 

Lauzim found the taverns full of legislators, so he and 
Chastellux stopped with Colonel Wadsworth, whom 
they declared to be " tall, well made, and of a noble 
and agreeable countenance." ^ 

The larger part of the infantry remained in New- 
port ; the rest were sent to North Providence and 
camped on the Dexter Farm, open land that now forms 
part of the city. Camp Street perpetuates the memory 
of their stay, in the nomenclature of the town. The 
officers were quartered with various citizens, all of 
whom, from Governor Cook down, seemed to have 
opened their doors to receive our allies. Those who 
paid rent for their rooms had no reason to complain 
of high prices. For seven weeks' use of Major Robin- 
son's great room, Comte Dumas paid but ten dollars. 
Penelope Peck received from Dr. Fersen, principal 
marine physician of the navy of France, for the rooms 
he occupied, the modest rental of six shillings per 
week. But the payments were all made in lawful sil- 
ver money, and not in Continental currency. 

An army quartered on a city is usually an unwel- 
come guest, but the French made no disturbance and 
paid cash for what they got. They were, therefore, 
popular among the people, while the presence of the 
French officers furnished an interest to Newport and 
Providence society which those staid towns had not 
before known. 

Rochambeau now turned over his command to Baron 
de Viomenil, and on January 11, 1783, he sailed for 
France.^ In a farewell letter to him Washington stated, 
with his usual accuracy, the value of Rochambeau's 

1 Chastellnx, Travels, etc. (1787), i, 30. 

2 59th Cong-. 1st Session Sen. Doc, vol. 32, no. 537 (Count de Ro- 
chambeau Commemoration), p. 500. 



410 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

services. " I cannot permit you to depart from this 
country," be wrote, " without repeating to you the high 
sense I entertain of the services you have rendered to 
America, by the constant attention which you have paid 
to the interest of it, by the exact order and discipline 
of the corps under your command, and by your readi- 
ness at all times to give facility to every measure which 
the force of the combined armies were competent to." ^ 

After a stormy passage Rochambeau reached France, 
and at once presented himself at Versailles. It is mel- 
ancholy to consider how many French gentlemen who 
risked their lives in the cause of American independ- 
ence ended honorable careei-s on the scaffold in their 
own country. Rochambeau was more fortunate. He 
received from the King the commendation to which 
he was justly entitled, and he was afterwards made a 
marshal of France. Like many of his old comrades in 
America, he was brought before the Revolutionary Tri- 
bunal and condemned to death. It is said that on the 
day appointed for his execution the cart which trans- 
ported prisoners was so full that there was no place 
for him, and before his turn came again Robespierre 
had been sent to the block and the prisoners were 
liberated. He was an old man when Napoleon's 
great career began, but he was held by him in high 
esteem, and was made a grand officer of the Le- 
gion of Honor. He died in 1807, full of years and 
honors. 

After the departure of Rochambeau, the French 
army remained for a while at Rhode Island waiting for 
the fleet, which was to convey them home, to be put 
in readiness. A final ball was given at Newport on the 
16th of November, at Mrs. Crowley's assembly-room, 

1 Writings of Washington, Spaika's ed., -viii, 368. 



CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 411 

by some of the young noblemen of Rocham beau's army. 
The " Mercury " informs us that the rooms " exhibited 
a sight beautiful beyond expression, . . . and the whole 
transactions of the evening were conducted with so 
much propriety and elegance that it gave the highest 
satisfaction to all who had the honor of being present." 

The Prince de Brogiie described the matter in some- 
what different terms. The young people declared that 
since the French had been away there had been no 
more amusements at Newport, and accordingly he and 
a few others decided to give a ball to those disconso- 
late fair ones. " We met with neither reluctance nor 
refusal when we spoke of dancing. Our company was 
composed of some twenty young ladies, some of them 
married, all of them beautifully dressed, and all ap- 
pearing to be pleased. . . . We quitted Newport with 
great regret, but not without having first kissed the 
hand of Polly Leiton." ^ 

The weather during the march to Boston was cold 
and disagreeable. Quite a number of the common sol- 
diers were ready to leave their colors and stay in Amer- 
ica, where the chance of a prosperous existence seemed 
as good as in France. There were, therefore, some 
desertions, but on the 7th of December the army 
reached Boston and made its triumphal entry. The offi- 
cers and soldiers were dressed in their best. " A great 
part of the population of the town," says the Comte 
de Segur, " came out to meet us ; ladies stood at their 
windows and welcomed us with the liveliest applause ; 
our stay was marked by continued rejoicings, by feasts 
and balls which succeeded each other day by day."^ 

If the Bostonians were sorry to have their guests 

1 Journal du Voyage dii Prince de Brogiie, Colonel, etc. ; in Sociiti 
des bibliophiles franqois : Melanges, 2d part. 

2 Mim. de Sigur (1825 ed.), i, 418. 



412 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

leave them, many of the French shared their regret. 
" I leave," says Segur, " with infinite regret a country 
where men are, as they ought to be everywhere, sincere 
and free. Private interests are there confounded in the 
general interests. . . . Each man dresses according 
to his means and not according to the fashion. Each 
thinks, says, and does what he wishes. . . . Nothing 
drives one to be false, to be base, or to flatter." * 

On the 24th the fleet under Vaudreuil sailed from 
Boston, carrying with it the French army. The legion 
of Lauzun remained south and did not sail until May 
12, when it embarked at the Capes of Delaware. 

The French government was liberal in the bestowal 
of rewards upon those who had reflected honor upon 
their country by their service in the United States. 
Viomenil was made a lieutenant-general. La Fayette 
and Lauzun were made mar^chaux de camp, Deux- 
Ponts was made a brigadier, and the Vicomte de 
Rochambeau, the son of the Comte de Eochambeau, 
was made a Knight of St. Louis. 

We feel a natural interest in the fortunes of those 
gallant volunteers in the cause of American liberty. 
It Is impossible to trace the fate of all, but among the 
officers were members of great French families, who, 
from their rank as well as from their ability, were 
certain to hold prominent position when they returned 
to the land of their birth. A direful fate awaited 
many. Apparently most of them had everything to 
hope from life, but while they had been fighting on 
American battlefields they had been preparing a more 
portentous and sinister upheaval in their own land. 
Many bore back laurels won in the American Revo- 
lution only to meet death in the French Revolution. 
1 M4m. de SSgur (1825 ed.), i, 422. 



CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 413 

The officers of the army under Louis XVI were 
recruited almost entirely from the nobility, and these 
well-born volunteers were involved in the ruin of the 
class to which they belonged. The young men who 
fought for liberty on our side of the Atlantic were, 
for the most part, ready to welcome liberty in their 
own land ; but that did not protect them from the 
violent hands of those who guided the fortunes of the 
French Kevolution; they came under the ban, not 
because their patriotism was weak, but because their 
pedigree was good. 

La Fayette was the most conspicuous volunteer in 
our cause, and the fame he won in America made 
him a leading figure in the political upheaval in his 
own country. Here his career had been one of unusual 
success. His good judgment never failed, his military 
achievements, if not extraordinary, were meritorious 
and at times brilliant. But the orderly progress of our 
Revolution was well adapted to the manner of man 
that La Fayette was. His unselfish zeal endeared him 
to those in whose behalf he came to fight. The purity 
of his motives and his patriotism received full appre- 
ciation when he served under a leader like Washing- 
ton. For the dark passions, the stormy tumults in 
which France became involved. La Fayette was not 
the man ; he exerted little influence over the Revolu- 
tion in his own country. If he did not tarnish his 
former fame, he did not gain any new glory. He pre- 
served the lofty elevation of his character through all 
the trying ordeals of a long and eventful life. But it 
must be confessed that he was unequal intellectually 
to the great crisis into which he was thrown. Indeed, 
to many students of French history he appears only, 
as Mirabeau declared him, a Cromwell-Grandison. 



414 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The Prince de Broglie was among the most distin- 
guished in birth of the French noblemen who came to 
our aid. His father was a duke and marshal of France, 
and a prince of the Holy Roman Empire, who had 
commanded an army during the Seven Years' War. 
The son came over to America in 1782, and had no 
opportunity for active service ; but his memoirs show 
him to have been sincere in his devotion to our cause, 
and singularly acute, for a young man a little over 
twenty, in his judgments upon the new and strange 
people among whom he was thrown. Unlike some of 
his associates, his zeal for political liberty was not 
confined to this country ; after his return he was 
active in advocating reforms in France, and was sent 
as a deputy to the States-General. There he acted 
with the liberal element, and after his term had ex- 
pired, he served in the army of the Rhine. But the 
overthrow of the monarchy went beyond his desires. 
He resigned from the army, and, instead of taking 
refuge abroad, sought peace in his country-seat. He 
did not find it there, for he was arrested as a suspect, 
and on June 27, 1794, was executed on the guillotine. 
He met his fate when safety was just at hand; a few 
days later Robespierre was overthrown, and the Reign 
of Terror ceased. 

A similar fate awaited an officer who played a more 
important part both in America and in France. The 
Comte de Custine came here in 1781. After his re- 
turn to France, he became mar^chal de camp and 
governor of Toulon. In 1789 he was elected to the 
National Assembly, and in 1792 he commanded an 
army on the lower Rhine. He was popular with the 
soldiers, but his conduct did not suit the Jacobins; he 
was arrested at the head of his army, taken to Paris, 



CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 415 

and brought to trial. It was still in the early days of 
the Committee of Public Safety, and Custine's friends 
thought the condemnation of the general impossible, 
as it could be based only on perverted slanders. They 
soon discovered their mistake. The general defended 
himself in a way that would have convinced any 
ordinary tribunal, and indeed there was nothing he 
had done which required defence. The crime charged 
was treason. The crime he had committed was the 
giving offence to the Jacobins, who were resolved to 
show that no man, either in the army or in private 
life, was strong enough or popular enough to with- 
stand their hostility. Custine was one of the first 
notable victims of the Terror; he was condemned and 
executed with the promptitude that added consterna- 
tion to such downfalls. 

The Due de Lauzun was one of the most amiable, 
as well as one of the most gallant of the French vol- 
unteers, and if he was a leader of the roues in France, 
he was a model of the proprieties in America. He, 
too, met the common fate of a trial before the Kevo- 
lutionary Tribune and death upon the scaffold. Vio- 
menil, who was second in command to Rochambeau, 
fell mortally wounded when defending the royal family 
in the Tuileries against the attack of the mob on 
August 10, 1792. The Chevalier Duportail, another 
brilliant French officer, early enlisted in the Ameri- 
can service (1777), and at Yorktown commanded the 
engineer corps. He was received with honor on his 
return, and in 1790 was made minister of war. It 
was a perilous dignity at such a time, and neither the 
minister's patriotism nor his capacity saved him from 
accusation when accusation often meant death. He also 
came before the Revolutionary Tribunal and met the 



416 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

usual condemnation, but he made his escape and found 
safety in the land for whose liberties he had fought. 

The list of those who thus met death or ruin in the 
Revolution in their own land could be long extended. 

While many of the officers who took part in our 
war met an early and evil fate, for some of them a 
very different fortune was reserved. The three La- 
meths served in America with credit, and one of them 
was severely wounded at Yorktown. Two of them 
were for a while prominent figures in the French Re- 
volution, and were fortunate enough to live through 
it and occupy positions of prominence afterwards. 
Theodore Lameth, who served in this country when 
a little over twenty, died in 1854, at the extreme age 
of ninety-eight. Had he lived a few years longer, he 
would have seen the country in whose formation he 
had assisted on the verge of dissolution from internal 
dissensions. 

With the exception of La Fayette, Alexandre Ber- 
thier was destined to the most conspicuous lot. He 
served with great credit in this country with La Fay- 
ette and under Rochambeau, and he took part in the 
final victory of Yorktown. He passed through the 
French Revolution with honor and with safety, and at 
last became a follower of Napoleon. He was one of 
those whose extraordinary fortunes corresponded 
with that of their extraordinary leader. Berthier 
accumulated an enormous fortune ; he was made a 
marshal of the empire ; he was created Prince of Wa- 
gram ; he married the niece of the King of Bavaria ; 
he was loaded with life's honors, only at last, as was 
believed, to take his own life in the agony of con- 
flicting emotions excited by Napoleon's return from 
Elba. 



CLOSING YEARS OF THE WAR 417 

Dumas, who so often expressed unfavorable views 
as to his American associates, helped to organize the 
National Guard, escorted the King, and protected him 
during his return from Varennes. Later he became a 
general under Napoleon and was minister of war to 
Joseph Bonaparte when he was king of Naples. 

The Comte de Segur, whose memoirs contain one 
of the most interesting accounts of the condition of 
French society when he was a youth, and of the con- 
ditions of our own country when he was here, also 
found fortune under Napoleon, and became a member 
of the Imperial Senate. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 

At the beginning of the Revohition the colonists 
knew little of the French, and what they did know 
was not reckoned in their favor. French Canadians 
had been objects of immemorial dislike, strengthened 
during occasional periods of acute apprehension. To 
the American colonist a Frenchman was a papist, 
which was bad, and much given to using Indian allies 
in war, which was worse ; he had neither political tra- 
ditions nor political rights, and his views on questions 
of government were not worthy of consideration. 

In social and domestic life he was still less to be 
copied. The American colonists shared the belief of 
their English cousins, that the French, for the most 
part, starved on bad food, that they believed in a bad 
religion, and were addicted to bad morals. A French- 
man did not eat roast beef, nor read the Scriptures, 
nor keep the Sabbath, nor regard other men's wives 
with puritanical rigor. 

By French literature the colonists were unaffected, 
because, with few exceptions, they knew nothing 
about it. The number who could read French was 
small, the number who did read French to any extent 
was smaller. The teachings of the physiocrats had no 
effect upon American economic thought, except as 
some trace of them may have been distilled through 
English writers ; the political theories of Montes- 
quieu and of Rousseau, the wit of Voltaire, the infidel- 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 419 

ity of the encyclopaedists, had no influence upon men, 
the most of whom did not know these writers even 
by name. Our ancestors' modes of thought were essen- 
tially English ; the political traditions which they in- 
herited, the political institutions which they founded, 
wei-e unaffected by French thought. 

These conditions were not largely modified in the 
years during which French and American soldiers 
stood shoulder to shoulder in the "War of Independ- 
ence, The influence upon the French soldiers, and 
especially upon the officers, of what they saw in the 
country they came to assist, was very considerable. 
But their own modes of thought had little effect on 
American society or American politics. In the senti- 
ments of our ancestors towards the French people a 
very great change was, indeed, produced by the war. 
This was natural ; however much the French had in- 
terfered with the comfort and happiness of the Amer- 
ican colonists in the past, they now came as their 
friends and benefactors. The value of the French alli- 
ance was recognized by all intelligent Americans. 

Furthermore, the French soldiers made themselves 
personally popular. The first arrivals were indeed 
little relished. For the most part they consisted of 
adventurers who came here with exaggerated views of 
their own importance, who offended their associates 
by their overbearing manners, and wearied them by 
their incapacity. But this was no longer the case 
after the French government espotised the American 
cause, and sent over officers and soldiers from the reg- 
ular army to cooperate with their American allies. 
Considering the character of the average Frenchman, 
especially when campaigning in foreign lands, and how 
strange to them seemed many of the customs of the 



420 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

colonists, the uniform propriety of their conduct is 
deserving of all praise. During the four years that 
French soldiers were on our soil, there was a univer- 
sal chorus of laudation over their conduct. It seemed 
the more meritorious when contrasted with the brutal- 
ities of the Hessians. The Hessians came, indeed, as 
enemies of the American government, but they were 
nominally the friends of the large body of Tories 
whose sympathies were still with England. Yet the 
Hessian soldiers, and indeed the English soldiers, plun- 
dered friend and foe with impartiality. The loyalist 
found that his crops were stolen, his house pillaged, 
and his family maltreated, quite as much as if he were 
the most ardent of patriots. 

But the French soldiers were models of propriety. 
They paid for what they got, they respected the chicken- 
roosts, they were polite to the women. In the latter 
years of the war, most of the gold in circulation was 
French gold, sent over by the French government, and 
paid out by the French army. The farmer and the 
storekeeper who substituted louis d'or for American 
Continental currency naturally entertained a kindly 
feeling for France. When the Marquis de Chastellux 
was travelling in Virginia in 1782, he recorded his 
satisfaction at observing that most of the money staked 
at the cock-fights was French gold. It was found in 
equal abundance in other channels of trade, and our 
ancestors viewed it with quite as much satisfaction as 
the marquis. 

Rochambeau says that when the Indians visited his 
camp at Newport, they manifested no emotion as they 
gazed at the cannon, or watched the French troops at 
their exercises, but they could not overcome their as- 
tonishment when they saw ripe apples hanging upon 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 421 

the trees under which the soldiers had long been 
camped. In all his three campaigns, the count says, 
there was never a disturbance between a soldier of 
the French and of the American army.^ 

The credit for such a result was largely given to 
Rochambeau by an officer who seems to have doubted 
whether the allies were really as fond of each other 
as they professed to be. He was, says Count Fersen, 
" the only man capable of commanding us here, and 
of maintaining that perfect harmony which has reigned 
between two nations so different in manners, morals, 
and language, and who, at heart, do not like each other." 
Such a statement was perhaps modified by the writer's 
own feelings, for he adds : " Our allies have not always 
behaved well to us, and the time that we have spent 
among them has not taught us to like or esteem them." 2 

The good order maintained by the French soldiers 
was chiefly due to the discipline enforced by the French 
officers. It is perhaps more surprising that the officers 
themselves, who were brought in contact with American 
society, should have conducted themselves in a manner 
in which even our Puritan ancestors found nothing to 
criticize. Some of the officers appreciated the delicacy 
of the situation and were surprised, as well as pleased, 
at the result. One of them writes his father : " You 
know Frenchmen, and what are called courtiers, enough 
to judge of the despair of our young men of that class 
who find themselves obliged to pass the winter tran- 
quilly in Newport. . . . No suppers, no theatres, no 
balls. Yet they acquit themselves creditably amid such 
privations." ^ Another praises the good example set by 

1 Mimoires cle Rochambeau, i, 254, 314. 

^ Fersen, Diary, etc. (translated by Miss Worineley), 63. 

3 Ibid., 26. 



422 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Vaudreuil, the commander of the squadron at Boston, 
and says that such conduct, " followed beyond all hope 
and belief by the officers of his squadron," captivated 
the hearts of a people which had not hitherto been 
friendly to the French. " The officers of our navy," he 
adds, " were everywhere received, not only as allies, but 
brothers ; and though they were admitted by the ladies 
of Boston to the greatest familiarity, not a single in- 
discretion, not even the most distant attempt at im- 
pertinence ever disturbed the confidence or innocent 
harmony of this pleasing intercourse." ^ Their record 
at Newport and Philadelphia, and wherever they went, 
was equally blameless. 

To-day the Frenchman of the better class finds many 
of our social usages strange to him, and the difference 
was even more marked at the time of the Revolution. 
French customs have changed somewhat, and Ameri- 
can customs, Nvith the growth of wealth and fashion, 
have changed still more. But in the days of 1776 the 
simplicity of life to which our colonial fathers were 
bred had been little modified. 

The widespread well-being, the rarity of poverty, 
made its impression upon our allies. It was, indeed, a 
favorable time for French gentlemen to investigate the 
ways of a simpler and more wholesome society. The 
artificiality of life in the upper circles had begun to 
pall on those who mingled in it. The Queen sought 
to gratify her desire for change by playing dairy-maid 
at her miniature farm at the Trianon ; philosophers 
praised the primitive man ; courtiers and fine ladies 
babbled of green fields and running brooks. Some- 
what of this was artificial, but much was genuine. 
There was also a more active interest in the condition 
1 ChasteUux, Travels, etc., ii, 291, 292. 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 423 

of the masses of the people than France had before 
witnessed. Both officers and men came from many a 
sad sight of poverty and distress, from peasants living 
in huts, on black bread, pinched by hunger because so 
great a share of their scanty crops was absorbed by the 
tax-gatherer. 

It is from the officers that we must take our record, 
but the privates were quite as much impressed by a 
country where every man had his fowl in the pot, where 
hunger was rare, and extreme poverty unknown. 

" In America," wrote La Fayette, " there are no 
poor, nor even what we call peasantry. Each individ- 
ual has his own honest property." " Such is the pre- 
sent happiness," writes another, " that the country has 
no poor, and every man enjoys a certain ease and in- 
dependence." " This little establishment," writes the 
Marquis de Chastellux, of the house of an American 
colonel, where he visited, " in which comfort and sim- 
plicity reign, gave an idea of that sweet and serene 
state of happiness which appears to have taken refuge 
in the new world." Speaking again of a gathering of 
ladies that he attended, he says : " This assembly re- 
called to my mind in every respect those of Holland 
and Geneva, where one meets gayety without inde- 
cency and the wish to please without coquetry." * 

Gayety without indecency can still be found in 
American society, but with the growth of wealth it is 
doubtful whether any one would now find close resem- 
blance between social life at New York and Geneva. 
Change has been more rapid in the great republic than 
in the small republic. Even Fersen, who did not love 
us, found the inhabitants of the country prosperous 
without luxury or display. " They content themselves," 
1 Chastellux, Travels, etc., i, 286. 



// 



424 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

he writes, " with mere necessaries. . . . Their clothes 
are simple but good, and their morals have not yet 
been spoiled by the luxury of Europeans. It is a 
country which surely will be very happy if it can en- 
joy a long peace, and if the two political parties which 
now divide it, do not make it suffer the fate of Poland 



" 1 



and so many other republics. 

In the residence of the wealthy simplicity was still 
found. A party of officers visited the country house 
of Mr. Tracy, the most considerable merchant at 
Newbury, which was then an important port. They 
found a terraced garden, a hothouse, the residence 
handsome and well furnished, and, says the narrator, 
" everything breathes that air of magnificence, accom- 
panied with simplicity, which is only to be found 
among merchants." Here indeed the guests, after an 
excellent supper, drank good wine, and continued 
drinking Madeira until bearers of the names of Tal- 
leyrand and Montesquieu became intoxicated. It 
should be said that this was attributed to the fact that 
the host offered them pipes to smoke, and they were 
overcome by the tobacco. A similar result has been 
attributed to the same cause by others besides French 
officers.^ 

While our allies found our modes of life simple, 
they pronounced our drinks both good and potent. At 
General Heath's, the guest says the dinner was plain 
but good, and adds, " It was true that there was not 
a drop of wine, but with excellent cider and toddy one 
may very well dispense with it." ^ As they got far- 
ther south they found both wine and whiskey were to 
be had, and usually both were acceptable. One, in- 

^ Fersen, Diary, etc., 26. ^ Chastellux, Travels, etc., ii, 245. 

3 Ibid., i, 82. 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 425 

deed, writes from Virginia: "The whiskey or corn 
spirits we had in the evening, mixed with water, was 
very bad." But this may have been owing to the 
mixture. 

On the whole, the meals were satisfactory. The 
French became accustomed to the American custom 
of drinking coffee with meat and vegetables, and 
learned to appreciate an American breakfast. Prairie 
chicken they found to their taste, and declared its 
black meat was more delicate and higher flavored 
than that of the heath-cock. 

At some places trials were experienced. In Vir- 
ginia, wrote an officer, the people ate nothing but 
cakes made of Indian corn and baked before a fire. 
The outside was hard, and the inside was dough, and 
the only drink was rum mixed with water, and called 
grog, which the officers did not like. But as they 
themselves on this excursion were well provided with 
pates, hams, wine, and bread, this, says the writer, 
"prevented our feeling the misery that reigns in inns 
where nothing is found but salt pork and no bread." ^ 

Some customs were distasteful to the visitors. The 
Marquis de Chastellux lamented the feather-beds, 
from which many of them suffered greatly. A usage 
equally disagreeable sometimes prevailed at dinner. 
The practice of asking a friend at table to drink a 
glass of wine with one, our ancestors were charged 
with carrying to excess. " I find it an absurd and truly 
barbarous practice," writes one of the victims. . . . 
"They call to you from one end of the table to the 
other, 'Sir, will you permit me to drink a glass of 
wine with you ? ' . . . The bottle is then passed to 
you, and you must look your enemy in the face. . . . 
^ Fersen, Diary, etc., 54, 



426 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

You wait till he likewise has poured out his wine and 
taken his glass. You then drink mournfully with him, 
as a recruit imitates the corporal in his exercise." ^ 

Meat, when paid for in French gold, was cheap ; 
but the foreign officers who were in the American 
service and were paid in Continental currency found 
a very different condition of affairs. Kalb, who was 
a major-general in our army, was full of just laments. 
His pay as a general was nominally two thousand 
dollars, but he tells us that this represented little more 
than fifty dollars in gold. " My journey," he writes 
a friend in 1780, "costs me immense sums. I cannot 
have my equipage follow me, I have to live in the 
taverns, or in private houses, where I pay at the 
same rate. My pay for six months is hardly enough 
for the necessary expenses of one day. ... I was 
once directed to take up quarters in a private house 
for the night. They gave me some bad soup and grog 
for drink. Yet the next morning, without breakfast, 
my account for four men and three servants was 
eight hundred and fifty dollars. The mistress of the 
house told me politely that she had put in nothing 
for lodging and left it to my discretion, but three or 
four hundred dollars would not be too much for the 
trouble she had had with ray servants." It is not strange 
that the baron adds : " These people pretend that they 
are sacrificing everything for . . . liberty. . . . An 
ordinary horse costs twenty thousand dollars ; I say 
twenty thousand dollars " ; and he sighs. " Would 
that I were at my own home, and had never embarked 
in this galere."^ 

1 Chastellux, Travels, etc., 185-186. 

^ Kalb to Baron HoltzendorfF, from Petersburg in Virginia, May 
29, 1780 ; Kapp, Life of Ealb, 325. 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 427 

The character and conduct of our women were of 
great interest to the young beaux and dandies who 
came over from France, and who, at home, showed as 
much recklessness in making love as they displayed 
on the field of battle. Their judgments were almost 
uniformly favorable, and were creditable to their 
intelligence. They were surprised at the freedom with 
which women met them, yet they had sense enough 
to realize that the women were not in love with them, 
but that such were the usages of a society in which 
intrigues were unknown. The contrast between the 
freedom of our young girls and the strictness with 
which the French jeiaie jille is guarded constantly 
impressed our visitors. One of them was a little 
shocked when he found even so staid a personage as 
Samuel Adams tete-a-tete with a young girl of fifteen, 
who was preparing his tea. "But," he adds, "we 
should not be scandalized at this, considering that 
he is at least sixty." The strictness of the married 
women surprised them as much as the freedom of the 
unmarried. " I went to see Mrs. Bingham," writes 
one, " a young and handsome woman only seventeen. 
Her husband was there, according to American cus- 
tom." When the young women discovered that a man 
was married, lamented Rochambeau, forthwith they 
regarded him as a person possessing no possible inter- 
est, and would have nothing to say to him. 

Either the women were graver than their descend- 
ants or they appeared sedate to those accustomed to 
French vivacit}'. In one place Chastellux speaks of 
meeting ISIrs. Spencer, and says she was gay and even 
given to laughter, a rare thing among American 
women. ^ Certainly this remark would not be made 
1 Chastellux, Travels, etc , ii, 130. 



428 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

now. Another criticism made by our allies in the Revo- 
lution is still made by foreigners, for it was declared 
that all American children were spoiled. 

In some respects the women of the Revolution 
seemed less attractive than would their descendants 
of to-day. In dress, indeed, they were reasonably sat- 
isfactory. "Be assured," writes a French officer in a 
formal letter to the father of James Madison, "that 
during a three years' residence in America the pro- 
gress in women's dress has not escaped me." But in 
music, drawing, and indeed in all the arts, they were 
found sadly lacking. Musical taste was undoubtedly 
little developed. Yet though there was little of musi- 
cal education, it was not unknown. In Philadelphia 
one of our guests made the round of the churches, 
and at last found satisfaction at the English church. 
It appeared to him a sort of opera. A handsome 
minister in the pulpit, reading, speaking, and singing 
with a grace entirely theatrical; a number of young 
women answering melodiously from the galleries; a 
soft and agreeable vocal music well accompanied on 
the organ; "all this," he adds, "compared to the 
Quakers, the Anabaptists, Presbyterians, etc., ap- 
peared to me rather like a little paradise itself than 
as the road to it." * 

On the whole, American women, if we may believe 
our visitors, had not yet attained to that degree of 
social charm which is now accorded to them even by 
foreigners who criticize the manners of our men. One 
of the officers wrote that they were little accustomed 
to giving themselves trouble either of body or mind. 
" Making tea and seeing that the house is kept clean," 
he complains, " constitute the whole of their domestic 

1 Chastellux, Travels, etc., i, 289. 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 429 

province." This did not apply to all ; he found many 
of them agreeable, but still, when compared with their 
French sisters, lacking in accomplishments. This was 
undoubtedly true. Men who moved in the best society 
in Paris could find in the ladies of their acquaintance 
a familiarity with art in all its forms, and a degree 
of skill in many of them, a knowledge of literature, a 
brilliancy of conversation, which to say the least was 
much less common among the women of the Revolu- 
tion. It may gratify our patriotic pride to feel that if 
such an inferiority existed then, it does not exist now. 

In other respects the French also asserted their 
superiority. When the Marquis de Chastellux went 
to a ball in Boston with his acquaintance Mr. Breck, 
the agent of the French navy, he speaks of various 
French gentlemen who danced the minuet and did 
honor to the French nation by their noble and easy 
manner. But I am sorry to say that the contrast was 
considerable between them and the Americans, " who 
are in general very awkward, particularly in the min- 
uet. . . . The ladies," he adds, "were all well dressed, 
but with less elegance and refinement than in Phila- 
delphia." But when he dined at Mr. Breck's he reports : 
"There reigned in this society a tone of ease and free- 
dom which is pretty general at Boston, and cannot 
fail of being pleasing to the French." ^ 

The dancing of the Boston ladies seems to have been 
decidedly unsatisfactory. Another officer tells us that 
before leaving that city he wished to make acquaint- 
ance with the fair sex. " Twice a week," he writes, 
" there is a ladies' hall or school where the young 
ladies meet to dance, from noon until two o'clock. I 
spent some moments there ... I found nearly all 
1 Chastellux, Travels, etc., ii, 259, 262. 



430 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the women extremely handsome, at the same time ex- 
tremely awkward. It would be impossible to dance 
with less grace, or to be worse dressed, although with 
a certain extravagance." * It is pleasant to reflect that 
the progress made by American women in the arts 
since the days of the Revolution has extended to 
dancing, and that even at Boston a French officer 
would now find nothing to criticize. 

At this time social life in Philadelphia was probably 
more agreeable than in any other American city, and 
the Prince de Broglie is one of many who bear wit- 
ness to its charms. He speaks first of his visit to a 
small town of which the social requirements were ap- 
parently simple. " I only knew a few English words," 
he writes, " but I knew enough to drink excellent tea 
made with the best of cream, and to say to a young 
lady that she was pretty. ... As a result I had the 
necessary elements for success." It is doubtful if at 
Philadelphia compliments so direct in their form would 
have been relished, though they might have been ex- 
cused on account of the prince's scanty knowledge of 
English. He writes of his journey to that city : " It 
was very warm, but the beauty of the roads, the at- 
tractiveness of the country, the imposing majesty of the 
forests, the air of abundance that everywhere appeared, 
the fairness and courtesy of the women, all contributed 
to atone for any sensations of fatigue." ^ In Phila- 
delphia he took tea with Mrs. Morris. He found the 
furniture elegant, the table handsomely arranged, the 
mistress of the house fair and pleasing ; everything 
was charming. The tea was still excellent, and the 

1 Dubourg's Journal, June 14, 1781 ; Magazine of American History, 
iv, 214. 

2 Narrative of the Prince de Broglie, in Balch's Les Franqais en 
Amirique, tr. by E. S. Balch, vol. i. 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 431 

prince seems to have rivalled Dr. Johnson in his fond- 
ness for it, for the French minister checked him at his 
twelfth cup. Even at Philadelphia the dancing did 
not correspond to the high ideals of the French. "The 
ladies of Philadelphia," writes the prince, "though 
sufficiently magnificent in their clothes, are not gen- 
erally dressed with much taste ; alike in their head- 
dress and their heads, they have less of vivacity and 
charm than our Frenchwomen. Although they are well 
shaped, they are lacking in grace, they do not courtesy 
well, nor do they excel in dancing. But," he adds, 
" they know how to make tea well, they educate their 
children with care, they are scrupulously faithful to 
their husbands, and many of them have natural wit." ^ 

Lack of grace in dancing was excusable in a coun- 
try where this amusement was sometimes forbidden 
by law, G<^rard, the French minister, speaks of the 
complications in which he was involved in this respect. 
He desired to acknowledge the civilities which he had 
received by a banquet, which was to be followed by a 
ball. To this some objected, and Gerard says : " They 
allege a law of Congress which forbids public enter- 
tainments. This law originated with the northern 
Presbyterians at the time when Congress fervently be- 
sought the aid of Heaven. Things have taken another 
turn, and now quite a number of senators dance every 
week." With diplomatic reserve Gerard expressed no 
opinion as to whether the senators danced well or ill.^ 

Social differences were observed, not only between 
Boston and Philadelphia, but between the North and 
the South. Of the southern women our marquis speaks 
less favorably, though it was in Virginia that he made 

1 Journal du Prince de Broglie, 46, 47. 

^ Correspondence of Gerard ; in Durand, New Materials, etc. , 166. 



432 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

his observations. He found them poorly educated and 
indolent, as a result of being served by slaves. " The 
consequence of this is," he writes, " that they are often 
pert and coquettish before, and sorrowful helpmates 
after marriage." ^ 

The young nobles who went to America were in fit 
condition to be affected by what they saw ; they came 
well prepared to absorb the teachings of American 
life and American institutions, and the simplicity that 
was found among some of the American women pro- 
duced a strong impression upon them. A certain weari- 
ness of elaborate dress and conventional modes of life 
had already manifested itself in Paris. The ardent 
youths of the period were ready to be favorably af- 
fected by different ideals. It was not only the natural 
ardor of youth for a pretty woman, but a reaction from 
the life to which he had been accustomed, that excited 
the Prince de Broglie's enthusiasm when he met Polly 
Leiton, the Quakeress. " The simplicity of her dress 
gave to Polly," he tells us, " the air of a Holy Virgin, 
and to this the modesty of her speech and the grace 
of her bearing corresponded. I confess," he adds, 
" this beguiling Polly seemed to be the chef-d'oeuvre 
of nature, and whenever her image presents itself to 
me, I form the plan of writing a large book against 
the attire, . . . the coquetry, and factitious charms of 
various women that are admired in the world." ^ 

The charming Polly excited equal admiration in the 
Comte de Sdgur. He says : " So much beauty, so much 
simplicity, so much elegance, so much modesty, were 
perhaps never before combined in the same person " ; and 
adds : " Had I not been married and happy, I should, 

1 Chastellux, Travels, etc., ii, 203. 
" Journal du Prince de Broglie, 68. 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 433 

while coming to defend the liberty of Americans, have 
lost my own at the feet of Polly Leiton." ^ He also 
expresses his admiration of the country in much the 
same terms as de Broglie. He was charmed alike by 
the beauties of virgin forests, and fields that had not 
yet known the plough, and by the spectacle of pro- 
sperity and thrift where civilization had already 
found its way. Wherever he stopped, he tells us, he 
was received with simplicity of manner, courtesy, and 
urbanity. He met neither poverty nor vice, but every- 
where ease and contentment, with neither the preju- 
dices nor the servility of European society. To such 
blessings, he added, that if the fare was simple, it was 
everywhere abundant ; that if the rum was too strong 
and the coffee too weak, the tea was excellent.- 

The French officers were equally ready to criticize 
their American allies. This insolent conduct, one of 
them wrote, deserved to be severely reprimanded, but 
how could one punish those in office in a country 
where the people were governed by caprice rather than 
by reason. " The Americans," he adds a little later, 
" are easy to deceive, indolent by nature, suspicious ; 
they always think they see what they fear ; they won't 
take the trouble to examine the reasons for their be- 
lief." They were so indolent, he declared, that they 
allowed the English to destroy Bedford without even 
sending notice of what was going on.^ 

That the Americans should have appeared to the 
French reserved or even phlegmatic, is not strange, 
but often they are accused of indolence and lack of 
business habits. It is hard to believe that the energy 
so noticeable in their descendants could have been 

1 Mim. de Sigur (1825 ed.), i, 396. 2 jjj^.^ 559. 

8 Extrait du Journal d'un officier de la marine de Vescadre de M. le 
comte d'Estaing (1782), 39, 41. 



434 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

lacking in any large proportion of our ancestors. Yet 
the Prince de Broglie, who, for the most part, judged 
us favorably, declared that our people were irresolute, 
as well as phlegmatic and greedy for money.* 

The Abbe Robin, who was an intelligent observer, 
makes somewhat similar criticisms. " Their character," 
he says, writing of our ancestors, " is cold, slow, and 
mild. They are not very industrious. . . . Their soft- 
ness of character is due to the climate as much as to 
their customs ; one finds it even in domestic animals. 
The horses are docile, one does not meet with those 
that are restive or high-strung; even the dogs are 
caressing and timid ; strangers have nothing to fear 
from their violence." ^ 

The cultivators of the soil seemed to him more 
simple than French peasants, though without their 
rusticity or their roughness ; more intelligent, with 
less dissimulation, but less industrious. In this judg- 
ment perhaps the abbe was not altogether wrong; 
the French peasant then and now is willing to under- 
go continuous labor to an extent distasteful to the 
American farmer. The distinction between the two 
classes was the same as it is now; the abbe found 
our farmers less attached to ancient usages and more 
ready for improved methods of cultivation.^ 

He thought that the American women regarded 
church as a paradise, though not always from the 
highest motives. "Piety is not the only thing," he 
says, " that brings American women in crowds to 
church. Without theatres, without public promenades, 
it is there they go in the desire to show their increas- 

^ Journal du Prince de Broglie, 48. 
■■' Robin, Nouveau Voyage, etc., 41, 42. 
« Ibid., 43. 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 435 

ing luxury. They appear dressed in silks and shadowed 
sometimes by superb feathers. Their head-dresses imi- 
tate those which our French ladies w^ore a few years 
ago. They do not use powder, but the most fashion- 
able begin to adopt European customs." ^ 

An associate of the Prince de Broglie, the Comte de 
Segur, one of the young aristocrats who was especially 
fascinated by the hopes of a better future for humanity 
that seemed opening to the world, writes, when leaving 
Boston in December, 1782: "I leave a country where 
one follows a simple code of simple laws, and respect- 
ing good morals, one is happy and tranquil. It is in 
outraging morals that one becomes the fashion in 
Paris. I was treated as a brother everywhere in Amer- 
ica. I saw only public confidence, hospitality, and cor- 
diality. The girls are coquettes in order to find hus- 
bands, the women are discreet in order to hold them. 
I know that this country cannot long preserve morals 
as pure as this, but if it keeps them for only a century, 
is a century of happiness nothing?" ^ 

All were not arrayed with the simplicity of Broglie'8 
Polly Leiton. " I was surprised," writes another, " to 
find the traces of French fashions in the forests of 
America. The head-dresses of all the women except 
the Quakers are high and complicated. One is lost in 
reflection, when he finds in the province of Connecti- 
cut so strong a taste for dress and so much luxury, 
combined with customs that are so simple and pure 
that they resemble those of the ancient patriarchs." ' 

Another writer described the women as tall and 
well proportioned, generally with regular features, 

^ Robin, Nouvea-u Voyage, etc., 14. 
2 Mim. de Sigur (1825 ed.), i, 423. 
' Robin, Nouveau Voyage, etc., 38. 



436 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

with a pale complexion and little color. They have less 
charm and less ease, he writes, than Frenchwomen, 
but more nobility of bearing. The men, he said, were 
usually well made, and few were fat, but they also, for 
the most part, had pale complexions. 

Another comment was truer then than it would be 
now, for on the whole life was then harder, and the pro- 
gressive ease of civilization, amid many other benefi- 
cial effects, tends to preserve the good looks of women 
to a greater age. " At twenty-five years," writes the 
abb^, " the women have no longer the freshness of 
youth, at thirty-five or forty they are wrinkled and 
decrepit." ^ 

The immoderate use of tea is constantly criticized. 
" They take a great deal of tea, the use of this insipid 
drink is their chief pleasure. There is not an inhab- 
itant who does not take it, and the greatest mark of 
politeness they can show is to offer it to you." To 
the tea, he adds, the loss of their teeth was attributed. 
The women were ordinarily pretty, but at eighteen or 
twenty they had often lost this precious ornament. But 
he himself attributed this rather to hot bread, because 
the English and Dutch preserved their teeth, though 
they also were tea-drinkers.^ 

La Fayette viewed everything in this country with 
the eyes of youthful enthusiasm. He found the women 
of the South pretty in appearance, simple in manners, 
and neat in dress, and he was no less pleased in the 
North. When travelling from Washington's camp to 
Albany, to take command of the army which was to 
conquer Canada, but which never started on the ex- 

^ Robin, Nouveau Voyage, etc., 14, 15. See also Granite Monthly, iv, 
424. 

* Robin, Nouveau Voyage, etc., 39. 



FRENCH IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA 437 

pedition, he was greatly charmed by his journey of 
four hundred miles. Travelling leisurely on horse- 
back, so he writes, he had the opportunity of observ- 
ing the customs of the people and their patriarchal 
life. The women were devoted to their own homes ; 
there they found happiness and there they gave hap- 
piness. It was only to unmarried girls one talked of 
love, and coquetry of this sort was amiable and decent. 
La Fayette goes on to complain of his own country, 
though certainly his own marriage was an exception 
to those of which he speaks. " In the marriages of 
chance one makes in Paris, the faithfulness of the 
women is often contrary to nature, to reason, and, one 
could almost say, to justice. In America one marries 
her lover. To accept another would be to break a 
valid treaty, because both parties know to what they 
are engaging themselves." * 

The Comte de Deux-Ponts was among the officers 
who came over with Rochambeau, and he noted down 
his impressions of our people. They were always com- 
plimentary. " The Anglo-American," he says, " is 
fleshier than the Frenchman, without being taller." 
This certainly is not true unless Frenchmen have 
diminished in height and increased in breadth. Then 
he adds: "He is quite strong, of a robust constitution, 
his phlegmatic temperament renders him patient, de- 
liberate, and consistent in all his undertakings." 
He gave the preference to those who lived north of 
the Delaware. They possessed, so he wrote, more 
courage and energy, and a rigid Presbyterianism had 
strengthened their character, while the people south 
were less energetic and less capable of enduring 
the fatigues of war. Neither the war of the Revolu- 
1 Lafayette, Mimoires, etc., 40. 



438 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

tion nor the Civil War justified this depreciation of 
southern men. 

Naturally enough, American manners seemed cold 
to those accustomed to French exuberance. One of 
the followers of Rochambeau complains of the reserve 
of the Americans, and the coldness with which they 
received those who came to their assistance.^ " We 
did not meet with that reception on landing which we 
expected, and which we ought to have had. A cold- 
ness and a reserve appear to me to be characteristic 
of the American nation. They seem to have little of 
that enthusiasm which one supposes would belong to 
a people fighting for its liberties, and to be little 
suited to inspire it in others." 

The gloom of the New England Sabbath also im- 
pressed itself upon our visitors. " What a gloomy 
silence reigns in all your towns on Sunday," writes 
one. "A stranger would imagine that some epidemic or 
plague had obliged eVery one to confine himself at 
home." The women are at a loss what to do with their 
fine dresses that have shone only at the meeting, and 
can only divert themselves by scandal, while the men, 
wearied with reading the Bible to their children, as- 
semble round the bowl. "Make happy days then of 
Sundays," he continues, " and you will confer on them 
an inestimable present." ^ 

This advice was sent to Mr. Madison. It is quite 
certain that if it had been sent to John Adams it 
would have strengthened the poor opinion he enter- 
tained of the French. 

1 Comte de Deux-Ponts, My Campaigns in America (translated by 
S. A. Green), 91. 

2 Chastellux, Travels, etc., ii, 383-387. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 

After the capture of Yorktown the time had at last 
arrived when there was a possibility of closing the 
long contest for American independence. Nearly two 
years elapsed before a treaty was agreed upon, and 
the negotiations were attended with much distrust 
and recrimination among those charged with them. 
Not only at the time, but ever since, they have been 
a fertile theme for controversy ; the representatives 
of America were not sparing in their criticisms of 
one another, and they founded schools of partisans 
who dispute the credit or the blame which should be 
attributed to each. Among the allies, also, the har- 
mony that had prevailed during the prosecution of 
the war was not found in equal measure in the nego- 
tiations for peace. Some Americans declared that 
France proved an unfaithful friend at the end. Some 
Frenchmen asserted that the United States considered 
only their own interests, and deserted the cause of 
their benefactress. It is possible now to study the 
diplomacy of both nations, and see whether either can 
be justly accused of bad faith toward its ally. 

Suggestions of reconciliation between England and 
the United States had often been advanced during 
the progress of the war, and, naturally, they were 
made to the representative of the colonies in France. 
Dr. Franklin was by far the most conspicuous Amer- 
ican in Europe, and it was probable that any negoti- 



440 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ations for peace would be in his hands. In 1778 one 
Pulteney, a member of Parliament, visited France, 
under an assumed name, and sought to open a con- 
ference with Franklin.^ He seems to have proceeded 
without authority, and his action bore no fruit. The 
English still clung to the hope of retaining some con- 
trol over the colonies, while both France and the 
thirteen states had agreed that absolute independ- 
ence must be the first condition of peace. 

A few months later Pulteney was followed by a 
still more mysterious intriguer. A letter signed Charles 
de Weissenstein, a name savoring of many nation- 
alities, was thrown over the gateway of the house 
occupied by the American minister. It suggested a 
plan of reconciliation, as a part of which Adams, 
Hancock, Washington, Franklin, and others should 
receive either valuable offices or pensions for life, for 
amounts to be inserted in blanks left opposite their 
names ; and it further promised that if American 
peers were ever created, these leaders should be in- 
cluded in the first promotion. The letter closed with 
the statement that the writer would be at Notre- 
Dame at a certain hour, with a rose in his hat, ready 
to receive a reply. 

The American minister did not attempt to meet 
this extraordinary negotiator, but some French police 
officers were on hand and reported that a man corre- 
sponding to the description wandered about the cathe- 
dral at the appointed hour, and at last returned to 
his hotel and was heard of no more.^ Franklin was 
convinced that the Weissenstein letter was George 
Ill's own conception, and he prepared a fiery answer 
to it. It is not impossible that the English King 
1 Wharton, ii, 523, 527. 2 Bigelow, Franklin, u, 435-436. 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 441 

thought that the American colonies could be led back 
to loyalty by making Washington a peer, and Frank- 
lin and John Adams pensioners. His treatment of the 
colonists in the past showed no better understanding 
of their character. 

In 1779 Vergennes suggested to Congress that it 
might be well to select an envoy empowered to treat, 
in case England should at any time manifest a desire 
for peace. There was little prospect of such overtures 
at this stage of the war, but even the suggestion of 
peace was grateful, and Congress at once took action. 

The selection of a commissioner was not free from 
intrigue and state jealousies. The choice lay between 
Adams and Jay. Franklin's name was not suggested; 
he was already at Paris as the American minister, 
and possibly it was thought that his services could be 
secured without a formal appointment as peace com- 
missioner. Moreover, the persistent slanders which 
Lee and Izard poured out against him had their effect 
on members of Congress, who, for the most part, were 
ignorant of the condition of foreign courts and of the 
position held by our representatives abroad. Adams 
was the choice of the New England states, who de- 
sired some one to press with unwearied zeal for the '/ 
recognition of the rights of New England fishermen 
in the Newfoundland fisheries, and in Adams they 
selected a man who certainly was faithful to their 
trust. His name was naturally suggested for the 
position : he had been for nearly a year and a half at 
Paris as one of the representatives of the United 
States, and had lately returned ; the experience which 
he had gained would surely be of much value. Jay 
had the support of New York and the South, and 
was agreeable to the French minister. 



442 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

At first Adams received the votes of five states and 
Jay of four, and there was no choice ; but a compro- 
mise was reached : Adams was selected as commis- 
sioner for the peace negotiations, while Jay was sent 
as minister to Madrid, where he spent two years of 
discomfort, obtaining few promises of aid and still 
less performance. 

Having chosen a commissioner, Congress next pro- 
ceeded to frame his instructions. There had already 
been much and fervent discussion of the terms to be 
demanded: the New England states regarded the 
question of the fisheries as all important, the southern 
states were equally interested in the extension of the 
western frontier, and in securing the free navigation 
of the Mississippi. In all these matters, Gerard, the 
French minister, took an active part ; and that his 
counsel should be much heeded was not unnatural, 
when we consider the importance of the French alli- 
ance to the young republic. There were in Congress 
factions largely under the influence of the French 
minister, and factions that were not influenced by him 
at all, on whom he naturally looked with ill-favor. 
Partly to simplify the issues, and partly because he 
regarded himself as bound to protect the interests of 
Spain and of all the Bourbon family, he had been 
anxious that Congress should take no decided stand on 
any question except the recognition of independence. 

Both Gerard and his successor were instructed by 
Vergennes to moderate the demands of Congress, not 
only lest these should hinder the attainment of peace, 
but still more from regard for the Spanish allies of 
France. It was desired by many members that the 
right to the fisheries, a proper western boundary, and 
the free navigation of the Mississippi should be in- 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 443 

eluded in the ultimata to be presented by the repre- 
sentatives of the United States. But Spain wanted 
the American colonists to be kept as far as possible 
from her possessions, and the free navigation of a 
river was to the Spanish as distasteful an idea as free- 
dom of commerce. 

In the negotiations for peace at Philadelphia, as 
at Paris and London, the demands made by Spain 
constantly embarrassed the representatives of France. 
Gerard was able to secure the adoption of instructions 
in a form agreeable to him. It was decided that an 
acknowledgment of the absolute independence of the 
United States must be a condition of peace, but all 
other matters were left to the fortune of negotiation. 

Adams arrived at Paris in February, 1780, but his 
presence in the French capital did not foster cordial 
relations between the young republic and her power- 
ful ally. The selection of Adams by Congress as com- 
missioner to treat of peace was not agreeable to Ver- 
gennes. In his first foreign mission Adams had not 
created a favorable impression on the French minister. 
Vergennes had probably assumed that Franklin would 
be designated as commissioner, and Adams, when he 
reached the French court, was persona non grata. Nat- 
urally complications soon arose between the American 
commissioner and the French minister. Adams sug- 
gested that he should at once formally notify the Eng- 
lish that he was an envoy sent from the United States, 
and empowered to agree on terms of peace. As the 
English King and his prime minister had no thought 
of making peace, unless the colonists were ready to 
return to their former allegiance. It was not important 
that they should be informed that Adams was at Paris, 
ready to sign a treaty which should recognize Ameri- 



444 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

can independence. At all events, Vergennes advised 
against announcing Adams's official character. He may- 
have thought it was premature, he may have wished 
that there should be no suggestion of readiness for 
negotiations, until France and the United States could 
cooperate. But Adams was annoyed at the failure to 
make solemn announcement of his official position, 
and he saw in this action manifest proof of the bad 
faith of France, and of the ill-will of her minister. 
He soon decided in his own mind that the colonies 
were to be used as an aid to French ambition, and 
were to have no opportunity to act as their own in- 
terests might require, but this belief does not seem to 
have been well founded. 

There is no doubt that Vergennes feared that the 
Americans might abandon the French alliance, make 
their own peace with England, and leave France to 
carry on alone the war she had begun to secure inde- 
pendence for the colonies. Apprehensions of this sort 
led him to discourage negotiations with England until 
France could join in them. His fears appeared in a 
letter written to La Luzerne soon after Adams Tarrived 
at Paris. " My opinion has been, and still is, that there 
is a party which desires Congress to make peace with- 
out any attention to our alliance. In other words, to 
obtain an assurance of American independence directly 
from England, without our participation." ^ In this sus- 
picion he was wrong, and no one would deny that such' 
action would have been in the highest degree dishon- 
orable. Washington, Franklin, the Congress, all de- 
clared, that under no circumstances could the United 
States make terms with England unless France was 
included in the treaty. 

^ Doniol, iv, 414. 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 445 

Other causes of disagreement soon arose and in- 
creased Vergennes's distaste for the American pleni- 
potentiary. It was disagreeable for Adams to acknow- 
ledge obligations to any one, either for his country 
or for himself. The assistance given by France, he 
thought, should be credited, not to the kindness of the 
donor, but to the unusual merit of the recipient. This 
was an unfortunate frame of mind. There is nothing 
ignoble in sincere gratitude ; a man or a nation may 
gladly admit that others have acted as friends. " I 
think," Franklin wrote to the President of Congress, 
" an expression of gratitude is not only our duty, but 
our interest. A different conduct seems to me what is 
not only improper and unbecoming, but what may be 
hurtful to us. Mr. Adams, on the other hand, who at 
the same time means our welfare and interest as much 
as I or any man can do, seems to think a little appar- 
ent stoutness and a greater air of independence and 
boldness in our demands will procure us more ample 
assistance. It is for the Congress to judge and regu- 
late their affairs accordingly." ' 

Adams was convinced that Franklin's way to secure 
aid from France was not the right way, and he adopted 
a course of his own with such success that Vergennes 
at last refused to have any further communication 
with him. Adams informed the French minister that 
the colonies were under no distressing burden of 
obligation to their ally. " On the other hand, the 
French could not acknowledge too much obligation 
to America," he said, "for, without their cooper- 
ation, England was too powerful for the House of 
Bourbon, . . . and France should not grow weary of 
a policy that had secured for her an amount of con- 
1 Aug. 9, 1780; Wharton, iv, 23. 



446 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

sideration in Europe such as she had never received 
before."* 

A further controversy was excited over the repudia- 
tion by Congress of its paper money. Apart from the 
aid furnished by the government, French merchants 
had sent large quantities of supplies to the Americans, 
and they held large amounts of the Continental paper 
currency. In March, 1780, Congress recommended 
that this should be redeemed at the rate of forty to 
pne, and Adams informed Vergennes of this action. 
Not unnaturally, the minister was greatly disturbed. 
This, he wrote, will be a most severe blow to the 
French, who have been ready to furnish the Americans 
with articles necessary for them, and who will be 
ruined as a return for their aid. Little of this cur- 
rency had come into the hands of other foreigners, 
and now those were to suffer who had been willing to 
assist the Americans in their distress.^ 

When Franklin was constantly asking for new loans, 
it was hardly the part of wisdom to insist that the col- 
onies had the moral right to settle with their creditors 
at two and a half cents on the dollar, but Adams did 
not hesitate. He sent Vergennes an elaborate argu- 
ment, showing that Congress had the right to adopt 
this measure, and there could be no exception in favor 
of foreigners. " I flatter myself," he wrote, " that I am 
so much a master of the principles as to demonstrate 
that the plan of Congress is not only wise but just." ' 

He flattered himself without cause. Doubtless the 
demonstration convinced Adams, but it produced in 
Vergennes an indignation that was not unnatural. He 

1 Relation, June 17, 1780; Doniol, iv, 416. 

2 Despatch, June 3, 1780; Doniol, iv, 415. 
8 Doniol, iy, 418. 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 447 

wrote La Luzerne asking that Congress should mod- 
ify the resolution so far as it concerned French sub- 
jects, and added, " His Majesty flatters himself that 
this assembly, actuated by other principles than those 
Mr. Adams has shown, will think the French worthy 
of some consideration, and that it appreciates the 
marks of interest which the King has incessantly man- 
ifested towards the United States." ^ 

Refusing to be convinced by the arguments of 
Adams, Vergennes carried his woes to Franklin. " Mr. 
Adams . . . has sent me," he wrote, "along disserta- 
tion, . . . but it contains only abstract reasonings, hy- 
potheses, and calculations, . . . principles than which 
nothing can be less analogous to the alliance subsisting 
between his Majesty and the United States." ' 

It is not strange that Franklin should have re- 
gretted the unwise activity of his associate, and he 
endeavored to sooth Vergennes's irritation. " When 
we are asking aid," he wrote Arthur Lee, " it is neces- 
sary to gratify the desires, and, in some sort, comply 
with the humors of those we apply to." This senti- 
ment would have been approved by Adams as little as 
it was by Lee. At all events, on July 10, Franklin 
wrote Vergennes that it was just that foreign mer- 
chants, and especially the French, should not suffer 
from this action, and he agreed to lay the whole ques- 
tion before Congress for its consideration. This he 
did, much to Adams's annoyance, and the incident 
helped to increase the latter's irritation against both 
Vergennes and Franklin.' 

This episode was followed by another, in which 
Adams could only have volunteered his advice because 

1 Doniol, iy, 419. » Translated in Wharton, iii, 827. 

» Wharton, iii, 844. 



448 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

he felt that Franklin was not capable of attending to 
the interests of the country he represented. In July, 
1780, Adams sent Vergennes a letter in regard to 
directions to be given Rochambeau and Ternay, who 
were about to sail to America with an army to assist 
Washington. Adams informed the French minister 
that, while he did not know to what part of America 
Ternay and Rochambeau were destined, he had no 
hopes of anything decisive from their operations, 
even though they were instructed to cooperate with 
General Washington. Having indulged in this pro- 
phecy, which the result did not verify, he stated that 
what America desired was the presence of French 
ships cruising along the coast and giving an oppor- 
tunity for American privateers to levy contributions 
upon English commerce. He added, in somewhat 
questionable taste, that many Americans thought the 
court of France did not mean to give any effectual 
aid to America ; and while he deprecated such an opin- 
ion, he suggested that the action he recommended 
would prove the sincerity of the French in their al- 
liance. Of a French army he saw less need, because 
he said that the English troops in North America 
for the last two years had been absolutely in the 
power of their enemies, so nothing was wanted but a 
little attention to accomplish the entire reduction of 
their power.* 

If Adams thought the American troops were able 
to overcome the English forces unassisted, he certainly 
did not share Washington's opinion. A little earlier 
Washington had written : " Unless a system very 
different from that which has for a long time pre- 
vailed be immediately adopted throughout the states, 
1 Works of John Adams, vii, 219-227. 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 449 

our affairs must soon become desperate, beyond the 
possibility of recovery. . . . Indeed, I have almost 
ceased to hope." 

"Whether Adams's suggestions were marked by 
more or less wisdom, Vergennes might properly have 
replied that his advice would be considered when it 
was asked. He sent, however, a civil answer, saying 
that the troops Were directed to act under Washington's 
orders. This drew a further reply, in which Adams 
criticized the manner in which the French had fur- 
nished military assistance, and this he accompanied 
by the announcement that advice might be expected 
frequently from him in future. " I am determined," he 
wrote, " to omit no opportunity of communicating my 
sentiments to your Excellency upon everything that 
appears to me of importance to the common cause, in 
which I can do it with any propriety." * 

He might well have omitted the last clause. Frank- 
lin was the minister by whom such communications 
could properly be made, but Adams was convinced of 
his own superior wisdom, and felt that his counsels 
must fill the gaps left by the indolent voluptuary who 
was neglecting his country's interests. 

This criticism exceeded the limitations of Ver- 
gennes's endurance, and the prospect of endless com- 
munications from this self-appointed counsellor doubt- 
less filled him with dismay. He forwarded the entire 
correspondence with Adams to Franklin, with the re- 
quest that it should be sent to Congress, in order that 
that body might know how its representative was dis- 
charging a duty equally important and delicate. To 
Adams himself he replied that Franklin was the only 
person accredited from the United States to the French 

1 Doniol, iv, 422 ; JVorks of John Adams, vii, 241. 



450 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

King, and with him alone such matters must be treated. 
And he added, as a farewell shot, that his Majesty did 
not require Mr. Adams's solicitations in order to in- 
terest him in the welfare of the United States.^ 

To La Luzerne Vergennes laid bare his heart. " This 
plenipotentiary will only cause embarrassment and 
mischief. He possesses a rigidity, a pedantry, an ar- 
rogance and a vanity which render him unfit to treat 
political questions." ^ 

Adams's relations with the French minister were 
now so strained that even he realized that he could 
not be of service in Paris. On July 27, 1780, he left 
for Holland and endeavored to obtain assistance for 
the United States from the States-General. He insisted 
that the French representative hindered his progress 
in Holland, but in this he seems to have been mistaken. 
Vergennes did not allow any petty annoyance to in- 
terfere with his exertions for the success of the allied 
cause, and as the Dutch were unwilling to lend on 
the credit of the United States, the French King bor- 
rowed ten million livres and turned them over to his 
allies. 

Patriotism does not require us to say that in these 
controversies the American was always right, and the 
Frenchman always wrong. Vergennes disliked Adams 
and believed him more friendly to England than to 
France. The belief was not correct, but the dislike 
was natural. The qualities which Adams manifested 
in a still more striking way when he was president, 
were displayed in his career as a diplomat. He not 
only suspected of wickedness those who differed from 
him, but he was sure they were wicked. The man who 

» July 29, 1780; Doniol, iv, 423. 

2 Letter of Aug. 7, 1780 ; Doniol, iv, 423. 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 451 

believes every one else a thief and a liar is usually a 
rogue himself, but Adams's frame of mind was ex- 
ceptional. He was a man of the utmost uprightness 
and veracity, and yet he found it hard to believe that 
others possessed any of the honesty of which he had so 
much. To conciliate, to use the wise arts of a Franklin, 
he regarded as unworthy conduct, to which he would 
not stoop. 

During all the late years of the war it was necessary 
for the states to obtain large sums of money from an 
ally whose own financial condition was constantly be- 
coming worse. The French people were ardent in the 
American cause, and Vergennes was sincerely anxious 
for the independence of the colonies. But the most 
zealous friend can be chilled, and Adams was pecul- 
iarly fitted to make the French minister button up his 
pockets and leave the American colonies to carry on 
the war, unaided by French gold, and with a paper 
currency of which five hundred dollars would not 
buy as much as one louis. Adams was patriotic and 
upright, but these qualities alone could not make an 
adroit negotiator for a struggling state demanding aid. 
If Franklin had been recalled, as Lee and Izard and 
his other enemies desired that he should be, and Adams 
alone had represented the United States at the court 
of Versailles during these closing years, when our suc- 
cess was assured by French aid, it is entirely possible 
that the aid would have been refused and the alliance 
would have come to naught. The sympathy of the 
French people for our cause had much to do in keep- 
ing the French nation constant to our alliance, but 
it is impossible to overestimate the value of the aid 
which Franklin rendered. 

It was unfortunate that Adams excited the animos- 



452 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

ity of the French minister, and his usefulness was also 
diminished by the morbid jealousy with which he re- 
garded Franklin's position. Even if Franklin had 
not been at the zenith of popularity and fame, his 
character would have been distasteful to this exact 
and rigorous Puritan. There was, apparently, some- 
thing to criticize in the conduct of the American 
minister. He was old, rather infirm, fond of pleasure, 
and by no means an accurate man of business. He 
sent few letters to Congress, and went to a great many 
dinners with entertaining Frenchmen and charming 
Frenchwomen. There is no doubt he found the latter 
occupation more agreeable, and, considering the condi- 
tions of French society, it is by no means certain that 
he was not serving his country quite as well when de- 
lighting diplomats and philosophers with his conver- 
sation, as when writing letters that would reach Phila- 
delphia six months after the events they narrated. 

Very improperly, important financial duties were 
added to Franklin's diplomatic responsibilities. He 
asked to be relieved from them, but he asked in vain. 
Whenever Congress was in need of money, and it 
was always in need, a biU of exchange was drawn 
on Franklin, and he was expected to get the French 
minister to advance the funds with which to honor it. 
He succeeded in doing this for years with marvellous 
success, and it was largely owing to the qualities 
which Adams condemned, that Franklin was rarely 
sent away empty-handed from a begging trip to the 
chamber of Vergennes. It is certain tliat if Adams 
had been minister, the French treasury would have 
been soon closed to such requests, and dishonored 
Congressional drafts would have been as plentiful as 
discredited Continental currency. 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 453 

It must be said also that when it came to the ac- 
counts of the moneys disbursed by Franklin upon in- 
numerable requests and demands, they were carelessly 
and imperfectly kept. Franklin had little clerical 
assistance ; he was not systematic, he disliked detail 
work, and the accounts of the American treasury in 
Paris were in great confusion. Not even Franklin's 
enemies ever questioned his absolute integrity, but 
integrity is not all that is required in public finance. 

From the nature of his being, Adams was jealous 
of Franklin's popularity, and he found abundant 
grounds for criticisms, which he honestly believed to 
be just. He wrote his cousin in 1778 of his views on 
Franklin. " The other you know personally, and that 
he loves his Ease, hates to offend, and seldom gives 
any opinion till obliged to do it. I know also, and 
it is necessary that you should be informed, that he is 
overwhelmed with a correspondence from all quarters, 
most of them upon trifling subjects and in a more 
trifling style, with unmeaning visits from Multitudes 
of People, chiefly from the Vanity of having it to say 
that they have seen him. There is another thing that 
I am obliged to mention. There are so many private 
families. Ladies and gentlemen, that he visits so often, 
— and they are so fond of him, that he cannot well 
avoid it, — and so much intercourse with Academicians, 
that all these things together keep his mind in a con- 
stant state of dissipation. . . . But if he is left here 
alone, . . . and all maritime and Commercial as well 
as political affairs and money matters are left in his 
Hands, I am persuaded that France and America 
will both have Reason to repent it. He is not only so 
indolent that Business will be neglected, but you 
know that, although he has as determined a soul as 



454 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

any man, yet it is his constant Policy never to say 
' yes 'or ' no ' decidedly, but when he cannot avoid 
it."^ 

Adams's animosity toward Franklin grew no less 
with time. In 1811, when Franklin had been dead 
for twenty -one years, and Adams had long retired from 
public life, he accused Franklin and Vergennes of 
conspiring to crush him, of indulging in low intrigues 
and base tricks ; he charged the philosopher with ex- 
treme indolence and dissipation, and denounced the 
turpitude of his conduct when he entered into part- 
nership with the Comte de Vergennes, the most power- 
ful minister of state in Europe, to destroy the character 
and power of a poor man, almost without a name, 
born and educated in the American wilderness and 
unknown in the European world.^ 

Franklin's position in France was too brilliant to 
be disturbed by any jealousy of Adams, though 
doubtless he was annoyed by the latter's ill-timed 
activity. To plot and intrigue, as Adams charged him 
with doing, would have been as foreign to Franklin's 
character as to Washington's. In the intensity of his 
atrabilious character, Adams's judgment went far 
astray, and his conviction of Vergennes's furtive and 
wicked hostility toward America seems as groundless 
as his belief that Franklin was guilty of tricks and 
low intrigues. 

Vergennes was an astute and experienced diplomat, 
yet if it be the test of diplomacy to get the utmost 
possible for the country one represents, Franklin was 
his superior. Personal liking had much to do with 

1 To Samuel Adams, Dec 7, 1778 ; Hale, Franklin in France, i, 
229. 

2 Works of John Adams, i, 664. 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 456 

the fact that the French minister was loath to say no 
to any request of the American envoy; but no man 
realized more thoroughly than Franklin how valuable 
is personal popularity in such negotiations, and no 
one used it more unsparingly, — Vergennes might 
have said, more unmercifully. Even Adams admitted 
that the French court put its confidence in Franklin 
alone, but still he felt that the vigor and intellect of 
an Adams ought to be more effectual than the affa- 
bility and adroitness of a Franklin. 

A new endeavor for peace led to some change in 
Adams's position and increased his irritation against 
the French court. In the early part of 1781 there 
seemed little reason to expect a speedy and favorable 
termination of the war. The year 1780 was one of dis- 
aster : Charleston had been captured, Gates had been 
defeated at Camden, and much of the South had fallen 
into the possession of the English. In the North the 
treachery of Arnold had threatened the country with 
ruin. The finances of the colonies were at their lowest 
ebb, Continental currency had become practically 
worthless, a suit of clothes cost two thousand dollars, a 
barrel of flour sold for fifteen hundred dollars. The re- 
sults of the alliance between France and the United 
States had not, thus far, corresponded to the hopes 
which had been entertained ; the cost of the war was 
constantly increasing, while the expectation of a suc- 
cessful termination grew less. It was at this juncture 
that Russia and Austria offered to act as mediators and 
close this protracted and unfortunate contest. 

Vergennes was unwilling to repel the offer, lest he 
should give offence to those countries, and, moreover, 
he was quite ready for peace. The English, so it was 
said, would accept the mediation, but France could 



456 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

take no step without the consent of her allies. In hia 
desire for peace, the terms to which Vergennes wished 
Congress to agree seem singularly unsatisfactory, and 
differ widely from those that were obtained a few years 
later. But although the French minister was eager 
that the ultimatum should be so moderate as to insure 
its acceptance, his subsequent conduct showed that he 
was willing his allies should get as much more as they 
could. The proposition of mediation was made at al- 
most the lowest era of depression during the war. It 
was not strange that Vergennes advised his allies to be 
satisfied with moderate terms, when victory seemed so 
remote, and in writing to the French minister at Phila- 
delphia, he even suggested that it might be necessary 
to consent to the loss of some of the thirteen states. 

" It is certain," he said, " that the United States 
. . . would suffer a sensible loss by the separation of 
some of the provinces. ... In this the King entirely 
agrees with Congress, and his Majesty, guided by an 
intelligent policy and by his engagements, will do all 
he can that the thirteen colonies may preserve their 
union without alteration. But only too often circum- 
stances furnish the law to the most powerful sovereigns. 
. . . The King will not change his resolution, unless 
he sees the absolute impossibility of obtaining a rea- 
sonable peace without some sacrifice. But ... a sac- 
rifice is among the possibilities, and if it becomes un- 
avoidable, it is necessary to be resigned. Most of the 
Belgian provinces threw off the Spanish yoke, but only 
seven preserved their independence. ... It is well 
that we should make the Americans realize that the 
war cannot be eternal, and there is a time at which 
one must needs stop. . . . His Majesty will suggest 
no sacrifice to them. This unpleasant task he will leave 



AMERICAX EXVOYS IN FRANCE 457 

to the two mediating powers if ever it becomes neces- 
sary." ' 

This suggestion was not made to Congress, but the 
possibility that it might be necessary to accept a long 
truce, instead of a formal recognition of independence, 
was not only suggested to Congress but was acknow- 
ledged by that body. In advising Congress to obtain 
the good-will of the mediators, by exercising the ut- 
most moderation in their demands, Vergennes added 
the judicious counsel, that whether treating for a per- 
manent peace or for a truce, the war should be carried 
on with the utmost vigor, for this was the true way 
to bring the English to reason and secure honorable 
terms.- ^ 

In June, 1781, Congress authorized the commis- 
sioners to accept the mediation of the Emperor of 
Russia and the Emperor of Germany (as he was in- 
accurately styled), insisting only that no peace should 
be made without an acknowledgment of the independ- 
ence of the thirteen states. As to all other matters, 
they were left to the suggestions already given Adams, 
in which they could see the desires and expectations 
of Congress, but they were bound by no fixed instruc- 
tions : they were to secure the interests of the United 
States in such manner as circumstances might direct. 
So far as their relations with France were concerned, 
the instructions were couched in language which the 
French minister might well have dictated, and which 
was probably due to his inspiration, in substance if 
not in form. "You are to make the most candid and 
confidential communications upon all subjects to the 
ministers of our generous ally, the King of France ; 

1 Yergennes to La Luzerne, June 30, 1781 ; Doniol, iv, 601-602. 

2 Doniol, iv, 553-556. 



458 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or 
truce without their knowledge and concurrence, and 
ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and 
opinion." ^ 

If these instructions were followed literally, the 
American commissioners must adopt whatever condi- 
tions of peace the French minister should decide to 
recommend. Probably so extraordinary an abrogation 
of independent action was not intended to be taken 
literally ; the commissioners were to pay to the opin- 
ion of a valued ally the deference to which it was 
justly entitled, and to sign no treaty unless France 
joined. As a matter of fact, the instructions did not 
prove of any importance. They were drawn in view 
of the mediation offered by Russia and Austria, and 
this came to nothing ; when peace was made, the re- 
presentatives of England and America conferred with 
one another and agreed on terms, and the American 
commissioners decided that it was not advisable to 
have Vergennes join in their deliberations. The in- 
structions of Congress, to obtain which La Luzerne 
had spent so many anxious hours, proved of no more 
value than so much blank paper. 

The action taken by Congress in another direction 
was of more practical importance. Adams had become 
distasteful to Vergennes, and the French minister 
would have been pleased if some one else had replaced 
the belligerent New Englander, but to this his friends 
would in no way consent. The people of New Eng- 
land felt that Adams would be to them a tower of 
strength in the great question of the fisheries, and a 
large party in Congress was loath to inflict upon him 
the affront of a recall, even if he had not always been 

1 Wharton, iv, 505. 



AMERICAN ENVOYS IN FRANCE 459 

judicious in his diplomatic career. It was decided 
therefore to create a commission to treat of peace, 
instead of leaving Adams alone. Jay was unanimously 
chosen as his associate, and Laurens, who was then a 
prisoner in the Tower of London, and JefiFerson were 
selected as other associates. The French minister was 
anxious that Franklin should be one of the commis- 
sioners, and Franklin was manifestly a fit man for 
the work. But there was strong opposition to him in 
Congress. Arthur Lee and Izard had returned home 
filled with anger, and had followed him with unweary- 
ing animosity. The Lees had an important following 
in Congress, and they were all hostile to Franklin. 
Only by the active manipulation of Sullivan was it 
possible to elect Benjamin Franklin as one of five 
commissioners. 

It is sad to find that the influence of the French 
minister rested in part on the arts of corruption. Tom 
Paine had used his ready pen in a manner distasteful 
to the minister, and the latter adopted a simple remedy. 
He saw Paine and suggested that he should employ 
his pen in inspiring his people with proper feelings in 
reference to France and the alliance, and with hatred 
toward the English. " He informed me, that he would 
accept this task with pleasure. I promised him an 
allowance of a thousand dollars a year." ' The same 
simple appliance obtained the support of General 
Sullivan when he became a member of Congress, and 
his action secured Franklin's selection as one of the 
peace commissioners. "This delegate," writes La Lu- 
zerne, " has shown in this affair equal patriotism and 
attachment for the alliance." ^ 

1 Gerard to Vergennes, Jan. 17, 1779 ; Doniol, iv, 60. 

* La Lazerne to Vergennes, May 13, 1781 ; Doniol, iv, 608. 



460 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The selection of additional commissioners to treat 
for peace was naturally distasteful to Adams, and he 
was offended also by the form of the instructions. In 
this, as in many other things, he saw sure proof of 
the duplicity and bad faith of the French government. 
The action of Congress excited him to an outburst 
which seems somewhat frothy. " Congress surrendered 
their own sovereignty into the hands of a French min- 
ister. Blush, blush, ye guilty records, blush and per- 
ish. It is a glory to have broken such infamous orders. 
Infamous, I say, for so they will be to all posterity. 
How can such a stain be washed out ! " In declaring 
that his country had prostituted its own honor Adams 
was sincere, as he always was ; but there seems no 
reason that the records of which he complains should 
stain their yellow parchment by a blush, or that pos- 
terity should be disturbed by their infamy. 

Congress insisted on less than its commissioners 
obtained, but the instructions were given when the 
fortunes of the colonies were almost at their lowest 
ebb ; the commissioners undertook the negotiations 
when the victory at Yorktown had brought the war to 
a successful termination. When the instructions were 
adopted, it was asking much to insist on American 
independence. When the representatives of America 
and England began their formal conferences Ameri- 
can independence "liad been recognized, and they had 
only to deal with the other questions arising between 
the two countries. To Vergennes's firmness as much 
as to any other single fact, the commissioners were 
indebted for this advantage. 



' 



CHAPTER XXV 

NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 

In the conduct of Vergennes during the negotia- 
tions there was little of which a reasonable man 
could complain. Adams's belief, that France nearly 
bankrupted herself in a Machiavellian scheme to save 
the colonies from utter overthrow, and yet keep them 
from becoming powerful or rich, might almost seem 
the product of a diseased imagination. Vergennes 
wrote La Luzerne, his representative in America, that 
the King would use his influence for the advantage 
of the United States, and if he did not succeed in 
procuring for them all that they desired, the fault 
would be not his, but that of the circumstances which 
controlled him.^ There was nothing in Vergennes's 
conduct which did not correspond to this profession, 
and nothing to show that he was displeased at the 
success of the American plenipotentiaries in their 
demands ; even when they agreed on terms with the 
English without consultation with him, he manifested 
only transient and not very strong annoyance. The 
diabolical ingenuity which Adams and Jay detected 
in the conduct of the French minister appears neither 
in his acts nor in his correspondence. 

On the other hand, Vergennes was anxious, and, 
from the standpoint of French interests, justly anx- 
ious, that peace should be made. Prudent men like 
Turgot had advised the King that in the financial 

1 Douiol, V, 42. 



462 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

condition of the country it was perilous to incur the 
expense of a new war. But the desire to avenge past 
defeats and humiliate England, together with a sin- 
cere sympathy with the efforts of the colonists to 
achieve freedom, united in overcoming these prudent 
counsels. In 1775 the debt of France had reached 
over two milliards and the expenses exceeded the 
income by twenty million livres.* The cost of the war 
had been great.^ Vergennes felt that it was important 
that France should have peace, and have it speedily. He 
had undertaken war to obtain the independence of the 
colonies, and that result was now secured. It was neither 
strange nor reprehensible that he did not desire to 
continue the war in order to secure advantages for his 
allies in which France felt no special interest. 

Except so far as they might conflict with the de- 
sires of Spain, to which France was bound by closer 
bonds than to the colonies, Vergennes was willing 
that the Americans should make the best terms they 
could. He neither said nor did anything to interfere 
with the success of their negotiations, but he was 
exceedingly anxious that they should not protract the 
war over the question of their fisheries and their 
western boundaries, and thus involve France in further 
contest. Therefore it was that he desired that Con- 
gress should not put forward these demands as an ulti- 
matum, but should so leave it that peace might be made, 
even if all the advantages desired were not obtained. 
And, therefore, he wished that, so far as possible, 
the American commissioners should consult with the 
French King; not that he might betray them, but 
that negotiations might be so guided that peace should 
be the sure result. 

^ Doniol, i, 282. ^ Gomel, Les Derniers Controleurs, i, 36. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 463 

It is evident that Vergennes would have cared 
little about the form of the instructions adopted by- 
Congress if the negotiations had been entirely in 
Franklin's hands. In his sagacity and fairness Ver- 
gennes had the utmost confidence, but he felt, and not 
unjustly, that Adams was hostile to France and him- 
self- He wrote La Luzerne, expressing his pleasure 
at the action of Congress because, otherwise, Adams 
would have been free to follow or reject the advice of 
France. " It is sufficient to know the character and 
principles of Mr. John Adams to realize how danger- 
ous such power would have been in his hands, and 
how we might have been exposed to scenes that 
would have been disagreeable and even scandalous." 
But now that " the ardor, the stubbornness and the 
roughness of Mr. Adams will be tempered by the 
calmness, the wisdom and the experience of Franklin," 
Vergennes thought that all would be well.^ 

Throughout the war France dealt liberally with 
the colonies. She had driven no hard bargain, when 
she promised them her aid ; if it had not been for 
French assistance, the army of Washington would 
have disbanded because the states were unable or un- 
willing to raise the money to supply the needs of the 
soldiers ; had it not been for the assistance of the 
French army and fleet, Yorktown would not have 
been taken. So when Adams called on the guilty 
records to blush and perish, because they instructed 
him and his associates to consult with the French 
King as to terms of peace, his emotions as well as his 
metaphors were somewhat exaggerated; and when he 
accused the French of acting from a malicious pur- 
pose to cripple the country they had befriended, the 
1 Doniol, V, 43. 



464 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

fact that he entertained such a belief is not creditable 
to his intelligence. 

Such was the condition of affairs when the news of 
the surrender of Yorktown reached Paris. It was ap- 
parent that the war was practically ended, and the 
long endeavor of England to reduce the colonies to 
subjection must now be abandoned. George III indeed 
refused to recognize the situation ; his indomitable 
stubbornness, if it had been attended by intelligence, 
would have made him almost a great man. " The get- 
ting a peace at the expense of separation from Amer- 
ica," he wrote after the fatal news, " . . . is a step to 
which no difficulties shall ever get me to be, in the 
smallest degree, an instrument." ^ 

But even North would no longer heed the royal 
commands, and in the brief interval before his over- 
throw, he made some overtures for peace. Apparently 
his hope was to divide the allies, and by making terms 
with one, to gain the chance of obtaining better terms 
from, or of continuing the war against, the other. 
Secret emissaries visited both Franklin and Vergennes 
to see if either would consider separate action, but they 
met a similar rebuff from both. 

In the choice of the agent sent to Franklin a stu- 
pidity was shown worthy of George III in his best 
days. A man named Digges, a Maryland merchant 
and a protege of Arthur Lee, had some dealings in 
relation to the American prisoners in England. Frank- 
lin, at various times, furnished money to relieve the 
needs of these unfortunate men, and a portion of this 
Digges received for distribution. Some four hundred 
pounds of it he misapplied to his own use. Such a 

^ William B. Donne, The Correspondence of George III and Lord 
North, ii, 39S. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 465 

dastardly theft, practised upon these unfortunates, ex- 
cited the wrath of the benevolent philosopher. " What 
is he," he wrote, " who can break his sacred trust by 
robbing a poor man and a prisoner of eighteen pence 
given in charity for his relief, and repeat that crime as 
often as there are weeks in a winter. ... If such a 
fellow is not damned, it is not worth while to keep 
a devil." ^ 

Yet Digges was sent to visit Franklin, and see if he 
would enter upon secret negotiations for peace between 
England and the colonies. Suggestions for a separate 
peace had been made before, but had received no en- 
couragement from Franklin. " There is not a man in 
America, a few English tories excepted," he wrote 
his friend Hartley, a member of Parliament, who often 
suggested the desirability of a reconciliation, "that 
would not spurn at the thought of deserting a noble 
and generous friend for the sake of a truce with an 
unjust and cruel enemy. . . . The Congress will never 
instruct their commissioners to obtain a peace on such 
ignominious terms, and though there can be but few 
things in which I should venture to disobey their or- 
ders, yet if it were possible for them to give me such 
an order as this, I should certainly refuse to act." ^ 
Digges was now informed that the American commis- 
sioners were ready to treat, but there could be no 
peace with America unless France were included. 

Another emissary named Forth visited Vergennes 
and suggested the possibility of peace between France 
and England on terms favorable to the former coun- 
try ; but throughout all negotiations and suggestions 

1 Franklin to Hodgson, April 1, 1781 ; Writings of Franklin, 
Smyth's ed., viii. 231. 

2 Franklin to Hartley, Jan. 15, 1782 ; Ibid., 358. 



466 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

for negotiations, Vergennes had one answer : that 
France would agree to nothing unless peace were made 
also with her allies on terms satisfactory to them.^ 

The situation was a complicated one. England had 
begun war with her revolted colonies alone, but there 
were now four nations in arms against her, and the 
field of hostilities extended from the banks of the 
James to the mouths of the Ganges. Hostile fleets met 
on the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific ; 
while Washington was besieging Yorktown, the Span- 
ish were besieging Gibraltar, and Dutch crews were 
infesting the British Channel and the North Sea. Eng- 
land's enemies were actuated by different purposes, 
and not all of them were even bound together by any 
formal alliance. France had made a treaty with the 
United States, in which she agreed to carry on war 
until their independence was secured. Spain had en- 
tered the contest somewhat later as the ally of France, 
but she was in no way an ally of the United States. 
Her action had been welcome, because it increased the 
difficulties England had to meet, and Spain and the 
colonies had, to a certain extent, acted harmoniously. 
Jay had been received as the American minister at 
Madrid, and the Spanish had furnished some money 
to the Americans, though very much less than had 
been asked. 

But Spain was making war for her own hand: she 
had succeeded to the rights of France in the vague 
and vast possession which went by the name of Loui- 
siana, and looked with jealousy on the desire of the 
United States to extend their western boundaries and 
share in the navigation of the Mississippi. Spain had 
taken part in the war, not from any desire to assist in 
1 Doniol, i\, passim (see Index, under Forth). 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 467 

procuring American independence, but because she 
hoped, as a result of the struggle, to extort advantages 
for herself. France and Spain were closely united by 
the Family Compact, and the French minister felt 
bound to obtain satisfactory terms for France's ally, 
the Spanish King, no less than for her other ally, the 
American colonies. From this came many of his em- 
barrassments : neither wished to be sacrificed to the 
other, and their desires in some respects were likely to 
become antagonistic. 

The French had not asked at any time any im- 
portant advantages for their own country. It was be- 
lieved that the independence of the American colonies 
would be a fatal blow to the mercantile supremacy of 
England, and the French anticipated sharing in the 
trade with the young and growing nation, which, in 
the past, had been monopolized by the English. Ver- 
gennes hoped also to secure for France some minor 
advantages in India, and some modifications in the 
ignominious treaty which had closed the Seven Years' 
War. 

The States-General of the Netherlands had recently 
been forced into the war by the overbearing conduct 
of England, but they were not allies of any of the 
other three combatants, and only friendly feelings re- 
quired them to be included in the negotiations for 
peace. 

Such was the condition of the various belligerents 
when the prospect of peace began to assume practical 
shape. The efforts to induce either France or the 
colonies to desert their alliance, so that England might 
make terms with one and continue war against the 
other, had been made and had failed. The English 
ministry now proceeded in good faith to bring to an 



468 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

end a disastrous war, which had continued for seven 
years without advantage or glory. On March 20, 1782, 
Lord North resigned, and the negotiations passed into 
the hands of the Rockingham ministry. 

In the new administration Lord Shelburne was sec- 
retary of state for the colonies, and with him Franklin 
had been on friendly relations when in England years 
before. Franklin found an opportunity to send a note 
of congratulation, in which he expressed the hope that 
Lord Shelburne's return to power might lead to a gen- 
eral peace. In answer to this, informal negotiations 
soon began, which at last resulted in a formal treaty. 

The first suggestion of the English was that the 
independence of the United States should be accorded, 
and that, in return for this concession, peace should be 
made between France and England on the terms of the 
Treaty of Paris in 1763. But this involved the sur- 
render of all the advantages France had gained in the 
war, in return for an acknowledgment of independ- 
ence, which had been actually won. As Franklin said, 
" This seems to me a proposition of selling to us a 
thing that is already our own, and making France 
pay the price they are pleased to ask for it." ^ 

In April, one Oswald, an amiable but not espe- 
cially astute old gentleman, visited Paris, and received 
from Fi-anklin a rough statement of the demands that 
would be made by the United States, and Fox, the 
secretary of foreign affairs, sent Mr. Grenville on a 
similar errand to Vergennes. In one of Grenville's 
interviews with Franklin he suggested that France 
might insist on conditions that were not provided for 
in the original alliance, and if so the Americans were 

1 Franklin to Adams, May 8, 1782 ; Writings of Franklin, Smyth's 
ed., viii, 487. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 469 

not bound to continue the war in order to obtain 
them. But Fi-anklin, during his years of residence at 
Paris, had learned the value of the assistance which 
France rendered the colonies, and was distressed by 
a suggestion that savored of scanty gratitude. " I told 
him," he writes, " I was so strongly impressed with 
the kind assistance afforded us by France in our dis- 
tress, and the generous and noble manner in which it 
was granted, without exacting or stipulating for a 
single privilege or particular advantage to herself in 
our commerce or otherwise, that I could never suffer 
myself to think of such reasonings for lessening the 
obligation ; and I hoped, and, indeed, did not doubt, 
but my countrymen were all of the same sentiments." * 

The attitude of France was the same. The creden- 
tials of Grenville authorized him to treat with the 
French ; but either from accident or design their allies 
were omitted. But Vergennes repeated what he had 
so often said, — that France would enter into no nego- 
tiations unless her allies were included in them.^ 

Shelburne and Fox were distrustful of each other, 
and played at cross -purposes. Fox desired that the 
independence of the United States should be at once 
acknowledged. Perhaps his desire was the stronger, 
because negotiations with the United States as a for- 
eign power would come within his province, and Shel- 
burne, as secretary for the colonies, could then have 
no pretence for interfering in them. Shelburne, on 
the other hand, thought that the acknowledgment of 
independence should be left for the treaty, and that 
he should remain in charge of the matter. The quar- 
rels of the ministers in London found their echo in the 

1 Franklin's Journal; Writings of Franklin, Smyth's ed., viii, 499. 

2 Conference, May 26, 1782 ; Doniol, v, 113. 



470 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

reports of the envoys at Paris. Grenville complained 
to Fox that Oswald seemed the favorite channel of 
communication, and that when he sought to learn from 
Franklin the views of the American commissioners, he 
encountered an impenetrable reserve. 

Fox soon quarrelled with Shelburne and resigned, 
and the negotiations were left entirely in the hands of 
the latter. In April, 1782, the Comte de Grasse suf- 
fered a crushing defeat in the West Indies, and both 
Vergennes and Franklin feared that this disaster 
might check the anxiety of the English to end the 
war. Apparently it had no such effect ; the English 
minister was still ready and anxious to make peace, 
if it could be obtained on reasonable terms. So far as 
the United States were concerned, the defeat of de 
Grasse proved in no way prejudicial to their interests. 
The war in North America had practically ceased, 
and, as a result of this disaster, France and Spain 
were less apt to delay peace by demanding advantages 
which the English would not grant. 

Accordingly Oswald was selected to treat with the 
American commissioners, while Grenville was replaced 
by Fitzherbert in the negotiations with Vergennes. 
The choice of Oswald to continue the work he had 
begun must have been satisfactory to Lord Shelburne, 
and it was certainly very agreeable to Franklin. The 
Scotsman seems to have been one of the most ami- 
able of men, and one of the poorest of diplomats. He 
was, as Shelburne truly said, " a pacifical man," while 
Franklin styled him " a very honest, sensible man." 
The American commissioner might well have thought 
Oswald sensible, for whatever Franklin advanced Os- 
wald regarded as worthy of serious, if not of favorable, 
consideration ; and by his plaintive eagerness to obtain 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 471 

peace at any price, he encouraged the American repre- 
sentatives to insist upon their demands, when their 
antagonist was plainly ready to concede everything. 
Oswald said, indeed, that the English were ready to 
carry on war, if France demanded humiliating terms 
of peace. But as a means of raising supplies, he could 
only suggest they might follow the example of Charles 
II, shut up the exchequer, and default on the payment 
of interest on the public debt. 

If only in this way could England raise money to 
carry on the war, Franklin felt that her enemies need 
not be afraid. Accordingly he suggested to Oswald 
that if England wished to make reparation for the 
harm she had done, and avoid futui-e trouble, she 
had best cede Canada to the United States. This he 
said would really be a reconciliation, which, he added, 
" is a sweet word." To obtain Canada was a favorite 
scheme of Franklin's, and if it had been insisted upon 
as strenuously as the American right to the fisheries, 
possibly it might have been granted. " Her chief ad- 
vantage from that possession," said Franklin, " con- 
sists in the trade for peltry" ; and this was not seriously 
contested.^ 

The complacent Oswald, if we can trust Franklin, 
liked the idea, and said that, while England was too 
much straitened to make reparation in money, he 
would try to persuade the minister to offer it in this 
form. But Shelburne did not view the proposition 
with favor, and New England and its representatives 
were more interested in the banks of Newfoundland 
than in the farms of Canada. So Franklin's favorite 
scheme came to naught, though the acquisition of 

1 Lord Edward Fitzmaurice, Life of William Earl of Shelburne, 
iii, 180-182. 



472 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Canada would have been worth more to our country 
than all the cod in the sea. 

The United States were a small and poor people 
dealing with a rich and powerful monarchy, yet they 
had an advantage of position in these negotiations 
which their representatives used to the utmost. As it 
was certain that the independence of the colonies 
must be recognized, Shelburne now desired to restore, 
so far as possible, friendly relations. If the Americans 
were to be no longer English colonists, there was no 
reason why they should not remain England's cus- 
tomers and furnish an important outlet for English 
trade. The long war had embittered their feelings, 
and Shelburne feared lest this might divert from 
hostile England to friendly France a great portion 
of their valuable commerce; therefore he wished to 
make peace promptly, and was willing to concede 
liberal terms. 

There was, however, delay over the preliminaries. 
The powers granted Oswald authorized him to treat 
with the thirteen colonies or plantations. As it was 
understood on all sides that recognition of the abso- 
lute independence of the United States would be the 
first article of any treaty, any preliminary acknow- 
ledgment was a matter of form rather than of sub- 
stance. So at least it seemed to Franklin, who was 
anxious to proceed, so that terms might be agreed 
upon before Parliament met on the 26th of Novem- 
ber. The condition of Shelburne's ministry was one 
of unstable equilibrium, and both the minister and 
Franklin desired that an agreement between England 
and the United States should be presented to Parlia- 
ment at its opening as an accomplished transaction, 
and beyond the power of parliamentary interference. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 473 

But John Jay arrived in Paris in June, and he 
soon became the leading actor in these negotiations. 
Franklin was not well and much of the time was con- 
fined to his bed. Jay was young, ambitious, and vigor- 
ous, and, after two years of uselessness at Madrid, 
he naturally yearned for a field where something 
could be accomplished. He at once declared that he 
would not proceed with the conferences unless the 
independence of the United States was first formally 
acknowledged. 

If the English had desired delay, this furnished 
them with abundant pretext for it; but Shelburne 
wanted peace, and was ready to please the Americans 
in every respect. He had cherished the dream of a 
federation between the mother counti*y and the Amer- 
ican colonies, a vision which, applied to other colonies 
of England, still allures the English statesman. In 
his instructions to Oswald he suggested the possibility 
of some plan of federal union, and wished Franklin 
to consider the suggestion ; but he was soon con- 
vinced that the day for this had gone by. For politi- 
cal reasons of his own he did not desire delay, and he 
was willing to grant favorable terms in the hope of 
preserving for the mother country a liberal share in 
the trade with the new nation. These considerations 
made him ready to yield on debated questions, and 
accordingly the instructions were modified to meet 
Jay's requirements. Oswald was authorized to treat 
with the commissioners of the thirteen United States, 
and their existence as a nation was formally acknow- 
ledged at the beginning of the negotiations. 

In October Adams arrived from Holland and as- 
sumed his duties as one of the commissioners. In 
his diary he expressed his opinion of his associates. 



474 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

"Between two as subtle spirits as any in this world, 
the ohe malicious, the other I think honest, I shall 
have a delicate, a nice, a critical part to act. Franklin's 
cunning will be to divide us ; to that end he will pro- 
voke, he will insinuate, he will intrigue, he will 
maneuver. My curiosity will at least be employed in 
observing his invention and his artifice." ^ 

Such was Adams's judgment upon one who had 
done as much to secure the success of the colonies iu 
Europe as Washington had done in America. It is 
sad that a man who was honest, able, and patriotic 
could view no one who obtained a larger degree of 
popular favor than himself except with a malevolent 
jealousy that blinded his judgment and lessened his 
usefulness. 

Whatever lack of harmony existed among them- 
selves, the American plenipotentiaries were now ready 
to proceed, and the question arose as to how far they 
should confer with their French allies. Jay, as well 
as Adams, had little love for France. " Mr. Jay likes 
Frenchmen as little as Mr. Lee and Mr. Izard did," 
writes Adams ; " he says they are not a moral people ; 
they know not what it is ; he don't like any French- 
men. The Marquis de La Fayette is clever, but he 
is a Frenchman."^ Jay's dislike of the French pre- 
pared him to distrust their policy, and he soon formed 
the opinion that Vergennes was secretly manoeu- 
vring against the interests of the United States. 
These suspicions became certainties in his mind 
when he discovered that one Rayneval had been sent 
on a secret mission to London. His object, so Jay 
was convinced, was to tell Shelburne that France dis- 
approved of the American demands in reference to 

1 Works of John Adams, Hi, 300. 2 jrj,-^^ 303, 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 475 

the fisheries and the bouudaries, and would not 
support them. 

Both Americans and Frenchmen may feel some in- 
terest as to the justness of this suspicion. The French 
did so much for our ancestors that it is unpleasant to 
believe that at the last they acted in bad faith, and 
looked with ill-favor upon demands that were impor- 
tant to the young republic. The entire record is be- 
fore the world ; we can read the instructions of Ver- 
gennes to La Luzerne, the reports of Rayneval, all 
that was said and done in the negotiations carried on 
between France and England, and nothing can be 
found which shows any endeavor on the part of the 
French to prevent the entire success of their American 
allies. Even if Vergennes was not anxious that all 
their demands should be granted, he did nothing and 
said nothing which could be criticized as in any way 
showing bad faith. 

It is indeed certain that Vergennes did not wish to 
continue an expensive war in order to secure for the 
United States either fisheries or enlarged boundaries; 
in the matter of the Mississippi Valley he probably 
would have been glad to see an agreement reached 
that might be satisfactory to Spain. But in this there 
was no ground for complaint, and when it came to the 
actual negotiations, Vergennes's course was consistent 
and upright. He repeatedly informed the English that 
France had no authority to treat for the United States, 
and in no way did he interfere with the success of their 
negotiations. The history of the Rayneval mission can 
be studied in the records of the French foreign office ; 
it is honorable both to Shelburne and to Vergennes.^ 
It was oil account of this mission that Jay and Adams 

1 Doniol, V, chap. 4. 



476 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

decided that the French were acting in bad faith, and 
it is worth while, therefore, to give a brief account of 
the transaction. 

In April, 1782, the unfortunate Comte de Grasse 
was defeated by Rodney, and he was made a prisoner 
and carried to England, In August, he was released, 
and Lord Shelburne availed himself of this oppor- 
tunity and sent by de Grasse a secret message assur- 
ing Vergennes of his sincere desire for peace, and 
suggesting that the French despatch a special envoy 
to London. Accordingly, early in September, Rayne- 
val was sent to confer with the English minister ; but 
if Adams and Jay could have read his instructions 
and reports, they would have found in them no guilty 
secrets. There was, indeed, very little said about the 
United States. The instructions given Rayneval con- 
tained but one article on the subject, and in this it 
was stated that absolute and unconditional independ- 
ence must be accorded to the colonists, while the envoy 
was to inform the English minister that it was the 
unalterable resolution of France to make peace only 
in connection with her allies. In the treaty between 
France and the United States it had been agreed that 
war should be continued until their independence was 
recognized. This demand and this alone, in behalf of 
the United States, France presented ; this only was 
she bound by her treaty to obtain for her ally. All 
other questions that might arise were left for the Eng- 
lish and the Americans to settle between themselves. 
On the other hand, the demands to be made in behalf 
of France and Spain were practically in the hands 
of the French. On these points Rayneval had full 
instructions ; these and these alone he was sent to dis- 
cuss; these and these alone he did discuss. The resto- 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 477 

ration of some of the West India islands to France, 
her rights in the Newfoundland fisheries, and advan- 
tages to be secured for her trade in the East Indies 
were matters he was to debate, while, on behalf of 
Spain, he was to insist upon acquisitions for her in 
the Gulf of Mexico, and the restoration of Gibraltar.* 

The interviews between Shelburne and Rayneval 
were satisfactory ; on both sides there was a desire for 
peace, and a readiness to agree on terms that should 
be just and honorable. The articles concerning France 
and Spain were debated at length and on most points 
with a reasonable prospect of agreement. Shelburne 
met the question of peace with France in a spirit far 
different from that which actuated Chatham at the 
close of the Seven Years' War, and he seems honestly 
to have desired unity of action between the two great 
powers in the affairs of Europe. " Let us change our 
mistaken principles," he said ; " let us act in accord, 
and we can furnish the law for the rest of Europe." ^ 

Like a true disciple of Adam Smith, Shelburne 
was ready to consider propositions of commercial free- 
dom that would have been regarded as ruinous by- 
most Englishmen. "I regard a commercial monopoly," 
he said, " as an odious thing, and a device to which 
the English nation is especially inclined. . . . My 
ideas are exactly opposed to the catechism of the Eng- 
lish merchants." ^ 

The suspicion that Rayneval was sent to assert the 
claims of Spain on the Mississippi Valley, which also 
haunted Jay, proved to be entirely without founda- 
tion. Indeed, only once were the affairs of America 

1 Douiol, V, 104-105, 143. 

* Conference of Sept. 18 ; Doniol, v, 128. 

« Report, Nov. 11; Doniol, v, 128. 



478 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

discussed at all, and then in a very cursory manner. 
Shelburne said that he anticipated much trouble with 
the Americans on the subject of the fisheries, and he 
hoped the French would not support their demands. 
But the cautious emissary replied in diplomatic lan- 
guage that doubtless the Fi-ench King would desire 
the Americans to restrain their demands within the 
bounds of justice and reason. And when his own opin- 
ion was asked on the question of the fisheries, he said 
that he was not familiar with the subject. An inquiry 
on the subject of the western boundaries was no more 
successful : the envoy neither supported nor denied 
the American demands, although Shelburne declared 
that the pretended charts, on which they were based, 
were mere folly. Shelburne closed the interview by 
saying that the revolt in America was really the work 
of France; but Rayneval justly replied that the Eng- 
lish should charge this lamentable result to the folly 
of their own ministers.^ 

The report of Rayneval convinced Vergennes that 
the English were ready to make peace on fair terms, 
while the interviews persuaded Shelburne that the re- 
quests of France and Spain would contain nothing on 
which an agreement could not be reached except, pos- 
sibly, the demand for Gibraltar. " Gibraltar," said the 
English minister, "will be as formidable a rock in these 
negotiations as it is in the sea." ^ 

Shelburne's inquiries as to the support France would 
give the American demands were apparently intended 
to gratify an idle curiosity, for the English had already 
practically decided to grant them. Possibly the English 
minister thought he could assume a more determined 
air with the American commissioners if the French 
1 Doniol, V, 133. 2 Doniol. v, 126. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 479 

intimated any ill-will towards the attitude of their 
allies ; but if he entertained any such purpose he got 
no encouragement, and the negotiations with the United 
States continued their placid course. 

But Jay's suspicions of the Rayneval mission led 
him to a step which might be justlj' criticized. Con- 
vinced that Rayneval was occupied in evil devices, he 
himself sent an emissary to London, whose instructions 
could not have been made public without injury. He 
selected one Vaughan, whose commission was to sug- 
gest to Shelburne that now was the time for England 
to choose between France and the United States, and by 
granting the demands of America, to secure the future 
good- will of their country. It is hard to say what effect 
this message had on the English minister. Certainly 
if Vergennes had adopted a similar measure, he would 
be denounced as a false ally by every American writer. 

Another incident led Jay and Adams to distrust 
Vergennes, and with somewhat better reason. One 
Marbois was secretary of the French legation at Phila- 
delphia, and in March, 1782, he sent a letter to Ver- 
gennes criticizing the position taken by the Americans 
in reference to the fisheries, and suggesting that the 
French King should declare that their contention was 
ill founded and would receive no support from him. 
This letter was intercepted by the English, and they 
sent a translation of part of it to the American com- 
missioners, with the laudable desire of exciting irrita- 
tion between the allies.^ 

Assuming that the letter was correctly translated, 
which Franklin seemed to question, it was a stupid, 
injudicious, and unfriendly message, which showed that 
Marbois was a very poor man for his place. Apparently 

1 Wharton, v, 2.38. 



480 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the letter never reached Vergennes, and certainly the 
advice was not heeded; for the French King never in- 
timated that he would not support the Americans in 
their demand for participation in the Newfoundland 
fisheries. The English minister, Vergennes wrote some 
months later, sent the American commissioners a letter 
from Marbois, " in order to make them suspicious of 
our attitude on the fisheries. . . . There is a brief 
reply to this ; the opinion of the Sieur du Marbois is 
not that of the King and his Council, and Congress 
knows well that the steps indicated in that despatch 
were never taken." ^ 

In view of all this, the American commissioners had 
to decide how far they would confer with Vergennes 
in their negotiations with England for peace. Their 
decision created much ill-feeling at the time, and is 
still a subject for complaint by French historical 
writers. Upon this point the instructions of Congress 
were specific : the commissioners were to undertake 
nothing without the knowledge of the French King, 
and were to govern themselves by his opinion and ad- 
vice. But the commissioners were reluctant to comply 
with these instructions, specific as they were. Jay dis- 
trusted Vergennes and wished to proceed with the nego- 
tiations without conferring with him. If the French 
minister was hostile to the demands made in behalf of 
the United States, the less he knew about them the 
better ; and if he should advise against pressing them, 
their position would become embarrassing. On the 
other hand, Franklin had confidence in the friend- 
liness of their allies, and probably had still more con- 
fidence in his own ability to induce Vergennes to 
agree to whatever he recommended. The question was 
1 Doniol, V, 297. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 481 

settled by Adams, who arrived in October and at once 
cast his vote with Jay. Franklin acquiesced in the view 
of his associates without further debate, and the com- 
missioners proceeded with the negotiations, asking 
Vergennes neither for assistance nor for counsel. 

The importance of this action has been exaggerated 
both by those who approved and by those who con- 
demned it. If the commissioners had obeyed their 
instructions, consulted regularly with Vergennes, and 
yielded entire respect to his opinions, the final treaty 
would have been the same. Doubtless, if the English 
had been obstinate in refusing any of the American 
demands, and there had been danger that the nego- 
tiations would fail, Vergennes would have been anx- 
ious that his allies should yield and peace be insured. 
But no such contingency arose ; and considering the 
pacific mood of the English minister and the pacific 
character of the English negotiators, there was little 
danger of a breach. The conduct of the English 
would not have been different had full reports of the 
conferences been daily transmitted from Franklin's 
house in Passy to Vergennes's apartment in the 
Louvre. Nor would Vergennes have been so obtuse as 
to advise the Americans to yield what it was evident 
the English were ready to grant. No one knew better 
than he that such advice would not be followed, and 
that it would prejudice France with the country whose 
gratitude and whose trade he greatly desired to obtain. 

On the other hand, there was no special reason 
why the French should have complained of the con- 
duct of their American allies, nor did they complain 
very strenuously. As to any violation of the instruc- 
tions of Congress, that was for the commissioners to 
settle with their own government. Jay said he would 



482 FRANCE IN JHE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

break them as readily as his pipe, which he forthwith 
proceeded to smash. In the outcome, while the action 
of the Americans possibly interfered with some of the 
aspirations of Spain, a country to which we were 
bound neither by treaty nor by gratitude, it was in- 
directly of service to France, as the history of the 
negotiations will disclose. 

Vergennes had repeatedly said that the conditions 
of peace between the English and the Americans 
must be settled between them, and he had no concern 
in the matter, except that none of the allies should 
conclude a treaty until all had obtained satisfactory 
terms. ^ He knew of the progress of the negotiations, 
and if he was not informed of the details, he made no 
complaint. The commissioners were daily conferring 
in Paris, and it was easy for him to get whatever 
information he desired as to their progress. Even to 
his representative at Philadelphia he expressed his 
discontent at the conduct of the American commis- 
sioners in very mild and guarded terms. He wrote, in 
October, that Jay and Franklin preserved a strict 
reserve, and suggested that Livingston, if he thought 
proper, might write reminding them of their instruc- 
tions ; but he added, " you will be very careful not to 
present this as a complaint, and ask Mr. Livingston 
not in any way to reprove Mr. Franklin and Mr. Jay. 
... It is enough that he will excite them to show us 
the confidence which they have been directed to give." ^ 
Nor, when terms had been agreed upon without con- 
sultation, did Vergennes manifest anything more than 
a little not unnatural pique, except when, for a brief 
period, he feared that this action might result in the 
failure of his own negotiations, and prolong the war. 

^ Doniol, V, 86, and passim. ^ Doniol, v, 139. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 483 

Vergeunes repeatedly notified the English that he 
had no authority to treat with the United States, and 
it was agreed on all hands that the negotiations for 
each country should proceed separately. Doubtless, 
Vergennes expected that the American commissioners 
would confer with him as the matter progressed, but 
at no time did he show any desire to interfere in their 
negotiations. The statement he sent to La Luzerne 
was entirely correct. " If the American commissioners 
are exact in the reports they send, they will not com- 
plain that we seek to influence them or to hinder their 
negotiations. I receive what they see fit to tell me. 
They know that when needed, I would render them 
all the good ofi&ces in my power, but I do not put 
myself in the way of knowing more than they are 
disposed to disclose." * 

Doubtless, Vergennes feared that some of the re- 
quests made by the Americans might be stubbornly 
refused by England, and hostilities be indefinitely 
continued for this reason. He had repeatedly sought 
to moderate the demands of his allies, not because he 
was hostile to their success, but because he feared 
they would be unsuccessful, and peace be postponed. 
He was far from realizing the willingness of the 
English to yield all that was asked, and he did not 
foresee the easy victory which awaited the American 
representatives. In the same letter to La Luzerne, he 
adds : " Despite all the cajoleries which the English 
ministers shower upon the Americans, I do not think 
they will be facile upon the fisheries nor upon the 
boundaries as the American commissioners under- 
stand them." And he foresaw yet more difficulty in 
the matter of the loyalists, whose claims, he said, the 

1 Doniol, V, 177. 



484 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

English could not decently abandon and the Ameri- 
cans were resolved not to concede.* 

Having determined to act without Vergennes's 
counsel, the American commissioners proceeded reso- 
lutely and successfully in their work. Practically all 
that the Americans asked, the English conceded, and 
naturally this facilitated the progress of the negotia- 
tions. There had been associated with the amiable 
Oswald a Mr. Strachey, who was supposed to be 
deeply versed in the matter of the fisheries. He was 
a man of little diplomatic experience and very mod- 
erate ability. It is strange that when the United 
States were represented by diplomats such as Frank- 
lin, Adams, and Jay, the interests of England should 
have been intrusted to men who were alike mediocre 
and obscure. But Shelburne wished for peace, and 
as apparently he was willing to grant whatever was 
asked, it made little difference what manner of men 
were chosen as negotiators. 

The first question that arose was as to the fisheries, 
and Adams presented the American case with great 
ability, fully justifying the confidence placed in him 
by his New England constituents, to whom the ques- 
tion of the fisheries seemed of the highest importance. 
Jay was equally successful in the far more impor- 
tant question of the western boundaries, and the 
Mississippi Valley east of the river was ceded to the 
United States. Apparently the desire of Franklin for 
Canada was not shared by his associates. Probably it 
would not have been agreed to, and still it is possible 
that Canada might have been obtained, as Franklin 
suggested, by satisfying the demands made in be- 
half of the American Tories. At this price it would 
1 Doniol, V, 177. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 485 

have been as good an investment as the purchase of 
Louisiana. 

The English commissioners yielded easily on the 
right of fishing and the western boundaries, but they 
were strenuous in their demands in behalf of the 
American loyalists. This was regarded as a point of 
honor, and on this Shelburne said they could not 
yield. Vergennes seems, also, to have felt that some 
satisfaction might properly be given the loyalists, 
though it is hard to see that it was any business of 
.his. But Franklin was strenuous in his opposition, 
and at last the English yielded on this also. As a 
solace to their pride it was agreed that Congress 
should recommend legislation by the states for the 
restoration of the confiscated property of British sub- 
jects ; but both sides knew that this meant nothing. 
On November 30, 1782, the articles were signed, with 
an agreement that they should not go into effect until 
peace was made between France and England. 

Certainly it would have been courteous to notify 
Vergennes of the agreement before the American 
commissioners set their hands to it. The two nations 
had been allies in a great war, and the law, as well as 
good manners, forbade either partner making a secret 
bargain for his own advantage. But the breach was 
one of manners rather than of substance. It had been 
left to the American commissioners to make theh* 
own bargain with England, and they had done so. It 
would have been absurd for Vergennes to object to 
the terms that had been agreed upon, when they in no 
way affected the interests of France. If he had objected, 
he would have put himself in so false a position that 
the American commissioners would have signed with- 
out his approval, and the French minister made no 



486 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

blunders of that sort. He might, indeed, have asked 
them to withhold their signatures until the French had 
made terms with England, and they might properly 
have acceded to his request ; but their agreement did 
provide that it should only become operative when 
France also had made peace. So far as the moral effect 
was concerned, it would have been the same whether 
the document was formally signed or was merely wait- 
ing for signature. 

Franklin informed Vergennes that the articles had 
been signed, and that experienced diplomat evidently 
realized that if the Americans were new to diplomacy 
they understood the art of attending to their own 
interests. But he received the information calmly, 
and on December 4 he wrote Rayneval, who was then 
at London: "You did not suppose when you left us 
that the negotiations of the Americans were almost 
concluded. Yesterday I received a letter from Frank- 
lin announcing that everything was agreed upon and 
about to be signed. . . . The translation of the pre- 
liminaries which I enclose saves my entering on any 
detail. You will remark that the English buy a peace 
rather than make one. Their concessions on tlie 
boundaries, the fisheries and the loyalists, exceed all 
that I believed possible. ... I said to Mr. Franklin 
that notwithstanding the provision that these articles 
should not take effect until peace was agreed upon 
between Fi-ance and England, their signature was 
none the less premature."^ 

Vergennes also wrote La Luzerne, enclosing a copy 
of the preliminaries : " You, as well as I, will surely 
applaud the extensive advantages which our allies, the 
Americans, have obtained by the peace, but certainly 

1 Doniol, V, 188. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 487 

you will not be less surprised than I was at the ac- 
tion of tlie commissioners. According to the instruc- 
tions of Congress, they were to do nothing without 
our participation. I informed you that the King 
would not seek to influence the negotiations, except 
so far as his good offices were necessary for his friends. 
The American commissioners will not say that I have 
sought to interfere, and still less that I have wearied 
them with my curiosity. They held themselves care- 
fully aloof from me. . . . You can judge of my surprise 
when on November 30 Mr. Franklin informed me that 
the articles were signed. The reservation made in re- 
gard to us does not prevent this being an infraction of 
the promise to sign jointly. I owe Mr. Franklin the 
justice to say that he sent a copy of the articles on the 
next day. He will not complain because I received 
them without any demonstrations of sensibility. It was 
not until he came to see me a few days later that I 
showed him how hastening their signatures was not 
an obliging proceeding towards the King. He ap- 
peared to see this and excused himself and his col- 
leagues as best he could. Our conversation was amica- 
ble. ... I accuse no one; I do not blame even Mr. 
Franklin. He yielded perhaps too easily to the im- 
pulses of his colleagues, who affect to ignore the rules 
of courtesy. ... If we can judge the future by what 
we have just seen, we shall be poorly repaid for what 
we have done for the United States of America." * 

Though Adams and Jay regarded France as a poor 
friend. Congress still turned to that country for the 
money which could not be obtained at home. Upon 
Franklin the duty of making requests for money was 
always imposed, and certainly no one else could have 
1 Doniol, V, 192. 



488 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

been so successful in obtaining it. "Dr. Franklin," so 
Adams wrote, " who has been pliant and submissive in 
everything, has been constantly cried up to the stars, 
without doing anything to deserve it." Only the ex- 
traordinary combination of tact, courtesy, and social 
charm which Franklin possessed could have procured, 
year after year, from a bankrupt treasury, the money 
necessary for the success of the American cause. If 
Adams had been our minister at Paris, France would 
probably have left us to our fate long before Yorktown 
was captured. 

And now, by an unhappy combination, hardly had 
Franklin performed the disagreeable duty of notify- 
ing Vergennes that the American commissioners had 
signed articles of peace without the cooperation of 
France, than he was required to follow this errand 
with a request for more money. The necessity of ob- 
taining financial aid from France and the frequency 
of the calls might properly have modified the severity 
of Adams and Jay towards our ally. It is not alto- 
gether in place to assume the dignity of a hidalgo 
towards a man from whom you have just borrowed 
five dollars, and of whom you are about to ask ten 
more. The applicant who receives a loan with a haughty 
expression and refuses to degrade himself by saying 
thank you, may save his face, in Chinese phraseology, 
but after all his attitude is not heroic. Such was never 
the position which Franklin assumed. He asked many 
favors from the French, but he always insisted that it 
was both good policy and good manners to be thank- 
ful for them. 

On November 30, Franklin notified Vergennes of 
the signature of the articles. A very few days later the 
doctor again visited the minister and asked him to lend 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 489 

the states twenty million francs. Certainly it was an 
unfortunate time for such a request. Even the mildest 
of men, when still smarting from a snub, does not re- 
ceive with enthusiasm a request for a loan, and this 
demand came when it seemed that the snub might do 
serious injury. When the Americans signed the arti- 
cles with England, though Vergennes was annoyed, 
he evidently regarded their act as an offence against 
manners rather than a serious political blow. But at 
that time the terms of peace between England, France, 
and Spain seemed to be agreed upon by the apparent 
willingness of England to restore Gibraltar. Now the 
English said they would not surrender Gibraltar, and 
the Spanish said they would make no peace unless it 
was restored to them ; as a result there seemed a pos- 
sibility of the continuance of the war, and Vergennes 
naturally attributed the change in the English position 
to the fact that they had agreed with the United 
States and regarded that country as practically off 
their hands. 

Another incident increased the irritation of the 
French minister. Franklin told him that he was about 
to send the preliminaries to the United States in a 
ship under English safe conduct. This was natural 
enough, but Vergennes was alarmed at the condition of 
negotiations in London, and feared that when Congress 
and the American people found that terms satisfactory 
to them had been agreed upon, they would drop out 
of the contest, and France might be left to carry on 
the war with only Spain as an ally. And now on top 
of all this, came a request for a further loan of twenty 
million francs! 

On December 15 Vergennes sent Franklin a note 
expressed with unusual acerbity. " I am embarrassed," 



490 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

he wrote, " to explain your conduct and that of your 
associates. . . . You agreed on preliminaries without 
conferring with us, though Congress instructed you to 
take no step without the participation of the King. 
You are going to excite in America the belief that 
peace is assured, without even informing yourself what 
progress we are making in our negotiations. You are 
wise and discreet, you know what is fitting, you have 
performed your duty all your life ; do you think you 
satisfy the obligations which bind you to the King? 
. . . When you can solve my doubts on this subject, 
I will ask his Majesty to satisfy your demands." * 

Such a letter would have discouraged most appli- 
cants for money, but nothing discouraged Franklin. 
He at once presented his apologies in the best form 
in which they could be put. "Nothing," he wrote, 
" has been agreed in the preliminaries contrary to the 
interests of France, and no peace is to take place be- 
tween us and England until you have concluded yours. 
Your observation is, however, apparently just, that, 
in not consulting you before they were signed, we 
have been guilty of neglecting a point of hienseance. 
But, as this was not from want of respect for the 
King, whom we all love and honor, we hope it will be 
excused, and that the great work, which has hitherto 
been so happily conducted, is so nearly brought to 
perfection, and is so glorious to his reign, will not be 
ruined by a single indiscretion of ours. And certainly 
the whole edifice sinks to the ground immediately, if 
you refuse on that account to give us any further 
assistance." ^ ■ 

1 Doniol, V, 191. 

* Franklin to Vergennes, Dec. 17, 1782 ; Writings of Franklin, 
Smyth's ed., viii, 342. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 491 

It illustrates the uniform generosity shown by 
France to her American allies that, notwithstanding 
Vergennes's temporary irritation, he soon acceded 
to Franklin's request for more money. " I will add 
nothing," he wrote La Luzerne, after referring to this 
action of the American commissioners, " in respect to 
the demand for money which has been made upon 
us. You can judge if conduct like this encourages us 
to new demonstrations of liberality." But he did not 
execute the threat which he made in his irritation. 
The United States needed money, as they always did, 
and Vergennes was ready to assist them, as he always 
was. To furnish the entire amount of twenty millions 
was indeed impossible. The French treasury was in 
sore need, and Vergennes could truthfully have said 
that her own financial distress left France in no con- 
dition to be generous. But if the King did not supply 
the twenty millions, he did what he could, and lent 
the United States six millions at five per cent, when 
he was himself paying seven per cent on borrowed 
money. 

Such proof of honest friendship cannot be over- 
thrown by the jealous suspicions of Adams or the 
unfounded apprehensions of Jay. " I pressed hard, 
therefore," said the indefatigable Franklin, " for the 
whole sum demanded, but was told it was impossible, 
the great efforts to be made . . . and the enormous 
expense engaged in, having much embarrassed the 
finances." ^ And he adds the just reflection : " Our 
people certainly ought to do more for themselves. It 
is absurd, this pretending to be lovers of liberty while 
they grudge paying for the defence of it." 

Similar complaints are often found in Washington's 
1 Franklin to Morris, Dec. ?«, 1782; Wharton, vi, 159. 



492 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

and Franklin's correspondence, and they suggest some 
reflections on American character and patriotism as 
they were displayed at the time of the Revolution and 
in the Civil War of the following century. Certainly 
it does not reflect unfavorably on the men of the Re- 
volution if we find progress in succeeding generations. 
It would be a poor commentary on the liberty they 
established and the government they founded, unless 
their fruits were shown, not merely in growth of popu- 
lation and increase of wealth, but in the development 
of national and individual character. The patriotism 
and devotion displayed by many in the Revolution 
must not blind us to the fact that many others showed 
little desire to devote themselves, and still less will- 
ingness to devote their money, to their country's cause. 

It was the remissness of the states in furnishing 
money, as well as the difficulty in raising troops, 
which rendered the aid of France so indispensable to 
success. Doubtless there were many reasons which ex- 
plained in part the scanty pecuniary assistance which 
the people of the thirteen states were willing to give to 
the cause of their independence. 

The inability of Congress to impose taxes aggra- 
vated the situation ; a strong central government could 
have adopted some system of taxation, and to this 
most would have submitted, peacefully if not cheer- 
fully. The states themselves, if their legislators and 
their people had been actuated by a generous patriot- 
ism, could have done much to remedy the condition. 
But not only was each state unwilling to contribute 
more than its share ; few showed any strong desire to 
contribute even so much. Undoubtedly, a large part 
of the population were not eager for separation from 
England, and if they acquiesced in the revolutionary 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 493 

movement, it was more from the fear of offending 
others than from any zeal in the cause. Naturally they 
did as little as they could without incurring the ill- 
will of their neighbors, and those most indifferent to 
the success of the revolutionary cause were found 
largely among the prosperous members of the commu- 
nity. The well-to-do are rarely eager for radical polit- 
ical change, and many were bound by religious, pecu- 
niary, and social ties to the old country. 

It is sometimes said that the poverty of the colonists 
rendered it impossible for them to raise the funds 
necessary to carry on the war, but this apology does 
not seem well founded. The financial needs of the 
Revolution were insignificant when compared with the 
wars of to-day. The English had no more than thirty 
thousand soldiers in America at any one time. It did 
not require a great army to contend successfully with 
such a force, and the colonists, though their wealth was 
insignificant compared with our present standards, 
were a prosperous and not a poor people. Issuing paper 
money that soon depreciated was an act of folly that 
brought ruin to many honest people and aggravated the 
difficulties of the situation. But to some extent Con- 
gress was driven to this measure because it was impos- 
sible to raise money in any way except by the printing- 
press ; and while paper money brought ruin to some, 
it furnished to others an opportunity for the rapid 
accumulation of wealth. The prosperity which had 
prevailed in America prior to the Revolution did not 
entirely vanish after the war began. On the other 
hand, there were displays of wealth and luxury which 
had formerly been infrequent. 

It is impossible not to contrast the niggardliness 
shown, not by all, but by a considerable proportion of 



494 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the population, with the extraordinary liberality with 
which the entire community met the calls of the gov- 
ernment when our national existence was in peril dur- 
ing the Civil War. There are abundant explanations 
of the contrast, and an undue reverence for the past 
should not lead us to overlook them. It would be sad, 
indeed, if a century of liberty and prosperity had not 
developed a broader and deeper patriotism. At the 
time of the Revolution there was no country with 
great traditions to which patriotism could strongly 
cling ; the new Confederacy was an experiment, whose 
workings at the beginning were far from satisfac- 
tory. The United States of 1861 had a stronger 
hold on the love of its citizens than the Confederacy 
of 1776. 

Moreover, the traditions of American life during 
two generations, the activity of business, the oppor- 
tunities for the rapid accumulation of wealth, had fos- 
tered the willingness, which is so strong an element in 
American character, to spend money without limit, 
when the end is worthy of the expenditure. No people 
has acquired wealth with such success, no people ex- 
pends it with such readiness. The energy with which 
Americans accumulate money has led to the erroneous 
belief that they are, above other peoples, worshippers 
of the almighty dollar. The worshipper of the dollar 
is the man who will not spend it for a good cause, and 
no people deserve so little to be reproached for that 
offence. Our ancestors had not yet developed that 
liberality of expenditure which is now an element of 
American character. They had not learned that the 
value of money consists in the ability to do something 
with it. But if these qualities were not largely de- 
veloped in the thirteen colonies in 1775, they can claim 



NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 495 

the glory of founding a nation whose people have 
shown their willingness to give their money freely for 
a good cause and to sacrifice their lives to save the 
republic. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

CONCLUSION 

It is now time to trace the history of the negotia- 
tions between France, Spain, and England, and see 
the effect produced on them by the agreement made 
between England and the United States. If the sig- 
nature of preliminaries by the American commis- 
sioners had any influence on the treaty finally made 
by England with France and Spain, it is impos- 
sible to see where it worked any injury to French 
interests. 

The visits of Rayneval to London, which Jay viewed 
with such distrust, had, as we have seen, nothing to 
do with questions affecting the United States. His 
only mission was to ascertain if the English were ready 
to grant France and Spain terms that would be fairly 
satisfactory to these countries. As soon as the French 
were satisfied that Shelburne in good faith desired 
peace and was willing to agree to reasonable condi- 
tions, the negotiations took formal shape. While the 
American commissioners remained at Paris, the ques- 
tions affecting France and Spain were for the most 
part considered at London. 

So far as France was concerned, terms were agreed 
upon with the utmost ease. The Fi-ench were singu- 
larly modest in their demands ; they had begun the 
war to assist the United States, and they asked little 
for themselves at its close. Fitzherbert, the English 
commissioner at Paris, and Vergennes soon reached 



CONCLUSION 497 

an agreement, and there was little need of applying 
to the ministers at Loudon for instructions. 

On one question, not of large importance except as 
it affected the national dignity, Vergennes was inexor- 
able. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 contained a provision 
that the fortifications of Dunkirk should be destroyed. 
This provision was a constant irritation to France, and 
was not without its effect in making the French people 
eager for a new war with England whenever oppor- 
tunity offered. At the beginning of the negotiations it 
was now suggested that all clauses in former treaties 
relating to Dunkirk should be abrogated, and to that 
proposal Shelburne offered no objection except that 
he hoped France would not exercise the right of re- 
storing the fortifications of Dunkirk, as English pride 
would not suffer " a pistol to be pointed at the mouth 
of the Thames." ^ 

The matter was of small practical importance, but 
the French felt their honor was involved in the aboli- 
tion of a humiliating condition. England was in no 
position to insist on it at the end of a disastrous war, 
and it was therefore agreed that in the future France 
might fortify and reestablish the Port of Dunkirk as 
she saw fit. 

In India, where the French might fairly have 
claimed large advantages, they obtained little save 
some unimportant acquisitions in territory and some 
slight ameliorations in trade conditions. The rights 
of the French to fish in Newfoundland were left 
substantially as they had been fixed by the Treaty of 
Utrecht seventy years before. In the West Indies 
the islands captured by either party were restored. 

France secured the independence of her American 
1 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, iii, 260 ; Doniol, v, 144. 



498 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

allies, but the material advantages she obtained were 
small recompense for a war which had cost her seven 
hundred and seventy-two millions. 

In 1783, as in 1763, her embarrassment grew 
chiefly out of the demands made by her Spanish ally. 
Few political combinations were more extolled, and 
with less reason, than the family alliances of the 
Bourbon kings. What everybody believes to be a 
source of strength is not infrequently a source of 
weakness, and of this truth in politics there is no 
better illustration than the relations between France 
and Spain in the eighteenth century. For centuries 
before, the nations had been on terms of chronic 
hostility. Frequent intermarriages had not checked 
national animosities nor interfered with national am- 
bitions. Louis XIV, having a Spanish woman for his 
mother and another Spanish woman for his wife, 
devoted himself with pertinacity and success to jfilch- 
ing the possessions of Spain for the aggrandizement 
of France. His policy was wise if not chivalric, and 
France profited largely by these acquisitions, while 
Spanish power continued the long decline which be- 
gan under Philip II. 

In an evil day Louis abandoned a national policy 
for dynastic ambition : he resolved to place his grand- 
son on the Spanish throne, and at once the European 
nations banded themselves together to oppose this 
action. The most sagacious statesmen saw in it grave 
danger to the balance of power and the liberties of 
Europe. William III declared that if a French prince 
should reign at Madrid, England and Holland were 
in great danger of total ruin. Louis himself believed 
that with the elevation of his grandson to the Spanish 
throne the Pyrenees would cease to exist. Both were 



CONCLUSION 499 

mistaken. At the end of a long contest a French 
prince was recognized as king of Spain, but the 
influence of France in Europe was less after the War 
of the Spanish Succession than before it. Nor was 
this merely the result of the long and disastrous 
conflict; closer relations between the two countries 
proved an element of weakness to France, the assist- 
ance she obtained from Spain was of little value, the 
Spanish ships were usually rotten, their soldiers were 
ill equipped and ill disciplined. The alliance between 
France and Spain was regarded by the latter as ex- 
isting solely for the benefit of Spain; the Spanish 
would do little to assist France, they expected the 
French to do everything to assist Spain. 

Three " Family Compacts " were signed by the 
Bourbon monarchs during the eighteenth century. As 
each was announced, statesmen grew pale and neigh- 
boring peoples anticipated calamity from the alliance 
of two great nations. But each of these compacts 
made France less dangerous to the rest of Europe, 
and procured little advantage for Spain. 

In 1733 the Treaty of the Escurial, the first of the 
Family Compacts, was signed between Louis XV 
and Philip V. It resulted in the establishment of the 
Bourbons as kings of Naples, where they reigned for 
over a century and a quarter, to the infinite harm of 
their subjects, and established one of the most retro- 
grade and corrupt of European monarchies. 

In 1743, during the AYar of the Austrian Succes- 
sion, a second Family Compact was entered into be- 
tween Louis XV and Philip V. By it great possessions 
were to be obtained in Italy for the younger son of 
Philip, Gibraltar was to be captured from England, 
and the colony of Georgia was to be destroyed because 



500 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

it might be injurious to Florida. The endeavor to 
obtain for Spain what this treaty demanded prolonged 
the war for years, and cost France an infinite amount 
of blood and money. France won great victories 
during the war, but as a sagacious French minister 
said, her zeal for the welfare of Spain extended to the 
sacrifice of her own interests. "The Spanish alli- 
ance," he laments, " is like a ball attached to the leg 
of a criminal. If the Spanish would only desert us, 
we might keep our acquisitions for ourselves." All 
that France gained from the war was the recognition 
of a Spanish prince as Duke of Parma, where he and 
his posterity ruled for fifty years, without advantage 
to the people or glory to themselves, until the soldiers 
of the Revolution sent them adrift. 

In 1761 the third family alliance was formed, and 
this was still in force when the American Revolution 
began. Like the treaties which preceded it, it was 
fraught with disaster to both parties. Spain was too 
infirm to be of any assistance to France, and her scat- 
tered possessions afforded rich plunder for the English 
during the Seven Years' War. When peace was made 
in 1763, the French King treated his Spanish relatives 
with a generosity that would have been admirable in 
a kinsman but was criminal in a ruler. Spain was 
forced to surrender to England Florida and her pos- 
sessions in North America east of the Mississippi. As 
a compensation for this, France ceded to Spain the 
province of Louisiana, which included not only New 
Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi, but a vague 
claim to territories which now contain more people 
and more wealth than the Kingdom of Spain. ^ 

^ See the author's France under Louis XV, i, 131-137, for an 
extended discussion of the effect upon France of her family relations 
with Spain. 



CONCLUSION 501 

The possible value of these possessions was realized 
by no one, but their ownership made Spain look with 
jealousy upon the growth of the English colonies in 
America, and no European nation was less inclined 
to assist the colonists in their struggle for independ- 
ence. Most of the European powers regarded the 
question with entire indifference. A few desired the 
success of the colonists, not because it might help 
them, but because it would harm England. The Eng- 
lish were not popular on the Continent ; the growth 
and power of Great Britain excited the jealousies of 
less fortunate lands, and most of the European 
nations were quite willing that the United States 
should achieve their independence if they were able 
to do so. The feeling in Spain was different. No 
nation had so much reason to fear colonial revolts ; if 
the English colonists were successful in throwing off 
the authority of the mother-land, this would be a dan- 
gerous example for Spanish colonies, which suffered 
from more unwise regulations than were ever devised 
by George III. 

There were other reasons why the cause of American 
independence aroused no sympathy in Spain. Not only 
did French statesmen see in the American war an op- 
portunity to injure England and extend the influence 
of France, but popular sentiment was strong in com- 
pelling intervention. The sympathy of French society 
and French philosophy for the American patriots, the 
enthusiasm for the young republic, which pervaded 
the nation, compelled the interference of France in 
their behalf and helped to make it successful. Of 
such feeling there was in Spain absolutely none. The 
teachings of French philosophers found no entrance 
into the kingdom of Philip II. The enthusiasm of 



502 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

Parisian society for liberty and progress found no 
echo in the palaces of Madrid. There were no young 
Spanish noblemen eager to follow La Fayette and 
assist in securing the liberty of the young republic. 
The new wine of hope and progress which was making 
France drunk did not pass the Spanish frontier. 
When we compare the political beliefs and aspira- 
tions of the French under Louis XVI with those 
which found utterance under Louis XIV, we seem to 
have entered a new world. Doubtless the rule of 
Charles III, the best of the Spanish Bourbons, im- 
proved somewhat the condition of his country, but in 
religious or political or social beliefs and sympathies, 
it is hard to find any difference between Spain under 
Charles III and Spain under Philip II. Of the great 
literary activity in France there was no trace in Spain. 
There was no Encyclopaedia, and no Social Contract ; 
neither disciples of Voltaire nor disciples of Rousseau. 
The influence of French thought seems to have been 
absolutely null upon the subjects of Bourbon kings 
who lived beyond the Pyrenees. In this also it was 
shown how unimportant was the result of the great 
war which placed a French prince on a Spanish throne. 
It was not, therefore, any interest in the cause of the 
thirteen colonies which led Spain to enter into the war 
against Great Britain. After the surrender of Bur- 
goyne, Vergennes believed that the time had come to 
recognize American independence, and to promise the 
assistance of France. But the Spanish King was not 
ready for action, and was unwilling that France should 
take the decisive step. His counsels were disregarded, 
and in 1778 the treaty of alliance between France and 
the United States was signed. Though Vergennes had 
disregarded the advice of Charles III, he sought to 



CONCLUSION 503 

induce him to accept the decision and assist in the 
war which was certain to ensue. His overtures were 
received with little favor. The Spanish King-, so said 
Florida Blanca, his prime minister, was offended at 
the disregard with which France received his counsels. 
Regarding himself as the head of the Bourbon family, 
he was quick to resent any imaginary slight, and he 
now declared that he was treated like a viceroy of a 
French province, who must take up and lay down arms 
as he received orders.* 

But apart from Spanish irresolution and Spanish 
pride, there were deeper reasons for his unwillingness 
to act, and in view of subsequent history, we can 
hardly complain of them. The founding of a republic 
in America was necessarily repugnant to an illiberal 
and unprogressive monarchy. Moreover, even Span- 
ish pride could not wholly disregard the growing weak- 
ness of a fossilized government, and to that effete 
power the establishment of a new and vigorous repub- 
lic in the West seemed fraught with peril. Timidity 
gave the Spanish rulers a more intelligent foresight 
than they usually displayed ; their apprehension of the 
future position of the American Republic was more 
correct than Vergennes's prophecies. Undoubtedly 
Vergennes sought to minimize the dangers to be ap- 
prehended, in order to dispel the fears of a desired 
ally; but the United States has proved to Spain as 
dangerous an enemy as Charles III and his ministers 
feared. Its example influenced the colonies of Spain in 
South America to throw off her yoke, and in the last 
few years the American Republic by force of arms has 
stripped the ancient monarchy of all that was left of its 
colonial empire either in the Atlantic or the Pacific. 
^ Montmorin to Vergennes, Ang. 18, 1778 ; Doniol, iii, 545. 



504 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

The apprehensions of the Spanish were therefore 
well justified. " They do not view without inquietude," 
writes the French ambassador, " the prosperity of the 
colonies, and fear they will prove to Spain an enemy 
far more dangerous than the English. They desire 
them to be so enfeebled by the war that they must 
accept the terms which Spain might dictate. These 
conditions would have kept them in anarchy, like Ger- 
many, and it is for this reason that the Spanish feel 
aggrieved towards us for treating with them." Repeat- 
edly the French ambassador wrote that an entire lack 
of sympathy with the American cause was the obsta- 
cle he met in his efforts to induce Spain to join in the 
war against England.^ 

Vergennes sought to allay these fears by reflections 
on the probable future of the new republic, which do 
not disclose any prophetic ken. Will not England be 
a more formidable neighbor, he writes, " than the 
United States for a long time and probably forever ; 
left to themselves, and subject to the inertia which is 
the essence of all democratic institutions, it would be a 
mistake to be apprehensive of their future prosperity. 
I fear, rather, the anarchy into which the states may 
fall, when they enjoy the sweets of peace. It is enough 
to consider the extent of territory they occupy, the 
differences in climate, in industry, in soil, ... to 
understand that their union will never be perfect even 
if they are not actually divided."" "If we can believe 
Gerard," he writes again, " it will be a long time, even 
centuries off, before this republic will have sufficient 
consistency to take any part in foreign politics." ^ 

^ Montmorin to Vergennes ; Doniol, iii, 20. 

' Vergennes to Montmorin, April 3, 177S ; Doniol, iii, 51. 

8 Same to Same, Oct. 30, 1778 ; Doniol, iii, 561. 



CONCLUSION 505 

Thus the French minister sought to allay Spanish 
apprehensions of the influence of the new republic, but 
Vergennes's arguments did not excite in the Spanish 
court any symj)athy with the American colonists or 
any desire for their independence. Neither among 
Spanish politicians, nor in Spanish society, nor in 
Spanish literature, did the struggle of the American 
people for independence arouse any sympath3\ Ver- 
gennes realized that the widespread enthusiasm for 
the insurgents which existed in France was not to be 
found in Spain, and therefore he appealed, not to 
sympathy, but to greed; not to any desire to help the 
Americans, but to the hope of gaining advantages for 
herself, as a means of inducing Spain to join in the 
war against England. Here he struck the only chord 
to which the Spanish court would respond, and by 
such means he at last brought Spain into the con- 
test. 

But we may wonder why a sagacious statesman 
should have thought it worth while to offer so great 
inducements in order to get such scanty assistance. He 
was not ignorant of the weakness of the Spanish navy, 
nor of the dilatory and inefficient manner in which 
Spain would furnish aid. He knew, or might have 
known, that she would be slack in supplying her quota, 
and only vigorous in demanding the advantages that 
had been promised. Her energy would be displayed, 
not in the prosecution of the war, but in the negotia- 
tions for peace. The French ambassador at Madrid 
truthfully described the hopeless and helpless condition 
of that effete monarchy. Her treasury was controlled 
by a minister who was true only to dishonest subordi- 
nates ; the Minister of War had neither industry nor 
credit ; in the navy one could trust neither officers 



506 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

nor soldiers. The magazines were poorly furnished and 
the navy yards were ill equipped.^ 

These gloomy pictures were verified when war was 
at last declared, and yet so strong was the glamour 
that clung about the Family Compact, that Vergennes 
thought it necessary to obtain the cooperation of Spain 
on almost any terms. He lived to see his mistake : the 
alliance with Spain was a detriment to the progress of 
the war, and her demands very nearly destroyed the 
possibility of making peace. 

It was at first suggested that the Family Compact 
bound Spain to come to the assistance of France. By 
the terms of that compact, Spain was to furnish France 
with ships when she was attacked, but it could not 
justly be said that this provision now applied. France 
had not, indeed, declared war on England when she 
recognized the independence of the United States and 
by a secret treaty agreed to go to their aid, but she 
deliberately placed herself in a position that made war 
certain. When the first encounter took place, Ver- 
gennes tried to show that the English had been the 
aggressors, that the war was made upon France and 
not by her, so that she was entitled to aid under the 
express terms of the treaty. But the Spanish King 
had no thought of risking his fleet in response to the 
demands of the Family Compact, unless he was pro- 
mised some reward for his efforts. 

For months war between France and England was 
practically waging, and still the Spanish King sent 
neither arms nor fleets to assist his nephew of France. 
Instead of this, he assumed the role of arbitrator, and 
wished England and France to submit to his judgment 
the settlement of their differences. This proposed arbi- 

1 Report, Dec. 24, 1777 ; Doniol, iii, 35. 



CONCLUSION 607 

tration bade fair to put the French in a most embar- 
rassing position. For them to decline the proffered 
mediation would be highly offensive, and might destroy- 
any hope of retaining Spain as an ally if the endeavor 
for peace came to naught. Yet any suggestion of me- 
diation would excite in America the suspicion that 
France was ready to abandon her ally, and such a 
fear would be increased by the knowledge that Spain 
was wholly indifferent to the fate of the thirteen states. 
In these negotiations Vergennes displayed that just 
regard for the obligations France had assumed which 
he always manifested down to the final treaty of peace. 
He said that the first and indispensable article in any 
treaty must be the absolute acknowledgment by Eng- 
land of the independence of the United States.* 

But the Spanish King was not inclined to accept 
this as a basis for negotiations, and he suggested that 
instead of a recognition of American independence, 
there might be a long truce such as Spain had made 
with the United Netherlands in 1609. Such an expe- 
dient was sure to be unacceptable to the Americans, 
and Vergennes explained how different was their sit- 
uation from that of the Dutch, who, two centuries 
before, had revolted against the authority of Spain. 
Charles brought the matter to a conclusion by notify- 
ing the English minister that he was ready to act as 
mediator upon the understanding that there should be 
an immediate suspension of arms, and that terms of 
peace should then be agreed upon at Madrid. 

Vergennes was appalled at this announcement ; it 

^ Vergennes to Montmorin, May 1 and Oct. 17, 1778 ; Doniol, lii, 63, 
523. ' ' Bien entendu, que la reconnaisance de I'ind^pendanee des Etats 
Unis sera la base de toute n%ociation." " L'enti^re ind^pendance poli- 
tique et territoriale des ^tats Unis en le premier article." 



608 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

was not only that Spain declared with how little in- 
terest she viewed the interests of the colonies, — of 
this there had long been no concealment, — but either 
France must offend Charles by refusing to accede to 
such terms, or she must stand convicted of manifest 
bad faith. Such a truce would have left Rhode Island, 
New York, and many other places in the possession of 
England. " America will justly believe that she is 
abandoned by us," he wrote, " and believe that she is 
free from all obligations. I fear she will return to the 
leading strings of England." * 

From this embarrassment the French were saved 
by the stubbornness of their opponents. George III 
refused to proceed, even on the terms suggested by 
the Spanish King. England, he replied, would accept 
Charles as a mediator, if France would first withdraw 
her fleet from America and cease furnishing aid to 
the American colonies. 

Such an answer closed all efforts at mediation, and 
the Spanish now began to consider how large a bid for 
their assistance could be obtained from France. The 
peculiarities of the monarch, said his minister, ren- 
dered it important that the bid should be high. "It is 
necessary," he writes, " to calm the scruples of a con- 
science that is so delicate and so timid," ^ It could only 
be quieted, like many another delicate and timid con- 
science, by the prospect of large and substantial ad- 
vantages. " To ask everything and grant nothing is 
their desire with us," wrote the French ambassador. 
Spain was playing with an eager suitor, and could 
safely practise the arts of a greedy mistress. " The 
King is no longer young," said his minister ; " he has 
been pious all his life and his scruples beset him." The 
1 Doniol, iii,708. 2 Doniol, iii, 643. 



CONCLUSION 509 

recollection of past defeats had made him timid ; all 
these things concurred to make him wish to avoid war. 
'' But," he added, " I know him : though devout, the 
love of glory will affect him " ; and therefore he asked 
the French ambassador to put in writing the advan- 
tages that Spain would gain if she became the ally of 
France. " In order to get Spain to declare herself," 
wrote Montmorin," we must agree not to make peace 
until she has received Gibraltar, Florida, and Jamaica." 

It was not precisely in this form that France made 
her bid, but it was suggested that for Spain should be 
procured Mobile and Pensacola, the expulsion of the 
English from the Bay of Honduras, and the revocation 
of their right to cut wood in the Bay of Campeachy, 
and, lastly, the restitution of Gibraltar. The Spanish 
meditated long on these propositions, and when they 
appeared in the form of a proposed treaty, they had 
gained in vigor and dimensions. 

First and most clearly, was it declared that his Cath- 
olic Majesty should obtain by the future treaty of peace 
the restoration of Gibraltar. The possession of the 
famous fortress touched Spanish pride, and pride, more 
than policy, controlled their councils. For seventy 
years they had sought to recover this fortress, with 
a tenacity of purpose that would be entitled to respect 
if it had been accompanied by any display of ability 
in the effort. But to wrest this impregnable rock from 
England was an enterprise the hopelessness of which 
soon became evident, and over the agreement so lightly 
given to procure Gibraltar for Spain the negotiations 
for peace at the end of the war nearly came to ship- 
wreck. In addition to this Spain was to have, as fruits 
of the victory. Mobile and all Florida; the English 
were to be expelled from the Bay of Honduras, and 



510 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

should no longer cut wood on the Bay of Campeachy. 
Last of all, the island of Minorca was also to be re- 
covered for Spain. ^ 

While the Spanish demanded more than Vergennes 
had offered, they would not agree to furnish the 
American colonies even the moderate assistance which 
the French minister had asked. His draft of the pro- 
posed treaty read : "The independence of the United 
States of North America being the basis of the en- 
gagements which his Majesty has contracted with them, 
the two powers agree that they will not lay down arms 
until this independence has been recognized by the 
English King." It was a very different condition to 
which the Spanish were willing to agree. After recit- 
ing this article as proposed by France, the treaty 
prepared by them proceeded to say that the Catholic 
King wished to please his nephew and procure for 
the United States the advantages they desired, but as 
he had as yet made no treaty with them, he reserved 
this question for the future. In other words, Spain 
would not promise any aid to the United States ; she 
would not wage war to insure their independence, 
and to that decision she religiously adhered. 

Such was the treaty proposed by Spain. By its 
terms France assumed serious obligations, some of 
which she was finally unable to perform. She incurred 
the possibility of unpleasant complications growing 
out of the conflicting demands of her American allies 
and her Spanish allies ; having begun war to secure 
the independence of the United States, she involved 
herself in further obligations to continue it until 
Spanish ambition should be satisfied. And for all 
this she received nothing but promises of assistance, 
1 Convention of April 12, 1779 ; Doniol, iii, 760. 



CONCLUSION 511 

the small value of which had been proven by the ex- 
perience of half a century. But alliance with Spain 
was deemed the corner-stone of French policy ; the 
French had a wholesome fear of the power of England 
on the seas, but with the aid of the Spanish navy they 
believed that victory could be assured. It was only a 
few years since the alliance of Spain in the Seven 
Years' War, instead of securing victory to the French, 
had resulted in more disastrous defeats than they had 
suffered when they were carrying on a naval war with 
England alone. But the teachings of experience are 
as little heeded by nations as by men. In the seven- 
teenth century France grew great by the spoils of 
Spain. It might have been some consolation to a 
vindictive Spaniard that in the eighteenth century 
France exposed herself to constant defeat by allying 
herself with Spain. Spain was to France a valuable 
enemy and a costly friend. 

In April, 1779, the convention between France and 
Spain, which had been the constant object of Ver- 
gennes's diplomacy for more than a year, was at last 
signed.* The terms of the treaty were kept secret, but 
the fact of the alliance was at once proclaimed. 
Though the United States had not gained a new ally, 
the English had another enemy, and the action of 
Spain excited much enthusiasm in America as well 
as in France. Washington hoped soon to have the 
pleasure of sending thanks to the King of Spain and 
the Two Sicilies, as the ally of the United States, but 
this hope was not realized. 

It was not strange that the Spanish King was un- 
willing to bind himself to the American colonies, for 
nothing would have been more agreeable to him than 

1 Found in Doniol, iii, 803-810. 



612 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

their return to their former allegiance. The arguments 
of Vergennes did not overcome the just apprehen- 
sions of the Spanish as to the outcome of the estab- 
lishment of a free and independent government on 
American soil, whose political and religious traditions 
would be at variance with the principles of government 
dear to Spain, and would be fraught with danger to 
the vast possessions of that country in America. "While 
Charles and his ministers did not venture to oppose 
the fixed resolution of France to secure independence 
for the American colonies, they were full of projects 
that might cripple the growth and power of the new 
republic. 

The treaty made by France with America, so 
Florida Blanca declared, was worthy of Don Quixote ; 
certainly his countrymen did not resemble that hero 
in their dealings with the thirteen colonies. Canada, 
they insisted, must be left to England, that the seeds 
of division and jealousy might remain between the 
United States and the mother country. The Ameri- 
cans, so Florida Blanca declared, were in sore need 
of France, and they must agree to such terms as 
France and Spain should dictate. Only thus, he con- 
tinued, could the colonies be kept in a sort of depend- 
ence which would leave them in constant need of the 
assistance of the two crowns. 

These ungenerous suggestions found no response 
from French diplomats. If Adams and Jay could 
have had access to the Spanish State Papers, they 
would have found in them no proofs of that jealousy 
of American growth which they erroneously attributed 
to Vergennes. Neither he nor his associates received 
with favor suggestions of that character. "I observe 
with some pain," writes the French ambassador at 



CONCLUSION 513 

Madrid, "that tlie Spanish are in singular dread of 
the prosperity and progress of the Americans . . . 
To me it appears that the danger which may some 
day result from the prosperity of the United States is 
very distant." ^ 

However, it was almost certain that the independ- 
ence of the United States would be acknowledged, 
and the Spanish were ready to make terms with the 
new republic if they could obtain much and give 
little. These endeavors were not successful. Family 
affection and political traditions induced the French 
to accede to almost all that Spain demanded; but 
while the colonists were eager to obtain a new ally, 
they did not propose to check the future development 
of their country. The Spanish desired Florida, and for 
this the people of the United States had then no spe- 
cial longing, but the question of western boundaries 
was more difficult. Louisiana was now the property 
of Spain, the free navigation of the Mississippi was 
contrary to the precepts of Spanish colonial govern- 
ment, and the extension of the American Republic 
westward was abhorrent to Spanish prejudice. 

The vast territories that were covered by the name 
of Louisiana were not indeed growing in wealth and 
population ; they added little, if at all, to the re- 
sources of Spain ; but the Spanish were jealous of 
any interference with their possessions, even if these 
were inhabited only by Indians and wild beasts ; they 
wished no boat to float down the Mississippi bearing 

1 Montmorin to Vergennes, Oct. 19, 1778 ; Doniol, iii, 558-559. " It 
is plain that Spain regards the United States as soon to become her 
enemy and . . . will spare nothing to keep them remote from her 
possessions and especially from the Banks of the Mississippi" 
(Doniol, iii, 576). " They wish to render access to their colonies forcTer 
impossible to the Americans " (Doniol, iii, 585). 



514 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

the American flag, even if the Spanish flag was rarely 
seen upon its waters. 

But the extension of her western boundaries and 
the right to the navigation of the Mississippi were 
indispensable to the development of the United States, 
and no one was inclined to barter such advantages for 
the uncertain aid that could be expected from Spain. 
Little progress, therefore, was made towards a treaty 
between the two nations, and in truth the Spanish had 
no desire for such a treaty. They took part in the 
war, allured by the hope of important gains from 
England ; they had no thought of assisting the Amer- 
ican colonies ; their troops and fleets they wished to 
use exclusively in quarters where Spain could gain 
advantages for herself. And they wished also to be 
free from any embarrassing alliance with the United 
States, so that when the time of peace-making came, 
they could endeavor to keep the English colonists as 
far removed as possible from their own possessions. 

Feeble as was the Spanish rule, it extended over 
larger portions of North and South America than in 
the days of Charles V or Philip II. In addition to 
the South American territory, Mexico, Cuba, and 
large portions of the West Indies were still subject 
to the Spanish crown, and to these had been added 
Louisiana, with vague claims over the Valley of the 
Mississippi and the Pacific slope of North America. 
Spain's foreign empire was probably a source of weak- 
ness rather than of strength. Her rule bore so hardly 
upon the inhabitants of scattered lands and islands, 
that the home government could derive small profit 
from them ; they were so rigorously excluded from 
dealing with other nations, that they could not in- 
crease in wealth, and there was little to be gained, 



CONCLUSION 615 

even by the Spanish who held the monopoly of their 
trade. 

But these vast possessions gratified national pride, 
and the thought of losing them was bitter. Moreover, 
if they did not add materially to the national wealth, 
they furnished an opportunity for many favored in- 
dividuals to acquire riches. If the natives were over- 
taxed and the merchants so burdened by restrictions 
that they could make no profit, the viceroys, the gov- 
ernors, the host of lesser officials, often reaped gains 
as liberal as they were illegitimate. Many an impov- 
erished nobleman replenished the family coffers as 
president or corregidor in Peru or Mexico or Cuba. 
Many a needy adventurer purchased official protec- 
tion, and returned to Spain having accumulated in a 
few years more than he could gain in a lifetime in 
Madrid or Cordova. At all events, the Spanish re- 
garded as of vast importance the preservation and 
extension of their foreign empire, though it was a 
curse to the subject peoples and of no real advantage 
to the governing state. 

Such were the relations between France and Spain 
when the question of peace with England became a 
practical one. The demands made by France for her- 
self were simple and were soon disposed of. She had 
begun the war largely influenced by a desire to weaken 
the power of England, and largely influenced also by 
a sincere sympathy for the colonists in their struggle 
for independence ; there had been no expectation of 
reaping great advantages for herself. But she had 
bound herself to obtain much for her ally, and the 
bond was held by a creditor that would yield nothing 
from its terms. Some of the requests advanced by 
Spain were agreed to, but the demand for Gibraltar 



616 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

seemed, as Shelburne had prophesied, the rock upon 
which the negotiations might suffer shipwreck. For 
years the forces of France and Spain had been en- 
gaged in the siege of the fortress ; the soldiers and 
ships which Spain promised the alliance had been 
used almost exclusively in the effort to capture Gibral- 
tar for her own use. 

There was now no hope of recovering the fortress 
except by negotiation, and the Spanish court declared 
that the restoration of Gibraltar was their ultimatum. 
To Spain the French were so bound by treaty and by 
family ties, that Vergennes felt that he must support 
this demand, even if it resulted in a continuation of the 
war. But to surrender Gibraltar by treaty, after the 
heroic defence of it by English soldiers and sailors, 
was sure to be in the highest degree unpopular, and 
the Cabinet was divided on the question. Shelburne 
apparently contemplated the possibility of granting 
the request if it were necessary for peace, but he in- 
sisted that England must have compensation in terri- 
tory elsewhere. 

The Spanish King proposed that the French cede 
Corsica to England ; but devotion to the Family 
Compact had not prepared the French King to sur- 
render this great island in order to buy a fortress 
for another country.^ Shelburne then suggested, as a 
compromise, Guadeloupe and Dominica, or Martinique 
and Sainte-Lucie, and Vergennes felt that, if neces- 
sary, France, though at the end of a successful war, 
must sacrifice her own possessions in order to satisfy 
her ally. It was decided that the French would cede 
Dominica and Guadeloupe, if England would restore 
Gibraltar to Spain. " France will suffer a substantial 

1 Doniol, V, 210. 



COVCLUSION 617 

loss," said Vergennes, "but this consideration . . . 
will not prevent the King from contributing a reason- 
able proportion towards the establishment of peace. 
. . . He will make a sacrifice worthy of his magna- 
nimity." ^ 

Rayneval thought that the English had decided to 
accept this proposition, but it is by no means certain 
that they would have dons so. The possessions to be 
ceded by France were indeed valuable and important. 
But, as Shelburne said, Gibraltar was dear to the 
English nation, and it had been further endeared by 
a heroic and successful defence. Even if an advanta- 
geous exchange had been offered, it is doubtful if 
Shelburne would have faced the English Parliament 
with the annouucement that the Union Jack was no 
longer to float over the rock of Gibraltar. At all 
events, when Vergennes thought that peace was about 
to be made with the surrender of the fortress as one 
of its conditions, the news reached London that pre- 
liminary articles with the United States had actually 
been signed. Whether this was the cause or the pre- 
text, the proposed agreement as to Gibraltar was re- 
jected. Five members of the Cabinet, so Shelburne 
told Rayneval, now wished to break off negotiations 
with France, and only by incredible effort, so he said, 
did he check this newly excited enthusiasm for a con- 
tinuation of the war.^ If the question of Gibraltar 
were to be further considered, Shelburne declared 
that they must have more in exchange, and he now 
suggested la Trinite or Sainte-Lucie. " See the result 
of the secret signature by the Americans," says a 
French historian, speaking of the relations between 

1 FitzTnaurice,.it7e of Shelburne, iii, 302-315 ; Doniol, v, 219. 

2 Doniol, V, 229. 



618 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

our country and France. " It saved Gibraltar to Eng- 
land by allowing her to raise the price and making it 
impossible for us to reduce it. . . . Jay and John 
Adams unknowingly made a gift of Gibraltar to the 
enemy of their country. . . . Aad they prevented our 
paying the debt contracted to Spain." ^ 

It is by no means certain that this is correct, or 
that the English would have brought themselves to 
the point of surrendering Gibraltar, no matter what 
they got in exchange ; but if it were correct, the 
French had every reason to feel grateful to the Amer- 
ican commissioners for their action. The possession 
of Gibraltar by Spain was of no advantage to France, 
and yet to obtain this for her ally France was asked 
to surrender valuable islands in the West Indies. 
Her obligation was a foolish* one to assume, and she 
was fortunate to be relieved of it. If Jay and Adams 
saved Guadeloupe and Dominica for France, they did 
her a friendly turn, and certainly there was no reason 
that the Americans should have sacrificed anything 
to assist Spain. Spain had no claims on the United 
States ; she had wished ill to the cause of American 
independence and had done nothing to further it ; her 
policy had been selfish and she could not ask for gen- 
erosity; there was no reason that the people of the 
United States should sacrifice one cod on the New- 
foundland Banks or one acre of land in the Western 
Reserve to obtain Gibraltar for Spain. It was more 
fitting that this fortress should remain the posses- 
sion of a power that was able to protect it, and cer- 
tainly its ownership by England could do America 
no harm. 

But no such considerations lessened Vergennes's 
1 Doniol, V, 230. 



CONCLUSION 619 

anxiety when Rayneval forwarded the last demand of 
the English Cabinet. It was manifest that the English 
were resolved to ask a price for Gibraltar to which 
the French could not agree, while on the other hand, 
the Spanish King kept himself aloof in sulky state, 
declaring that Spanish honor could accept no peace 
without Gibraltar. " I dropped my arms when I read 
your despatch," Vergennes wrote Rayneval; "Porto 
Rico, Sainte-Lucie, la Trinite, do they think we do not 
know the value and importance of those possessions? 
. , . The King desires peace, . . . but this desire is 
a virtue and not a weakness. They are mistaken in 
England if they believe it is only necessary to inflate 
their demands in order to obtain them. ... If it is 
necessary to prolong the calamities of war, his Majesty 
will submit with resignation." ^ 

The negotiations for peace could not be conducted 
with entire secrecy, and from every side came voices 
of disapproval. There was a party in France eager to 
continue the war, and still more eager to discredit Ver- 
gennes. They declaimed in all the antechambers of 
Versailles against a policy that at the end of a suc- 
cessful war would sacrifice valuable possessions — the 
fair islands of Guadeloupe and Dominica and la 
Trinite — in order to gratify Spanish pride. 

There was also a strong party in England eager to 
continue the war and overthrow Shelburne, and they 
could make their sentiments known in Parliament and 
in the press. They declaimed against the ignominy of 
surrendering Gibraltar, which had been won and held 
by the expenditure of so much British blood, the pos- 
session of which was part of the heritage of British 
glory. " There is a great deal of bitterness and a great 
1 Doniol, V, 234-235. 



520 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

deal of indecency in the House of Commons," wrote 
Rayneval/ to whom, naturally, the usages of a free 
government and criticisms of the ministers of the 
crown seemed very insolent. Nor were the opponents 
of the proposition consoled by the islands that were 
to be received in exchange. Spain might compensate 
France for her generosity by ceding to her the Spanish 
portion of San Domingo, and then France, said the 
English merchants and planters, as the owner of San 
Domingo would furnish sugar to all the markets of 
the world. 

So the French decided to continue the war, if Eng- 
land refused to cede Gibraltar, and Spain would not 
make peace without it. Such a decision showed the 
fidelity with which France kept her agreements with 
her allies, but it was not creditable to the wisdom of 
her rulers. If they had made an agreement which 
would involve the country in the evils of further war- 
fare, for an object in which France had no interest, 
their only course was to break the agreement. Their 
highest duty was to their own country, they had no 
right to sacrifice the welfare of their people in an at- 
tempt to execute unwise compacts. Fortunately, they 
were saved the necessity of having to carry on a costly 
war, or to break a foolish bargain. 

The English now proposed that Florida and Minorca 
should be ceded to Spain instead of Gibraltar. Ver- 
gennes submitted the proposition to the Spanish min- 
ister at Paris, expecting the usual response, that the 
surrender of Gibraltar was the ultimatum of Spain. 
To his amazement, he was told that the Spanish King 
would accept the offer. Even now it is difficult to see 
what led to this change of heart. Possibly the am- 

^ Rayneval to Vergennes, Dec. 4, 1782 ; Doniol, v, 251. 



CONCLUSION 621 

bassador's instructions bade him say that Spain would 
never abandon Gibraltar so long as there was a chance 
of getting it; but when he saw that this determination 
would result in a continuation of the war, he was to 
admit that he had used the expression in a diplomatic 
sense. 

The decision was as grateful as it was unexpected. 
Vergennes was filled with joy that France had saved 
for herself the valuable islands which she had been 
ready to sacx-ifice in order to satisfy the demands of 
her ally. With Gibraltar still English, Shelburne be- 
lieved he could present the treaty to Parliament with- 
out fear of disaster. 

There was now no obstacle to an agreement, and in 
January, 1783, the preliminaries between France and 
Spain were signed. " It is with the sweetest satisfac- 
tion," writes Rayneval to Vergennes on January 20, 
" that after the trials of four months of negotiation, 
I inform you that the preliminaries of peace have 
been this day signed." 

On September 3, 1783, the formal treaty of peace 
was signed by the representatives of the four nations 
which had been at war. In view of all that had gone 
before, the American commissioners, at Vergennes's 
request, executed a declaration that in signing the 
preliminary articles they had no object but to facili- 
tate the progress of the negotiation, and that their 
act was in no wise to be regarded as an abandonment 
of their engagements with France. " We hope this 
treaty will dispel suspicion and show that the young 
republic places above all else fidelity and constancy 
in its engagements." ^ 

1 Doniol, V, 277. Jay -was absent, tut Franklin and Adams executed 
the paper. 



622 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

I have endeavored to give some account of the aid 
furnished by France to our ancestors in the war for 
national existence. It is difficult to surmise what 
might have been, but apparently it would have been 
impossible to bring the war to a successful termina- 
tion if France had not interfered in our behalf. Pos- 
sibly, if the states had been forced to rely entirely on 
their own resources, assistance would have been given 
more freely to the general government, taxes would 
have been voted, money raised, troops enrolled, clothed 
and fed. But if the colonies unaided had done no 
more for themselves than they did when they had 
France as an ally, the Continental Army sooner or 
later would have disbanded. Resistance could only 
have been carried on by guerilla warfare, and inas- 
much as a considerable proportion of the population 
were not zealous in the cause, it is doubtful if guerilla 
warfare could have been continued indefinitely. 

At all events, the new nation owed a heavy debt 
of gratitude to France for assistance in the hour 
of need. The obligation was fully recognized, and a 
strong feeling of affection for our allies long pre- 
vailed in this country ; it was sufficiently active to be 
an important factor in our politics when the French 
Revolution threatened to involve us in dangerous 
complications. 

Yet the union between the two countries proved 
less durable and less important than was anticipated 
in the first fervor of their alliance. Gratitude does 
not often continue indefinitely as an active force, and 
untoward events hastened the chilling process which 
the years in due time would have produced. France 
as a republic was less agreeable to deal with than 
France under the old resrime. However much our 



CONCLUSION 523 

ancestors sympathized with efforts to establish politi- 
cal freedom, it was more difficult to agree with tlie 
citizens of the new republic than with the servants 
of an absolute king. The French Kepublio treated 
America with the same inattention to established 
usage that it showed towards European governments, 
and the antics of such representatives as Genet caused 
our ancestors to regard the Frenchman with a very 
chastened affection. 

The Napoleons discarded many of the traditions of 
the old regime, and certainly they did not inherit 
its friendship for America. The first Napoleon, in 
his dealings with this country, showed his customary 
disregard for the rights of others ; as a result of his 
arbitrary action, we found ourselves in war with 
England and narrowly escaped war with France. 
After the Napoleonic era France was regarded by the 
average American in the same light as any other 
nation ; our relations were friendly but there was 
no pretence of effusive affection. Louis Napoleon in- 
creased the ill-feeling which his uncle had aroused. 
If Napoleon III could have had his way at the time 
of our Civil War, France would have done what she 
could to destroy the nation which she had helped to 
create. It is doubtful whether the Emperor in his 
intrigues represented the French people, whom he 
governed so poorly and injured so greatly. But as a 
result of the ill-feeling which his policy created, most 
Americans sympathized with Germany rather than 
with France when their final struggle came. 

"While the War of the Revolution decided the fate 
of the American colonies, it was only an incident in 
the long record of French warfare. France had the 
satisfaction of humiliating an ancient rival, but the 



524 FRANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

expectation of materially weakening England's power 
was disappointed. England was as important a factor 
in European politics after the loss of lier American 
colonies as she had been before. 

The influence of the American alliance upon France 
was of a character that no one had anticipated. The 
power of England was not broken, France gained no 
monopoly of the trade with America and not even 
any important part in it ; if the irritation caused by 
the disasters of the Seven Years' War was somewhat 
allayed by England's defeat, yet the position of 
France on the Continent was not materially strength- 
ened by the American Revolution. The important 
effect was on the French people themselves: the 
success of the American colonists in establishing a free 
government had a great influence upon the French 
mind during the years before their own Revolution. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



In this index, for convenience, the first commission sent to France, consisting 
of Deane, Frauklin, and Lee, is indexed as " American Commissioners," and the 
Commission of 17S'2, as " Peace Commissioners." In the text, the action of the vari- 
ous governments concerned is sometimes attributed to the king, sometimes to the 
ministry, and sometimes to tlie country ; therefore it will be well, for instance, 
in seeking references to the action of France on any subject, to consult entries 
under France, Louis XVI, French government, and Vergennes. 



Academy of Sciences, Franklin elected 
to, 141 ; meeting of Franklin and Vol- 
taire at, 143. 

Acadia, ceded to England in 1713, 16. 

Adams, Mrs. Abigail, wife of John, de- 
scribes Madame Helvetius, 142. 

Adams, John, and the house at Passy, 
137 ; on Franklin's reputation in 
France, 140; opposed to I^ench troops 
serving on land, 290, 291 ; cliosen as 
peace envoy, 441, 442; in Paris, 442; 
persona non grata there, 443 ; early 
disagreement with Vergennes, 443, 
444; suspects V. of bad faith, 444, 4C0, 
461, 463, 464, 474, 475, 479; his view 
of our relations with France, 445, 446; 
Vergennes declines communication 
with, 445 ; defends repudiation of 
paper money by Congress, 446, 447 ; 
at odds with Franklin thereon, 447; 
interferes concerning instructions to 
Rochambeau and Ternay, 448, 449; 
goes to Holland, 450 ; a man of the 
utmost uprightness and veracity, yet 
distrusted honesty of others, 451 ; his 
jealousy and criticism of Franklin, 
452-ic>4, 474, 488; his animosity to 
Vergennes, 454 ; strongly supported by 
New England, 458; Congress gives him 
four colleagues as peace commission- 
ers, 459 ; arraigns Congress, 460; Ver- 
gennes naturally distrustful of, 463 ; his 
diary quoted as to Jay and Franklin, 
474 ; his opinion of La Fayette, 474 ; 
and the Marbois letter, 479, 480 ; votes 
against conferring with Vergennes dur- 
ing negotiations, 481 ; presents Amer- 
ican case on fisheries, 484 ; 61, 62, 109, 
139, 438, 440, 441, 446, 476, 487, 491, 
518 

Adams, Samuel, 251, 427, 453. 

Agriculture, in France, 212. 

Alabama, colony of, 240. 

Alabama, Confederate cruiser, 157, 159. 

Amazon, frigate, 326. 

America, North, relative position and 
prospects of France and England in, 
prior to Seven Tears' War, 15, 16. 

American army, deplorable condition of, 



6, 7; disasters of, cause modification 
of Vergennes's views, 125, 126; as La 
Fayett« found it, 190 ; its bad condi- 
tion responsible for failure of move- 
ment against Newport (1779), 206 ; 
unfed, unclothed, unpaid, 283; its ap- 
pearance contrasted with that of Ro- 
chambeau's troops, 308; its junction 
with French at White Plains (1781), 346, 
347 ; how disposed, 347, 348 ; move- 
ments in Yorktown campaign, 365 
seqq.; at King's Ferry, 3C6 ; marches 
to PhUadelphia, 367 ; at Philadelphia, 
369; marches southward , 37 1 ; at Cl)e8- 
apeake Bay, 374; commended by Ro- 
chambeau, 405 ; its condition in 1781, 
406. 

American character and patriotism in 
the Revolution and in the Civil War, 
compared, 9, 492 seqq. 

American colonies, defects of form of 
government, 4 seqq. ; their financial 
system, 5, 6 ; criticized by Gerard, 8; 
decreased usefulness of mother coun- 
try to, after expulsion of French from 
Canada, 20; signs of discontent ob- 
served by Choiseul, 25; visit and re- 
port of Pontleroy, 25, 26 ; Kalb's mis- 
sion, and report on conditions and 
sentiment, 27-29 ; their affairs ne- 
glected in France during last years of 
Louis XV, 32; interest in, renewed in 
France, 40 seqq. ; opening of hostili- 
ties in, 42 ; secret mission of Bonvou- 
loir, 45 seqq.; effect of their example 
on France not apprehended, 49; im- 
portance of their revolt well under- 
stood in France, 51 ; first loans to, 
made without direct application, 59; 
Beaumarchais appeals to Louis XVI for 
aid for, 81-84 ; he obtains loan for, 
85; their material condition in 1775, 
208; probable fate of, had France not 
intervened, 234, 235. And see United 
States. 

American colonists, minority of, averse 
to separation, 7; more devoted to 
their respective states than to the 
republic, 7j lack zeal and self-sacri- 



628 



INDEX 



flee, 7 ; obnoxious to France before 
their revolt, 15 ; their action the cause 
of her impaired influence in North 
America, 15 ; their complaints against 
the home government, 28; no altru- 
ism in French interest in their success, 
52 ; Vergennes advises that they be 
assisted and encouraged, 53 seqq.; un- 
, provided with munitions of war in 
1776, 130 ; their religious beliefs more 
like those of Cromwellians than those 
of Paris, 207; their declared princi- 
ples attractive to novelty-seeking 
Frenchmen, 218 ; as they appeared 
to the French, 236 ; their ante-bellum 
views of Frenchmen generally, 418, 
and of French literature, 418, 419 ; 
their mode of thought essentially 
English, 419; their opinion of the 
French much changed by the war, 419. 

American commissioners, and the af- 
fairs of Hortalez & Co., 100 seqq. ; 
Bent to France by Congress, 129 seqq. ; 
their arrival, 133 ; begin their duties, 
144 ; unfriendliness among, 144 ; ob- 
tain secret audience at Versailles (Dec. 
1776), 144-146 ; proposed treaty of com- 
merce, but no alliance, 146 ; formal 
audience (Jan. 5, 1777), 146; their pro- 
posals and arguments, 147 ; their fore- 
cast of movements of trade not real- 
ized, 147, 148 ; correspond with Ver- 
gennes as to American privateers in 
French waters, 160, 161 ; and French 
volunteers for America, 166 ; advise 
La Fayette to postpone departure, 
178 ; their lack of harmony, 221 ; de- 
spite their quarrels, united in efforts 
to obtain aid, 226, 227 ; their sugges- 
tion of March, 1777, 227 ; renew re- 
quest for treaty of commerce and for 
alliance, after Saratoga, 233 ; announce 
news of favorable decision to Congress, 
238 ; sign treaty of alliance, 239, 240, 
241 ; compared by Florida Blanca to 
Roman consuls, 243 ; their status 
changed by treaty, 243 ; formally pre- 
sented to Louis XVI, 243. And see 
Franklin, Deane, and Lee. 

American manners, 348, 349. 

American navy, came into existence as 
result of privateering, 153; its early 
operations, 153 seqq. ; Franklin prac- 
tically secretary for, 156. 

American representatives in Europe 
during the war, 221. 

American republic, the ideal state in the 
view of many Frenchmen, 209; doc- 
trines on which it was based, fatal 
teaching for subjects of Bourbons, 
210. 

American women, as seen by French of- 
ficers, 427 seqq. ; Southern, 431 ; La 
Fayette quoted concerning, 436, 437. 

Americans, sometimes criticized by 
French officers, 433, 434. 

Amphitrite, vessel chartered by Beau- 



marchais, leaves Havre, 93 ; returns to 
port, 94. 

Annapolis, Md., 374. 

Amie of Austria, wife of Louis XIII, 
498. 

Aranda, Conde de, Spanish minister at 
Paris, 223, 224. 

Arbuthnot, Harriot, English admiral, 
319, 321, 322, 360. 

Argenson, Marc-P. de Voyer, Comte d', 
214. 

Army, American. See American army. 

Army, French. See French army. 

Arnold, Benedict, Washington learns of 
his treason, 317 ; 322, 455. 

Arrot, Vicomte d', 304. 

Aumont, Duchesse d', 135. 

Austin, Jonathan L., carries news of 
Burgoyne's surrender to France, 230, 
231 ; and Franklin, 231. 

Austria, proffered mediation of, 455; ac- 
cepted by Congress, 457, 458. 

Austrian Succession, War of the, 499, 
600. 

Ayen, Due d'. See Noailles, Due de. 

Ayen, Duchesse d', La Fayette's mother- 
in-law, 172. 

Baltimore, allied armies at, 373, 374. 

Barb^-Marbois, Franjois, Marquis de, 
255. 

Barclay, Mr., and Beaumarchais's claim, 
109, 110, 112. 

Barras, Louis, Comte de, succeeds Ter- 
nay in command of fleet, 340 ; joins de 
Grasse, 381, 382 ; sacrifices his ambi- 
tion to his sense of duty, 383-386 ; 343, 
359, 362, 375, 376, 394. 

Barry, Jeanne BeQU, Comtesse du, ex- 
iled by Louis XVI, 34 ; 32, 76. 

Bayonne, 183. 

Beaumarchais, Pierre-Augustin Caron 
de, intrusted with funds advanced by 
France and Spain for use of the col- 
onies, 58 ; quoted, 64 ; intermediary be- 
tween Vergennes and Deane, 68, 69 ; 
his character and career, 70 seqq. ; 
"watchmaker to the King," 71; sec- 
retary of the King, 72 ; his lawsuit 
with Maupeou, and its results, 73 ; be- 
comes interested in American affairs, 
73 ; mission to Eon in England, 76, 
77 ; meets Arthur Lee, 78 ; advises 
French ministry to aid colonies (1775), 
78, 79 ; his memoirs to the King, 79, 
81-84; seeks to stir Vergennes to ac- 
tion, 79-81 ; his second visit to Lon- 
don, 81 ; Vergennes accepts his plan, 
84, 85 ; assumes name of R. Hortalez & 
Co., 85 ; his motives not altogether un- 
selfish, 85, 104, 105; receives 1,000,- 
000 livres each from France and Spain, 
86 ; and Deane, 87 ; authorized to pro- 
cure and ship supplies, 87, 88; and the 
Secret Committee of Congress, 88, 89; 
his zeal, 90 ; and Barbue Dubourg, 90, 
91; operations of Hortalez &Co., 91 



INDEX 



529 



seqq. ; ships munitions of war, 92, 93; 
Kalb complaius of, 93 ; sailing and re- 
turn of the Amphitrite, 93 94; liis 
ships reach Porstmouth, N. H.. 95; 
value of munitions sliipped by, to Sept. 
1777, 95 ; payment not forthcoming, 90 ; 
Lee's intrigues against, 9C ; his large 
credit balance, 97 ; demands pajTnent, 
97 ; in financial distress, 97, 98; Con- 
gress executes contract with Hortalez 
& Co., 99, 100 ; inquiries of American 
commissioners concerning, 100 seqq. ; 
Vergennes's reply, 102 ; thanked by 
Congress, 103; despatches second fleet 
(Dec. 1778), 105 ; his advances to Steu- 
ben, 106 ; the Fier Roderigue loses her 
convoy, 106 ; sends supplies to Virginia 
and So. Carolina, 107 ; speculations in 
West Indies, 107, 108 ; unfairly treated 
by U. S., 108; controversy concerning 
his accounts, 108 seqq. ; referred to 
Deane, 108, lOti, Barclay, 109, 110, 
Lee. 113, Alex. Hamilton, 113 ; letter 
to President of Congress, 11'2, 113; 
ruined by the French Revolution, 114 ; 
refugee in Hamburg, 114 ; his memo- 
rial in his daughter's behalf, 114, 115 ; 
died unpaid, 115 ; final settlement with 
his heirs (1835), 115 seqq.; 119, 164, 
167, 231. 

Beaumarchais, Eugenie, daughter of 
above. See Delanie, Mme. Eugenie. 

Beaumont, Christophe de, Archbishop 
of Paris, 295. 

Belle Poule, La, French frigate, 258. 

Berlin, Lee at, 225, 226. 

Bertliier, Alexandre, 416. 

Bingham, Mrs., 427. 

Blois, Bishop of, 295. 

Bonvouloir, M.. his secret mission to 
the colonies, 45 seqq. ; the first formal 
step toward French aid, 46 ; before 
the Secret Committee of Congress, 47 ; 
his imtrustworthy reports, 48 ; results 
of his mission unimportant, 48 ; his re- 
port, &1 ; 62. 

Bordeaux, La Fayette at, 179, 181, 182; 
its growth in the 18th century, 212. 

Boston, Kalb at. 28: d'E-staing's fleet 
at. 269 seqq.; hostility to French at, 
270 ; rioting at, 270 ; La Fayette's 
reception at, 298 ; French army at, 
411. 

Boston, game of cards, its origin, 218. 

Boundaries, western, of U. S., question 
of, in peace negotiations, 484, 485. 

Bourbonnais regiment, the, 303, 308, 
344. 

Bourgeoisie, their grievances against the 
aristocracy, 209. 

Brandywine, battle of, 190. 

Breck, Mr., agent of the French navy, 
429. 

Br^tigny, Marquis de, 274. 

Broglie, Charles-Frangois, Comte de, 
secret adviser of Louis XV, and the 
proposed uiTasion of England, 74 



seqq., 194 ; agrees to assist La Fayette, 
176; his family and career, 193, 194; 
out of favor uuder Louis XVI, 194; 
his ambition to " manage " the Ameri- 
can revolution based on ignorance of 
American character, 195; Kalb in his 
interest, 195 ; Kalb's letter to Deane 
concerning him, 196, 197 ; Deane's 
interest aroused, 198, 199; his selfish 
motive, 199, 200; La Fayette not in 
his interest, 200 ; his ambition entirely 
ungratified, 201 ; 75. 

Broglie, Claude-Victor, Prince de, his 
Journal quoted, 348, 408, 411, 430, 431, 
432.431; guillotined, 414. 

Broglie, Victor-Frangois, Due de, 27, 30. 

Brown, Misses, 408. 

BurgojTie, Gen. John, surrender of, 230, 
231, 238. 

Burke, Edmund, on Franklin, 132. 

BjTon, John, English admiral, defeated 
by d'Estaing (July. I'^'S). 106, 273 ; 
263. 

Campaign of 1781, 343 seqq.; the only 
one in which French and Americans 
fought side by side, 343. And see Tork- 
town Campaign. 

Campeachy. Bay of, 509, 510. 

Canada, settlement of, begun by Car- 
tier (1635), 15; colonists lacked en- 
couragement from France, 15, 16 ; 
ceded to England by Treaty of Paris, 
20 ; conquest of, paved the way for 
England's loss of her own colonies, 20 ; 
its value not generally realized in 
France, 21 ; Kalb's report of condi- 
tions in, 28, 29; the people content 
with English rule, 29; France not de- 
sirous to regain, 45, 46 ; cession of, to 
U. S., suggested, 471 ; in peace negoti- 
ations, 484 ; 227,249,512. 

Canadians, French. See French Canadi- 

Cap Frangois, French fleet at, 357, 358. 

Cape Haytien. See Cnp Francois. 

Caron, M., father of Beaumarchais, 70. 

Cartier, Jacques, 15. 

Castries, Marechal de, minister of the 
marine, 337. 

Catherine II of Russia, 43, 124. 

Censorship of the press, ineflaciency of, 
in France, 215. 

Charles III, of Spain, and the Falkland 
I'ds. dispute, 31, 32; assumes r8Ie of 
arbitrator between France and Eng- 
land, 506 seqq.; 57, 58, 85, 124, 241, 
502, 503, 511, 512, 516. 519, 520. 

Charleston, S. C, 186,278. 

Charlus de La Croix, Comte de, 303. 

Chastellux, Frangois-Jean, Marquis 
de, letter of, criticizing Rochambeau, 
intercepted, and sent to R., 343 ; his 
Travels in No. America, quoted, 348, 
409, 420, 422, 423, 425, 427, 428, 429, 
431,432,438; 341,368,389. 

Chatham, William Pitt, Earl of, hia 



530 



INDEX 



return to power dreaded by France, 43, 
44; 75, 237, 258, 477. 

Chaumont, Le Ray de, lends the H8tel 
de Valentinois to Franklin, 134, 135 ; 
refuses to accept rent, 137 ; active 
in sending supplies to America, 138 ; 
unpaid, dies a bankrupt, 138. 

Chaumont, M. de, son of I^e Ray de C, 
seeks settlement of latter's claim, 138, 
139 ; also bankrupt, 139. 

Chavagniac, ChSteau, 170. 

Chavagniac, Mile, de, grandmother of 
La Fayette, 170. 

Chavaillac, Sieur Gilbert du Mottie, 
Chevalier de, alias of La Favette on 
the Victory, 179. 

Chesapeake Bay, de Grasse arrives at, 
370 ; part of allied armies at, 374 ; bat- 
tle between de Grasse and Graves, 
382. 

Choiseul, Etienne-Frangois, Due de, 20, 
22 ; and the proposed invasion of 
England, 22, 23 ; reorganizes army and 
navy, 23, 24 ; watchful for signs of dis- 
content in America, 25 ; reports of his 
agents, 25, 26 ; forecasts future of the 
colonies, 26 ; sends Kalb thither, 27 ; 
his interest w^nes, 29 ; nearly causes 
war over Falkland I'ds., 30-32; and 
Charles III, 31 ; and Louis XVI, 34, 
35; 75,301. 

Civil War in U. S., qualities displayed 
in, 494. 

Clermont-Ferrand, Bishop of, quoted, 
208. 

Clinton, Gen. Sir Henry, his slowness 
and hesitation, 318,319; deceived by 
intercepted letters from Washington 
and Chastellux, 342, 343; reinforced 
by Hessians, 354; kept in ignorance of 
Washington's change of plan, 364 
seqq. ; and Cornwallis, 380; 3G1, 362, 
379, 381. 

Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 336. 

Collier, Sir George, 1G3. 

Colonies. See American colonies. 

Colonists. See American colonists. 

Commerce, Deane's arguments as to re- 
sults of revolution on, 65-67. 

Commercial companies in French colo- 
nies, 18, 19. 

Committee of Foreign Correspondence 
(of Congress), its instructions to 
Beane, 62, 63 ; as to pa}Tnent for sup- 
plies shipped by Beaumarchais, 88; 
87, 89, 91, 130. 

Committee of Safety. See Com. of For- 
eign Correspondence. 

Concorde, La, frigate, 340. 

Congress, Continental, limited powers 
of, 4 ; its deterioration and helpless- 
ness, 5 ; its economic blunders, 5 ; 
committee of, examines Bonvouloir, 
47 ; appoints Committee of Foreign 
Correspondence, 62 ; sends Deane to 
Paris, 62, 63 ; and the supplies shipped 
by Beaumarchais, 88 j and B.'s de- 



mand for payment, 97, 98 ; makes con- 
tract with Hortalez & Co., 99, 100; 
makes inquiries of Vergennes through 
commissioners, 100 seqq. ; formal vote 
of thanks to Beaumarchais, 103 ; in 
financial straits, 104 ; and Deane, 109; 
and Beaumarchais's accounts, 109 
seqq. ; refers them to Lee, 113, and to 
Hamilton, 113 ; declines to pay amount 
found due by Hamilton, 114 ; selects 
commissioners to France, 129 ; pro- 
posed treaty, drafted by, 129, 130 ; pre- 
scribes duties of the commissioners, 
130 ; and the French volunteers, 167, 
187 seqq. ; votes to accept La Fay- 
ette's services and make him major- 
general, 188; French opinion of, 218; 
hears news of treaty of alliance, 238; 
and the treaty, 245 ; and French sub- 
sidies, 249 ; and Gt^rard. 250 seqq. ; 
and the French fleet, 262 ; and Sulli- 
van's complaint of d'Estaing, 271 ; 
votes thanks and a sword to La Fay- 
ette, 284 ; deterioration of, during 
the war, 291 ; factions in, 291, 292; 
decreased respect for, in Europe, 297; 
French subsidies reluctantly intrusted 
to, 298 ; resolutions commending La 
Fayette, 299 ; fails to instruct repre- 
sentatives abroad, 325, 326 ; votes to 
send special envoy to France, 330 
seqq. ; intrigues in, 330, 331 ; selects 
Laurens, 331 ; reviews allied armies, 
369 ; appoints Jay peace commissioner 
(1779), 441, 442; instructions to him, 
442 ; acknowledgment of absolute in- 
dependence a condition, 443; effect 
in France of its repudiation of cur- 
rency, 446, 447 ; improperly imposes 
financial duties on Franklin, 452 ; 
Vergennes' s advice to, concerning 
terms of peace, 457 ; authorizes com- 
missioners to accept mediation of 
Russia and Austria, 457 ; sends new 
instructions to them, 457, 458 ; its 
instructions disregarded in negotia- 
tions, 459, 480, 481, 482 ; arraigned by 
Adams, 460; seeks new French loan, 
487, 488 ; inability of, to impose taxes, 
492; 223, 444, 445. 

Conti, Prince de, 211. 

Continental Congress. See Congress. 

Continental currency. See Currency in 
U. S. 

Conway, Gen. Thomas, La Fayette on, 
101. 

Conyngham, Capt., privateer, flagrant 
violation of neutrality laws by, 161 ; 
imprisoned, 161; released and com- 
mits new depredations on English 
commerce, 162; captured by English, 
162 ; narrowly escapes being hanged 
as a pirate, 163; 154. 

Cook, Governor, of Rhode Island, 409. 

Cornwallis, Charles, Earl, in Virginia, 
363 seqq. ; and La Fayette in spring 
of 1781, 379, 380 ; his fate decided by 



INDEX 



531 



inefficiency of Graves, 380-383; and 
Clinton, 380 ; might have escaped liad 
he acted in time, 390, 391 ; liis only 
hope in prolongation of siege, 3'>-' ; 
sends flag of truce (Oct. 17), 393, and 
surrenders, 393 ; terms of surrender, 
394; 11, 3i2, 354, 361, 371,385,38(3, 
388. 
Correspondence between governments 
and tlieir representatives, neglected, 

Corsica, annexed to France, 29 ; 516. 

Crowley, Mrs., 410. 

Cuba, 514. 

Currency, irredeemable, perils of, 5, 6. 

Currency in the United States, depre- 
ciation of, 282, 283, 426 ; worthless, 
360, 455. 

Custine, Adam-Philippe, Comte de, 303, 
315, 414, 415. 

Dancing, in America, 428, 429, 430, 431. 

Deane, Silas, first envoy to France, 02 ; 
lacked qualifications for the post, 62 ; 
his instructions, 62, 63; reaches Paris, 
July, 1776, 64 ; interview with Ver- 
gennes, 64; his execution of his mis- 
sion, 65-67 ; embarrassed by B. Du- 
bourg's indiscretion, 68 ; " turned 
over " to Beaumarchais, 09 ; negotia- 
tions with Beaumarchais, 87, 88 ; and 
Ducoudray, 94, 168 ; and Beaumar- 
chais's accounts, 108, 109 ; his own af- 
fairs entangled, 109 ; one of three 
commissioners to France, 129 ; quoted 
concerning Franklin, 132 ; at odds 
with Lee, 144, 222 ; and Conj-ngham, 
161, 162; his engagements of French 
volunteers, 165-167; and La Fayette, 
175, 176-178; Kalb enlists him in 
Broglie's interest, 190-198 ; signs 
treatv of alliance, 239; 98, 99, 119, 120, 
150, 183, 184, 187, 325. 

Declaration of Independence, effect of, 
in France, 120 seqq. 

Delancey, Gen. Oliver, 346. 

Delarue, Mme. Eugenie, daughter of 
Beaumarchais, 114, 115, 116. 

Des Touches (or Destoiiches), Capt., 321, 
322. 

Deserters, misleading reports of, 354. 

Deux-Ponts, Christian, Comte de, 303. 

Deux-Ponts, Guillaume, Comte de, 303 ; 
My Campaigns in America, quoted, 
371, 412, 437, 438. 

Digby, Robert, English admiral, 391. 

Digges, Mr., sent by Lord North to 
Franklin, 464, 465. 

Dillon, Arthur, Comte de, 277. 

Dillon, Comte Robert, 304. 

Dolphin, cruiser, 160. 

Dominica, 516, 518, 519. 

Doniol, Henri, his La Participation de 
la France, etc., 4 note. 

Drayton, William H., commissioner of 
Congress, 100. 

Dubois, Abb6 GuiUaume, 37. 



Dubourg, Barbue, and Franklin, 67 ; his 
interest in American affairs, 67, 68 ; 
his offlciousness annoys Deane, 68 ; 
supplanted by Beauinarchais, 69 ; jeal- 
ous of B., 90, 91 ; 119. 

Dubourg, Baron Cromot-, his journal 
quoted, 344, 348, 349, 366, 368, 369, 
370, 371, 374, 430. 

Ducoudray, Philippe-C-J-B. Tronson-, 
engaged by Deane, sails on Amphitrite, 
and orders her back to Havre, 94: 
causes trouble in America, 167, 168; 
inspector of artillery, 108 ; his death a 
happy accident, 169; 188. 

Duer, William, commissioner of Con- 
gress, 100. 

Dumas, Comte Mathieu, 409, 417. 

Dimkirk, provisions relating to, in treat- 
ies of Utrecht and Paris, 13, 14 ; freed 
from English control, 257, 497 ; all 
treaty provisions relating to, abro- 
gated in peace of 1783, 497 ; 51, 52, 
161. 

Dupleix, Joseph-F., Marquis, 13. 

Duportail, Louis le B^gue, on La Fay- 
ette, 387, 388 ; his later career, 415, 
416 ; 341. 

Durant, M., aliaa of Beaumarchais, 93. 

East India Company (French), its mo- 
nopoly abolished, 24. 

East India trade, in peace negotiations, 
477. 

East Indies, in negotiations between 
France and England, 497. 

Easton, Job, 307. 

Edict of N.intes, Revocation of, 19. 

EUer)', William, commissioner of Con- 
gress, 100. 

Elliot, Hugh, English minister at Ber- 
lin, and Lee, 226. 

Eneyclopcedia, The, 214. 

Encyclopaedists, 419. 

England, her triumph over Prance in 
Seven Years' War, 13, 14 ; bitter feel- 
ing in France against, 14, 52, 53, 204; 
proposed invasion of (17G4), 22 seqq.. 
74 seqq.; and the Falkland I'ds., 30- 
32 ; general belief concerning effect 
of colonial revolt on, 41 , 42 ; Ver- 
gennes's report on French interfer- 
ence, 122 seqq.; V.'saim, to lessen her 
power, 127; prospect of war with, 
main preoccupation of French minis- 
ters, 148 seqq. ; might have invoked 
action of France in 1776 as precedent 
in Geneva Arbitration, 157 ; change in 
French sentiment toward, since 1640, 
206 ; her power greater after Revolu- 
tion, 237 ; French-American alliance 
aroused new zeal for war, 280 ; plans 
for invasion of, revived, 287, 288 ; her 
status in America in 1780-81, 327 ; at 
war with four nations in 1781, 466 ; 
first suggestions as to terms of peace, 
468 ; negotiations with U. S., 482 
seqq. ; articles signed (Nov. 30, 1782), 



632 



INDEX 



485; peace with France essential to 
validity of Anglo-American treaty, 
486, 487 ; negotiations with FVance 
and Spain, 496 seqq. ; war party in, 
519, 520 ; treaty with France and 
Spain, signed, 521. 

English armies in the Revolution, 4 ; 
manoeuvres of, in the summer of 1781, 
353, 354 ; surrender of, at Yorktown, 
393 ; terms imposed on, 394; desire to 
surrender to French, 394. 

English fleet, off Newport, 318, 319 ; re- 
inforced by Rodney, 319 ; in American 
waters mismanaged throughout the 
war, 380, 381 ; under Graves, 381-383. 

English generals, their procrastination 
and bad judgment, 220. 

English government, incapacity of, dur- 
ing controversy with the colonies, 3, 
4 ; maladroitness of, as to Dunkirk, 
51, 52 ; not deceived by Vergennes's 
assurances to Stormont, 150 ; and the 
French-American treaty, 2.57 ; good 
faith of, in peace negotiations, 467 ; 
negotiations with France and Spain, 
517. 

Eon, Chevalier d', and the proposed in- 
vasion of England, 74 ; uncertainty as 
to his sex, 74, 77 ; possessed of dangpr- 
ous secret, 75 ; a blackmailer, 75, 76 ; 
30. 

Eon de Beaumont. See Eon, Chevalier 
d'. 

Escurial, Treaty of the (1733), the first 
Family Compact, 499. 

Estaing, Charles Hector, Comte d', his 
defeat of Byron, 106, 273; his illustri- 
ous descent, 258, 259 ; his early career, 
259 ; given command of fleet for 
America, 260 ; his instructions and 
departure, 260, 261 ; his long voyage 
to Delawarp Capes, 261, 262 ; reports 
arrival to Washington, 202 ; pursues 
Howe to N. Y., but cannot cross the 
bar, 263; sails to Rhode Island, 204; 
La Fayette cooperates with, on land, 
265 ; not responsible for failure of 
movement against Newport, 266, 267 ; 
his second pursuit of Howe checked 
by gale, 268, 269; sails to Boston, 269, 
thereby causing severe criticism, 209, 
270; hostile demonstrations at Boston, 
270 ; defends his cour.se, 271, 272 ; sails 
for West Indies, 272; his campaign 
there, 272, 273 ; Lincoln appeals to, for 
aid in the South, 273, 274 ; proposes 
expedition against Halifax and New- 
foimdland, 274 ; sails to Florida, 274, 
275 ; lays siege to Savannah, 275 seqq. ; 
wounded, 277 ; returns to West Indies, 
278; guillotined, 279; 10, 106, 362. 

Europe, lack of interest in American af- 
fairs in, outside France, 41, 501. 

Falkland Islands, dispute concerning, 

30-32. 
Family Compacts, a constant source of 



serious disadvantage to France, 498 
seqq., 500 note ; 30-32, 124, 467, 506 
seqq. 

Feather-beds, 425. 

Ferdinand of Brunswick, 196, 198. 

Fersen, Count Axel, on Washington, 
314 ; his Diary quoted, 421, 423, 424, 
425. 

Fersen, Dr., 409. 

Fier Roderigue, man-of-war fitted out 
by Beaumarchais, in d'Estaiug's fight 
with Byron, 106. 

Finances of France, 56, 328, 338, 339, 
462. 

Finances of U. S., parlous condition of, 
in 1780, 282 seqq.; and in 1781, 353, 
371, 372, 455. 

Financial conditions in U. S. during the 
war, 493. 

Financial .system of the colonies dis- 
cussed, 5, 6. 

Fisheries (Newfoundland), question of, 
441 , 442 ; in peace negotiations, 477, 
478; JWarbois letter concerning, 479, 
480; Adams presents case of, 484, 485 ; 
French rights in, undisturbed by 
treaty, 497. 

Fitzherbert, Alleyne, Baron St. Helens, 
replaces GrenviUe as envoy to France, 
470 ; 406. 

Fleury, Joly de, succeeds Necker, 339. 

Flenry, Marquis de, quoted, 393. 

Florida, colony of, 249, 500, 509, 513, 
520. 

Florida, Confederate cruiser, 157. 

Florida Blanca, prime minister of Spain, 
promises aid to Americans, 228; his 
promise not kept, 228 ; and the French 
treaty of alliance, 242 ; 327, 503, 512. 

Forbes, Mr., commissioner of Congress, 
100. 

Forth, Mr., secret emissary to Ver- 
gennes, 465. 

Fox, Charles James, sends Grenville to 
Paris, 468 ; mutual distrust of Fox and 
Shelburne, 469, 470; quarrels with 
Shelbume and resigns, 470. 

France, was her aid essential to success 
of American Revolution ? 5, 7, 9, 10, 
11, 522; conditions in, which led to 
her intervention, 12 seqq., 204; effect 
of Seven Years' War on, 12, 13, 20, 
204; more bitter toward England than 
toward Prussia, 14, 204; had no love 
for English colonists, 14, 15; her mis- 
taken theory of colonization, 18, 19; 
monopolies, bounties, etc., 18; colonial 
conditions discouraged emigration, 18, 
19 ; much richer and more prosperoiw 
in 1775 than in 1763, 24 ; different as- 
pects of her aid, 39, 40; first sugges- 
tion of, as an ally, 45; Bonvouloir's 
mission, 46 ; Vergennes's policy adopt- 
ed, 53 ; and the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, 119 seqq., 21S ; Vergennes's 
report in favor of taking a hand, 122 
seqq.; results of early negotiations, 



INDEX 



533 



127 seqq. ; definite recopnition of new 
republic by, delayed by ill-success of 
American arms, 1-S; Franklin, Deane, 
and Lee sent as commissioners to, 
129; Franklin's arrival, 131, 132 ; pol- 
icy of, as to American privateers, a 
violation of neutrality, 152, 155, and 
of Treaty of Utrechti^ 155 ; forced to 
act against privateers, 156 seqq.; her 
action compared with that of Eng- 
land in 1861-65, 157, 159 : makes treaty 
of alliance wiih U. S. (1778"), 163 : Eng- 
land declares war on, 163; zeal for 
American cause increased by La Fay- 
ette's adventure, 183 ; genuine enthu- 
siasm for that cause, 204, 205 ; change 
in French thought since the English 
rebellion of 1640, 206, 207 ; signs of re- 
volution in, visible at death of Louis 
XV, 207 ; condition of the peasantry, 
208; burdensome privileges of tlie 
aristocracy, 209 ; conditions in, uinder 
Louis XIV and Louis XV compared, 
210 seqq. ; economic condition im- 
proved, but demand for cliange insist- 
ent in 1770, 212, 213; social inter- 
course and tlie salons, 213 ; increasing 
interest in political affairs, 214, 215; 
influence of Voltaire, Rousseau, etc., 
214, 215 ; ineflBciency of press censor- 
ship, 215 ; effect of scientific discover- 
ies in 18th century, 215, 216; "era 
of boundless hope," 216, 217 ; public 
opinion impatient of Vergennes's de- 
lay, 229, 230 ; influence of American 
alliance on political development of, 
235 ; Gerard appointed minister to 
U. S., 247 seqq. ; relations with Spain, 
248, 249 ; prepares for war with Eng- 
land, 258; effect of La Fayette's re- 
turn, 285 ; new plans for invasion of 
England, 287, 288, abandoned, 289 ; 
advised by Spain to make separate 
peace with England, 327 ; the only 
country where the TJ. S. could get 
money, 334 ; borrows in Holland 
for V. S., 336; changes in ad- 
ministration (1781), 336 seqq.; at war 
all over the globe, 397 ; social condi- 
tions in, 422 ; abandonment of, by 
U. S., never contemplated, 444 ; finan- 
cial conditions in, 462 ; in instructions 
of Congress to peace commissioners, 
457, 458 ; her liberal dealings with 
U. S. throughout the war, 463 ; to be 
included in any treaty, 464 ; status of 
her alliances on the eve of peace, 466, 
467 ; in peace negotiations, 468, 469 ; 
Anglo-American treaty conditional on 
peace between England and, 486, 487 ; 
neeotiations between England and 
France and Spain, 496 ; modest terms 
demanded by, 496 ; embarrassment 
caused bv Spain, 498 seqq.; relatinns 
with Spain under Louis XIV, 498; 
"Family Compacts," a constant source 
of disadvantage to France, 498 seqq., 



500 note, 506, 510, 511 ; influence of, 
impairfd by War of Spanish Succes- 
sion, 499 ; terms of convention with 
Spain in 1779, 511 ; treaty with Eng- 
land (Sept. 1783), 521 ; American alli- 
ance disappointing in its results, 522, 
523 ; after-effects of American success 
in, 524. 

France under Lends XV, 500 note. 

Francy, Theveueau de, Beaumarchais's 
agent in America, 98 ; negotiates con- 
tract with Congress, 99; 107. 

Franklin, Benjamin, on Vergennes, 38 ; 
in Committee of Foreign Correspond- 
ence, 62 ; and B. Dubourg, 67 ; and 
the question of French subsidies prior 
to alliance, 110. Ill ; one of three com- 
missioners to France, 129 ; liis qualifi- 
cations, 129, 132 ; effect of his arrival 
in France, 131 seqq. ; unpopular in 
England, 131, 132; and Lord Stor- 
mont, 132; " a sage of antiquity," 133; 
police reports concerning, 134; in 
lodgings in Paris, 134; at HStel de 
Valentiuois, Passy, 134, 135; puts 
lightning-rod on the house, 136; pop- 
ularity and social success, 136 ; and 
John Adams, 137 ; lives at Passy " in 
oflBcial semi-obscurity," 139, but much 
in the public eye, 140 ; Adams on, 140, 
453, 474, 488 ; best known as man of 
science, 140; elected to Academy of 
Sciences, 140; his writings popular in 
France, 141; medallions, busts, etc., 
of. 141, 142; relations with women, 
142; Madame Helvetius, 142; Com- 
tesse d'Houdetot, 143 ; meeting with 
Voltaire, 143; Stormont's snsficions 
of, 145; demands formal audience, 
146; his diplomatic conduct, 147 seqq.; 
disavowed by Vergennes to Stor- 
mont, 150 ; opposed to privateering, 
but assists privateers, 156, 157, 158, 
159 ; practically secretary for the in- 
cipient American navv, 156 ; and 
Conyngham, 162, 163; French volun- 
teers tender services to, 165; more 
cautious than Deane in accepting ten- 
ders, 166 ; his influence in arousing 
French sympathy, 205, and in nego- 
tiations for aid, 219 ; Stormont on, 
219 ; difficulties in his way, 221 ; not 
responsible for friction among com- 
missioners, 221; Lee's plans for, 222; 
and Izard, 222, 223 ; treated by French 
ministers as practically sole repre- 
sentative of U. S., 223; letter to 
Lee, 224 ; and J. L. Austin, 231 ; signs 
treaty of alliance, 239 ; presented at 
court, 243, 244; intrigues in Congress 
against, 330; praised by Vergennes, 
331 ; his popularity in France, 331 ; 
his success in obtaining loans, 334, 
4.52 ; quoted, concerning crisis in U. 
S., 335, 336 ; approached by Pnlteney, 
440 ; and the Weissenstein letter, 440, 
441 ; why not mentioned as peace en- 



534 



INDEX 



voy, 441 ; appealed to by Vergennes, 
in matter of repudiation of paper 
money, 447; Adams's jealousy of, 452, 
453 ; financial duties imposed upon, 
452 ; his accounts carelessly kept, 453; 
criticized by Adams, 453, 454; post- 
mortem denunciation of, by Adams, 
454 ; his position iu France unassail- 
able, 454; superior to Vergennes in 
diplomacy, 454, 455; finally made 
peace commissioner, 459 ; North sends 
secret emissaries to, 464, 465 ; and 
Lord Shelburne, 468; and Oswald, 
468; and Grenville, 469; declines to 
consider terms disadvantageous to 
France, 469 ; negotiations with Os- 
wald, 470 seqq. ; suggests cession of 
Canada, 471 ; favors conferring with 
Vergennes, but is overruled, 480, 481; 
and the loyalists, 485 ; informs Ver- 
gennes of signing of articles, 486, 
487 ; required to request new French 
loan, 488, 489 ; Vergennes writes 
sharply to, 490 ; his reply, 490 ; letter 
to R. Morris, 491 ; 102, 107, 183, 184, 
197, 220, 229, 233, 248, 293, 298, 325, 
443, 444, 445, 446, 448, 449, 451, 479, 
482, 484, 492. And see French gov- 
ernment and Vergennes. 

Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia, in- 
different to fate of colonies but wishes 
France to interfere, 225 ; and Lee and 
his papers, 226 ; 14, 30, 123, 124, 196, 
230, 234. 

French alliance, delayed by ill-success 
of American arms, 228, 229 ; disap- 
pointing results of, in first two years, 
280 seqq. 

French army, in Seven Tears' War, 23 ; 
reorganized by Choiseul, 23 ; under 
JRockambeau, composition of, 303, 
304; condition of, on arrival iu U. S., 
306 ; favorably received, 306, 307 ; ex- 
cellent conduct, 307, and fine appear- 
ance of, 308; long inactive, 310 seqq. ; 
at Newport, 317 ; discontent in, 344 ; 
physical condition better than morale, 
344 ; marches to the Hudson, 344, 
345 ; joins American force at White 
Plains, 346, 347 ; disposition of, 347, 
348 , campaigning in the wilderness, 
350, 351 ; movements of, in Yorktown 
campaign, 365 seqq. ; arrives at Ches- 
apeake Bay, 374 ; after Yorktomi, 
402; marches northward to the Hud- 
son, and to Rhode Island and Boston, 
404-411 ; sails for France, 412; some 
facts concerning, 412 seqq. ; became 
popular in U. S., 419, 420; whose is 
the credit ? 421. 

French Canadians and the English col- 
onists, 418. 

French colonization, in North America, 
15 seqq.; in the Mississippi Valley, 
17 ; causes of failure of, 18, 19. 

French commerce, growth of, after 
Seven Years' War, 24. 



French development in America, 
checked by jealousy and opposition 
of English colonists, 15. 

French fleets in American waters. See 
Estaing and Grasse. 

French government, effect of American 
policy of, on France. 11 seqq. ; paid 
little heed to colonization, 19 ; feared 
war with England and return of 
Chatham to power, 43 ; advances 
1,000,000 livres to colonies (June, 
1776), 86 ; connives at despatch of 
Beaumarchais's vessels, 95 ; hesitates 
at prospect of war with England, 
148, 149 ; promises secret help, and 
money, 148 ; influenced by probable 
evils of reconciliation between Eng- 
land and her colonies, 149 ; and La 
Fayette, 149 ; ceases to hinder La 
Fayette's departure, 183, 184, 185; 
public opinion most potent factor in 
its action, 205 seqq. ; treats Franklin 
as sole commissioner, 223 ; decides 
upon alliance after Burgoyne's sur- 
render, 231 ; criticized for having de- 
layed too long, 231, 232 ; motives of, 
in making alliance, 235, 236 ; hopes 
of material advantage not fulfilled, 
237 ; resolves to send fleet to Amer- 
ica, 258; La Fayette's plan for rein- 
forcements considered by, 290, 291 , 
decides to send army under Rocham- 
beau, 294, 295 ; preparations for de- 
spatch of Rochambeau, 300 seqq. ; ap- 
proves his decision against attack on 
N. Y., 316; declines request of Hart- 
ford Conference for more troops, 
but promises funds and naval succor, 
328, 329 ; important changes in (1781), 
336 seqq. And see France and Ver- 
gennes. 

French literature, in 17th century, 210 
seqq.; American colonists not affected 
by, 418, 419. 

French ministers. See French govern- 
ment. 

French missionaries in America, 16. 

French navy, reorganized by Choiseul, 
23,_24, 

French officers, their discipline responsi- 
ble for good conduct of troops, 421. 

French people, effect upon, of American 
policy of the government, 11 seqq.; 
their desire to assist Americans to ob- 
tain independence as unselfish as uni- 
versal, 236 ; La Fayette a better repre- 
sentative than Vergennes, 23G ; their 
instincts truer than those of French 
statesmen, 237, 238 ; change in Amer- 
ican sentiment toward, after the war, 
418, 419. 

French philosophei-s, applaud principles 
of American patriots, 229. 

French philosophy, influence of, on so- 
ciety, 210. 

French Revolution, the. See Revolution, 
French. 



INDEX 



636 



French salons, influence of, 211 ; 213, 
214. 

French statesmen, closely observant of 
relations of England with her colonies, 
30, 40 ; more intiueuced at first by 
probable results of revolt than by sym- 
pathy, 41. 

French thought, extraordinary revolu- 
tion in, in preceding century, 20C, 
207. 

French treasury, unfavorable condition 
of, urged by Turgot, 56 ; state of, in 
17S0-S1, 328,338, 339. 

French volunteers, among the military 
upper classes, anxious to aid the col- 
onists, 1G4 seqq.; their motives, 1G4, 
165 ; their number embarrassing, 165, 
166 ; Deane's injudicious engagement 
of, 166, 167. 

Gage, Gen. Thomas, 40. 

Gamier, M., French charge d'affaires 
and minister to England, 40, 41, 42, 43, 
44, 120, 126. 

Gates. Gen. Horatio, 192, 330, 455. 

Gazette de France, 214. 

George III, characteristics of, 4 ; and the 
Weissenstein letter, 441 ; refuses to re- 
cognize the situation after Yorkto^vn, 
464 ; and the proposed mediation of 
Spain, 508 ; 44, 229, 443. And see Eng- 
land. 

Georgetown, So. Carolina, 185, 186. 

Georgia, colony of, 273, 4ii9. 

Gt5rard de Rayneval, Conrad, first 
French minister to America, quoted, 
4, 5, 8, 9 ; acting foreign secretary, 40 ; 
appointed minister, 247 ; his instruc- 
tions, 248 seqq.; his departure con- 
cealed, 250; reception in U. S., 260; 
received by Congress, 250 seqq.; a use- 
ful representative, 253; on the ques- 
tion of western boundary of U. S. , 253 ; 
and on the fislieries question, 254 ; re- 
lieved, 254 ; celebrates birth of Louis 
XVI, 404 ; quoted, 431 ; his influence 
in matter of instructions to Adams, 
443 ; 04, 238, 260, 203. 

G^vaudan, wolf of, 171. 

Gibraltar, siege of, 301 ; England's re- 
fusal to restore to Spain delays peace 
with France, 489, 509, 515-521 ; 477, 
478, 499, 514. 

Gloucester, Duke of, brother of George 
III, a partisan of the colonists, 173. 

Goethe, Johann AAolfgang von, 73. 

Goiissencourt, Chevalier de, his Opera- 
tions of the French Fleet, etc., 356, 357. 

Grand, M., 111. 

Grasse, Frangois-Joseph-Paul, Comte 
de, succeeds d'Estaing in command of 
fleet, 278 ; his proposed cruise to U. S. 
secretly communicated to Washington 
and Rochambeau, 329 ; arrives at Ches- 
apeake Bay, 354 ; his descent and ca- 
reer, 355 ; assigned to command ex- 
pedition to U. S., 355, 35G ; in the "West 



Indies, 356 seqq. ; corresponds ^th 
Rochambeau as to destination in U. S., 
358 seqq. ; decides on Chesapeake, and 
thereby determines Washington's plan 
of campaign, 361-364 ; his arrival an- 
nounced in Phila., 370 ; its stimulating 
effect, 371 ; entitled to large share of 
credit for capture of Yorktown, 376- 
379, 390 ; his inconclusive engagement 
with Graves decides Cornwallis's fate, 
382, 383 ; and Barras, 383-386 ; awaits 
northern army, 386 ; confers with 
Washington on Ville de Paris, 389, 
390 ; refuses to remain on coast after 
fall of Yorktown, 395, 396 ; returns to 
West Indies, 397, and is overwhelm- 
ingly defeated by Rodney at " The 
Saints," 397-400 ; taken prisoner, 400 ; 
ends his life in disgrace, 400, 401 ; 
Wasliingtou quoted concerning, 401 ; 
carries message from Slielburne to 
Vergennes, 476 ; 333, 340, 341, 342, 343, 
352,375,391,392,393,470. 

Grasse, Madame de, third wife of the 
above, 400. 

Graves, Thomas, Baron, English admiral, 
his inefficiency, 381, 382 ; inconclusive 
engagement with de Grasse off the 
Chesapeake, 382; returns to N. Y., 
383 ; 305, 318, 380, 385. 

Greene, Gen. Nathanael, 245, 379, 396, 
397. 

Grenada, 273. 

Grenville, Thomas, sent to France by 
Fox (1781), 4G8 ; his interviews with 
Franklin. 468, 469; accredited to 
France alone, 469 ; his mission and 
Oswald's conflict, 470 ; replaced by 
Fitzherbert, 470. 

Grimaldi, D. Geronimo, Marquis de, 
Spanish minister to France, 58, 59, 127. 

Guadeloupe, 516, 518, 519. 

Guines, Adrien-Louis de Bonnieres, 
Comte de, French ambassador to Eng- 
land, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49. 

Hair-dressing in America, 405. 

Hamburg, HStel de, 134. 

Hamilton, Alexander, Beaumarchais'a 

accounts referred to, 113, 114; his 

award not accepted, 114, 1 18 ; 314, 331. 
Hancock, John, 440. 
Hartford, meeting of Washington and 

Rochambeau at, 314 seqq., French 

army at, 3*15. 
Hartford Conference, result of, sent to 

France, 325, 326; reply of French 

ministry to, 328, 329, 340. 
Hartley, Mr., M. P., 465. 
Havre, forces assembled at, for invasion 

of England, 288. 
Head of Elk, allied armies at, 373. 
Heath, Gen. William, plays important 

part in Yorktown campaign, 365 ; 271, 

30G, 309, 318, 424. 
Helvetius, Madame, and Franklin, 142 ; 

described by Mrs. Abigail Adams, 142. 



536 



INDEX 



" Heretics." See Huguenots. 

Hermione, man-of-war, takes La Fayette 
to Boston, 298. 

Hessians, 220, 354, 420. 

Hodge, Mr., partner of Conyngham, 162. 

Holbach, Baron von, his salon, 213 ; his 
System of Nature, 214. 

Holker, M., sent to U. S. by Vergennes, 
230. 

Holland, and the U. S. loan, 334, 335, 
336 ; in the war, 467. 

HoUande, H8tel de, headquarters of 
Hortalez & Co., 91, 92. 

Honduras, Bay of, 509. 

Hood, Samuel, Viscount, English ad- 
miral, 357, 3S1. 

Hortalez, Roderigue & Co., name under 
which Beaumarchais negotiated with 
U. S., 68, 85, 89, 91-93, 97, 99, 100, 
108, 112, 113, 144, 152. And see Beau- 
marchais. 

Houdetot, Comtesse d', and Franklin, 
143. 

Howe, Richard, Earl, admiral, sails to 
N. Y. after evacuation of Phila., 262 ; 
pursued by d'Estaing, 203; sails to 
Newport, and forces d'Estaing to sea, 
268 ; pursued by him, but saved by 
gale, 208, 269. 

Howe, William, Viscount, general, 125, 
220, 229. 

Hudson Bay Territory, ceded to Eng- 
land in 1713, 16. 

Huguenots, barred from colonies when 
expelled from France, 19. 

Hunter, Mrs. Deborah, 307. 

Independence of U. S. guaranteed by 
France in treaty of alliance, 240 ; re- 
cognized by England at outset of for- 
mal negotiations, 473; an indispensa- 
ble part of any treaty, 507 and note ; 
aid of France essential to establish- 
ment of, 522. 

India, lost to France by Seven Years' 
War, 20. 

Indians, 309, 310, 420. 

Ireland, Spain suggests interference in, 
rather than in America, 58. 

Izard, Ralph, his abuse of Franklin, 
136, 137 ; envoy to Grand Duke of 
Tuscany, makes trouble with Frank- 
lin, 222, 223 ; 330, 441, 451, 459, 474. 

Jamaica, 509. 

Jay, John, President of Congress, 103; 
quoted, 334; and the peace commis- 
sionership (1779), 441, 442 ; minister 
to Spain, 442 ; one of peace commis- 
sioners (1782), 459 ; takes leading part 
in negotiations (June), 473 ; declines 
to proceed unless independence is for- 
mally acknowledged, 473 ; had little 
love for France, 474 ; suspicious of 
Rayneval's mi-ssion to England, 474, 
475; suggests severance of interests of 
France and U. S., 479 ; increased dis- 



trust of Vergennes, 479 ; and the 

Marbois letter, 479, 480 ; opposes con- 
ferring with Vergennes, 480 ; and the 
instructions of Congress, 481, 482 ; 
461, 466, 476, 477, 484, 487, 491, 518. 

Jefferson, Thomas, declines to serve as 
commissioner to France, 129 ; named 
on peace commission, 459. 

Joliet, Louis, 16. 

Jones, John Paul, and the French alli- 
ance, 244; receives first honors paid to 
American flag, 244 ; 154. 

Kalb, Johann,! Baron, his title and an- 
tecedents, 26, 27 ; his mission to the 
colonies, 27, and reports, 28, 29 ; com- 
plains of Beaumarchais, 93 ; sails with 
La Fayette from Bordeaux, 179, 180 ; 
La Fayette's indebtedness to, 181, 182, 
voyage to U. S., 184, 185; commends 
La Fayette, 189, 19); "advance 
agent" of Comte de Broglie, 195 
seqq.; enlists Deane in Broglie's in- 
terest, 196, 197 ; change in liis opinion 
of Washington, 201, 202 ; 30, 169, 176, 
186, 188, 426. 

Kalb, Madame, 181, 182, 186, 189. 

King's Ferry, 365, 366, 405. 

Knox, Gen. Henry, 314, 341, 389. 

La Fayette, Marie-Jean-Paul-Roch- 
Yves-Gilbert du Mothier, Marquis de, 
his birth and lineage, 169 ; early years 
and marriage, 171, 172 ; his character, 
173 ; his first interest in American 
affairs, 173, 174 ; decides to volunteer, 
174 ; offers services to Deane, 175 , 
balked by ministers, 175, but persists, 
176 ; applies to Comte de Broglie, 176; 
presented to Deane by Kalb, 176,177; 
promised rank of major-general, 177, 
and accepts, 178 ; buys ship and cargo 
for himself, 178 ; seeks consent of 
ministry, 178; letter to his father, 178, 
179 ; sails from Bordeaux (Mar. 25, 
1777) to Los Pasajes, 179,180; leltre 
de enchet against, 180 ; public interest 
and sympathy aroused, 180, 181, 183 ; 
returns to Bordeaux, 181 ; borrows of 
Kalb, 181, 182 ; returns incognito to Los 
Pasajes, 182, 183, and sails thence, 
184 ; his reception in U. S., 1&5 seqq. ; 
receives special recognition from Con- 
gress, 188 ; presented to Washington, 
189; his enthusiasm, 189; Washing- 
ton's confidence in, 190 ; joins army as 
a volunteer, and is woimded at Bran- 
dywine, 190; ambitions of distinction, 

191 ; given command of a division, 
191 ; the " Cabal's " jealousy of, 191 ; 
proposed Canadian expedition, 191, 

192 ; at Valley Forge and Monmouth, 
192 ; the most useful friend among 
French volunteers, 103 ; not in Brog- 
1 Mr. Thomas Balch, in his work The 

French in Ainericn. gives Kalli's name 
thus : Henry-Jules- Alexandre von Robaii. 



INDEX 



)37 



lie's interest, 200 ; appointed to com- | 
mand uuder Sullivan, 204, 2te ; and 
d'Estaiug, 2u5 ; remonBtrates against 
d'Estaiug's going to Boston, 209 ; 
commended by Washington, 284; ap- 
plies for furlough, 2S4 ; tlianked by 
Congress, 2S4 ; returns to France, 2S4 ; 
technically a prisoner, but is received 
by Louis XVI, 285 ; urges more vigor- 
ous support of American cause, 285 
seqq. ; letter of, to 'Washington, 280 < 
his labors not wasted, 2S7; interested 
in proposed invasion of England, 288, 
289 ; procures large reinforcements for 
U. S., 289 ; his plan of operation, 289, 
290; on the disputes between factions 
in XJ. S., 292 ; insists on despatch of 
troops, and desires to command them, 
292, 294 ; letter of, to Vergennes, 293; 
his memorial to Maurepas, 293, 294 ; 
asks permission to return to U. S., 
296 ; his instructions, 297 ; his recep- 
tion at Boston, 298, 299 ; at Wasliing- 
ton's quarters, 299 ; visits Congress, 
299 ; given command of 2000 men. 
299 ; overzealous in dealing with his 
countrymen, 310, 311 ; advises move- 
ment against N. Y., 311 : his zeal net- 
tles Rochambeau, 312, 313 ; their 
friendship unbroken, 313; and Com- 
waUis in spring of 1781, 379, 380 ; rein- 
forced by troops from fleet, 38G ; his 
calmness and good judgment, 387 ; in 
command of troops until Washing- 
ton's arrival, 3SS ; his career in Amer- 
ica reviewed, 413; his after life, 413 ; 
quoted, 423, 430, 437 ; 9, 230, 246, 200, 
270, 271, 314, 315, 317, 333, 364, 370, 
391, 395, 474. 

La Fayette, M.irie-Louise-Julie de La 
Riviere, Marquise de, mother of 
above, 170. 

La Fayette, Marie-Madeleine Pioche de 
La Vergne, Comtesse de, 170. 

La Fayette, Michel-L-C-R-G. du Mo- 
thier. Marquis de, father of La Fay- 
ette, 170. 

La Fayette, Madame de (Noailles), wife 
of La Fayette, 172, 179, 244. 

La Fayette family, the, 109, 170. 

La Luzerne, C6sar-Anne de, second 
French minister to XJ. S., 254 ; letter 
of Vergennps to, concerning terms of 
peace, 48G, 487; 317, 335, 360,302, 309, 
370, 444, 447, 450, 458, 459, 461, 475, 
483. 

La Salle, Robert Cavelier, Sieur de, 16. 

Lameth, Theodore, 416. 

Languedoc, d'Estaing's flagship, 250, 
260, 208. 

Laurens, John, special envoy to France 
in quest of loan, 331; letter of Wash- 
ington to, 332 ; in France, 333 ; his 
defects as an envoy, 335 ; returns to 
U. S. with fimds, 336 ; peace commis- 
sioner, 459 ; 270. 

Lauzun, Armand-Louis de Gontaut- 



Biron, Due de, and Mrs. Hunter, 307 ; 
his grand ball at Newport, 308 ; guillo- 
tined, 415 ; 303, 304. 340, 408, 409. 

Lauzun, Legion of, 303, 408. 

Laval-Montmorency, Marquis de, 303. 

Law, John, and the Mississippi Com- 
pany, 10, 17. 

Lee, Arthur, his character, 78, 96 ; rela- 
tions with Beaumarchais, 78 ; intrigues 
against Beaumarchais, 96, 100 ; his 
misrepresentations to Congress, 96, 
97; prevents settlement of Beaumar- 
chais's claims, 104 ; that claim re- 
ferred to him, 113 ; his report thereon, 
113; chosen commissioner to Fiance, 
129 ; his dislike of Deane and Frank- 
lin, 144 ; his unfortunate temper and 
conduct, 221, 222 ; his plan for ar- 
ranging American affairs in Europe, 
222 ; bis complaints to Congress, 222 ; 
practically ignored by French minis- 
ters, 223 ; starts for Madrid, 223, and 
is detained at Vittoria, 224 ; goes to 
Berlin, 225 ; and Frederick II, 220 ; 
his papers stolen, 226 ; again in Paris, 
abusing Franklin, 226 ; signs treaty 
of alliance, 239 ; his abuse of Frank- 
lin, 330 ; 80, 83, 88. 109, 136, 137, 251, 
441, 451,459,404, 474. 

Leiton, Polly, 411, 432, 433. 

Lexington, cruiser, 160. 

Lincoln, Gen. Benjamin, appeals to 
d'Estaing for aid, 273 ; commands 
American force at siege of Savannah, 
270-278 ; on d'Estaing, 278 ; 346. 

Livingston, Robert R., 482. 

Lom^uie, Louis, his Beaumarchais et 
son Temps, 118 note. 

Long Island, battle of (Aug. 1776), 125, 
120 ; delayed French alliance almost 
two years, 126. 

Los Pasajes (Spain), 180, 183, 184. 

Louis XIV, and Dunkirk, 13 ; and the 
Spanish alliance, 4S.I8 ; and the War of 
the Spanish Succession, 498, 490 ; 22, 
23. 

Louis XV, and the proposed invasion of 
England, 22, 73 seqq. ; his political 
methods, 23 ; intervenes in Falkland 
I'ds. dispute, "1, 32; dismisses Choi- 
seul, 32 ; his death, 32 ; his secret di- 
plomacy, 74 seqq. ; ominous state of 
France at his death, 207 ; 71,499, 500, 
501. 

Louis XA^, his accession, 32, 33 ; chooses 
new ministers, 34 seqq. ; never eager 
to interfere in America, 35, 30; and 
Turgot, 39, 40 ; Vergennes submits 
his views to, 52, 54 ; advice of other 
ministers to, 54-56 ; Turgot urges 
non-interference, 56, 57 ; authorizes 
first loan to colonies, 58 ; Beaumar- 
chais's memorials' to, 79 seqq. ; not in 
sympathy with colonists, 124 ; and 
the Comte de Broglie, 194, 201 ; mo- 
tives of his ministers, 210 ; convinced 
at last by their arguments, in favor 



638 



INDEX 



of aiding the colonists, 234 ; reluct- 
antly signs treaty of alliance, 242 ; re- 
ceives American commissioners, 243 ; 
borrows from Dutch to lend to U. S., 
450 ; 76, 89, 121, 12G, 148, 149, 233, 
238, 239, 249, 327, 328, 335, 336, 337, 
400, 401, 403, 404, 478, 479, 480. 487, 
490, 519. And see France, and French 
government. 

Louis XVII, birth of, celebrated in U. S., 
404. 

Louisiana, province of, and Law's Mis- 
sissippi Co., 17 ; ceded by France to 
Spain (1763), 20 ; 466, 500, 513, 514. 

Louvois, Marquis de, 23, 337. 

Loyalists in America, claims of, 483, 
484 ; English commissioners urgent 
concerning, 485 ; final disposition of, 
485. 

Madison, James, 438. 

Malesherbes, ChrtStien-Guillaume de 
Lamoignon de, 337. 

Marbois, M., secretary of French lega- 
tion in U. S., letter of, to Vergennes 
concerning fisheries, 479, 480. 

Marchant, Henry, 250, 252. 

Maria Theresa, queen of Louis XIV, 498. 

Marie Antoinette, and La Fayette, 285 ; 
76, 422. 

Marseillais, man-of-war, 269. 

Marseilles, growth of, in 18th century, 
212. 

Martinique, 516. 

Mason, George, letter of Washington to, 
331, 332. 

Maupeou, Ren^-N-C-A. de, Chancellor, 
and Beaumarcliais, 73. 

Maurepas, Jean-Fr(5d6ric Ph^lippeaux, 
Comte de, made first minister by 
Louis XVI, 35 ; his character and his- 
tory, 35; assures Stormont of France's 
neutrality, 50 ; his views as to aiding 
the colonies openly, 55 ; on selling 
prizes in French ports, 159 ; and La 
Fayette's adventure, 184, 185 ; ap- 
proves La Fayette's plan, 290; 121, 
233, 293, 294, 337. 

Mauroy, Vicomte, 182, 183. 

Mercantile cupidity, attributed to col- 
onists by Gerard, 9. 

Mercy-Art;enteau, Austrian ambassa- 
dor in France, quoted, 212. 

Mexico, 514. 

Mexico, Gulf of, 477. 

Minorca, 510, 520. 

Mirabeau, Gabriel-H. Riquetti, Comte 
de, on La Fayette, 413. 

Mississippi Company, 16, 17. 

Mississippi River, free navigation of, 
indispensable to development of U. S., 
514 ; 466, 513. 

Mississippi Valley, and French coloniza- 
tion, 17 ; in peace negotiations, 475, 
477 ; 484, 514. 

Mobile, 509. 

Monmouth, battle of, 192. 



Monopolies, 18. 

Montbarey, Alexandre-M-L. Saint-Mau- 
ris, Prince de, minister of war, 337. 

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, 
Baron de, 418. 

Montmorin-Saint-H^rem, Armand-Marc, 
Comte de, Frencli ambassador in 
Spain, quoted, 503, 504, 505, 508, 509, 
512, 513 and note. 

Moravians, and La Fayette, 190. 

Morocco, 240. 

Morris, Gouverneur, 372, 373. 

Morris, Robert, superintendent of 
finance, correspondence with Wash- 
ington, 372 ; 107, 353, 368. 

Morris, Mrs. Robert, 430. 

Mount Vernon, 375. 

Munitions of war, colonists ill supplied 
with, in 1776, 130. 

Music, in U. S., 428. 

Nantes, Franklin at, 131. 

Nantes, Revocation of Edict of, 19. 

Napoleon I, and the U. S., 523. 

Napoleon III, 523. 

Navy, American. See American navy. 

Navy, French. See French navy. 

Neclier, Jacques, on the force of public 
opinion in France, 206 ; at the trea- 
sury, 338, 339 ; his Compte Rendu, 339 ; 
intrigued against and overthrown 
(17S1), 339; 337. 

Netherlands. See Holland. 

New England, supports Adams because 
of fisheries question, 458. 

New Orleans, founded, 16, 17. 

New York, movement against urged by 
La Fayette, but rejected by Rocham- 
beau, 310 seqq. ; proposed attack on, 
315, 316 ; Washington and Rocham- 
beau decide on movement against, 341, 
342 ; doubts as to this plan, 352 seqq., 
whicli if finally abandoned, but osten- 
sibly still in contemplation, 364 seqq. 

New York harbor, depth of water on 
bar, 263 and note ; 361. 

Newfoundland, ceded to England in 
1713, 16, 227, 274. 

Newfoundland fisheries. See Fisheries. 

Newport, R. I., futile movement against, 
10, 264 seqq.; French fleet at, 306, 
307, 308; 321,322,410,411. 

Newport Morcury, quoted, 411. 

Newtown, Frencli army at, 345. 

Nicholson, Capt., privateer, 154. 

Noailles, Emmanuel-M-L., Marquis de, 
French ambassador in London, an- 
nounces Frencii-American alliance to 
Lord Weymouth, 256, 257 ; given his 
passports, 257 ; 184, 239. 

Noailles, Louis Marie, Vicomte de. La 
Fayette's brother-in-law, offers his 
services to D^ane, 175; balked by the 
ministry, 175 ; goes to America with 
Rorhamheau, 303 ; 345. 

Noailles, Philippe, Due de (sometime 
Due d'Ayen and Due de Mouchy), 



INDEX 



639 



La Fayette's father-in-law, 171, 173; 
opposes La Fayette's departure for 
America, 175, 176, 17S, 179 ; ISO, 181, 
1S3. UU. 

North, Frederick, Lord (later Earl of 
Guilford), Euglish prime minister, 
makes overtures for peace after York- 
tosvTj, 464; resigns, 468; 4, 77, 237, 
443. 

North and South, social differences be- 
tween, 431. 

Old rcSgime, the, principles of American 
revolution fatal to continuance of, 
210. 

Oneidas, 309. 

Oswald, Richard, sent to Franklin in 
Paris by Shelbunie, 469; his mission 
conflicts with Grenville's, 470 ; treats 
with American commissioners, 47U, 
471 ; 484. 

Pacific slope of U. S., 514. 

Paine, Ihomas, bought by Vergennes, 
459 ; 109. 

Paris, rapid growth of, 212. 

Paris, Treaty of. See Treaty of Paris. 

Paris Duveruey, and Beaimiarchais, 72. 

Parliament, reports of debates in, fur- 
nished to Gamier, 43. 

Parliamentary corruption, common in 
England, 43. 

Passy, Frauklin's residence at, 134, 135. 

Patriotism, lacking in U. S. during the 
Revolution, 491 seqq. ; but abundantly 
present during the Civil War, 494. 

Peace, early attempts toward, 441 seqq. ; 
appointment of John Adams and his 
negotiations, 442 seqq. ; proposed me- 
diation of Russia and Austria, 455 ; ad- 
ditional American commissioners ap- 
pointed, 458 seqq. ; secret negotiations 
after Yorktown, 464, 465 ; formal steps 
taken after the faU of Lord North, 468 
seqq. ; delay over preliminaries, 472 
seqq. ; terms of, not changed by exclu- 
sion of Vergennes, 481 ; articles be- 
tween England and U. S., signed Nov. 
30, 1782, 485; not injurious to France, 
496 ; between England, France and 
Spain, 496 seqq. 

Peace commissioners (American), in- 
structions to, 457, 458 ; acted without 
regard to instructions, 458, 480 seqq. ; 
chosen by Congress, 459, 460 ; nego- 
tiations with Oswald, 470 ; decide not 
to confer with Vergennes, 480, 481 ; 
progress of their negotiations, 484 
seqq. ; sign preliminaries with Eng- 
land without notifying Vergennes, 485, 
486, 487 ; sign treaty of Versailles 
(Sept. 1783), 521. And see Adams 
(John), Franklin, Jay, and Laurens. 

Peace commissioners (English), their 
mediocrity and obscurity, 484 ; urgent 
in behalf of claims of loyalists, 485. 

Peasantry in France, at death of Louis 



XV, 208 ;" grievances against aristo- 
cracy, 209 ; better off under Louis XV 
than under Louis XIV, 212. 

Peck, Penelope, 409. 

Pennsylvania regiments, mutiny of, 321, 

Pensacola, 509. 

Perch, brigautine, 230, 231. 

Philadelphia, Kalb at, 27 ; evacuation of, 
262; allied armies at, 368, 369 ; in 
1781, 370; patriotism not over-ebul- 
lient in, 370 ; social life at, 430, 431. 

Philadelphia Packet, quoted, 368, 369. 

Philip II of Spain, 498. 

Philip V of Spain, 498, 499. 

Philip, Don, Duke of Parma, 500. 

Physiocrats, 24, 418. 

Pinkney, William, attorney-general of 
U. S., 117. 

Pitt, William. See Chatham. 

Plymouth, and the French "invasion," 
2S8. 

Pontleroy, M. de, sent to America by 
Choiseul, 25 ; his report, 25, 26. 

" Poor Richard," in France, 141. 

Port Royal, 272. 

Porto Rico, 519. 

Portsmouth, N. H., 95. 

Portugal, 125, 126. 

Prevost, Gen. Augustine, his successful 
defence of Savannah, 275, 277. 

Princeton, N. J., 3G7, 368. 

Privateering, fascination of, 152, 153; 
Franklin opposed to, 156. 

Privateers, American, 152 seqq. ; France 
affords refuge and shelter to, 152, 
153 ; equipment of, popular in colo- 
nies, 152; their field of operations, 153 ; 
germ of American navy, 153; recog- 
nized principles of international law 
only when favorable to tliem, 155; 
provisions of Treaty of tJtrecht con- 
cerning, 155; assisted by Franklin, 
156, 158 ; attempted no concealment, 
158. And see Conyngham, Jones, 
Nicholson, and Wickes. 

Prizes of American privateers, sold in 
French ports, 157 seqq. 

Providence, French army at, 407 seqq. 

Providence Gazelle, quoted, 407, 4(i8. 

Public opinion in France, a potent fac- 
tor in deciding action of ministers, 205 
seqq. 

Pulaski, Count Casimir, killed in siege 
of Savannah, 277; 169. 

Pulteney, Mr., M. P., attempted negotia- 
tions of, with Franklin, 440. 

Puritans, their opinions and manners 
aroused no sympathy in France, 206, 
207. 

Ranger, Jones's ship, at Nantes, 244. 

Rayneval, M., his mission to England, 
474, 475, 476 seqq., 496 ; letter of Ver- 
gennes to, on Anglo-American treaty, 
486;517, 519, 520, 521. 

Rayneval, Gerard de. See Gerard. 



640 



INDEX 



Reprisal, sloop-of-war, carries Franklin 
to France, 131 , 154 ; prizes taken by, 
154 ; escapes English ship, 165 ; 157, 
160. 

Revolution, American, would it have 
been successful without French aid ? 
5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 522 ; and the French 
Revolution, 11, 524. 

Revolution, French, and the American 
Revolution, 11, 524. 

Richelieu, Due de, and Beaumarchais's 
accounts, 116. 

Riviere, Mile, de La, mother of La Fay- 
ette, 170. 

Riviere, Marquis de La, La Fayette's 
maternal grandfather, 170. 

Rivington'' s Roynl Gazette, prints inter- 
cepted letter from Washington, 323. 

Robin, Abb6 Claude, his Nouveau Voy- 
age, quoted, 3-17, 365, 368, 394, 395, 
434, 435, 436. 

Robinson, Major, 409. 

Rochambeau, Donatien-Marie-Joseph de 
Vimeure, Vicomte de, in his father's 
army, 303 ; sent to Paris with resolu- 
tions of Hartford Conference, 325, 326, 
328 ; returns with reply of ministry, 
329 ; 333, 340, 412. 

Rochambeau, Jean-Baptiste-Donatien de 
Vimeure, Comte de, on the proposed 
invasion of England, 289 ; chosHn 
to command French troops in U. S., 
294, 295 ; his birth and history, 295, 
296 ; secures increase of proposed 
force, bvit sails with only 5000 men and 
no horses, 300, 301 seqq. ; composition 
of his army, 303, 304 ; his voyage, May 
3 to July 11, 1780, 304-306; lands at 
Newport, 306 ; decides against attack 
on N. Y., 311, 315 ; his hope of rein- 
forcements never fulfilled, 312 ; and 
La Fayette, 312, 313 ; first interview 
with Washington, at Hartford, 314 
seqq. ; in quarters at Newport, 317 ; 
hopeless of Spanish cooperation, 320 ; 
and the intercepted letter of Wash- 
ington, 323 ; his instructions, 329 ; con- 
fers with Washington at Wethersfield, 
Conn., 341 ; their views not altogether 
in accord, .341 ; and Chastellux's let- 
ter, .343 ; his force joins Washington's 
at White Plains, 346 ; at Frog's Neck, 
350 ; corresponden'-e with de Grasse as 
to destination of fleet, 358 seqq. ; at 
Phila., 368 ; starts south, 371 ; ad- 
vances S20,000, 372 ; at Williamsburg, 
375 ; his appeal to Barras, 383-386 ; 
praises conduct of Americans at York- 
town, 392, 393, 405, 406; refuses to 
accept surrender, 394 ; in winter- 
quarters at Williamsburg, 402 ; had re- 
quested to be recalled in spring of 1 781 , 
403; his request granted after the fall of 
Yorktovra, 403 ; arrested on civil pro- 
cess, 400 ; sails for France, Jan. 1783, 
409 ; Washington's farewell letter to, 
409, 410; sentenced to death during 



the " Terror," but escaped, 410 ; his 
death, 410 ; good conduct of French ^ 
troops in IT. S. attributed to him, 421 j^ 
310, 316, 325, 330, 333, 345, ^47, 348, 
3.52, 376, 377, 378, 387, 389, 391, 400, 
401, 407, 408, 420, 427, 448. 

Rockingham, Charles Wentworth, Mar- 
quis of, succeeds Lord North, 468. 

Rodney, Caesar A., attorney-general of 
U. S., 117. 

Rodney, George B., Baron, admiral, at 
N. Y., 316, 317 ; off Newport, 319 ; goes 
to West Indies, 319 ; defeats de Grasse 
at " The Saints,'- April, 1782, 397-400 ; 
381, 476. 

Roman names, fondness of Americans 
for, 219. 

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and his Con- 
trat Social, 214 ; 217, 418. 

Royal Deui-Ponts regiment, 303, 308, 
344. 

Russia, possible interference of, 43 ; 
proffered mediation of, 455, 457, 458. 

Sabbath, the, in New England, 438. 

Sagittaire, man-of-war, 356. 

Saint-Germain, Claude-Louis, Comte 
de, minister of war, 55, 121, 337. 

St. Jean-de-Luz, 183. 

St. John's River, 275. 

St. Lucia (Lucie), 273, 516, 517, 519. 

Saint-Maime, Comte de, in Rocham- 
beau's army, 303. 

St. Malo, 288. 

Saint>Simon, Claude-Anne Montbl^ni, 
Marquis de, in command of troops on 
de Grasse's fleet, 362, 375, 376, 388, 391. 

St. Vincent, 273. 

Saintonge regiment, 303, 308, 344. 

" Saints, The " (Les Saintes). islands 
near which Rodney defeated de 
Grasse, 397-400. 

San Domingo, d'Estaing governor of, 
2,59 ; 357, 520. 

Sandy Hook, depth of water on bar, 263 
and note. 

Saratoga, battle of, 230; decisive of 
French intervention, 2.30, 231. 

Sartine, Antoine-R-J-G-6. de, minister 
of marine, .55, 121, 181, 301, 337. 

Savannah, siege of, 10, 275-278. 

Schuyler, Gen. Philip, 330. 

Scientific research in the 18th century, 
effect of, in France, 215, 216. 

Secret Committee of Congress. See Com- 
mittee of Foreign Correspondence. 

S^gur, Philippe, Comte de, minister of 
war, 337, 338, 340, 403, 404. 

S6gur, Louis Philippe, Comte de, son of 
above, his Memoires quoted, 133, 173, 
217, 316, 411, 412, 432, 4.33, 435 ; offers 
his services to Deane, 173 ; balked by 
ministry, 173 ; 337, 338, 417. 

Seven Years' War, contrast between, 
and th-! American Revolution, 4; an 
almost unbroken record of defeat and 
disgrace for France, 12 ; effect of, to 



INDEX 



641 



create longing for a new war, 13 ; con- 
firmed supreujacy of England as a co- 
lonial power, 20 ; 123, 204. 

St5vign6, Madame de, 211. 

Shelbume, William Petty, Earl of, sec- 
retary of state for the colonies, his 
friendship for Franklin, 4G8 ; sends 
Oswald toF..4fi8; strained relations 
with Fox, 469, 470 ; has sole conduct 
of negotiations after Fox's resigna- 
tion, 470 , opposed to cession of Can- 
ada, 471 ; eager for peace with U. S., 
472, 484, 490) ; his ministry unstable, 
472 ; his vision of a federal union with 
U. S., 473; recognizes independence 
at outset of negotiations, 473 ; com- 
municates with Vergennes through de 
Grasse, 476 ; Rayneval's mission to, 
476 fieqq. (see Rayueval) ; his atti- 
tude during the negotiations, 477 ; his 
economic views, 477 ; his ministry 
ready to grant demands of U. S., 478, 
481 : and the loyalists, 48,'; ; and Dun- 
kirk, 497 ; 474, 475. 516, 517. 519. 

Smith, Adam, Shelbume a disciple of, 
477. 

Social conditions in U. S., 422, 423 
seqq. 

Soissonnais regiment, 303, 308, 344, 369. 

Soubise, Charles de Rohan, Prince de, 

South and North, Bocial difEerences be- 
tween, 431. 

South Carolina, 273. 

Southern women, 431, 432. 

Spain, and the Falkland I'ds. dispute, 
30-32 ; Vergennes's advice to, 51 ; his 
argument for intervention in America 
coldly received by, 57, 58; finally 
adopts his policy, 58, 59; advances 
funds for use of colonies, 59, 86 ; fur- 
ther interchange of views between 
France and, 124 seqq. ; opposed to re- 
ceiving Lee, 224 ; Vergennes still 
seeks coSperation of, 228 ; offended by 
acts of American privateers, 228 ; and 
the alliance between France and U. S., 
240, 241, 242,243; relations of France 
with, 248, 249; and the western bound- 
ary of the U. S., 253; approves pro- 
posed invasion of England, but fails 
to siipport it, 287-289 ; disinclined to 
join France in sending troops to TJ. S., 
301; vain hopes of aid from, 319, 320 ; 
advice of, to Louis XVI, 327 ; and the 
early negotiations for peace, 442, 443 ; 
her demands a constant source of em- 
barrassment to France, 443, 496 seqq., 
506, 510, 511 ; in the formal negotia- 
tions, 462, 475, 476, 477, 482 ; her posi- 
tion and objects in the war, 466, 467 ; 
and Gibraltar, 489 ; and France, ne- 
gotiations for peace, 496 seqq., 515 
seqq. ; and the French alliance, 498 
seqq.; compensated by Louis XV for 
her losses in Seven Tears' War, 500, 
501 ; had not progressed since Philip 



n, 502 ; offended by action of France, 
502, 503 ; founding of republic in 
America naturally repugnant to, 503; 
her apprehensions justified by later 
events, 503, 504; finally brought into 
the contest by an appeal to greed, 
505 ; proposed mediation of, 506-508 ; 
terms demanded by, 508-510; terms 
of convention with France (1779), 511 ; 
vain negotiations for treaty with U. S., 
513, 514; her possessions in America 
in 1780, 514, 515 ; had no claim to 
gratitude of U. S., 518; treaty with 
France and England signed, 521. And 
see Charles III. 

Spanish Succession, War of the, 499. 

Spencer, Mrs., 427. 

Stamp Act, the, 27. 

Stanhope, James, Enrl, 37. 

Stark, Gen. John, 192. 

Sterling, Lady, 246. 

Steuben, Friedrirh W. A. H. F. von, 
Beaumarchais on, 95, 105,106, 169, 271. 

Stormont, David Murray, Viscount, 
English ambassador to France, and 
Vergennes, 49, 50 ; and Maurepas, 50 ; 
complains of French negotiations with 
colonies, 93; and Franklin, 132,219; 
and the audience of American com- 
missioners, 145 ; threatens war, 150 ; 
anrl the sale of prizes in French ports, 
160 ; obtains satisfaction for Conyng- 
ham's exploit, 161, 162; on Ver- 
gennes's duplicity, 227 ; and the 
news of Saratoga, 232 ; demands pass- 
ports and leaves Paris, 243, 257; 64, 
135, 184, 256. 

Strachey, Mr., 484. 

Sullivan, Gen. John, in command in 
Rhode Island, 204, 265; his ineffi- 
ciency in movement against Newport, 
266, 267 ; demands assistance of 
French in attack on Newport, 269 ; 
fulminates against d'Estaing for going 
to Boston, 269 ; Washington's corre- 
spondence with, 271 ; his complaint to 
Congress not made public, 271 ; 
d'Estaing's reply to, 271 ; withdraws 
from Newport, 272 ; letter of Wash- 
ington to, 332 ; his purchased support 
of Franklin for peace commissioner, 
4,59 ; 342, 393. 

Symonds, Thomas, 394. 

Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles Maurice 
de, on Beaumarchais's claim, 116, 
116; 213. 

Tarleton, Gen. Sir Banastre, 379. 

Taxation in France, unequal distribu- 
tion of burdens of, 211, 212. 

Taylor, Rob, 307. 

Tea, immoderate use of, in U. S., 436. 

Tea-duties, 27. 

Ternay, Chevalier de, in command of 
fleet conveying Rochambeau's army, 
304, 305, 306, 314, 316, 318, 448; hie 
audden death, 321. 



542 



INDEX 



Thacher, Dr. James, his Military 
Journal, quoted, 309, 310. 

Ticonderoga, capture of, 2:^9. 

Tobago, 358. 

Tracy, Mr., entertains French officers, 
424. 

"Treason House," Washington's head- 
quarters at, 3lJ7. 

Treaty of alliance and commerce be- 
tween France and U. 8., signed Feb. 
6, 1778, 238, 239, 240 ; news of, in U. 
S., 245, 246 ; announced to Lord Wey- 
mouth, 256 ; equivalent to declaration 
of war, 257, 258. 

Treaty of Paris (1763), terms of, 13, 14 ; 
galling to French pride, 21; provis- 
ions of, relating to Dunkirk, 497; 73. 

Treaty of Utrecht (1713), provisions of, 
as to privateers, 155 ; 13, 16, 497. 

Treaty of Versailles (1783). See Eng- 
land, France, Spain, Peace and Peace 
Commissioners. 

Trenton, N. J., 367, 368. 

Trinity, la, 517, 519. 

Trumbull, Jonathan, governor of Con- 
necticut, 407. 

Tunis, 240. 

Turgot, Anne-R-J., Baron de I'Aulne, 
minister of finance, 13, 38 ; his pre- 
vious history, 39 ; opposed to alliance 
with colonies, 39, 56, 57 ; his reasons 
convincing, 39, 40, 56, 57 ; a prophet 
without honor, 40, 57 ; 149, 337, 
461. 

Tuscany, 334. 

Tuscaroras, 309. 

Tybee Island, 275. 

United States, first steps toward seek- 
ing aid abroad, 61 seqq. ; hesitation as 
to France, 61 ; arrival of supplies 
and munitions shipped by Beaumar- 
chais, 95 ; conditions in, in 1778, 104; 
and payment for supplies from France, 
106, 107; and Beaumarchais's claim, 
114 seqq. ; remissness of, in paying for 
supplies, etc., 138 ; most favored of 
nations in the character of its enemies, 
220 , early ill prospects of, 220, 221 ; 
finances of, in confusion, 221 ; ill-suc- 
cess in the field postpones French alli- 
ance, 228, 229 ; 1778 and 1779 the most 
disheartening years of the war in, 280 ; 
French alliance produces no useful re- 
sults, 280, 281 ; 1779-80 a critical 
period, 281 ; financial evils most seri- 
ous, 282 ; state of the army, 283 ; bick- 
erings among representatives of, in 
Europe, 292 ; critical condition of af- 
fairs in winter of 1780-81, 331-333; 
finances near collapse in summer of 
1781, 353, 371, 372, 455 ; social condi- 
tions in, during the Revolution, 422 
seqq. ; constantly a borrower from 
France, 451 ; difficulties caused by 
Adams's quarrel with Vergennes, 451 ; 
adyised by Vergennes to accept mod- 



erate terms of peace, 457; advantages 

of, in negotiations, 472; future com- 
merce of, a coveted prize, 472 ; re- 
missness of states and people in supply- 
ing money, etc., 491, 492 ; in nego- 
tiations between France and Spain 
(1779), 508, 510, 511 ; vain negotiations 
for treaty with Spain, 513, 514 ; under 
no obligation to Spain, 518 ; a party 
to treaty between England, France 
and Spain, 521 ; could independence 
have been established without French 
aid ? 522 ; subsequent relations with 
France, 522, 523. And see American 
Colonies, and Congress. 
Utrecht, Treaty of. See Treaty of 
Utrecht. 

Valentinois, Due de, 135. 

Valentinois, HStel de, at Passy, 134-138 ; 
locus of negotiations between Ameri- 
can commissioners and French min- 
isters, 136. 

Valley Forge, 10, 192, 202, 245. 

Vaudreuil, Louis-Philippe de Rigaud, 
Marquis de, admiral, 412, 422. 

Vaughan, Benjamin, Jay's emissary to 
London, 479. 

Vaux, Comte de, commands French 
force for invasion of England, 288. 

Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de, 
minister of foreign affairs, quoted, 8 ; 
appointed by Louis XVI, 35 ; impor- 
tance to the colonists of his selection, 
35 ; his course on American affairs 
considered as a whole, 36 ; his early 
career, 36, 37 ; his wealth, 38 ; Frank- 
lin on, 38 ; assumes office, 40 ; quoted 
concerning affairs in America, 41 ; 
sends Bonvouloir to America, 45, 48; 
opposed to interference in 1775, 49; 
conversation with Stormont, 50; his 
inconsistent language to Spain, 51 ; on 
Dunkirk, 52; submits his views to 
Louis XVI, 52, 53; advises aiding the 
colonists, 53 ; his later Wews, favor- 
ing secret aid, submitted to Louis, 54, 
55, and to Charles III, 57 ; advises 
loan,. 58 ; receives Deane, 64 ; chooses 
Beaumarchais as intermediary, 68, 69 ; 
accepts B.'s plan, 84, 85 ; and B. Du- 
bourg, 90, 91 ; and Stormont's com- 
plaints, 93 ; questioned by commission- 
ers as to claims of Hortalez & Co., 100 
seqq. ; his reply, 102, 103 ; and the 
matter of French subsidies prior to 
treaty, 109, 110 ; his purpose strength- 
ened by Declaration of Independence, 
120 ; his report on American affaire 
(Aug. 1776), 122 seqq. ; views modified 
by ill-success of American arms, 
125 seqq. ; his main purpose to weaken 
England, 127, 128 ; and the American 
commissioners, 144-146 ; on the honor 
of republics, 148 ; and Stormont, 150; 
and the privateers, 156, 157, 160, 161, 
162 ; his memoirs, 203 ; quoted (April, 



INDEX 



543 



1777), 227 ; Stormont on his duplicity, 
227 ; ou the prospect of war with Eug- 
laiid, 2'JS ; despairs of American cause 
after Ticouderoga, 229 ; his delay con- 
demned by public opinion, 22;t, 230 ; 
sends Holker to U. S., 230; fears re- 
concUiatiou between England and col- 
onies, 232; reports favorably on new 
demands of commissioners, 233 ; his 
views accepted by the Cabinet, 233, 
2^ ; as to treaty of alliance, 239 ; tries 
vainly to induce Spain to join, 241, 
242 ; approves La Fayette's plan, 290 ; 
his zeal abated, 2;il ; and La Fayette, 
293 ; a consistent friend to America, 
327 ; commends Franklin, 331 ; and 
Laurens, 335 ; quoted, S'Jo ; seeks to 
moderate demands of Congress, 442, 
443 ; suggests appointment of peace 
envoy (1779), 441 ; not pleased with 
naming of Adams, 443 ; soon falls out 
with A., 444; declines to communi- 
cate with A., 445; disturbed by re- 
pudiation of paper money, 446, 447; 
appeals to Franklin, 447 ; and Adams's 
advice as to instructions to Rocliam- 
beau, 448, 449 ; sends correspondence 
to Franklin, 449, 450 ; liis friendship 
for U. S. chilled by Adams, 451 ; 
Adams's undying animosity to, 454 ; 
and Franklin, 454, 455 ; his view of pro- 
per terms of peace, 450; his advice 
to Congress, 457; and T. Paine, 459; 
his conduct during negotiations, 461, 
475; anxious for peace, 461,402; his 
confidence in Franklin, and distrust 
of Adams, 463 ; North sends spcret 
emissaries to, 464, 465 ; and Gren- 
ville's mission, 469 ; and the Rayneval 
mission, 476 seqq. ; distrusted by Jay 
and Adams, 479 ; and the Marbois 
letter, 479, 480; ignored by peace 
commissioners, 4S0, 4S1, 482, 483 ; not 
notified of treaty until it was signed, 
485, 486 ; his letters to Rayneval, and 
La Luzerne, 480 ; applied to by Frank- 
lin for large loan, 4SS, 489 ; angered 
by English attitude as to Gibraltar, 
etc., 489 ; fears abandonment by U. S., 
489, 490 ; his letter to Franklin, and 
the reply, 489, 490; promises smaller 
loan, 491; and the fortifications of 
Dunkirk, 497 ; and Charles III, 502, 
503, 504; his reasons for desiring 
Spanish cooperation, 505, 506 seqq. ; 
and Gibraltar, 516-521 ; 43, 44. 51, 63, 
79, 80, 82, 86, 87, 92, 96, 180, 184, 210, 
223, 235, 236, 237, 243, 244, 248, 2.53, 
256, 290, 299, 301, 328, 333, 334, 337, 
45.5, 456, 458, 460, 467, 474, 496, 512, 
521. 

"Versailles, Franklin's impressions of, 
243, 244. 

"Versailles, Treaty of. See Treaty of 
Versailles. 

Victory, carries La Fayette to U. S., 
179, ISO, 184, 185. 



Ville de Paris, de Grasse's flagship, 

389, 399. 
ViomiSnil, Antoine-Charles du Houx, 

Baron de, succeeds Rochambeau in 

command of the army, 403, 41)4 ; killf d 

at the Tuileries, Aug. 10, 1792, 415; 

409, 412. 
Virginia, 364 seqq., 425. 
Vittoria (Spain), 224. 
Voltaire, Jean-Fran^ois-Marie Arouet, 

on Canada, 21 ; meeting with Frauk- 

Un, 143 ; 73, 214, 217, 418. 

"Wadsworth, Col., 409. 

Washington, George, quoted, concern- 
ing conditions in the colonies, 0, 7, 9 ; 
La Fayette presented to, 189; his 
confidence in La Fayette, 190 ; writes 
to President of Congress in L. 's behalf, 
191; the cabal's ill-will to, 191; 
Kalb's opinion of, 201, 202; and the 
treaty of alliance, 245; strives to allay 
ill-feeling caused by d'Estaing's going 
to Boston, 271; and d'Estaiug, 271, 
272; urges d'Estaing to art in the 
South, 274 ; concerning the army, 
finani es, and public affairs generally, 
283, 284 ; and La Fayette, 281, 286; 
French troops commended to his care, 
297 ; increased respect for, in Europe, 
297 ; his first interview with Rocham- 
beau, 314 seqq. ; Count Fersen on, 
314 ; too cautious to a^opt any plan 
contrary to Rochambeau's advice, 
315; hears of Arnold's treason, 317 ; 
his vain hopes of aid from Spain, 319, 
320 ; and the opening of the campaign 
of 1781, 320, 321 ; his letter to L. 
Washington intercepted, and the con- 
sequences, 3'22 seqq. ; French minis- 
try places funds at his disposal, 329; 
intrigues in Congress against, 330 ; 
his letter to G. Mason on critical con- 
dition in 1780-81, 331, 332; and to 
Gen. Sullivan, 332 ; has confidence of 
French court and ministry, 333 ; con- 
fers with Rochambeau at Wethers- 
field, Conn., 341 ; their views not in 
accord, 341 ; his intercepted letter to 
Sullivan deceives Clinton, 342, 343; 
his army and Rochambeau's join at 
White Plains, 346; his table criti- 
cized, 348 ; his journal quoted, 352, 
353 ; his doubts as to attack on N. T., 
352, 353 ; seeks reinforcements, 353 ; 
begins to look southward, 353; his 
plans determined by news from de 
Grasse, 3G3, 364 ; decides on cam- 
paign in Virginia, 364 ; his purpose 
concealed from Clinton, 364 seqq. ; 
the movement against Comwallis, 
366 seqq. ; at Phila., 368; starts south, 

371 ; receives views of de Grasse's ar- 
rival, 371 ; financial troubles, 372 ; 
correspondence with Robert Morris, 

372 ; difficulties at Head of Elk, 373; 
entertains French officers at Mt. 



544 



INDEX 



Yemon, 375 ; assumes command of 
allied armies at Williamsburg, 375 ; 
appeals to Barras, 384, 385, 387 ; re- 
views allied armies, 388 ; confers with 
de Grasse on the Ville de Paris, 389, 
S90 ; lays siege to Yorktown, 392 ; 
fixes terms of surrender, 394 ; expects 
renewed efforts by British after York- 
town, 395; urges de Grasse to take 
part in expedition against Charles- 
ton, S. C, 395, 39G ; reviews French 
troops at King's Ferry, 405 ; his fare- 
well letter to Rochambeau, 409, 410 ; 
196, 229, 263, 266, 292, 306, 309, 310, 
311, 316, 310, 345, 346, 349, 350, 360, 
361, 362, 391, 393, 402, 404, 440, 441, 
444,445, 449,491,511. 

Washington, Lund, George Washing- 
ton's letter to, criticizing French fleet, 
322. 

Washington, Mrs. Martha, 246. 

Washington, Fort, capture of, 220. 

Wayne, Gen. Anthony, 379. 

Weissenstein, Charles de, name signed 
to letter suggesting plan of reconcilia- 
tion, 440. 

West Indies, French increase of trade 
with, 24; French possessions in, guar- 
anteed by treaties of alliance, 240 ; 
d'Estaing's fleet in, 272, 273 ; de 
Grasse's fleet in, 356 seqq. ; their fu- 
ture importance overestimated, 357; 
war in, after fall of Yorktown, 397 ; in 
the peace negotiations, 477, 497 ; 227, 
514. 

Wethersfield, Conn., Washington and 
Rochambeau confer at, 341. 

Weymouth, Thomas Thynne, Viscount, 
secretary of state for the colonies, 
256, 257. 



White Plains, junction of allied armies 
at, July 5, 1781, 346. 

Wickes, Capt., and the Reprisal, sloop- 
of-war, takes Franklin to France, 154: 
record of his cruise thereafter, 154; 
his curious views as to law of neutrals, 
155 ; protests against interference with 
his operations, 157, 158, 159. 

Wilkes, John, 77, 78. 

William III of England, 498. 

Williamsburg, Va., Washington assumes 
command at, 375. 

Women in America. See American 
Women. 

"World Turned Upside Down, The," 



Yorktown, siege of, the only important 
affair in which French and Americans 
fought successfully together, 10, 11 ; 
Washington in command of allied 
forces at, 375 ; siege determined on, 
390, and begun Sept. 30, 1781, 392; 
progre.ss of siege, 392 seqq. ; losses of 
allies in early operations, 392 ; bom- 
bardment begins, 393 ; siege ends with 
surrender, Oct. 13, 393 seqq. ; capture 
of, impossible without French fleet, 
390 ; its importance not realized at the 
time, 400 ; practically ended the war, 
464. 

Yorktown campaign, initial steps in, 
464 seqq. ; becomes publicly known in 
Phila., 371; progress of, 371 seqq.; 
accurate and masterly preliminaries 
of, 375, 376 ; de Grasse's share in, of 
commanding importance, 376-379; 
discussed on Ville de Paris, 390 seqq. 

Young, Arthur, his Travels in France, 
quoted, 208. 



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